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This  study  is  concerned  with  the  nature  of  political  discourse  in  the  2003  devolved 
Scottish  elections.  The  investigation  explores  the  potential  effects  of  the  new 
constitutional  arrangements  and  electoral  system  on  the  campaign  discourse  of 
Scottish  political  parties. 
The  four  weeks  of  election  campaigning  are  studied,  from  the  1st  April  to  the  1St  May 
2003.  Analysis  focuses  on  many  of  the  main  texts  produced  during  the  election 
campaign,  including  manifestos,  party  election  broadcasts  and  newspaper  articles. 
Conducted  in  the  Critical  Discourse  Analysis  tradition,  this  investigation  combines 
insights  from  Fairclough's  social  focus  and  three  dimensional  analysis  of  discourse 
and  van  Dijk  and  Chilton's  cognitive  approaches.  This  synthesis  of  approaches  is  an 
attempt  to  produce  an  analysis  that  can  explicate  both  social  and  cognitive  aspects  of 
ideological  discourse  production.  In  so  doing,  the  study  reappraises  van  Dijk's 
original  conception  of  the  `ideological  square'  (1998)  as  a  description  of  competitive 
discourse.  The  thesis  explores  the  dynamics  of  party  political  competition  and 
ideological  negotiation  in  devolved  Scottish  politics,  with  particular  attention  paid  to 
the  discourse  of  coalition  and  nationalist  politics. 
The  thesis  begins  by  outlining  the  following:  the  need  for  this  investigation;  initial 
background  information  on  the  events  leading  up  to  Scottish  devolution;  preliminary 
methodological  detail;  and  a  structural  outline  of  the  thesis.  Discussion  then  focuses 
on  the  ideological  character  of  Scottish  politics,  both  in  terms  of  public  opinion  and 
the  positions  of  political  parties,  as  represented  by  the  content  of  their  manifestos. 
Continuing  the  analysis  of  party  manifestos,  chapter  3  explores  discursive  strategies 
used  by  political  parties  to  construct  identities  and  negotiate  relationships  in  light  of 
actual  or  potential  coalition  government.  The  following  chapter  then  moves  the 
analysis  onto  party  election  broadcasts,  taking  particular  interest  in  the  rhetorical 
methods  employed  in  the  positive  and  negative  presentation  of  policies.  Chapter  5 
then  analyses  the  press  reception  of  party  election  broadcasts.  Looking  at  the  recycling 
of  political  messages,  chapter  5  uses  metaphor  analysis  to  investigate  representations 
of  elections  in  press  coverage.  Having  established  the  importance  of  a  nationalist agenda  in  Scottish  politics  during  previous  sections,  Chapter  6  investigates 
representations  of  Scottish  national  identity  in  election  discourse.  The  final  chapter 
summarizes  results,  discusses  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  the  thesis'  design  and 
suggests  avenues  for  future  research. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
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DISCOURSE? 
The  coming  of  devolution  and  the  first  Scottish  Parliament  elections  in  1999  heralded 
a  new  era  in  both  Scottish  and  British  politics.  Since  the  first  elections  there  has  been, 
predictably,  a  rash  of  academic  work  focusing  on  post  devolutionary  Scotland,  its 
politics  and  culture.  Numerous  works  have  appeared,  such  as  The  new  Scottish 
politics  (Hassan  and  Warhurst,  2000),  New  Scotland,  New  Politics?  (Paterson  et  al, 
2001),  New  Scotland,  New  Society?  (Curtice  et  al,  2002),  The  Scottish  Electorate 
(Brown  et  al,  1999),  Understanding  Scotland:  the  sociology  of  a  nation  (second 
edition)  (McCrone,  2001),  Break-Up:  Twenty-Five  Years  On  (Nairn,  2004),  Scottish 
Government  and  Politics  (Lynch,  2001),  Dislocating  the  Nation:  Political  Devolution 
and  Cultural  Identity  on  Stage  and  Screen  (Jackson,  2004),  Anatomy  of  the  New 
Scotland  (Hassan  and  Warhurst,  2002)  and  Claiming  Scotland:  National  Identity  and 
Liberal  Culture  (Hearn,  2000).  This  is  by  no  means  an  exhaustive  list  but  an 
impression  of  the  intellectual  energy  exploring  post  devolutionary  Scotland.  Many  of 
these  titles  either  explicitly  or  implicitly  express  newness  and  change;  and  it  is 
newness  and  change  that  give  this  investigation  its  focus.  The  starting  point  for  this 
thesis  is  that  given  there  are  new  systems  of  governance  in  Scotland  there  are  also, 
potentially,  new  ways  of  communicating  in  those  systems:  in  effect  new  discourses. 
The  inquisitorial  spotlight  of  this  study  falls  on  the  2003  elections,  the  second 
balloting  for  the  Scottish  Parliament.  Elections  are  a  locus  of  frenetic  political  and 
media  activity  and  they  are  also  bounded,  given  the  limited  time  in  which  to  campaign 
and  advocate  political  arguments.  As  such,  an  election  provides  an  opportunity  to  see 
competing  political  arguments  in  action  and  an  occasion  to  observe  if  the  `new 
politics'  (Paterson  el  al,  2001:  17)  has  given  rise  to  new  political  discourses.  If  there 
are  new  discourses,  one  can  investigate  how  they  are  constituted  by  the  new  politics, 
how  they  are  ordered  and  operate  in  the  new  environment.  In  turn,  if  there  are  new 
discourses  one  can  investigate  how  they  represent  and  negotiate  relationships  between 
the  various  competing  political  parties.  Evidence  is  drawn  from  a  corpus  of  texts 
composed  of  party  political  materials,  such  as  manifestos,  party  election  broadcasts, 
and  media  texts,  drawn  from  the  Scottish  press.  In  this  way,  the  study  may  investigate 
many  of  the  phenomena  of  contemporary  democratic  elections,  as  constituted  directly 
through  the  texts  of  the  party  political  campaigns  and  indirectly  through  the  mediated 
1 texts  of  mass  media  coverage.  One  such  phenomenon  might  be  the  strategically 
planned  and  implemented  nature  of  party  messages,  producing  consistency  across 
different  modes  of  communication  and  at  different  times;  messages,  therefore,  are  not 
limited  to  their  immediate  context  of  production. 
The  remainder  of  this  introductory  chapter  will  lay  out  some  of  the  recent 
historical  and  political  background  which  led  to  devolution,  introduce  the 
investigative  methodology  and  indicate  the  structure  of  the  forthcoming  exposition. 
1.1  Background  to  Devolution 
This  section  will  not  attempt  to  recount  the  numerous  and  complex  debates 
concerning  Scotland's  changing  constitutional  arrangements  with  the  United 
Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland  (UK).  Such  discussions  have  occurred 
in  greater  detail  than  could  possibly  be  afforded  here  (e.  g.  Bogdanor,  1999,2001; 
Brown  et  al,  1996;  Devine,  1999;  Devine  and  Finlay,  1996;  Finlay,  1997;  Linklater 
and  Denniston,  1992;  Paterson,  1994).  Drawing  on  the  aforementioned  work,  a  brief 
precis  of  the  arrangements  of  governing  Scotland  before  devolution  and  the  main 
issues  which  led  to  devolution  in  the  last  30  years  will  be  given. 
Before  devolution,  Scotland  occupied  a  unique  position  in  relation  to  its 
system  of  governance  in  the  world  of  democratic  nations.  It  was  the  only  nation  to 
have  its  own  legal  and  educational  systems  and  `separate  arrangements  for  the 
handling  of  executive  business,  but  no  separate  legislature  to  which  the  Scottish 
Executive  could  be  held  responsible'  (Bogdanor,  2001:  117).  Instead,  Scotland's  laws 
were  made  in  a  parliament  outwith  its  borders,  where  its  elected  representatives 
occupied  a  minority  of  the  legislative  seats. 
For  much  of  Scotland's  political  union  with  England,  party  political 
representation  north  and  south  of  the  border  remained  comparable  in  terms  of  the 
number  of  votes  parties  received  per  head  of  population.  Across  the  UK,  government 
proportionately  represented  its  constituent  parts;  no  one  area,  with  the  exception  of 
Northern  Ireland,  voted  significantly  differently  to  other  parts.  However,  with  the 
dawn  of  the  1960s,  the  distribution  of  votes  in  England  and  Scotland  began  to  change. 
From  1959  the  Labour  Party  dominated  the  political  scene  in  Scotland,  winning  a 
majority  of  seats  in  every  election.  This  supremacy  would  reach  its  zenith  with  the 
decimation  of  Conservative  party  support  in  the  1997  general  election,  where  the 
2 party  failed  to  win  a  single  seat  in  Scotland.  Therefore,  whenever  a  Conservative 
government  occupied  Downing  Street  a  democratic  deficit  existed  between  the 
Scottish  nation  and  its  political  masters.  For  27  out  of  38  years,  between  1959  and 
1997,  Scotland's  elected  will  was  under-represented  in  Westminster  government. 
The  1960s  also  witnessed  the  rise  in  the  electoral  fortunes  of  the  Scottish 
National  Party  (SNP),  and  their  ascent  would  continue  until  they  became  the  second 
party  of  Scottish  politics,  rivalling  Labour.  The  SNP's  incursion  introduced  an  overtly 
nationalist  flavour  into  politics  north  of  the  border,  which  further  differentiates  the 
nature  of  Scottish  politics  from  its  southerly  neighbour  (McCrone,  2001).  Scotland's 
constitutional  relationship  with  the  rest  of  the  UK  is  brought  into  sharp  focus  when 
the  two  main  parties  of  Scotland  are  divided  over  support  for  the  Union.  Therefore, 
with  an  asymmetrical  relationship  between  representation  of  executive  power  and  the 
growth  of  a  nationalist-separatist  vote,  the  constitutional  status  quo  has  been  under 
significant  threat  since  the  1970s  (Bogdanor,  2001;  Budge  et  al,  2004). 
It  is  not  the  case  that  nationalist  support  grew  from  nowhere.  Before  the 
democratic  deficit  arose,  `agitation  for  reform  in  Scotland  [had]  resulted  in  increased, 
responsibilities  accruing  to  the  Scottish  Office'  (McCrone,  2001:  45).  Brown  et  al 
(1996),  McCrone  (1992;  2001),  Paterson  (1994)  and  others  have  commented  that  the 
powers  of  the  Scottish  office  both  reflected  a  sense  of  Scottishness  and  helped  to 
reinforce  that  identity  through  the  institutions  of  civic  democratic  administration. 
McCrone  comments, 
As  democracy  slowly  made  its  way  into  the  governing  structures  of  these 
islands  in  the  nineteenth  century,  so  it  helped  to  consolidate  Scottish  civil 
society.  The  remarkable  growth  of  separate  political  administration  for 
Scotland  since  1886  has  undoubtedly  helped  to  reinforce  the  sense  of 
`Scotland'.  It  is  easier  to  visualise  what  a  separate  Scotland  would  look  like 
precisely  because  by  the  1980s  the  Scottish  Office  had  become  a  Scottish 
semi-state  with  powerful  administrative  apparatus.  (2001:  44) 
The  administrative  arrangements  supporting  and  administering  Scotland  lent  weight 
to  calls  for  devolution  once  the  political  climate  had  altered. 
The  general  elections  of  1974  brought  key  shifts  in  the  tides  of  party  political 
support,  resulting  in  devolution  climbing  up  the  political  agenda.  In  the  two  elections 
of  that  year  the  Conservatives  lost  13  per  cent  of  their  vote  in  Scotland  and  a  total  of 
eight  seats  to  the  SNP  (Bogdanor,  2001:  137).  The  scene  was  now  set  for  the 
3 introduction  to  Parliament  of  Labour's  devolution  proposal,  the  1976  Scotland  and 
Wales  Bill.  The  Scottish  Labour  Party  from  its  inception  had  found  appeal  in  home 
rule,  but  calls  for  devolution  had  been  tempered  by  greater  political  forces  of  the 
times.  From  the  1930s  the  Scottish  Labour  Party  perceived  more  benefit  for  Scotland 
in  a  centralised,  UK  based  model  for  administering  social  welfare  and  economic 
policies.  However,  the  success  of  the  SNP  by  the  mid  1970s  meant  that  the  Labour 
Party  could  no  longer  ignore  devolution  (Devine,  1999).  Due  to  its  minority  status, 
Harold  Wilson's  first  Labour  government  in  1974  had  to  rely  on  support  from 
nationalist  and  Liberal  MPs  who  supported  devolution.  In  addition,  the  report  of  a 
Royal  Commission  on  the  UK  Constitution  in  1973  recommended  a  directly  elected 
parliament  with  legislative  powers  for  Scotland,  (Brown  et  al,  1996)  adding  to  the 
strength  of  the  prevailing  political  wind.  However,  while  the  previous  Conservative 
leader  and  then  prime  minister,  Ted  Heath,  had  been  more  in  favour  of  devolution,  the 
new  leader  Margaret  Thatcher  was  less  well  disposed  to  the  idea,  later  commenting  in 
her  autobiography  `As  an  instinctive  Unionist,  I  disliked  the  Devolution  commitment' 
(1995:  322).  Against  renewed  Conservative  opposition  to  the  Bill,  as  well  as  some  of 
their  own  `sceptics'  (Brown  et  al,  1996:  20)  Labour  could  only  get  the  legislation 
through  Parliament  with  significant  amendments:  restricted  powers  for  the  assembly 
and  40  per  cent  of  the  total  voting  population  needed  to  support  devolution  in  the 
referendum  vote. 
If  timing  is  everything,  then  the  1979  referendum  campaign  had  little  in  its 
favour.  James  Callaghan's  Labour  government  had  been  dealing  with  an  economic 
crisis  and  growing  industrial  unrest  from  the  unions.  The  wind  had  changed  and  now 
the  referendum  campaign  had  to  be  steered  through  a  hostile  political  climate.  The 
campaign  would  prove  ultimately  unsuccessful.  Devine  recounts, 
A  number  of  factors  combined  to  cause  the  failure  of  the  1979  [devolution 
campaign]...  The  electorate  were  mainly  concerned  with  strikes,  industrial 
relations  and  unemployment,  and  a  mere  5  per  cent  of  those  interviewed  gave 
any  priority  to  devolution.  Equally  significantly,  the  Tories  were  doing  well  in 
these  surveys  and,  alone  among  the  major  parties,  were  committed  to  opposing 
devolution.  At  a  time  when  the  country  seemed  to  lurch  from  crisis  to  crisis, 
people  appeared  to  be  more  concerned  with  jobs  and  living  standards  than 
with  constitutional  reform.  1978-9,  saw  the  notorious  `Winter  of  Discontent', 
when  Britain  was  rocked  by  a  series  of  industrial  disputes  and  the  big  unions 
smashed  through  the  government's  pay  norms.  Television  images  of 
uncollected  rubbish  piled  high  on  the  streets  and  hospital  workers  out  on  strike 
4 conveyed  an  image  of  public  anarchy.  At  one  point  even  the  dead  went 
unburied.  A  government  which  had  demonstrated  such  incompetence  was 
hardly  in  a  position  to  convince  the  Scots  of  the  merits  of  the  Scotland  Act. 
(1999:  589) 
Not  only  was  the  political  context  unfavourable  but  the  `yes'  campaign  itself  was 
severely  divided  with  Labour  and  SNP  refusing  to  cooperate  with  each  other.  Unionist 
Labour  argued,  as  they  would  in  the  late  1990s,  that  devolution  would  strengthen  the 
union,  while  the  SNP  suggested  devolution  would  eventually  lead  to  independence. 
While  the  Welsh  devolution  result  was  a  clear  `No',  Scotland's  vote  produced  a  `Yes' 
win  but  failed  to  meet  the  40  per  cent  threshold.  Callaghan's  minority  Labour 
government  then  had  to  deal  with  the  political  fall  out,  which  would  taint  the 
affections  of  supportive  minority  parties.  Labour  were  unable  to  implement 
devolution,  resulting  in  both  the  SNP  and  the  Conservatives  motioning  for  a  vote  of 
no-confidence.  The  Liberal  and  SNP  votes  against  the  government  would  produce  a 
twist  of  political  irony.  In  helping  to  defeat  Labour,  the  Liberals  and  SNP,  on  the  back 
of  the  devolution  issue,  ushered  in  eighteen  years  of  anti-devolution  Conservative 
rule.  The  Scotland  Act  was  repealed  by  the  incumbent  Conservative  government  in 
May  1979,  despite  43  out  of  71  Scottish  MPs  voting  against  repeal.  Devolution  would 
remain  off  the  political  agenda  of  Westminster  government  for  nearly  the  next  20 
years,  but  would  be  rejuvenated  with  the  eventual  return  of  a  Labour  government. 
Conservative  rule  at  Westminster,  with  the  decline  of  its  vote  in  Scotland 
would  act  as  a  fulcrum  against  which  the  case  for  devolution  could  be  persuasively 
levered.  While  England  moved  ideologically  to  the  right  during  the  1980s,  Scotland 
moved  in  the  opposite  direction  (Curtice  et  al,  2002).  The  Thatcher  government's 
firmly  unionist  tendencies,  coupled  with  its  `policies  of  competitive  individualism' 
(Bogdanor,  2001:  196)  would  see  the  Scottish  Office  as  an  obstacle  to  those 
objectives.  These  factors  would  also  come  to  be  seen  as  running  counter  to  Scotland's 
elected  will.  With  the  unpopular  poll  tax  being  introduced  in  Scotland  before  England, 
it  was  easy  for  opposition  parties  to  paint  the  Conservatives  as  anti  Scotland 
(Paterson,  2002).  As  successive  Conservative  governments  and  the  Scottish  electorate 
seemed  to  grow  even  further  apart  during  the  1980s  and  90s,  the  political  conditions 
were  laid  in  which  devolution  could  achieve  popular  support. 
During  this  period  some  of  the  pro-devolution  opposition  parties  and 
interested  civic  agents  began  to  build  some  of  the  machinery  that  would  eventually 
5 support  another  bid  for  home  rule.  Precisely  a  year  after  the  failed  referendum  a  cross 
party  group  formed  a  Campaign  for  a  Scottish  Assembly,  its  Constitutional  Steering 
Committee  producing  a  Claim  of  Right  for  Scotland  (Bogdanor,  2001:  196).  The 
Claim  of  Right  (Scottish  Constitutional  Convention,  1995)  called  for  the 
establishment  of  a  Scottish  Constitutional  Convention  and  proclaimed  `the  right  of  the 
people  of  Scotland  to  decide  their  own  constitution,  and  indicated  that  the  UK  state 
had  become  too  centralised'  (Brown,  McCrone  and  Paterson,  1996:  63-4).  The 
Convention,  which  would  eventually  come  to  fruition  and  meet  for  the  first  time  in 
March  1989,  was  made  up  of  the  Labour,  Liberal  Democrat,  Green  and  Communist 
parties  and  representatives  from  various  civic  groups.  The  Conservatives  refused  to 
take  part  and  the  SNP  withdrew  from  the  Convention  just  as  it  began,  claiming 
independence  was  not  up  for  serious  consideration  (Brown,  McCrone  and  Paterson, 
1996:  64).  Bogdanor  comments  of  the  political  role  of  the  Constitutional  Convention 
within  the  political  climate  of  the  time, 
Devolution  was  not  a  high  priority  at  Westminster,  even  for  Labour,  and  there 
were  fears  that  a  Labour  government  might  not  be  willing  to  prepare  new 
devolution  legislation  only  to  see  it  once  again  destroyed  by  hostile  English 
back-bench  MPs,  as  had  occurred  in  1977  with  the  Scotland  and  Wales  Bill. 
Since  Scottish  issues  were  subsidiary  to  United  Kingdom  matters,  there 
seemed  no  way  in  which  the  Scots  could  make  known  their  support  for 
devolution  other  than  by  voting  SNP,  and  that  would  be  regarded  as  a  vote  for 
separation.  There  was,  therefore,  a  gap  in  the  Scottish  representative  system. 
The  Convention  was  intended  to  fill  that  gap.  Its  role  was  to  draw  up  a  specific 
scheme  which  could  then  be  adopted  by  an  incoming  government  sympathetic 
to  devolution;  and  also  to  promote  its  chosen  scheme.  (2001:  197) 
The  Scottish  Constitutional  Convention,  therefore,  functioned  as  a  vehicle  with  which 
to  galvanise  and  express  support  for  devolution,  keeping  it  on  the  political  agenda  in 
Scotland  while  it  was  off  the  agenda  at  Westminster.  In  addition  the  Convention 
sought  to  give  an  outlet  to  Scottish  public  opinion's  disquiet  with  Conservative 
government,  an  outlet  which  did  not  have  to  manifest  itself  as  a  separatist  protest  vote. 
The  Convention  can  be  seen  to  have  been  successful,  as  its  recommendations 
were  largely  taken  on  board  by  the  UK  Labour  Party  leadership.  Come  the  Labour 
general  election  landslide  of  1997  the  stage  was  set  for  the  enactment  of  devolution 
legislation.  The  leader  of  the  Labour  Party,  Tony  Blair,  had  insisted  in  1996  that  there 
must  again  be  a  referendum.  This  move  was  much  criticised  in  Scotland  but  it  proved 
6 important  in  terms  of  circumventing  criticism  from  English  back-benchers  (Bogdanor, 
2001:  198),  who  could  hardly  argue  against  the  popular  will  of  the  people  of  Scotland. 
The  referendum  took  place  on  September  11`f',  1997,  asking  two  questions:  should 
there  be  a  Scottish  Parliament;  and  should  that  parliament  have  tax-varying  powers? 
Seventy  four  per  cent  of  voters  supported  the  first  question  and  63  per  cent  supported 
the  second.  This  time there  was  no  40  per  cent  threshold  in  place;  if  there  had  been  the 
first  question  would  still  have  stood,  while  the  second  would  have  failed. 
Nevertheless,  Scotland  would  have  a  devolved  assembly. 
Paterson  et  at  (2001)  comment  of  the  first  election  campaign  that,  although  the 
pro  home  rule  parties,  including  the  SNP  had  been  more  cooperative  during  the 
referendum  campaign,  cordiality  did  not  survive  to  polling  day.  They  note, 
With  some  opinion  polls  in  1998  putting  the  SNP  ahead  of  Labour...  there 
was  significant  nervousness  in  Labour's  ranks,  and  old  rivalries  between  the 
two  parties  surfaced.  Prominent  players  in  the  Labour  Party,  including  Donald 
Dewar,  used  the  occasion  of  the  Scottish  conference  in  March  1999  to  attack 
the  SNP  and  to  warn  of  the  dangers  of  a  costly  `divorce'  from  the  rest  of 
Britain.  In  such  a  climate  the  `new  politics'  associated  with  the  Scotland 
Forward  referendum  campaign  were  no  longer  in  evidence.  (Paterson  et  al, 
2001:  17) 
This  `divorce'  motif  in  Labour's  electoral  discourse  will  be  further  scrutinised  later, 
as  it  was  manifest  in  the  2003  campaign  as  well.  Despite  the  new  electoral  system  the 
parties  seemed  to  follow  adversarial  habits  in  this  first  election.  However,  it  will  be 
argued  later  that  the  2003  campaign  exhibited  a  more  complex  rhetoric. 
The  first  Scottish  Parliament  elections  took  place  on  May  6`h,  1999,  electing 
129  Members  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  (MSPs).  Labour  obtained  the  most  seats  (56) 
. 
but  failed  to  obtain  an  overall  majority,  the  SNP  received  the  next  largest  share  of 
seats  (35),  the  Conservatives  came  third  (18),  the  Liberal  Democrats  forth  (17),  and 
the  Greens,  the  SSP  and  an  independent  candidate  received  one  seat  each.  Labour  and 
the  Liberal  Democrats  decided  to  enter  into  a  coalition,  the  first  ever  on  peacetime 
British  soil.  By  the  14th  May  Labour  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  had  signed  the  first 
Partnership  Agreement  (Hassan  and  Warhurst,  2000:  10). 
The  above  result  was  produced  by  a  new  mixed  form  of  electoral  system, 
based  on  both  proportionality  and  a  Single  Member  Simple  Plurality  (SMSP 
alternatively  known  as  First  Past  the  Post)  system.  This  Additional  Member  System 
7 gives  electors  two  votes  `one  for  a  constituency  member  and  a  second  for  a  party  list' 
(Paterson  et  al,  2001:  67).  The  majority  of  seats,  73  in  total,  come  from  the 
constituency  SMSP  vote;  the  remaining  56  seats  are  accrued  from  the  proportional 
regional  list  system. 
1.1.1  Researching  Scottish  Politics 
The  next  election  would  be  fought  on  the  same  mixed  electoral  system;  however,  the 
2003  vote  would  now  occur  after  four  years  of  stable  coalition  government.  This 
produced  new  quandaries  as  to  how  election  campaigns  would  be  conducted.  Now  on 
a  second  run  through  of  the  electoral  system,  interested  parties  would  be  well  aware 
that  a  majority  led  by  either  one  of  the  two  big  Scottish  Parties,  Labour  and  SNP,  was 
unlikely.  Instead,  a  coalition  was  the  likely  outcome  and,  as  will  be  discussed  in  the 
next  chapter,  for  reasons  of  ideology  the  minority  Liberal  Democrats  would  probably 
hold  the  balance  of  power,  whether  they  chose  to  sit  in  or outside  the  Executive.  As  it 
turned  out  the  Liberal  Democrats  again  decided  to  sit  in  the  Executive  with  Labour'. 
Also,  for  the  first  time  ever  in  British  politics,  two  parties,  Labour  and  the  Liberal 
Democrats,  would  be  campaigning  on  separate  agendas  but  arguing  from  the  same 
policy  record  in  office.  The  devolved  elections  also  mark  a  new  dynamic  in  the 
makeup  of  electoral  power,  with  three  centre-left  parties  dominating  the  Scottish 
political  scene.  As  the  Conservatives  are  the  only  right  wing  party  in  the  devolved 
parliament,  there  is  a  pervading  centre-left  hegemony  in  the  governance  of  Scotland. 
How  these  relationships  are  to  be  negotiated  in  what  Pritcher  (2002a)  refers  to  as  a 
traditionally  adversarial  media  environment  is  unknown  and  unexplored.  This  thesis 
will  attempt  to  address  these  issues  of  how  competing  Scottish  party  political 
ideologies  and  the  new  constitutional  arrangements  affect  the  construction  and 
negotiation  of  political  discourse  in  Scotland's  devolved  elections.  In  particular,  much 
1  Results  for  the  2003  election  were  as  follows,  Labour  50  seats,  SNP  27,  Conservative  18,  Liberal 
Democrats  17,  Green  7,  SSP  6,  and  independent  candidates  4.  The  positions  of  the  parties,  therefore, 
remained  much  the  same.  However,  while  the  Liberal  Democrats  and  Conservatives  won  the  same 
number  of  seats,  Labour  lost  6  and  the  SNP  8  seats  from  their  1999  totals.  The  big  parties'  losses  were 
the  gains  of  the  smallest  minority  parties  and  independent  candidates:  the  Greens  were  up  from  1  to  7, 
the  SSP  up  from  1  to  6,  and  three  extra  independent  candidates  up  to  4  from  1999  levels.  For  a  more 
comprehensive  breakdown  of  election  results  see: 
http:  //www.  scottish.  parliament.  uk/msp/elections/analysis/index.  htm  (24/07/2006)  or  The  Electoral 
Commission  (2003)  'Scottish  elections  2003:  The  official  report  on  the  Scottish  Parliament  and  local 
government  elections  1  May  2003'. 
8 of  the  focus  of  this  analysis  will  fall  on  the  three  dominant  centre-left  parties  as  the 
new  dominant  matrix  of  party  political  power  in  Scotland. 
To  date  much  of  the  analysis  of  Scottish  politics  has  been  conducted  in  the 
traditions  of  political  science,  sociology  and  history.  The  first  two  disciplines  have 
been  particularly  concerned  with  the  empirically  measurable  assessment  of  political 
events  and  social  structures  (Hassan  and  Warhurst,  2002;  Linklater  and  Denniston, 
1992;  McCrone,  1992,2001;  and  Paterson,  1994),  voting  results  (Bennie,  Brand,  and 
Mitchell,  1997;  and  Paterson  et  al,  2001)  and  public  opinion  (Bromely  and  McCrone, 
2002;  Curtice  et  al,  2002;  and  McCrone,  2001).  It  would  be  an  over  simplification  to 
state  that  this  was  the  sum  of  what  is  in  reality  a  rich  and  varied  study  of  Scotland's 
politics.  The  pervading  paradigm  for  studying  what  McCrone  (2001)  calls  `politics  in 
a  cold  climate'  is  the  empirical  one,  but  strongly  supported  by  a  canon  of 
constitutional  theory  (Bogdanor,  1999,2001;  Dicey  and  Rait,  1920;  Kellas,  1975;  and 
Nairn,  1977,2004)  and  studies  of  nationalism  (Coupland,  1954;  Harvie,  1994;  Heath 
and  Kellas,  1998;  and  Kellas,  1991).  This  thesis  by  no  means  wishes  to  discount  this 
previous  work;  on  the  contrary  it  embraces  many  of  its  insights  and  practices,  while 
questioning  a  few.  Coming  from  a  CDA  perspective,  this  study  values  the  analysis  of 
the  social  and  historical,  and  as  such  will  at  times  draw  on  these  methods  of  analyses. 
However,  while  supporting  the  aforementioned  work,  this  thesis  does  hope  to  add 
something  to  it  both  in  terms  of  methodological  approach  and  its  resulting  insights.  It 
is  hoped  the  methodological  framework  discussed  in  the  following  section  will  be 
able  to  add  to  the  study  of  Scottish  politics,  particularly  the  neglected  area  of  political 
discourse  in  Scotland. 
1.2  A  Critical  Discourse  Methodology 
This  thesis  stems  from  the  critical  discourse  analysis  tradition.  The  CDA  approach,  as 
developed  in  the  last  several  decades,  has  been  predominantly  the  domain  of 
linguistics,  as  typified  by  the  work  of  Fairclough  (1989;  1992;  1995a;  1995b),  Fowler 
(1991;  1996),  Kress  (1996),  van  Dijk  (1993;  1994;  2006a;  2006c),  van  Leeuwen 
(1996)  and  Wodak  (2001;  2006).  Fewer  non  linguists  work  in  the  tradition,  exceptions 
being  Chouliaraki  (1999;  2000;  Chouliaraki  and  Fairclough,  1999)  and  Billig  (Billig 
and  Macmillan,  2005),  for  example.  As  a  mode  of  study,  however,  CDA  aims  to  be 
multidisciplinary,  pulling  together  insights  from  a  range  of  the  social  sciences, 
9 humanities  and  arts.  Though  there  are  variations,  or  parallel  paradigms,  operating  in 
the  tradition  they  all  share  some  common  methodological  assumptions.  There  are 
three  main  traditions  that  broadly  fit  into  three  categories:  social,  cognitive  and 
historical.  Though  approaches  to  analysis  differ  in  certain  respects,  all  three  view 
language  as  a  social  resource,  which  stands  in  a  dialectic  relationship  to  society.  By 
this  assessment,  language  is  both  a  product  of  society  and  a  productive  resource  which 
influences  it.  Seen  here  is  the  theoretical  influence  of  Western  European  Marxism, 
that  of  Bakhtin  (1981),  Habermas  (1984;  1989),  Voloshinov  (1973)  and  Gramsci 
(1971),  which  began  to  see  language  as  part  of  productive  power.  In  addition  to  the 
economic  and  physical  capital  of  industrialised  society,  language  or  discourse  is  also 
able  to  be  used  as  a  tool  of  domination  and  of  resistance.  Also  significantly  influential 
was  the  work  of  other  European  critical  social  theorists,  such  as  Bernstein  (1968; 
1990),  Bourdieu  (1977;  1990;  1991)  and  Foucault  (1972;  1984).  Through  these 
theorists  CDA  inherits  its  focus  on  ideology  and  its  behaviours  of  social  dominance 
and  resistance.  Ideologies  are  operated,  in  addition  to  physical  means,  through 
language.  Ideology  can,  therefore,  be  seen  in  language;  and  to  study  language  in  use 
can  be  to  study  ideology  and,  in  turn,  the  operation  and  resistance  of  power. 
Fairclough  comments, 
As  well  as  being  determined  by  social  structures,  discourse  has  effects  upon 
social  structures  and  contributes  to  the  achievement  of  social  continuity  or 
social  change.  It  is  because  the  relationship  between  discourse  and  social 
structures  is  dialectical  in  this  way  that  discourse  assumes  such  importance  in 
terms  of  power  relationships  and  power  struggles.  (2001:  30-31) 
What  can  also  be  found  in  the  above  theorists  is  that  the  meanings  of  ideologies 
(particularly  powerful  and  dominant  ones)  are  not  always  transparent.  The  traditional 
Marxist  `false  consciousness'  influences  the  concept  of  `hegemony',  where  dominant 
ideologies  (those  of  the  dominating  elite  groups  of  a  society)  are  reproduced  as 
representations  of  the  natural  order  or  common  sense  (Fairclough,  1989).  Such 
representations  dialogically  reinforced  and  encode  the  constitution  of  social 
structures,  such  as  educational,  legal,  religious,  industrial,  economic  and 
governmental  institutions,  which  are  ordered  in  terms  of  the  interests  of  powerful 
social  groups.  Pardo  explains  further, 
10 A  dialectal  relationship  is  assumed  between  particular  discursive  facts  and  the 
situations,  institutions  and  social  structures  in  which  they  are  embedded.  On 
the  one  hand,  situational  contexts,  institutional  and  social,  delineate  and  affect 
discourse;  on  the  other,  discourse  influences  political  and  social  reality.  In 
other  words,  discourse  constitutes  a  social  practice  and  social  practice  is,  at  the 
same  time,  constructed  by  discourse.  (2001:  91) 
This  relationship  between  discourse  and  society  is  a  key  one  for  the  validation  of  the 
use  of  language  to  explore  socio-cultural  issues,  and  the  use  of  social  issues  to  explore 
language. 
At  this  point  it  may  be  useful  to  discuss  the  differences  between  the  dominant 
paradigms  of  CDA.  It  is  important  to  explore  methodological  nuances  as  this  thesis 
attempts  to  productively  marry  two  of  those  approaches.  The  social  (more 
sociologically  driven)  tradition,  as  seen  in  the  work  of  Fairclough  (1989;  1992;  1995a; 
1995b),  Kress  (1989;  1996),  Hodge  (Hodge  and  Kress,  1979;  1988)  and  van  Leeuwen 
(1996),  has  been  significantly  influenced  by  Foucault's  theory  of  discourse  and,  as 
such,  has  retained  a  strong  sociological  focus.  Wodak  et  al  (1999)  points  out  these 
theorists  tend  to  be  British.  Additionally,  Halliday's  social  semiotic  theory  (1978)  and 
his  systemic  functional  linguistic  analysis  (1985;  Halliday  and  Matthiessen,  2004) 
feature  prominently  in  social  critical  discourse  analytical  practice  (Wodak  et  al,  1999: 
7).  The  social  tradition  uses  a  tripartite  description  of  discourse:  discourse,  orders  of 
discourse/discourse  practices,  and  culture  practices.  The  dialogic  relationship  between 
language  and  society  is  reflected  in  this  three  dimensional  analysis.  As  language 
relates  to  society,  the  analyst  considers  discourse  from  three  perspectives:  the 
language  (or  text)  itself;  the  means  and  social  conventions  governing  the  production 
of  that  language;  and  the  social  and  cultural  practices  from  which  the  discourse 
emanates.  This  is  the  theoretical  point  at  which  social  and  linguistic  theories  are 
married  together.  Crudely  put,  in  Halliday's  social  semiotic,  language  is  a  system  of 
choices  and  that  system  is  at  least  in  part  governed  by  social  context.  Different  social 
contexts  produce  different  linguistic  choices,  which  Halliday  (1985)  encodes  as  three 
metafunctions:  ideational,  interpersonal  and  textual.  Fairclough  observes  of  his  use  of 
systemic  functional  linguistics, 
I  have  followed  systemic  linguistics...  in  assuming  that  language  in  texts 
always  simultaneously  functions  ideationally  in  the  representation  of 
experience  and  the  world,  interpersonally  in  constituting  social  interaction 
between  participants  in  discourse,  and  textually  in  tying  parts  of  a  text  together 
11 into  a  coherent  whole  (a  text,  precisely)  and  tying  texts  to  situational  contexts 
(e.  g.  through  situational  deixis).  This  multifunctionality  of  language  in  texts 
can  be  used  to  operationalize  theoretical  claims  about  the  socially  constitutive 
properties  of  discourse  and  text...  Texts  in  their  ideational  functioning 
constitute  systems  of  knowledge  and  belief...  and  in  their  interpersonal 
functioning  they  constitute  social  subjects  (or  in  different  terminologies, 
identities,  forms  of  self)  and  social  relations  between  (categories  of)  subjects. 
(1995b:  6) 
However,  this  dense  linguistic  terminology  should  not  lead  the  reader  to  conclude  that 
critical  discourse  analysis  is  only  concerned  with  discrete  levels  of  analysis,  with  text 
or  discourse  being  the  linguist's  prime  or  only  concern.  One  must  remember  the 
dialogic  links  made  by  theorists  between  discourse  and  the  context  and  means  of  its 
production.  In  this  view,  discourse  and  its  production  is  a  form  of  social  practice 
(Fairclough,  1995b).  Therefore,  to  study  discourse  is  an  essential  part  of  studying 
society,  and  Halliday's  contributions  supply  much  of  the  tools  for  performing 
linguistic  analysis,  for  example  grammatical  transitivity  and  modality  analysis. 
The  second  main  paradigm  in  CDA  orientates  toward  cognitive  studies.  Most 
notably  developed  by  Teun  van  Dijk  (1998)  and  Paul  Chilton  (2004),  this  approach 
also  uses  a  three  dimensional  model  to  investigate  discourse  and  society2.  This  time 
the  triadic  method  explores  `how  personal  and  social  cognition  mediates  between 
social  structures  and  discourse  structures'  (Wodak  et  al,  1999:  7).  The  cognitive 
approach  is  particularly  helpful  in  viewing  discourse  participants  as  social  and 
individually  motivated  agents.  Ideology  is,  by  definition,  a  group  phenomenon:  a 
system  of  beliefs  common  amongst  a  collective  (van  Dijk,  1998).  The  cognitive  CDA 
paradigm,  in  addition  to  the  above  social  thinkers,  borrows  from  cognitive  linguistics 
(Fauconnier,  1997;  Lakoff,  2002,1987;  Lakoff  and  Johnson,  1981;  Sperber  and 
Wilson,  1995;  and  Turner,  1991)  and  cognitive  scientists  (Abrams  and  Hogg,  1990; 
Billig,  1982,1990;  and  Tajfel,  1981,1982)  to  examine  the  relationships  between 
language,  group  identity  and  the  maintenance  or  resistance  of  social  structures,  roles 
and  institutions. 
2A  note  on  George  Lakoff  should  be  made  here  as  his  work  will  be  drawn  on.  Some  theorists  (e.  g. 
Hart,  2005)  refer  to  Lakoff  as  a  critical  discourse  analyst  but  he  is  not.  He  has,  provided  CDA  theorists 
with  a  valuable  tool  kit  with  which  to  explore  discourse  with  a  cognitive  inflexion.  Analysts  with  an 
interest  in  cognition  naturally  draw  on  his  work  as  a  cognitive  linguist.  Some  of  Lakoff's  activity  has 
been  bound  up  with  neo-conservative  discourse  in  the  U.  S.  (2004),  but  this  is  hardly  done  from  either 
the  methodological  or  ideological  standpoint  of  CDA. 
12 The  third  significant  paradigm  in  CDA  is  the  historical,  typified  by  the  Vienna 
School  of  Discourse  Analysis.  Ruth  Wodak  is  the  most  prominent  proponent  of  this 
approach.  Wodak  et  al  (1999)  assert  that  Bernstein's  theory  strongly  influences  their 
methodology.  The  Viennese  method  in  analysing  political  topics  and  texts  puts 
emphasis  on  `the  historical  dimension'  (Wodak  et  al,  1999:  7).  Wodak  et  al  explain 
this  has  a  two  pronged  approach, 
Firstly,  the  discourse-historical  approach  always  attempts  to  integrate  as  much 
available  information  as  possible  on  the  historical  background  and  the  original 
historical  sources  in  which  discursive  events  are  embedded.  Secondly,  a 
number  of  investigations...  have  traced  the  diachronic  change,  which 
particular  types  of  discourse  undergo  during  a  specified  period  of  time.  (1999: 
7-8) 
Still  important  are  the  aspects  of  critically  questioning  power  and  ideology.  Again 
they  employ  a  three  dimensional  approach,  this  time  between  the  historical,  socio- 
political  and  the  discursive.  This  final  methodology  is  briefly  drawn  on  in  the 
workings  of  this  investigation  (see  chapter  six).  However,  the  social  and  cognitive 
models  are  more  important  to  the  present  study. 
This  thesis  combines  the  social  and  cognitive  approaches  to  CDA  in  several 
ways.  In  particular,  Fairclough's  triadic  social  methodology  roots  an  analysis  in  the 
explication  of  socio-cultural  practices  as  productive  in  accounting  for  manifestations 
of  discourse,  and  vice  versa.  So  for  example,  in  this  study,  understanding  the  political 
context  that  led  to  devolution,  as  outlined  above,  provides  the  analyst  with  insights  to 
the  political  and  social  background  of  Scottish  politics.  Similarly,  understanding  the 
characteristics  of  the  current  constitutional  arrangements,  i.  e.  the  mixed  electoral 
system  for  Scottish  elections,  provides  explanations  for  social  and  institutional 
pressures  on  discourse  participants.  Where  the  social  approach  is  lacking  is  in 
providing  a  detailed  model  for  explaining  the  motivation  for  individuals  to  act  in 
groups. 
The  social  explanation  for  group  motivation  stops  at  the  operation  and 
resistance  of  power  (which  includes  accessing  resources);  and  it  does  not  give  an 
account  of  how  and  why  discourses  are  structured  in  particular  ways,  other  than  it  is 
in  the  interests  of  the  group.  Where  the  cognitive  approach  has  its  strength  is  in 
13 addressing  these  issues.  For  example,  van  Dijk  (1998)  provides  an  explanation  of 
group  behaviour  which  he  formulates  into  the  `ideological  square',  which  is  discussed 
further  in  chapters  3  and  4.  In  brief,  the  ideological  square  reduces  to  positive 
representation  the  in-group's  actions,  attributes  and  achievements  and  negative 
representation  of  the  out-group.  Van  Dijk  draws  on  work  in  social  psychology, 
particularly  Social  Identity  Theory  (SIT)  and  Self  Categorisation  Theory  (SCT). 
These  theories,  exemplified  by  the  work  of  Abrams  and  Hogg  (1990),  Billig  (1982; 
1990)  and  Tajfel  (1981;  1982),  explain  that  `groups  only  exist  if  members  identify 
themselves  with  the  group'  (Billig,  1995:  66).  This  membership  inevitably  involves 
making  categorical  distinctions  between  one  group  and  another.  The  motivation  for 
being  a  member  of  a  group  and  thus  making  such  distinctions  is  that  group 
membership  adds  to  positive  conceptions  of  self  (Tajfel,  1981).  Therefore,  an 
important  aspect  to  the  operation  of  ideological  groups  is  not  only  the  obtaining  or 
maintenance  of  access  to  power  or  scarce  resources  but  also  the  construction  and 
maintenance  of  a  positive  in-group  identity.  Groups  are  not,  therefore,  merely 
agglomerations  of  individuals  in  pursuit  of  power  and  at  the  behest  of  social 
pressures,  but  responsive  collectives  actively  engaged  in  both  internal  and  external 
dialogues.  Ultimately,  the  pursuit  of  power  for  scarce  resources  is  bound  up  with  the 
maintenance  of  positive  identity  for  the  group  and  correspondingly  the  individual. 
Van  Dijk's  ideological  square  is  a  model  based  on  understandings  of  group  behaviour 
that  describes  the  cognitive  framework  used  to  order  ideological  discourse. 
For  the  purposes  of  this  study,  van  Dijk's  ideological  square  begins  to  give  a 
framework  for  understanding  the  structuring  of  group  (in  this  case,  that  is  the  party) 
discourse,  in  relation  or  response  to  external  pressures,  namely  the  conditions  of  the 
electoral  campaign  and  its  potential  outcomes.  Groups  are  positively  and  negatively 
categorised;  discourses  are  then  ordered  to  reproduce  those  meanings  in  advocating 
group  interests,  in  the  competitive  environment  of  the  election. 
Chilton's  (2004)  cognitive  discourse  analysis  allows  the  analyst  to  then 
investigate  further  the  construction  of  in  and  out-groups  in  discourse.  His  deictic 
method  illustrates  how  in-groups  are  plotted  proximal  to  the  speaker  in  terms  of 
space,  time  and  modality  (which  equates  to  a  moral  and  truthful  rightness).  Out- 
groups  are  then  manifest  as  distal  coordinates  with  respect  to  the  in-group  who  is 
producing  the  discourse.  Through  the  use  of  these  three  dimensions  of  deixis  one  can 
investigate  who  is  plotted  as  antithetical  to  the  in-group  and  how  out-groups  and  their 
14 members  are  characterised.  These  representations  are  understood  through  a  spatial 
metaphor  that  equates  to  their  cognitive  representation,  where  out-groups  are  spatially 
and  morally  distal  to  the  in-group.  Therefore,  van  Dijk's  ideological  square  provides  a 
cognitive  model  that  accounts  for  ordering  of  discourse  based  on  the  representation  of 
positive  in-group  interests;  while  Chilton's  method  then  allows  in  and  out-group 
categorisation  to  be  mapped  in  special  terms  (which  related  to  cognitive 
representations)  in  discourse. 
Applying  these  cognitive  approaches  to  this  thesis  means  that  the  study  can 
regard  party  political  discourse  from  the  perspective  of  group  behaviour  operating  in 
response  to  both  internal  and  external  social  pressures.  Parties  will  be  expected  to  try 
to  represent  themselves  positively  and  their  opponents  negatively,  therefore 
constructing  different  positions  in  political  discourses  like  manifestos  and  party 
election  broadcasts  (PEBs).  However,  as  will  become  apparent,  such  a  clear 
bifurcation  of  discursive  strategies  is  not  the  complete  picture.  In  light  of  evidence 
from  the  Scottish  election  van  Dijk's  model  requires  some  alteration. 
1.2.1  A  definition  of  discourse 
The  word  `discourse'  has  already  been  used  quite  extensively  in  this  discussion  and, 
therefore,  requires  some  clarifications  as  to  its  usage  in  this  thesis.  The  term 
`discourse'  is  widely  used  in  scholarly  work  today  and  its  meanings  vary  depending 
on  where  it  is  used.  Functionalist  studies  of  language  and  critical  social  theory,  both 
of  which  find  their  nexus  in  CDA,  define  discourse  in  the  manner  used  by  this  study. 
As  should  be  evident  from  the  earlier  part  of  the  discussion  of  CDA,  it  is  the 
functional  view  of  discourse  `language  in  use'  (Brown  and  Yule,  1983)  or  language  in 
social  context  (Halliday,  1978)  which  is  important  here.  Discourse  should  be 
understood  as  language  not  just  as  serving  some  social  function  but  as  a  social  act  in 
and  of  itself.  In  the  systemic  functionalist  account  different  social  functions  are 
inherent  in  the  structuring  and  use  of  language.  And  in  the  CDA  paradigm  language  is 
both  action  and  social  behaviour,  where  language  stands  in  a  dialectal  relationship 
with  social  practice.  The  triadic  approaches  to  analysis  in  CDA  most  strongly  indicate 
how  discourse  is  to  be  understood.  Discourse  is  not  just  instances  of  language  or  text 
(for  example  a  manifesto);  e.  g.  text  is  at  one  and  the  same  time  an  instance  of 
discourse  practice  and  social  action.  Critical  discourse  analysts  sometimes  refer  to 
15 different  types  of  discourse,  such  as  `media  discourse',  `court  room  discourse'  or 
`political  discourse'.  This  further  communicates  the  social  function  of  language  in  use 
and  can  also  be  understood  in  terms  of  `genre',  where  features  of  texts  are  said  to 
encode  aspects  of  their  social  context.  Therefore,  the  definition  of  discourse  used  here 
is  language  rooted  in  social  context  and  as  social  practice,  dialectically  shaping  and 
being  shaped  by  social  action. 
1.3  A  Structure  for  Exploring  Scottish  Electoral  Discourse 
Now  that  a  domain  and  method  of  analysis  have  been  defined,  the  structure  of  the 
forthcoming  investigation  will  be  indicated.  Chapter  2  explores  electoral  discourse 
from  the  perspective  of  party  manifestos,  which  are  the  main  party  documents  of  an 
election,  providing  the  most  comprehensive  and  unmediated  account  of  parties' 
prospective  policy  programmes.  In  exploring  these  texts,  the  argument  is  situated 
within  a  discussion  of  the  ideological  centre  ground  of  Scottish  politics.  A  centre 
ground  defined  in  terms  of  both  the  political  ideologies  of  parties  and  voters.  And 
where  appropriate  comparisons  are  made  between  Scottish  and  English  and  UK 
politics.  It  is  important  to  understand  this  centre  ground  because  it  is  generally  where 
the  majority  of  public  opinion  resides  and  from  where  elections  are  fought  and  won. 
The  centre  ground  of  devolved  Scottish  politics  is  mapped  and  the  distinctive  nature 
of  Scottish  politics  indicated.  The  importance  to  Scottish  political  culture  of  centre- 
left  and  nationalist  ideological  agendas  is  highlighted.  In  identifying  the  dominant 
ideological  similarities  and  differences,  this  investigation  will  lay  the  foundations  for 
a  wider  discussion  of  the  discursive  strategies  used  to  negotiate  relationships  in 
devolved  electoral  politics.  This  is  in  line  with  CDA  triadic  methodological  practice: 
investigating  the  socio-cultural  context  of  discourse  (text)  and  discourse  practices 
(orders  of  discourse). 
Chapter  3  then  goes  on  to  further  examine  manifestos,  this  time  from  the 
perspective  of  the  discursive  strategies  employed  in  them  to  negotiate  the  ideological 
field  of  the  Scottish  election.  This  chapter  addresses  the  issues  of  how  a  political 
system  with  several  parties  occupying  similar  ideological  ground  on  the  centre-left  is 
negotiated.  How  parties  discursively  construct  and  negotiate  their  differing  identities 
and  relationships  -  bearing  in  mind  the  likelihood  of  coalition  government  -  are 
explored.  In  doing  this,  how  parties  discursively  label  and  position  opponents  is 
16 scrutinized.  Again  the  importance  of  the  nationalist  agenda  and  the  contextual 
pressures  of  the  likely  outcome  of  the  election,  due  to  the  electoral  arrangements,  are 
shown  to  affect  discursive  strategies  in  ideological  competition.  Both  Scotland's 
relationship  with  the  UK  and  potential  coalition  relationships  characterise  the 
discourse  practices  of  Scotland's  political  parties.  The  electoral  arrangements  produce 
less  adversarial  discourses,  alongside  adversarial  discourses,  shaped  by  ideological 
differences  between  Labour  and  the  SNP  over  the  Union.  This  investigation  is 
conducted  by  introducing  a  synthesis  of  the  two  approaches  of  Chilton  (2004)  and  van 
Dijk  (1998).  These  approaches  are  the  three  dimensional  deixis  analysis  and  the 
ideological  square.  The  former  indicates  how  ideological  agents  and  actions  are 
constructed  in  terms  of  proximity  to  the  utterer;  while  the  latter  provides  a  cognitive 
account  of  the  ideological  structuring  of  discourse.  However,  evidence  presented  in 
this  chapter  questions  the  adequacy  of  the  ideological  square's  descriptive  powers;  as 
such,  a  reformulation  of  the  square  is  recommended. 
Subsequently,  chapter  4  moves  the  investigation  to  another  mainstay  of 
political  campaigning:  party  election  broadcasts.  Whereas  the  previous  chapters 
looked  at  how  ideological  opponents  are  labelled  and  positioned  in  Scottish  political 
discourse,  chapter  4  investigates  strategies  for  rhetorically  structuring  and  presenting 
arguments  for  and  against  policies.  Focusing  once  more  on  Holyrood's  centre-left 
parties,  the  chapter  again  employs  the  ideological  square.  Of  particular  interest  is  how 
parties  negotiate  actual  or  potential  coalition  partnerships  in  adversarial  elections.  As 
such  the  following  issues  are  explored:  how  Labour  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  claim 
responsibility  for  a  shared  policy  programme  while  maintaining  individual  identities; 
correspondingly,  how  Labour  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  negotiate  pressures  to 
criticise  each  other  in  an  adversarial  election,  while  leaving  open  the  possibility  of 
future  collaboration;  the  strategies  used  by  the  main  opposition,  the  SNP,  and  the 
Liberal  Democrats  to  mediate  a  potential  coalition,  again  while  maintaining  separate 
identities;  and  how  the  two  main  parties  of  Scotland,  Labour  and  SNP,  argue  against 
each  other's  position.  This  analysis  further  supports  the  assertions  of  the  previous 
chapter:  that  while  adversarial  discourses  persist,  less  adversarial  discourse  strategies 
are  in  evidence  in  devolved  Scottish  politics.  These  observations  also  lend  weight  to 
the  assertion  that  van  Dijk's  ideological  square  requires  some  modification  to  account 
for  competitive  circumstances  that  produce  potential  and  actual  compromises  and 
17 coalitions  between  adversaries.  Also,  the  prominence  of  the  nationalist  agenda  is 
again  shown  to  be  important  in  Scottish  electoral  discourse. 
The  analysis  of  the  2003  elections  then  moves,  in  chapter  5,  to  investigate 
political  discourse  in  the  media:  specifically  the  Scottish  press.  In  this  chapter  the 
effects  on  the  representation  of  political  elections  of  pervasive  metaphors  and  their 
associated  cognitive  schemata  are  analysed.  Through  a  study  of  a  corpus  of 
newspaper  articles,  which  covered  the  PEBs  of  the  election,  metaphors  of  war, 
pugilism  and  argument  are  shown  to  be  integral  to  the  representation  of  political 
elections  by  politicians  and  journalists.  It  is  suggested  that  these  three  metaphors  are 
intimately  related  cognitively,  forming  an  overarching  `conflict  schema'  for  the 
discursive  representation  of  politics.  As  such,  elections  and  politics  are  represented  as 
competition  between  two  sides.  This  then  privileges,  in  the  production  of  discourse, 
representations  and  meanings  that  fit  the  schema,  i.  e.  two  party  adversarial  politics, 
where  the  winner  takes  all,  as  in  Westminster  SMSP  elections.  Meanings  associated 
with  non-adversarial  politics  are  less  likely  to  be  represented  in  the  news  media.  The 
appropriateness  of  this  metaphorical  representation  of  devolved  Scottish  politics  is 
then  questioned.  The  evidence  of  less  adversarial  discourse  strategies,  demonstrated  in 
previous  chapters,  leads  one  to  suspect  that  representations  of  politics  that  do  not 
reproduce  a  two  party  hegemony  would  be  more  appropriate.  Chapter  5  goes  on  to 
further  explore  the  nature  of  press  reception  in  the  reproduction  of  specific  policy 
messages  contained  in  PEBs  within  the  schematic  representations  of  politics  just 
mentioned.  This  focuses  specifically  on  Labour  and  SNP  messages  because  their 
PEBs  were  the  only  ones  to  receive  coverage,  probably  because  of  their  role  as 
protagonists  in  the  aforementioned  conflict  schema. 
As  the  nationalist  agenda  is  shown  in  previous  chapters  to  be  conspicuous  in 
the  discourse  of  devolved  Scottish  electoral  politics,  chapter  6  investigates  the 
discursive  construction  of  Scottish  national  identity  in  electoral  discourse.  Taking 
manifestos  and  PEBs  together,  chapter  6  studies  what  discursive  representations  of 
Scotland  and  Scottish  national  identity  look  like  in  the  locutions  of  the  nation's 
politicians.  This  analysis  is  placed  against  previous  political  science  and  sociological 
work  on  Scottish  national  identity  (Brown  et  al,  1999;  Curtice  et  al,  2002;  and 
McCrone,  2001),  and  against  Billig's  (1995)  conceptions  of  banal  national  identity. 
Both  approaches  are  found  to  be  useful  but  in  need  of  revision  in  light  of  observations 
made  here  and  elsewhere  (e.  g.  Higgins,  2004a,  2004b;  Law,  2001).  Within  this 
18 framework  two  main  issues  are  studied.  Firstly,  what  forms  of  national  identity  are 
reproduced  and  whether  the  discursive  evidence  from  this  investigation  tallies  with 
previous  work  on  Scottish  national  identity.  And  secondly,  the  discussion  addresses 
the  conflation  of  state  and  national  identities  in  Billig's  (1995)  discursive  account  of 
banal  national  identity.  On  the  first  issue  the  distinction  between  what  Brown  et  al 
(1999),  Curtice  et  al  (2002)  and  McCrone  (2001)  call  civic  and  non-civic  national 
identity  is  supported  by  the  evidence  presented.  This  distinction  equates  to  the 
differentiation  of  Staatsnation  and  Kulturnation  made  by  Wodak  et  al  (1999)  in  their 
critical  discourse  study  of  Austrian  national  identity.  The  two  forms  of  identity  are 
shown  to  be  simultaneously  deployed  in  the  language  of  Scottish  politics  of  all 
political  hues;  this  questions  some  of  the  conclusions  of  previous  work  on  Scottish 
national  identity.  On  the  second  issue,  Scottish  national  identity  and  British  state 
identity  are  shown  to  be  clearly  differentiated  by  all  parties  in  Scottish  politics. 
Chapter  6,  therefore,  recommends  that  Billig's  theory  be  adapted  to  accommodate  the 
negotiation  of  state  and  national  identities  in  a  sub-state  nation  like  Scotland. 
The  final  chapter  summarises  results,  draws  together  the  observations  of  this 
thesis  and  indicates  its  unique  contribution.  Chapter  7  also  takes  the  opportunity  to 
discuss  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  the  study;  before,  finally,  suggesting  possible 
avenues  for  future  research. 
19 CHAPTER  2:  A  MANIFESTO  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  IDEOLOGICAL  CENTRE  OF 
SCOTTISH  ELECTORAL  POLITICS 
2.1  Introduction 
The  2003  election  manifestos  are  the  focus  of  analysis  in  the  following  two  chapters. 
Manifestos  are  the  most  comprehensive  publicly  available  documents  produced  by 
political  parties  in  the  UK.  They  are  the  major  location  of  extensive  accounts  of  both 
individual  policy  detail  and  extensive  proposed  policy  programmes  for  campaigning 
parties3.  It  is  not  only  the  comprehensiveness  of  manifestos  which  makes  them  of 
interest  to  researchers  of  ideology  and  political  discourse;  it  is  also  the  salience  they 
are  afforded  in  election  campaigns  and  beyond.  These  are  documents  intended  for 
public  consumption,  but  very  few  of  the  electorate  actually  read  manifestos  (Brack, 
2000:  1):  however,  manifestos  are  extensively  covered  by  the  media  (Rosenbaum, 
1997:  212).  Because  the  political  debate  which  develops  around  them  occurs  in  the 
nation's  mass  media,  a  party's  manifesto  is  their  best  known  document  to  the 
electorate  (Cooke,  2000:  1).  The  manifesto  is  representative  of  the  party  in  general, 
whatever  its  internal  disputes,  with  the  content  often  discussed  and  influenced  by  the 
wider  membership  (Budge  et  al,  2004).  If  elected,  a  party  (or  parties  in  a  power- 
sharing  government)  will  claim  to  have  a  mandate  for  the  implementation  of  its 
policies  and  ideology  on  the  basis  that  the  electorate  voted  for  its  manifesto. 
Journalists  will  cross-question  politicians  during  and  after  election  campaigns  on  the 
statements  made  in  these  documents.  Pressure  groups  and  opposition  politicians  will 
refer  to  pledges  made  and  promises  broken  in  the  government's  manifesto  (Kavanagh, 
2000).  Discursively,  manifestos  serve  as  a  centripetal  force  on  a  party's  activists  and 
spokesmen.  Pulling  the  party's  discourse  to  its  centre  these  documents  function  as  the 
hub  of  policies  and  beliefs  around  which  a  party's  electoral  campaign  revolves.  That 
is  to  say,  manifestos  define  the  areas  and  boundaries  of  their  party's  electoral  debate. 
Manifestos  are  a  major,  if  not  the  major,  source  of  policy  and  ideological  record  for 
the  public,  politicians  and  journalists  alike;  they  are  the  textual  centre-piece  of 
contemporary  electoral  campaigning. 
3  For  a  brief  history  of  the  development  of  post-war  manifestos  in  Great  Britain  see  Rosenbaum  (1997: 
210-212). 
20 The  Manifesto  Research  Group  (MRG)  and  the  Comparative  Manifesto 
Project  (see  Budge  et  al,  2004,  Budge,  Robertson  and  Hearl,  1987,  Budge  and  Farlie, 
1983)4  have  built  up  a  body  of  analysis  investigating  general  election  manifestos. 
There  is  limited  work  available  on  Scottish  editions  of  British  general  election 
manifestos  (Leith,  2006).  Emanating  from  political  science,  this  research  is  generally 
rooted  in  the  quantitative  and  qualitative  research  methodologies  of  that  discipline  and 
its  focus  thus  far  has  been  entirely  on  Westminster  elections.  Compared  with  other 
areas  of  political  enquiry  such  as  psephology,  constitutional  theory  or  party  histories, 
manifestos  have  received  far  less  attention.  Within  the  CDA  tradition  manifestos  have 
not  received  a  great  deal  of  attention,  with  the  exception  of  Charteris-Black  (2004). 
Critical  discourse  studies  have  investigated  a  range  of  text  types  from  a  variety  of 
perspectives:  and  as  discussed  in  the  introduction  there  has  been  a  significant  interest 
in  political  subjects  from  the  field's  researchers.  A  strong  interest  in  political  texts  and 
discourses  is  hardly  surprising  in  a  discipline  whose  raison  d'etre  is  the  investigation 
and  de-mystification  of  ideologies  and  ideological  conflict.  What  is  surprising  is  that 
in  a  well  established  body  of  research,  with  specific  interests  in  political  discourse, 
there  is  a  notable  lack  of  work  on  what  are  the  core  political  documents  of  Western 
democracies.  This  neglect  is  still  more  surprising  given  that  the  majority  of  CDA  has 
occurred  over  the  last  twenty  years,  at  a  time  which  saw  significant  shifts  by  the  main 
UK  parties  to  the  ideological  right  and  centre.  The  following  two  chapters,  therefore, 
intend  to  begin  filling  this  gap  in  current  research. 
There  is,  evidently,  an  opportunity  for  more  analysis  of  manifestos  in  the 
newly  devolved  Scottish  political  context,  and  for  that  to  be  done  from  a  CDA 
perspective.  What  the  above  political  science  research  (with  the  exception  of  Leith, 
2006)  does,  is  to  consider  manifestos  as  texts  which  are  a  record  of  policies  which  are 
involved  in  a  political  dialogue  with  the  electorate  and  the  media,  neglecting  that 
manifestos  also  form  part  of  the  dialogue  between  political  parties.  This  inter-party 
dialogue  is  even  more  relevant  in  a  political  system  likely  to  yield  a  coalition 
government,  as  in  Scotland.  Under  such  conditions  co-operative  dialogues  become  a 
necessity  of  acquiring  and  managing  power.  As  the  textual  site  of  comprehensive  and 
detailed  policy  programmes,  manifestos  are  ideal  locations  to  investigate  ideological 
negotiation  in  the  political  realm.  As  the  main  documents  of  party  political 
4  Though  work  by  these  research  groups  has  not  just  focused  on  British  manifestos,  taking  a  broader 
view  of  European  democracies. 
21 competition  in  elections,  they  are  in  the  vanguard  of  ideological  competition  in 
modern  liberal  democracies.  From  a  discourse  analysis  perspective,  one  can 
therefore: 
"  Compare  constructions  of  parties'  ideological  statements 
"  Identify  discursive  trends  and  ideological  characteristics  of  Scottish  political 
discourse  at  a  particular  time 
"  Investigate  the  construction  of  parties'  `in'  and  `out-groups' 
"  Attempt  to  draw  conclusions  concerning  the  negotiation  of  inter-party 
relationships  within  a  specific  political  context 
"  And  thereby  assess  the  effects  of  the  political  context  on  the  actions  and 
discourses  of  political  agents  within  that  political  context 
These  are  some  of  the  reasons  why  election  manifestos  for  the  devolved  Scottish 
parliament  are  investigated  in  this  thesis.  This  chapter  and  the  one  that  follows  will 
attempt  to  address  these  potential  areas  of  analysis:  chapter  2  deals  with  the  first  two 
of  the  above  points,  while  chapter  3  concerns  itself  specifically  with  the  third  point. 
Taken  together  these  chapters  address  the  final  two  points. 
A  distinction  is  made  in  this  methodology  between  the  content  of  ideologies 
and  the  rhetorical  strategies  used  in  their  discursive  competition  -  though  in  reality 
the  two  are  intimately  connected.  Chapter  2  investigates  the  content  of  the  ideologies 
in  the  Scottish  political  centre,  whereas  chapter  3  is  more  concerned  with  the 
rhetorical  strategies  used  to  persuade  voters  in  devolved  elections.  In  layman's  terms 
one  might  make  the  distinction  between  style  and  substance  in  political  discourse: 
substance  being  content  and  style  the  methods  of  presenting  content  to  a  public 
audience.  However,  rhetorical  strategies  can  encompass  more  than  mere 
presentational  finesse.  It  will  be  illustrated  in  chapter  3  that  an  important  part  of 
ideological  competition  is  the  construction  of  competing  perceptions  of  `in'  and  `out- 
groups'. 
2.1.1  Investigating  ideological  content 
Brown  et  al  assert  that  `any  academic  analysis  which  failed  to  look  at  policies 
themselves...  would  be  failing  to  address  the  actual  discourses  of  politicians  and  of 
everyday  discussions  of  politics'  (1999:  93).  Thus  far  this  thesis  has  discussed 
ideologies  in  quite  non-specific  and  abstract  terms,  laying  a  descriptive  framework 
22 and  methodology  for  the  forthcoming  investigation.  This  investigation  will  now 
attempt  to  move  from  a  general  to  a  more  specific  discussion  of  ideologies.  As  such, 
the  ideological  landscape  of  Scottish  politics  will  be  the  focus  of  what  follows  here.  In 
discussing  this,  the  ideologies  of  Scotland's  people  and  the  political  parties  that  are 
elected  to  represent  them  are  discussed. 
Labour,  Liberal  Democrat  and  SNP  policies  and  beliefs  form  the  ideological 
centre  of  Scottish  party  politics.  This  research  has  contended  that  the  Liberal 
Democrats  are  ideologically  compatible  coalition  partners  for  the  Scottish  Labour 
Party  and  the  SNP  -a  fact  borne  out,  at  least  in  part,  by  the  Labour-Liberal  Democrat 
executive  partnership  prior  to  and  after  the  2003  election.  This  is  because  all  three 
parties  occupy  similar  political  ground  on  the  centre-left  of  the  political  spectrum 
(Brown  et  al,  1999,  Brown,  McCrone  and  Paterson,  1996  and  Paterson,  2002).  As 
these  three  parties  are  currently  the  most  likely  parties  of  power  in  Scotland  their 
political  positions  demarcate  the  centre  of  Scottish  political  debate.  This  chapter  will 
therefore  examine  how  the  so  called  `centre  ground'  is  defined  in  Scottish  politics  i.  e. 
what  policies  and  other  expressions  of  ideology  occupy  the  centre  of  political  debate 
in  a  devolved  Scottish  election.  Mapping  the  ideological  centre  is important  because 
it  forms  the  basis  for  potential  power-sharing  and  provides  a  context  for  discussing 
features  of  Scottish  devolved  election  discourse.  In  turn,  this  will  indicate  any  change 
in  the  manner  in  which  the  political  field  is  discursively  negotiated.  Therefore,  it 
should  be  possible  to  begin  to  explore  Bogdanor's  assertion  that  `Devolution  requires, 
and  may  conceivably  help  create,  new  relationships  of  consensus  and  co-operation' 
(2001:  286).  It  will  be  argued  that  Scotland  does  have  a  definably  distinct  political 
culture  which  is  reflected  in  its  centre-left  standing.  However,  Scottish  national 
identity  plays  a  central  role  in  explaining  the  character  of  mainstream  political 
ideology  in  Scotland:  that  is  the  primacy  of  the  interests  of'the  Scottish  nation'  within 
the  context  of  United  Kingdom  -  or  the  removal  of  Scotland  from  that  context,  as  the 
case  may  be. 
Analysis  in  this  chapter  is  not  linguistic  in  character,  as  grammatical, 
pragmatic  or  semantic  analysis  does  not  feature  when  comparing  manifesto 
statements.  However,  as  this  thesis  is  an  analysis  of  `discourse'  as  a  social  product, 
rooted  in  social  practice,  it  is  necessary  to  engage  with  the  content  of  policy, 
considered  as  articulations  of  group  beliefs.  This  approach  is  consistent  with  CDA 
methodology,  which  explicitly  roots  discursive  aspects  of  ideological  investigation  in 
23 the  institutional  content,  background  and  production  of  ideologies  (Fairclough, 
1995a).  Analysis  would  be  inadequate  if  it  failed  to  compare  the  detail  of  party  policy, 
as  it  is  integral  to  discourse  practices  of  the  political  field,  and  is  a  product  of  party 
ideology. 
2.2  What  is  an'ideological  centre'? 
The  most  commonly  held  conception  of  political  ideologies  in  the  UK  is  that  of  the 
left-right  dichotomy,  where  parties'  political  beliefs  are  described  as  being  left  or 
right  wing  in  nature.  The  left  is  defined  in  terms  of  policies  which  reflect  a  socialist 
position,  such  as  the  centralised  redistribution  of  wealth  to  alleviate  poverty  and  the 
nationalisation  of  industries  and  public  utilities:  whereas  the  right  is  associated  with 
more  laissez-faire  economic  policies,  the  privatisation  of  public  utilities  and  the 
introduction  of  free  market  principles  into  the  welfare  state  and  public  services.  In 
terms  of  values,  crudely  put,  the  left  is  more  collectivist  than  the  individualist  right. 
These  values  in  turn  are  realised  by  the  above  left/right  policy  preference.  However, 
`left'  and  `right'  do  not  provide  a  complete  descriptive  framework  of  political 
ideologies.  The  other  main  descriptive  dichotomy  is  between  libertarian  and 
authoritarian  positions,  where  liberal  policies  reflect  more  individual  autonomy, 
freedom  and  entitlements,  and  prohibitive  policies  on  individual  freedoms  represent 
an  authoritarian  standpoint.  These  positions  (left-right  and  libertarian-authoritarian) 
form  imaginary  clines  or  axes  upon  which  parties'  relative  positions  to  each  other  can 
be  mentally  mapped.  And  these  positions  are  metaphorical  descriptions  that  conjure 
spatial  denotations  to  make  meaningful  otherwise  abstract  beliefs  (Lakoff  and 
Johnson,  1980).  On  both  of  these  metaphorical  clines  one  can  envisage  ideological 
positions  which  have  varying  degrees  of  distance  or  proximity,  and  as  such  some 
point  in  between  two  extremes  is  the  centre.  Left-right  and  libertarian-authoritarian 
clines  do  not  necessarily  run  in  parallel  with  each  other.  Thatcherism,  for  example, 
combined  policies  of  the  neo-liberal  right  with  authoritarian  ideologies  to  produce  a 
brand  of  so  called  neo-conservatism,  with  similarities  to  its  transatlantic  contemporary 
in  Reaganism.  Thatcher's  governments  were  off  the  centre  of  public  opinion  in  terms 
of  UK  attitudes  to  public  services  but  were  in  the  centre  of  English  (but  not  Scottish) 
attitudes  on  the  libertarian-authoritarian  scale  (McCrone,  2001).  One  nation 
conservatism,  however,  is  more  centrist  on  both  left-right  and  libertarian-authoritarian 
24 clines.  On  the  other  hand  the  far  left  of  the  Labour  Party  historically  could  find  much 
agreement  with  the  right  of  the  Tory  Party  in  terms  of  their  authoritarianism,  but 
disagreed  profoundly  on  economic  policy. 
However,  it  is  the  left-right  distinction  that  is  often  the  focus  of  UK  politicians 
(Curtice  et  al,  2002:  199)  and  will  be  largely  the  focus  of  this  chapter.  The  centre  is 
where  the  groundswell  of  public  and  elite  opinion  can  be  found,  as  well  as  the  median 
from  which  the  extremes  of  political  opinion  lie.  The  centre  is  of  importance  to 
politicians  and  their  parties  because  the  centre  ground  is  where  elections  are  fought 
and  won,  as  it  attracts  the  highest  number  of  votes.  Paterson  comments  that 
successfully  seeking  the  centre  for  the  purpose  of  winning  elections  is  a  matter  of 
`whether  and  how  party  thinking  corresponds  to  the  thinking  of  that  broad  block  of 
electors  who  are  not  at  either  end  of  the  left-right  spectrum'  (2002:  197-198).  For 
example,  Labour  Party  reformers  of  the  1980s  and  90s  moved  the  party  to  the  centre 
ground  to  win  elections  because  they  saw  the  majority  of  voters  occupying  that 
ideological  position  (Paterson,  2002).  There  are  instances  of  parties  winning  elections 
and  governing  from  off  centre  positions  -  the  1980s  governments  of  Margaret 
Thatcher  being  a  case  in  point  (Heath,  Jowell  and  Curtice,  2001).  As  this  chapter  is 
written  the  UK  Conservative  Party  is  currently  seeking  the  centre  ground  again  under 
David  Cameron,  their  fourth  leader  since  losing  office  in  1997.  In  doing  so  they  are 
undertaking  numerous  policy  reviews  to  determine  where  their  policies  should  lie  in 
order  to  win  elections  -  this  is  inevitably  a  process  to  find  policies  which  can  be 
supported  by  both  a  majority  of  party  supporters  and  non-affiliated  voters  who  occupy 
the  centre  ground  in  public  opinion. 
It  must  be  stressed,  though,  that  the  centre  is  a  relative  position.  One  country's 
centre  may  be  to  the  right  or  left  of  another  country's.  As  mentioned  above,  Scotland's 
centre  is  roughly  described  as  centre-left;  this  is  particularly  clear  when  viewed  in 
comparison  with  England.  Bennie,  Brand  and  Mitchell  (1997),  Brown  et  at  (1999), 
Curtice  et  al  (2002),  and  McCrone  (2001)  all  point  to  differences  at  the  level  of  social 
beliefs  between  Scottish  and  English  electors,  which  correspondingly  produce 
different  policy  preferences  from  elected  representatives.  What  follows  is  an 
investigation  which  relates  the  policies  and  other  ideological  statements  of  Scotland's 
centrist  parties  to  the  wider  research  field  and  evidence  of  public  opinion.  By  relating 
evidence  of  public  and  political  belief  with  explicit  ideological  statements  found  in 
manifestos  this  chapter  combines  analysis  of  socio-cultural  context  with  discourse 
25 practices,  in  accordance  with  the  CDA  methodological  framework.  In  terms  of  the 
overall  analytical  goals  of  this  thesis,  a  more  detailed  explication  of  the  ideological 
landscape  of  devolved  Scottish  politics  is  necessary  because  it  provides  for: 
"  An  analysis  of  both  socio-cultural  and  discourse  practices 
"  The  gathering  of  specifically  Scottish  features  of  public  ideological 
negotiation 
"  The  development  of  a  more  general  theoretical  framework  and  analysis  of 
ideological  negotiation  in  public  discourse 
2.3  The  centre  ground  of  Scottish  politics 
One  may  ask  why  Scotland  has  political  values  that  are  different  to  those  South  of  the 
border?  Why  should  the  Scottish  people  and  their  politicians  currently  look  in  a  more 
left  and  libertarian  direction  than  their  English  counterparts?  And  what  then  are  the 
values  and  accompanying  policy  preferences  of  a  centre-left  Scotland,  i.  e.  what  does 
the  ideological  centre  of  the  Scottish  electorate  look  like?  Many  authors  have  stressed 
that  Scotland  retained  a  distinct  civic-culture  after  the  Treaty  of  Union  of  1707 
(Brown,  McCrone  and  Paterson,  1996,  McCrone,  2001  and  Paterson,  1994)  and  this 
thesis  discussed  Scotland's  socio-cultural  distinctiveness  within  the  UK  in  chapter 
one.  This  distinctive  culture,  with  its  different  legal  system,  religious  make-up, 
educational  traditions  and  party  politics  inevitably  informs  and  is  informed  by  the 
attitudes  held  by  those  people  who  now  inhabit  Scotland,  but  how? 
2.3.1  Social  structure  and  national  identity 
It  may  be  that  Scotland  has  a  significantly  different  social  structure,  for  example  with 
more  working  class  and  levels  of  religious  participation  than  England,  and  that  these 
differences  affect  mass  public  political  values.  Brown  et  al  (1999)  note  that  Scotland 
has  a  higher  proportion  than  the  rest  of  the  UK  of  people  who  identify  themselves  as 
'working  class',  some  71  per  cent.  Therefore  one  explanation  as  to  why  the 
Conservatives  fare  less  well  at  elections  in  Scotland  and  correspondingly  Labour  do 
much  better  is  that  traditionally  Labour  benefits  from  proportionally  more  `working 
class'  votes  in  Scotland.  In  the  past  religion  has  also  played  a  significant  role  in 
Scottish  politics,  where  the  Catholic-Protestant  split  is  more  telling  than  in  England 
26 which  is  overwhelmingly  Anglican.  The  Conservatives  had  to  be  able  to  dominate 
general  elections  and  used  to  command  the  working  class  Protestant  vote  (McCrone, 
2001:  114-115);  however,  post  World  War  II  their  share  of  the  working  class  vote  of 
any  religious  persuasion  has  been  in  decline.  Brown  et  al  (1999)  discount  social  class 
and  religion  as  the  only  significant  explanations  as  to  why  Scotland  feels  and  votes 
differently  to  England.  Therefore,  there  must  be  some  other  explanation  for  the 
topographic  differential  in  political  values  and  voting  behaviour  between  Scotland  and 
England. 
There  is  a  clear  relationship  in  Scotland  between  voting  behaviour  and 
national  identity.  The  explanation  for  Scottish  voting  behaviour,  therefore,  appears  to 
be  the  strength  of  national  identity,  or,  to  be  more  specific,  a  Scottish  national  identity 
as  opposed  to  or  superior  to  a  British  state  identity.  The  same  relationship,  between 
national  identity  and  domestic  politics,  does  not  exist  in  England  where  Englishness  is 
not  as  politicised  as  Scottishness  is  in  Scotland.  More  than  50  per  cent  of  Scots 
consider  themselves  either'Scottish  and  not  British'  or  Scottish  more  than  British' 
(Brown  et  al,  1999).  Paterson  confirms  this,  noting  that'All  ideological  groups  in 
Scotland  are  predominantly  Scottish  in  their  allegiance,  while  in  England  Britishness 
is  stronger'  (in  Curtice  et  al,  2002:  211).  Such  conclusions  reinforce  previous  work 
(Brown,  McCrone  and  Paterson,  1996)  which  proposes  that  parties  in  Scotland  which 
are  seen  to  best  represent  the  interests  of  Scotland  within  the  UK  context  are  those 
which  reap  the  electoral  rewards.  Brown  et  al  (1999:  chapter  3)  also  indicate  that 
Scottish  national  identity  translates  into  support  for  parties  such  as  Labour  and  the 
SNP,  which  are  perceived  as  being  pro-Scotland,  and  weak  support  for  the 
Conservatives,  perceived  as  the  least  pro-Scottish  of  the  main  parties.  The 
Conservatives  have  previously  been  able  to  dominate  Scottish  politics,  but  this  was  at 
a  time  (the  end  of  WWI  and  the  mid-1950s)  when  public  opinion  perceived 
Scotland's  best  interests  to  be  served  by  the  Union.  At  this  time  (when  Britishness 
and  Empire  played  strongly  in  the  public's  imagination  and  when  Scotland  was 
industrially  productive)  Scottish  Conservatives  stressed  more  collectivist  values,  such 
as  civic  duty  and  social  responsibility  (McCrone:  2001:  113).  Alternative  views  to  the 
strongly  unionist  Tory  model  arose  as  the  British  economic  and  social  situation 
changed  following  WWII,  as  McCrone  (2001:  115)  observes, 
27 By  the  1970s  and  1980s,  alternative  versions  of  political  Scottishness, 
associated  with  the  SNP  and  nationalist  elements  of  the  Labour  Party,  sought 
to  emphasise  the  gulf  between  Scottish  and  British  national  consciousness, 
rather  than  their  continuity.  The  ending  of  empire,  of  military  conscription, 
together  with  fifty  years  without  a  major  war,  coupled  with  the  extensive 
secularisation  of  Scotland  and  Britain,  combined  to  erode  and  enfeeble  the 
connection  between  Conservatism,  Protestantism  and  British  national  identity. 
Opinion  grew  that  Scotland's  union  within  the  UK  was  not  always  to  its  benefit, 
shifting  focus  from  a  British  centred  identity  to  a  more  Scottish  one.  Correspondingly, 
antipathy  to  the  union  grew,  finding  political  expression  in  the  rise  of  the  SNP  during 
the  1960s  and  1970s.  More  and  more  Scots  began  to  feel  that  Scotland's  interests 
were  not  best  served  by  the  Union.  During  the  1980s  and  1990s  the  Labour  Party 
increasingly  turned  to  embrace  devolution.  As  Thatcherite  neo-conservatism 
increased  the  ideological  gap  between  Scotland  and  England,  and  Scotland's 
industrial  decline  continued,  the  union  more  than  ever  began  to  be  seen  as  less  than 
beneficial  to  Scotland.  Therefore,  as  social  and  economic  conditions  altered,  parties 
were  rewarded  at  the  ballot  box  if  they  could  project  policies  which  the  electorate  saw 
as  in  the  interests  of  their  nation.  Over  time,  political  parties  which  are  perceived  as 
representing  Scottish  interests  within  the  UK  benefit  most  in  Scottish  balloting 
(Paterson,  2002). 
McCrone  comments  further  on  this  link  between  national  identity  and  political 
values, 
... 
if  we  measure  Scottish  opinion  vis-ä-vis  that  in  the  rest  of  Britain,  we  find 
that  Scots  are  somewhat  more  likely  to  be  more  'socialist'  (as  opposed  to  pro- 
market),  more  'liberal'  (as  opposed  to  socially  conservative),  and  less  'British 
national'  (as  opposed  to  Scottish)...  Labour  voters  in  Scotland  were 
significantly  more  left-wing  than  their  English  counterparts,  and  less  'British' 
in  national  orientation.  There  was  a  clear  association  between  'Scottish'  and 
having  social  democratic  values  which  had  been  building  up  during  the 
previous  twenty  years  [the  period  of  Conservative  rule  at  Westminster 
between  1979  and  1997],  and  which  helps  to  explain  why  the  Conservative 
Party  came  to  be  identified  as  an  'English'  party  (reinforced,  of  course,  by  its 
hostility  to  Home  Rule).  (2001:  124) 
There  is  no  reason  why  a  strong  sense  of  Scottish  national  identity  should  be  linked  to 
more  left-wing  and  liberal  ideologies.  National  identity  is  normally  seen  as  something 
quite  'banal'  (Billig,  1995),  i.  e.  a  national  identity  is  something  which  everyone  has 
but,  at  least  within  the  context  of  domestic  politics,  it  does  not  usually  gain  internal 
28 political  significance  unless  that  identity  is  disputed.  However,  within  the  UK 
political  context,  clearly  British  and  Scottish,  as  well  as  Welsh  and  Irish/Northern 
Irish  identities  are  politically  significant,  as  discussed  in  the  introductory  chapters. 
The  Scottish-British  identity  relationship  is  changing,  and  within  Scotland  at  least,  the 
Scottish  aspect  of  most  people's  national  identity  takes  priority,  whilst  in  England  a 
sense  of  Britishness  is  more  prevalent  (Paterson  in  Curtice  et  at,  2002:  211).  However, 
as  Brown  et  at  suggest'it  is  important  to  remember  that  in  a  crucial  sense  Scottish 
politics  have  always  been  nationalist  insofar  as  Scotland's  interests  have  always  been 
paramount  in  explaining  the  success  and  failure  of  the  parties'  (1999:  5).  Currently, 
both  the  Labour  Party  and  the  SNP  have  been  more  successful  in  being  perceived  to 
act  in  Scotland's  interests  (McCrone,  2001:  125),  and  both  of  those  parties  have  linked 
Scottish  national  interests  (evoking  national  identity)  and  left-wing  and  social 
democratic  views  together  in  their  political  discourse  (Brown  et  at.,  1999:  78). 
Unsurprisingly  then,  Scotland's  political  parties  play  an  important  role  in  delineating 
the  ideological  centre-ground  and  mediating  this  relationship  between  national 
identity  and  political  ideology.  So  it  is  the  political  parties'  role  that  will  now  be 
considered. 
2.3.2  National  Identity  and  Party  Politics  `in  a  Cold  Climate' 
Westminster  politics  has  three  main  parties,  Labour,  Conservative  and  Liberal 
Democrat.  Scotland,  however,  has  four  with  the  addition  of  the  SNP  who  are  the 
second  largest  party  in  terms  of  share  of  seats  at  the  devolved  elections.  The 
Conservatives,  far  from  being  the  electoral  alternative  to  Labour,  as  they  are  in 
England,  are  only  the  third  largest  party  in  the  Scottish  Parliament,  lagging  far  behind 
the  SNP.  A  significant  conservative  presence  in  the  devolved  parliament  is  only 
possible  because  of  the  proportional  character  of  an  electoral  system  they  opposed 
(Brown  et  al,  1999).  As  the  only  substantial  party  of  the  right  in  Scotland,  the 
Conservatives  find  themselves  somewhat  ideologically  isolated,  being  ill-suited  to 
coalition  partnerships  with  any  of  the  other  parties  at  Holyrood  (including  the  Greens 
and  SSP).  The  presence  of  the  SNP  in  Scottish  politics  clearly  differentiates  the 
Scottish  political  scene  from  England  in  terms  of  both  party  dominance  and  the 
relative  importance  of  nationalist  sentiment  in  domestic  political  discourse. 
29 Paterson  has  commented  on  the  effect  of  the  SNP  and  not  the  Conservatives 
being  the  main  opposition  to  Labour  in  the  ideological  centre  of  Scottish  politics, 
noting  that  it  'encourages  the  centre  politics  to  look  leftwards  rather  than  to  the  right, 
especially  in  the  context  of  a  broadly  proportional  electoral  system'  (2002:  216).  Add 
to  this  the  rise  of  the  SSP  on  the  left  of  the  political  spectrum  and  the  Scottish  Green 
Party  on  the  libertarian  ground,  Scotland  has  additional  party  competition  of  a  kind 
not  yet  found  in  English  politics.  The  two  largest  parties  of  Scottish  politics  are  both 
left-leaning  and  more  liberal  in  their  ideological  position.  Therefore,  the  main 
ideological  competition  and  resulting  policy  environment  is  over  the  centre-left  in 
Scotland,  whereas  in  England  it  is  more  to  the  right  as  the  Conservatives  inject  a  more 
right-wing  and  authoritarian  edge  to  Westminster  politics.  As  McCrone  observes, 
The  key  battle  ground  in  Scottish  politics  lies  between  Labour  and  the  SNP, 
Scotland's  two  major  parties.  Both  are  trusted  to  work  in  Scotland's  interests, 
and  both  tap  into  similar  left-of-centre  policy  preferences.  (2001:  125) 
McCrone  then  goes  on  to  note  of  the  two  main  parties  in  Scotland,  that  around  two- 
thirds  of  each  parties'  supporters  'give  the  other  party  as  their  second  choice, 
reinforcing  the  competitive  nature  of  Scottish  politics  around  a  similar  battleground' 
(2001:  125).  Therefore,  in  an  electoral  system  which  allows  for  two  choices,  as  with 
the  Scottish  Parliament,  voters  could  be  voting  for  both  parties,  reinforcing  both  the 
centre-left  parties  and  those  parties  which  are  perceived  as  acting  in  Scotland's 
interests. 
Coming  sections  in  this  chapter  will  delineate  the  policy  differences  and 
similarities  of  the  three  parties  of  the  Scottish  centre.  Ideological  compatibility  is 
particularly  important  in  a  system  which  is  likely  to  result  in  a  coalition.  Therefore 
having  an  understanding  of  what  might  determine  potential  patterns  of  partnership  in 
government,  would  be  useful  in  understanding  the  mechanics  of  Scottish  politics  and 
its  discursive  negotiation.  As  discussed  in  the  introduction,  the  three  centrist  parties  in 
Scotland  are  in  favour  of  varying  degrees  of  Scottish  autonomy  within  the  Union 
beyond  the  pre-1999  constitutional  arrangement.  Labour  is  the  most  unionist  of  the 
three;  being  the  party  at  Westminster  which  delivered  devolution  it  can  also  still  claim 
to  be  pro-Scotland.  The  Liberal  Democrats  are  federalist,  and  therefore  still  unionist 
in  the  sense  that  they  want  to  retain  Scotland  within  the  UK,  but  they  also  wish  to 
create  a  constitutional  symmetry  and  devolve  powers  to  English  regions  as  well, 
30 within  a  federalist  constitutional  framework5.  The  SNP  are  the  only  mainstream 
separatist  party  advocating  independence  for  Scotland  (but  with  the  retention  of  the 
Monarchy). 
These  ideological  positions  with  regard  to  Scotland's  constitutional  standing 
therefore  dictate  the  potential  patterns  of  division  and  co-operation  in  Scotland. 
Though  the  SNP  and  Scottish  Labour  are  both  more  left-wing  than  the  Liberals  a 
coalition  partnership  between  them  is  precluded  by  their  relative  positions  on  Scottish 
independence.  That  is,  no  coalition  is  likely  in  the  current  political  climate,  with  a 
pro-unionist  Labour  Party  in  office  at  Westminster.  However,  a  Conservative 
Westminster  based  government,  with  a  left-wing  consensus  presiding  in  Scotland 
could  create  a  political  atmosphere,  as  in  the  1980s  and  90s,  where  Scotland  feels 
politically  misrepresented  in  the  UK.  Such  a  situation  could  push  the  Labour  Party 
closer  to  their  nationalist  contemporaries,  in  a  bid  to  retain  power  in  Scotland.  If  the 
Conservative  Party  changes  direction  and  advocates  more  powers  to  the  Scottish 
parliament,  to  regain  a  foothold  in  the  periphery,  this  may  equally  push  the  other 
parties  of  the  Scottish  centre  to  advocate  even  more  powers  in  order  to  remain  to  be 
seen  as  the  most  pro-Scotland.  However,  as  things  currently  stand  the  Liberals  are 
seen  by  both  Labour  and  the  SNP  as  the  only  acceptable  coalition  partner.  There  are 
rumblings  in  Scotland's  quality  press  that  the  Scottish  Greens  are  potential  third  party 
partners,  with  the  centrist  parties,  if  a  situation  where  a  two  party  coalition  still  cannot 
form  a  majority.  Possible  coalition  became  a  point  of  discussion  at  the  Scottish 
Greens  2005  autumn  conference.  Nevertheless,  in  Scotland  coalition  partnership  in 
the  devolved  parliament  is  determined  by  parties'  constitutional  preferences  for 
Scotland  in  addition  to  ideological  compatibility  on  the  left-right  and  authoritarian- 
libertarian  axis.  These  patterns  of  potential  coalition  again  illustrate  the  political 
import  of  Scottish  national  identity  to  internal,  domestic  Scottish  politics. 
2.3.3  From  mass  values  to  policy  preferences 
Thus  far  in  this  section  on  the  political  centre-ground  in  Scotland,  how  Scotland 
differs  from  England  in  terms  of  social  structure,  national  identity  and  party  political 
5  Labour  at  Westminster  had  been  in  favour  of  devolution  to  the  English  regions,  including  elected 
mayors  and  assemblies  (with  far  less  powers  than  the  Scottish  Parliament).  However,  extending  devolution  to  the  English  regions  appears  to  have  halted  at  the  time  of  writing. 
31 representation  have  been  discussed.  This  chapter  suggests  these  differences  account 
for  Scotland's  political  ethos,  which  draws  on  a  more  centre-left,  more  liberal  and 
Scottish-centred  national  identity.  The  basic  theoretical  contention  of  the  political 
scientist  who  is  interested  in  voting  behaviour  and  political  culture  is  that  policy 
preference  stands  in  relation  to  underlying  political  values.  Although  there  may  not  be 
a  one-to-one  relationship  between  political  values  and  a  set  of  policy  preferences, 
there  is  necessarily  some  determining  factor  at  play.  That  is  to  say, 
policy  is  the  practical  effect  of  values.  Thus  when  people  place  themselves  on 
a  scale  running  from  left  to  right,  the  practical  political  effect  of  that  will  be  to 
influence  their  attitudes  to  such  policy  areas  as  redistributing  wealth  or 
supporting  comprehensive  education.  (Brown  et  al,  1999:  93) 
How  these  ideological  differences  are  made  manifest  as  different  policy  preferences 
among  the  Scottish  electorate  has  not  been  discussed.  Therefore  it  is  to  mass  public 
values  and  their  resulting  policy  preferences  that  this  section  now  turns.  Such  a 
discussion  is  particularly  important  within  the  context  of  a  discussion  of  the  Scottish 
Parliament,  as  Brown  et  al  comment, 
the  whole  tenor  of  the  debate  about  Scottish  political  distinctiveness  over  the 
last  two  or  three  decades  has  been  principally  about  disagreements  over 
policy,  and  the  main  agreement  for  a  Scottish  Parliament  is  that  it  will  produce 
better  policy,  by  which  is  usually  meant  policies  more  in  keeping  with  what 
people  want  in  Scotland.  (1999:  94) 
The  Scottish  Parliament  was  argued  for  and  established  (among  other  reasons)  to 
better  represent  Scottish  public  opinion  and  translate  that  opinion  into  legislation. 
Bromley  and  McCrone  (in  Curtice  et  al,  2002:  166-195)  claim  that  Scotland  is  by  no 
means  completely  uniform  in  the  social  attitudes  held  by  its  population,  and  that 
differences  exist  from  region  to  region.  But  there  are  general  national  trends  that  can 
be  identified  and  which  indicate  mass  social  values  and  policy  preferences 
particularly  on  the  left  to  right-wing  and  authoritarian-libertarian  scales  as  identified 
earlier  (Brown  et  al,  1999:  78). 
Scotland's  centre-left  values  resultantly  make  Scots  favour  governmental 
intervention  on  economic  matters,  therefore  they  are: 
32 "  More  hostile  to  privatisation  of  public  utilities  and  correspondingly  also  more 
pro  the  nationalisation  of  industry,  and  more  likely  to  support  the  trade  union 
movement  (Bennie,  Brand  and  Mitchell,  1997:  138) 
"  More  disposed  to  government  action  on  poverty  and  the  redistribution  of 
wealth  i.  e.  through  taxation  and  state  benefits  (Brown  et  al,  1999:  99  and 
Paterson  in  Curtice  et  al,  2001:  210-211) 
"  And  more  likely  to  support  a  minimum  wage  policy  (McCrone,  2001:  124) 
On  education,  Scots  are: 
"  More  opposed  to  selection  in  state  schools  than  the  English  electorate 
(McCrone,  2001:  124) 
"  And  against  private  sector  involvement  in  education  (Brown  et  al,  1999:  99) 
At  the  international  level  Scots  are  more  likely  than  the  English  to  be: 
"  In  favour  of  the  EU  social  chapter 
"  And  more  in  favour  of  giving  greater  power  to  Europe  (Bennie,  Brand  and 
Mitchell,  1997:  138,  Brown  et  al,  1999:  99  and  McCrone,  2001:  124) 
However,  it  is  more  a  case  of  Scots  being  a  little  less  anti-Europe,  with  slight 
majorities  on  the  left,  the  right  and  in  the  centre  still  not  favouring  the  Euro  (Paterson, 
2001:  211). 
Therefore,  there  are  significant  differences  between  Scotland  and  England, 
covering  far  reaching  and  strategic  aspects  of  policy,  on  the  economy,  on  education 
and  on  aspects  of  international  affairs.  In  relation  to  the  Scottish  Parliament,  however, 
and  its  ability  to  translate  Scottish  political  values  into  desired  policy  preferences 
there  may  be  a  problem.  As  Brown  et  al  postulate, 
The  striking  point,  though,  is  that  -  with  the  exception  of  education  -  the 
differences  are  not  mainly  in  areas  which  will  be  within  the  powers  of  the 
Scottish  Parliament.  They  mainly  concern  the  overall  structure  of  taxation, 
large-scale  redistribution,  and  even  some  areas  of  foreign  affairs.  (1999:  100) 
On  the  face  of  it  political  parties  in  Scotland  face  a  difficulty  in  that  the  devolved 
powers  of  the  Parliament  are  insufficient  to  deliver  the  policy  changes  desired  by  the 
Scottish  electorate.  However,  as  the  following  sections  in  this  chapter  and  the 
discussion  in  chapter  3  on  the  2003  party  manifesto  will  show,  the  parties  of  the 
Scottish  centre  do  attempt  to  address  all  of  the  above  areas  of  policy:  in  doing  so  the 
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devolution  settlement. 
2.4  Manifesto  Statements  of  the  Scottish  Centre 
The  preceding  section  discussed  the  ideological  centre  of  Scottish  politics  from 
several  perspectives,  including  social  and  party  political  differences  between  Scotland 
and  England,  and  resulting  public  opinion.  Together  this  has  given  an  overview  of  the 
ideological  centre  in  terms  of  mass  public  opinion  and  party  political  competition. 
This  section  will  consider  the  three  centre  parties  of  Scottish  politics  (as  defined 
above),  to  investigate  how  the  centre-ground  is  classified  by  looking  at  manifesto 
policy  statements.  Such  an  investigation  will  illustrate  how  party  representation 
related  to  public  opinion,  and  therefore  how  closely  party  political  ideology  matched 
public  opinion,  in  the  2003  Scottish  Parliament  election.  One  might  not  expect  an 
exact  match  between  the  public  and  their  representatives  as  there  is  a  tradition  of 
political  representatives  leading  as  well  as  representing  public  opinion.  The  difference 
between  public  opinion  and  mainstream  political  opinion  on  capital  punishment  is  a 
case  in  point.  The  political  establishment  is  against  whereas  opinion  polls  tend  to 
show  a  majority  of  the  UK  public  in  support  of  the  death  penalty.  However,  as 
mentioned  above  the  tenor  of  the  argument  for  a  Scottish  Parliament  was  that 
Scotland  had  a  different  political  culture  at  both  the  public  and  party  political  level, 
and  therefore  one  would  expect  to  see  some  ideological  fit  between  the  two  expressed 
in  political  discourse. 
As  discussed  above,  the  SNP  are  the  main  opposition  to  the  Labour  Party  in 
Scotland,  not  the  Conservatives.  Along  with  the  Liberal  Democrats  there  are  three 
mainstream  parties  occupying  the  ideological  centre  in  Scotland.  The  centre  would 
therefore  appear  quite  crowded,  with  all  three  parties  reflecting  the  broad  ideological 
preferences  of  the  centre-left  electorate.  If  they  all  sit  in  the  centre  ground  then  it  is 
legitimate  to  ask,  what  is  the  difference  between  them  or  conversely  are  their  policies 
the  same?  The  similarity  of  the  parties  was  a  prominent  enough  issue  for  Jack 
McConnell  to  address  it  in  the  introduction  to  Labour's  manifesto. 
The  choice  Scotland  faces  in  the  election  of  May  1  is  not  a  personality  contest 
between  people  with  the  same  priorities,  not  a  potluck  between  parties  who 
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Politicians  are  not  the  same  and  parties  do  have  different  priorities.  (2003:  5) 
What  follows  will  illustrate  that  one  can  define  areas  of  significant  similarity  but  as 
indicated  above  there  are  also  key  areas  of  disagreement.  Both  areas  of  similarity  and 
disagreement  help  differentiate  Scottish  politics  from  politics  south  of  the  Border.  As 
much  as  possible,  the  rest  of  this  chapter  will  focus  on  policy  details  as  well  as 
general  policy  statements,  such  as  a  commitment  to  increased  spending  on  health, 
education  and  policing.  The  reason  for  a  concern  for  details  of  policy  proposals 
(where  this  is  possible  as  detail  is  not  always  given)  is  one  might  assume  that  if  the 
parties  share  similar  ideological  ground  they  will  not  only  share  a  desire  for  similar 
ends  but  also  similar  means  to  those  ends. 
The  following  comparisons,  for  convenience  of  analysis,  are  made  in  seven 
areas: 
"  Health 
"  Education 
"  Law  and  order 
"  Economy  and  finance 
"  Democracy 
"  Agriculture/aquaculture 
"  Environment 
In  their  manifestos  the  parties  do  not  always  categorise  the  following  policies  within 
the  same  areas  as  this  analysis  -  for  example  policies  on  bureaucracy  and  Private 
Finance  Initiatives/Public  Private  Partnerships  (PFI/PPP)  can  and  are  found 
throughout  manifestos,  funding  different  policies.  Generally  speaking  the  policy  areas 
discussed  below  represent  areas  of  devolved  concern,  for  example  educational  matters 
such  as  class  sizes  and  undergraduate  university  student  funding,  or  on  health  issues 
such  as  the  recruitment  of  NHS  staff  and  hospital  funding.  That  is  not  to  say, 
however,  that  matters  which  technically  lie  outwith  the  gift  of  the  Scottish  Parliament 
are  not  discussed.  Such  ultra  vices  policies,  perhaps  unsurprisingly,  coalesce  around 
the  range  of  the  parliament's  powers  or  the  very  status  of  the  parliament  as  a  non- 
sovereign  body.  Therefore,  unionist  and  nationalist  sentiments  will  be  shown  to  play  a 
defining  role  in  Scottish  politics,  contributing  to  the  ideological  negotiation  of  the 
centre  ground. 
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On  nurses'  pay  and  recruitment  all  three  parties  of  the  centre  articulate  policies  which 
advocate  the  increased  recruitment  of  nurses  into  the  National  Health  Service,  as  well 
as  better  pay.  The  Labour  Party  claim  to  have  `increased  the  number  of  qualified 
nurses  by  1,700'  (2003:  21)  and  will  continue  their  programme  to  `recruit  and  train 
11,000  nurses  and  midwives'  (2003:  25)  by  2005.  Labour  state  this  policy  raises  their 
original  target  by  1,500:  they  commit  to  giving  nurses  a  10  percent  pay  rise  over  three 
years.  The  Liberal  Democrats  commit  themselves  to  2,000  extra  nurses  (2003:  3)  and 
better  training  conditions  for  them,  while  the  SNP  want  to  retain  more  nurses  and 
midwives  by  giving  them  an  11  percent  pay  rise.  This  pay  rise,  they  claim  will  also 
result  in  increasing  numbers  of  student  nurses  completing  their  degrees,  thereby 
increasing  overall  nursing  numbers  (2003:  5). 
The  Liberal  Democrats  and  Labour  share  their  commitment  to  the  so  called 
`free  personal  care  for  the  elderly'  policy.  Both  point  to  the  policy  as  an  example 
which  positively  characterises  the  actions  of  their  respective  in-groups.  This  free  care 
policy  originally  emanated  from  the  Liberal  Democrats  and  Scottish  Labour  were 
`reluctant  converts'  (Paterson,  2002:  206).  This  policy  was  a  major  legislative 
moment  of  the  first  parliamentary  session,  and  was  a  provision  that  the  Westminster 
government  did  not  emulate,  rejecting  the  policy  as  uneconomic.  Paterson  claims,  on 
evidence  from  the  Scottish  Social  Attitudes  Survey  2000  and  the  British  Social 
Attitudes  Survey  2000,  that, 
The  overwhelming  majority  of  people  in  all  ideological  groups  believe  that  it 
is  definitely  the  government's  responsibility  to  maintain  the  living  standards  of 
old  people...  Indeed,  in  the  centre  and  on  the  right,  the  support  in  Scotland  for 
this  is  firmer  than  in  England:  88  per  cent  as  against  81  per  cent  in  the  centre, 
and  76  per  cent  against  71  per  cent  on  the  right.  Although  the  question  as 
asked  in  the  survey  was  a  general  one,  not  relating  specifically  to  the  costs  of 
long-term  care,  the  pattern  of  views...  suggest  that  any  government  action  to 
help  old  people  would  be  welcomed  in  Scotland,  especially  in  the  centre  and 
on  the  left.  (2002:  206) 
Within  this  context  the  SNP's  lack  of  criticism  is  unsurprising  as  it  was  policy  they 
actually  supported  through  the  parliament,  but  they  are  also  not  forthcoming  with 
explicit  praise  for  the  policy. 
36 2.4.2  Education 
Labour  and  Liberal  Democrats  abolished  tuition  fees  in  the  first  parliamentary 
session,  established  the  graduate  endowment  and  reintroduced  grants  for  university 
students.  The  Liberal  Democrats  pledged  they  wanted  to  `Increase  the  funding  of 
Further  and  Higher  Education  in  Scotland  above  inflation  over  the  lifetime  of  the  next 
Parliament'  (2003:  17).  Labour  stated  that  they  also  committed  to  an  increase  of  15 
percent  in  the  higher  and  further  education  budget  by  2006  (2003:  8).  Although,  the 
SNP  would,  abolish  the  graduate  endowment  -  stating  it  `remains  absolutely 
committed  to  the  principle  of  free  education'  (2003:  13)  and  `will  work  to  ensure  a 
more  comprehensive,  coherent  and  fair  national  system  of  student  welfare  funding' 
(2003:  13)  -  all  three  parties  oppose  the  introduction  of  tuition  fees  in  their  manifestos 
and  state  a  commitment  to  achieving  a  `high  skilled'  economy  through  further  and 
higher  education.  Therefore,  the  centre  of  Scottish  politics  certainly  shares  much  on 
education,  not  least  a  commitment  to  a  high  skilled  workforce  and  hostility  to  tuition 
fees.  However,  on  the  detail  of  how  to  achieve  a  high  skilled  work  force  there  is  both 
agreement  and  disagreement  among  the  parties.  Labour  and  the  Liberal  Democrats 
share  a  policy  on  undergraduate  student  funding,  perhaps  unsurprisingly  after  four 
years  of  coalition;  whereas  the  SNP  disagree  with  both  the  other  two  parties  of  the 
centre  on  this  point  of  policy.  Paterson  (2002:  203-204)  notes  that  a  majority  of 
people  in  all  ideological  groups,  left,  centre  and  right,  in  both  Scotland  and  England 
favour  means-tested  fees.  The  UK  government,  on  this  point  at  least  are  in  step  with 
public  opinion  north  and  south  of  the  boarder. 
All  three  of  the  centre  left  parties  pledge  to  reduce  class  sizes.  The  SNP 
commit  to  reduce  class  sizes  to  eighteen  or  below  within  five  years  for  the  first  three 
years  of  primary  school  (2003:  11):  Labour  focus  on  secondary  education,  promising 
to  `reduce  class  sizes  to  a  maximum  of  20  in  Si  and  S2  for  Maths  and  English'  (2003: 
20):  while  the  Liberal  Democrats  claim  they  will  `use  the  expected  fall  in  school  rolls 
6cBuilding  our  skill  base  and  focusing  on  science,  research,  ideas  and  knowledge  is  central  to 
Scotland's  future  economic  growth.  That  is  why  we  are  committed  to  increasing  the  higher  and  further 
education  budget  by  15  per  cent  by  2006.  '  (Scottish  Labour:  On  your  side,  2003:  8) 
'The  SNP  believes  that  Scotland's  future  success  must  lie  in  drawing  the  right  lessons  from  our  past 
and  investing  in  a  highly  skilled  and  educated  workforce.  '  (SNP:  Release  our  potential,  2003:  12) 
'Scotland's  universities  and  colleges  are  vital  drivers  both  of  our  economic  future  and  of  the 
achievement  of  a  liberal,  well-educated  and  articulate  society.  '  (Scottish  Liberal  Democrats:  Make  the 
Difference,  2003:  17) 
37 to  cut  class  sizes'  (2003:  18  Make  education  for  life).  The  Liberal  Democrats  also 
claim  they  will  reduce  class  sizes  by  recruiting  3,000  extra  teachers  (2003:  18  Make 
education  for  life).  Similarly  Labour  pledge  to  recruit  2,500  more  teachers  (2003:  20). 
The  SNP  however  make  no  explicit  commitment  to  recruit  more  teachers;  this  may  be 
a  logical  implication  if  they  wish  to  reduce  class  sizes  but  the  reader  can  only  assume 
this  to  be  so. 
Labour  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  both  claim  credit  for  free  nursery  places  for 
three  and  four  year  olds.  Labour  state  `The  right  start  comes  with  our  commitment  to 
maintain  free  nursery  places  for  every  3  and  4  year  old  in  Scotland'  (2003:  17).  While 
the  Liberal  Democrats  expand  on  their  policy  commitment, 
Accessible,  flexible  and  comprehensive  childcare  is  important  in  tackling 
inequality  and  poverty  and  equipping  people  for  work...  We  will:  Aim  to 
create  flexible  childcare  provision  accessible  to  all,  building  on  the 
achievement  of  nursery  school  provision  for  children  of  three  and  four, 
expanding  childcare  facilities,  particularly  in  the  public  sector  and  through  co- 
operative  arrangements.  '  (2003:  35) 
The  SNP  demonstrate  a  consensus  amongst  the  three  parties  of  the  Scottish  centre 
stating  `Welcome  progress  has  been  made  with  nursery  education'  (2003:  11).  Like 
the  Liberal  Democrats  they  go  on  to  pledge  to  expand  on  state  supported  childcare  `by 
introducing  a  series  of  pilot  childcare  projects'  (2003:  10). 
2.4.3  Law  &  Order 
As  with  teachers  and  nurses  all  three  parties  of  the  Scottish  centre  pledge  to  find 
funding  to  employ  more  police  officers,  specifically  in  the  area  of  visible  policing. 
Labour  give  no  specific  figures  but  say  they  will  'significantly  increase  the  number  of 
police  officers  on  operational  duty  in  every  Scottish  Force'  (2003:  29)  and  increase 
funding  for  support  staff  and  technology  to  free  up  more  officers  for  the  beat. 
Recruiting  3,500  officers  over  the  four  year  parliament  is  the  goal  of  the  Liberal 
Democrats  (2003:  21  and  24):  while  the  SNP  set  their  target  at  1,000  more  officers  on 
the  streets  (2003:  9).  Therefore,  although  the  parties  differ  in  how  much  they  would 
increase  the  numbers  of  officers  on  the  beat,  they  share  a  commitment  to  visible 
policing  as  an  effective  way  to  cut  crime. 
38 The  topic  of  youth  crime  features  strongly  in  the  law  and  order  sections  of  all 
three  centre  left  parties.  Labour  state  `Youth  crime  is  a  particular  challenge'  (2003: 
30):  the  SNP  agree  saying  `Youth  crime  is  a  growing  problem  in  many  of  our 
communities'  (2003:  9):  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  confirm  the  consensus  pledging  to 
cut  youth  crime  and  asserting  that  `More  than  30  per  cent  of  recorded  crime  is 
committed  by  young  people.  Addressing  criminal  behaviour  at  an  early  stage  will  help 
cut  crime  now  and  in  the  future'  (2003:  22).  As  well  as  sharing  a  sentiment  that  youth 
crime  is  a  problem,  Labour,  the  SNP  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  have  similar  policies, 
with  which  they  propose  to  deal  with  the  problem.  All  three  parties  suggest  review 
and  reform  of  the  legal  systems  for  dealing  with  young  offenders:  Labour  calls  for  the 
modernisation  of  the  Children's  Hearing  System  (2003:  30),  expansion  of  youth 
courts  and  `fast-track'  Children's  Hearings  (2003:  31):  the  SNP  similarly  recommends 
`tougher  sanctions  for  persistent  young  offenders'  and  more  options  given  to 
Children's  Panels  (2003:  9):  while  the  Liberal  Democrat  propose  a  programme  to 
`continue  to  expand  the  availability  of  sentences  that  work  to  stop  reoffending, 
seeking  to  divert  young  people  from  a  life  of  crime'  and  to  `Improve  the  information 
given  to  panels  and  judges  on  the  availability  of  non-custodial  facilities.  '  (2003:  23- 
24).  All  three  centre  parties  identify  a  need  for  secure  accommodation  for  young 
offenders:  Labour  wish  to  increase  the  number  of  places  by  125:  the  SNP  commit 
themselves  to  doubling  the  number  of  secure  places  available  in  Scotland:  and  the 
Liberal  Democrats  state  `for  the  most  persistent  and  serious  young  offenders,  secure 
accommodation  is  appropriate.  We  will  devote  more  resources  to  making  secure 
accommodation  better  at  reducing  reoffending  than  it  does  at  present'  (2003:  24). 
Again  there  is  a  consensus  in  the  Scottish-centre,  which  identifies  parental 
responsibility  as  important  in  dealing  with  young  offenders.  Labour  propose  the 
introduction  of  Parental  Orders  to  `make  parents  accept  responsibility  for  their 
children'  (2003:  31):  the  SNP  propose  similar  orders  called  Parental  Compensation 
Orders  (2003:  9):  the  Liberal  Democrats  differ  slightly,  wishing  to  `Promote  parental 
responsibility  through  voluntary  measures'  (2003:  24)  and  not  legal  action. 
The  SNP  indicate  a  consensus  between  the  centre  parties  in  dealing  with 
narcotic  offences  with'In  1999  the  SNP  pioneered  the  idea  of  Drug  Courts  as  an 
effective  way  of  tackling  drug  related  crime.  Over  the  last  term  of  Parliament,  the 
Labour-LibDem  coalition  introduced  this  concept  with  positive  results'  (2003:  9). 
39 Rehabilitation  features  as  a  part  of  Labour,  the  SNP  and  the  Liberal 
Democrats'  strategies  to  deal  with  crime.  The  SNP  proclaim  their  position  with  'It  is 
vital  that  we  create  conditions  in  prisons  that  aid  the  rehabilitation  of  prisoners  and  cut 
re-offending'  (2003:  10):  both  Labour  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  express  similar 
sentiments  in  their  own  manifestos.  However,  there  is  a  rhetorical  difference  between 
Labour  and  the  Liberal  Democrats:  Labour  (2003:  29-30)  foreground  the  punishment 
aspect  of  judicial  redress,  followed  by  a  commitment  to  rehabilitation  of  offenders: 
whereas  the  Liberal  Democrats  (2003:  22-23)  do  the  opposites.  Labour  identifies 
rehabilitation  specifically  with  programmes  to  end  drug  addiction,  rather  than  issues 
connected  with  custodial  provision,  poverty  and  equality  of  opportunity  (or  at  least 
these  alternatives  are  not  present  in  their  manifesto).  The  Liberal  Democrats  express 
policies  which  aim  to  deal  with  offender  rehabilitation  within  the  context  of  custodial 
sentences  and  with  what  they  refer  to  vaguely  as  'increasing  the  range  and  availability 
of  programmes  to  stop  reoffending'  (2003:  22).  The  level  of  ambiguity  and  lack  of 
detail  in  this  policy  area  affords  all  three  parties  a  great  deal  of  rhetorical  latitude  in 
terms  of  agreement  or  disagreement,  as  there  is  little  explicitly  stated  with  which  to 
pin  them  down. 
Both  the  Labour  Party  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  suggest  the  extension  of  the 
scheme  of  restorative  justice.  Labour  prefer  to  introduce  a  policy  of  Community 
Reparation  Programmes  'to  make  the  offender  repair  the  community  they  have 
harmed'  (2003:  31),  while  the  Liberal  Democrats  want  to  bring  young  offenders  'face 
to  face  with  the  consequences  of  their  actions'  (2003:  23).  The  SNP  make  no  pledges 
in  their  manifesto  on  the  restorative  justice  issue. 
There  is  concord  between  Labour  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  over  victims' 
rights/victim  support.  Both  parties  supply  detail  rather  than  just  a  commitment. 
Labour  express  their  intentions  at  least  twice,  'We  will  strengthen  support  for  victims' 
(2003:  29),  and'In  the  second  term  we  will  keep  up  the  pressure  on  criminals  and 
increase  the  support  we  give  to  local  communities  and  to  victims  of  crime'  (2003:  29). 
The  Liberal  Democratss  make  similar  proclamations,  '[we  will]  Improve  the  rights  of 
victims'  (2003:  21),  'Give  particular  support  to  victims  of  crime,  both  in  relation  to 
7'For  those  who  commit  crime  there  must  be  effective  and  swift  punishment  but  this  must  also  be 
matched  by  the  chance  for  them  to  change,  so  they  live  law  abiding  lives  alongside  the  vast  majority  of 
our  citizens:  (Scottish  Labour:  On  your  side  2003:  29-30) 
a  'Effective  rehabilitation  to  cut  crime.  Prisons  are  appropriate  for  many  offenders  and  offences.  But 
they  can  turn  lesser  offenders  in  to  more  serious  criminals.  We  seek  to  prevent  reoffending.  '  (Scottish 
Liberal  Democrats:  Make  the  Difference  2003:  22) 
40 court  cases  and  as  they  return  their  lives  to  normal.  '  (2003:  22)  and  `We  have 
significantly  improved  the  treatment  of  victims  in  the  last  four  years.  We  will  build 
on  this,  making  sure  the  justice  system  protects  victims'  (2003:  25). 
Labour  identify  privacy  protection  and  specialisation  of  prosecution 
procedures  in  relation  to  victims  of  violent  and  sexual  offences  (2003:  29)  and 
consultation  on  issuing  bail  and  remand  in  relation  to  protecting  vulnerable 
communities  (2003:  29)  as  specific  policies  which  will  protect  the  victims  of  crime. 
Liberal  Democrats  proposed  to  increase  victims'  rights  through: 
"  Additional  support  for  the  court  process  and  beyond 
"  Provision  of  more  information  to  victims  about  legal  process  and  decisions 
"  And  for  vulnerable  groups  such  as  children  through  new  additional  legislative 
provisions  (2003:  25). 
Therefore,  there  is  a  great  deal  Labour  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  can  agree  on  with 
regard  to  the  victims'  rights  agenda. 
2.4.4  Economy  and  Finance 
Economic  and  public  funding  issues  are  an  area  of  policy  which  overarches  all  other 
policy  areas.  The  discussion  of  policies  related  to  finance  come  under  five  headings: 
"  Funding  projects,  principally  PPP/PFI  finance  projects 
"  Benefits  funding,  centred  around  fuel  poverty 
"  Bureaucracy  or  waste  in  the  public  services 
"  Tax  varying  powers  and  the  Barnett  Formula 
"  Privatisation  of  public  utilities,  specifically  the  water  industry. 
All  three  parties  share  an  ideological  belief  in  the  importance  of  state-funded  public 
services.  There  are  aspects  of  policy  they  all  agree  on,  or  on  which  they  are  close  to 
each  other  but  there  are  also  notable  areas  of  disagreement. 
The  use  of  PPP/PFI  projects  as  a  method  of  public  funding  is  a  good  example 
of  the  degrees  of  agreement  and  disagreement  on  some  policy  areas  between  the 
centre  parties.  PPP/PFI  funding  projects  cut  across  many  policy  areas  and  are  most 
closely  associated  with  large  scale  public  infrastructure  investment  such  as  building 
schools,  hospitals,  prisons  and  motorways.  Whether  one  refers  to  the  projects  as  PPP 
or  PFI  indicates  either  support  or  hostility  towards  this  system  of  public  funding 
provision.  PPP  clearly  indicates  the  `public'  aspect  of  the  funding  projects;  this  term 
41 was  adopted  after  similar  earlier  funding  projects  called  Private  Finance  Initiatives. 
The  SNP,  who  are  against  PPP/PFI  funding  projects,  use  the  latter  term  which  more 
clearly  indicates  the  `private'  sector  involvement  in  public  funding  initiatives.  Both 
Labour  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  state  a  commitment  to  PPP  but  they  do  so  in 
rhetorically  different  ways.  For  example,  Labour  actually  give  very  little  space  to 
discussing  PPP,  but  when  they  do  it  is  entirely  positive9,  framing  the  use  of  PPP  in 
terms  of  value  for  money  in  public  expenditure,  and  contrasted  with  what  they  denote 
as  18  years  of  underinvestment  by  the  Conservatives.  PPPs  are  said  to  bring  `results' 
and  `quality'  to  public  projects.  The  Liberal  Democrats  dedicate  more  space  to 
discussing  PPPs  and  begin  by  addressing  `the  debate'  on  the  involvement  of  the 
private  sector  in  public  service  provision. 
The  debate  about  public  as  opposed  to  private  provision  is  often  misleading: 
there  are  some  services  that  are  best  delivered  by  the  state  while  others  may  be 
better  delivered  by  private,  voluntary  or  mutual  organisations.  (2003:  12) 
The  Liberal  Democrats  go  on  to  stress  the  public  and  non-profit  (i.  e.  voluntary  and 
charitable  organisations)  aspects  of  the  PPP  provision,  explicitly  connecting  this  with 
`efficiency'.  For  example, 
It  is  important  that  people  get  the  best  services  in  the  most  financially  efficient 
way.  We  will: 
"  Encourage  greater  choice  in  the  provision  of  new  capital  for  public 
services,  by  supporting  the  development  of  mutual  organisations  and 
non-profit  distributing  organisations  to  build  and  maintain  public 
assets. 
"  Seek  to  change  Treasury  rules  to  allow  public  authorities  to  borrow 
money  and  issue  bonds,  and  ensure  that  rules  relating  to  Public  Private 
Partnerships  enable  different  types  of  funding  to  compete  on  equal 
terms.  This  will  create  a  range  of  options  for  public  authorities 
considering  capital  investment,  including  traditional  public 
procurement'.  (Scottish  Liberal  Democrats:  Make  the  Difference  2003: 
12) 
9  our  responsibility  is  to  get  the  best  value  from  every  public  pound  we  spend.  For  over  18  years  our 
public  service  infrastructure  was  under-funded  and  run  down.  We  have  invested  through  Public  Private 
Partnerships  in  a  way  that  brought  results  in  new  and  refurbished  infrastructure.  Quality  rebuilding  that 
minimised  the  risk  to  public  money  and  delivered  projects  on  time  and  on  budget.  Labour  will  continue 
to  support  PPP  and  other  innovative  models.  '  (Scottish  Labour.  on  your  side,  2003:  15) 
42 Foregrounding  public  bodies,  like  the  Scottish  Executive  and  local  authorities  (2003: 
27)  and  non-profit  organisations  in  the  discussion  of  PPP,  rhetorically  stresses  the 
`public'  facets  of  Public-Private  Partnerships. 
The  SNP  do  not  share  a  positive  attitude  towards  PPP/PFI  projects,  portraying 
them  as  `privatisation'  (2003:  5).  Rather  than  these  projects  being  value  for  money 
and  efficient  as  Labour  claim,  the  SNP  define  them  as  `an  expensive  privatisation 
project'  (2003:  5).  Here  the  `private'  as  opposed  to  the  `public'  aspects  of  the  funding 
projects  are  emphasised,  for  example, 
Under  this  scheme,  schools  and  hospitals  are  no  longer  owned  by  the  public 
sector  -  they  are  transferred  to  a  private  consortium.  Consequently,  they  are 
run  for  profit  rather  than  the  public  good.  By  this  route,  money  intended  to 
pay  for  public  services  leaves  the  system  to  pay  excess  private  profits...  We 
reject  this  notion  of  PFI-privatisation.  Scotland  deserves  better,  and  we  will 
pursue  polices  that  put  public  service  before  profit.  (2005:  5) 
There  are  explicit  contrasts  made  between  public  and  private,  where  `the  public  good' 
is  disposed  of  at  the  expense  of  `excess  private  profits'.  Instead  of  being  a  method  of 
producing  efficiency  in  the  public  sector  the  SNP  believe  PPP/PFI  is  the  cause  of 
inefficiency  and  poor  service'  0.  Whereas  Labour  present  PPP/PFI  as  a  means  to  an 
end  in  terms  of  producing  the  public  good,  the  SNP  characterise  is  as  a  bar  to  it.  The 
SNP's  alternative  policy  is  Not  for  Profit  Trusts".  Therefore,  the  two  main  parties  of 
the  centre  disagree  on  this  policy  initiative,  whereas  the  Liberal  Democrats  support 
the  policy  but  more  clearly  espouse  the  policy  framed  in  terms  of  public  and  non- 
profit  aspects. 
There  is  a  consensus  in  the  centre  over  government  intervention  to  reduce  fuel 
poverty.  All  three  parties  commit  themselves  to  an  extension  of  schemes  brought  in 
during  the  Scottish  Parliament's  first  term  under  the  Liberal-Labour  coalition.  As 
discussed  above,  demographically  Scotland  is  more  disposed  to  government 
10  'PFI-privatisation  is  one  reason  why  the  number  of  NHS  beds  has  fallen  -but  it  is  a  trend  we  are 
committed  to  reverse'.  (SNP:  Release  our  potential,  2003:  8) 
11  'We  reject  this  notion  of  PFI-privatisation.  Scotland  deserves  better,  and  we  will  pursue  polices  that 
put  public  service  before  profit.  We  propose  the  use  of  Not  for  Profit  Trusts  for  the  provision  of  public 
sector  assets.  These  would  allow  the  main  issues  of  ownership,  control  and  finance  to  be  addressed. 
Under  our  proposals,  the  assets  would  not  be  owned  by  a  private  consortium,  whose  first  motivation 
was  profit,  but  by  a  trust,  whose  first  priority  was  public  service.  This  would  ensure  that  the  asset  was 
run  for  the  benefit  of  the  community.  It  would  also  mean  that  instead  of  being  creamed  off  to  pay 
excess  profit,  public  money  was  channelled  back  in  to  the  provision  of  services.  '  (SNP:  Release  our 
potential,  2003:  5) 
43 intervention  to  reduce  poverty;  therefore  all  three  parties  of  the  centre  are  in  line  with 
public  opinion.  They  differ  in  regard  to  the  focus  of  policy:  Labour  intend  to  target  the 
elderly  (2003:  34);  the  SNP  also  target  the  elderly  as  well  as  the  disabled  and  families 
with  young  children  (2003:  25)  while  the  Liberal  Democrats  also  aim  at  those  with  a 
disability  (2003:  40). 
It  was  asserted  in  the  previous  section  that  the  Scottish  electorate  are  more 
hostile  than  their  English  counterparts  to  the  privatisation  of  public  utilities.  In 
connection  to  Scottish  Water  the  three  centrist  parties  appear  to  be  in  tune  with  their 
electorate  and  each  other.  Although  Labour  is  the  only  party  to  explicitly  state  they 
will  not  privatise  Scottish  Water  12,  the  Liberal  Democrats13  and  the  SNP14  make 
supportive  policy  statements  with  regard  to  the  publicly  run  utility,  which  suggests 
that  they  would  oppose  privatisation.  Over  how  the  utility  would  be  run  and  financed 
the  parties  do  differ,  with  the  SNP  opposing  PPP/PFI  models  and  proposing  to 
`amalgamate  the  offices  of  the  Water  Commissioner  and  the  Water  Regulator'  (2003: 
23),  while  the  Liberal  Democrats  suggest  the  implementation  of  the  Environment  and 
Water  Services  Act  to  `ensure  the  sustainable  management  and  integration  of  all 
policies  affecting  Scotland's  water  environment'  (2003:  31). 
All  three  parties  of  the  Scottish  centre  address  bureaucracy  in  government  in 
their  manifestos.  Bureaucracy  could  have  come  under  policy  issues  connected  with 
democracy  because  the  issue  might  be  discussed  in  terms  of  effective  and  accountable 
government  and/or  access  to  services.  However,  the  issue  is  often  framed  in  terms  of 
financial  waste,  which  also  produces  the  democratic  deficiencies.  Bureaucracy  is 
conceptualized  by  the  centre  parties'  manifestos  as  an  issue  which  cuts  across  many 
areas  of  government,  including  health,  children's  services,  community  support, 
government  and  its  agencies  and  education.  As  such,  policies  to  combat  bureaucracy 
are  found  throughout  the  manifestos,  in  various  policy  sections.  They  have  been 
drawn  together  as  one  area  of  discussion  here  because  bureaucracy  or  waste  seems  to 
12  'We  will  not  privatise  Scottish  Water  and  we  will  support  it  with  the  resources  necessary  to  invest  in 
our  public  water  and  sewerage  services  so  that  they  meet  health  standards'  (Scottish  Labour:  On  your 
side,  2003:  35) 
13  `Implement  the  water  Environment  and  Water  Services  Act  to  ensure  the  sustainable  management 
and  integration  of  all  policies  affecting  Scotland's  water  environment...  '  (Scottish  Liberal  Democrats: 
Make  the  Difference,  2003:  31) 
14  'Infrastructure  investment  is  needed,  yet  the  current  models  for  investment  (including  PFI- 
privatisation)  have  failed  to  deliver  the  level  of  improvement  needed  and  have  hit  consumers  hard  in 
the  pockets.  Consumers  in  Scotland  need  a  tough  new  champion  to  protect  their  interests.  We  will 
amalgamate  the  offices  of  the  Water  Commissioner  and  the  Water  Regulator  to  give  consumers 
protection'.  (SNP:  Release  our  potential,  2003:  23) 
44 form  a  general  issue,  which  like  funding  programmes  (like  PPP/PFI),  is  reducible  to  a 
general  ideological  principle  to  reduce  bureaucracy  in  the  system  of  government.  The 
SNP  identifies  bureaucracy  as  affecting  front-line  services  in  the  NHS  (2003:  6-7): 
academic  assessment  in  schools  (2003:  11):  and  in  the  public  sector  and  government 
where  bureaucracy  is  claimed  to  produce  a  democratic  deficit  and  affect  the  use  of 
public  services  15 
. 
Educating  children  with  special  needs  (Scottish  Labour:  On  your  side,  2003: 
20),  patient  care  in  the  NHS  (Scottish  Labour:  On  your  side,  2003:  26)  and  drug 
addiction  support  (Scottish  Labour:  On  your  side,  2003:  29-30)  are  some  of  the  issues 
affected  by  bureaucracy  which  Labour  propose  to  address  in  the  next  parliament.  Like 
the  SNP,  Labour  also  recognise  the  need  to  act  against  bureaucracy  in  government  for 
example  they  state,  `we  will  act  to  end  duplication,  buck-passing  and  waste  wherever 
it  exists  -  whether  it  is  in  Scotland's  devolved  government  or  in  its  agencies'  (2003: 
40).  Patient  service,  specifically  hospital  waiting  times  is  noted  by  the  Liberal 
Democrats,  like  Labour  and  the  SNP,  as  unduly  subject  to  bureaucratic  constraint. 
They,  the  Liberal  Democrats,  propose  to  abolish  hospital  trusts  to  remove  a  layer  of 
bureaucracy  giving  more  power  to  primary  health  care  providers  (2003:  5,7).  Liberal 
Democrats  agree  with  the  SNP  that  bureaucracy  affects  academic  assessment  in 
schools  (2003:  19)  and  they  concur  with  the  other  two  parties  of  the  centre  on  the 
need  for  government  to  limit  bureaucratic  waste16,  but  also  suggest  that  `the 
bureaucracy  of  government  has  adjusted  rapidly  to  devolution'  (2003:  11)  and  that 
governmental  bureaucracy  is  really  the  fault  of  Westminster  and  Whitehall  (2003:  11). 
A  great  deal  of  similarity  can  be  seen  between  the  parties  of  the  Scottish  centre 
over  the  need  to  cut  bureaucracy  and  which  areas  of  concern  it  affects.  There  is, 
however,  very  little  in  the  way  of  blame  for  bureaucracy  assigned  by  any  of  these 
parties.  The  Liberal  Democrats  do  criticise  external  political  bodies  in  London  and  by 
implication  the  SNP  is  critiquing  current  government  policy.  However,  all  three 
15  'We  want  to  make  the  unaccountable  accountable,  and  we  want  to  reduce  unnecessary  public  sector 
bureaucracy  by  transferring  powers  from  unelected  quangos  to  democratically  elected  councillors'. 
(SNP:  Release  our  potential,  2003:  26) 
'We  will  cut  the  size  of  government,  starting  with  a  smaller  Cabinet  and  less  ministers.  And  we  will 
abolish  unnecessary  tiers  of  unelected,  unaccountable  public  bodies  and  release  resources  from  excess 
bureaucracy'.  (SNP:  Release  our  potential,  2003:  26) 
`Cutting  government  down  to  size  would  reclaim our  public  services  for  the  people'.  (SNP:  Release 
our  potential,  2003:  30) 
16  `Scottish  Liberal  Democrats  believe  that  government  both  central  and  local  has  a  duty  to  taxpayers 
to  spend  their  money  effectively  and  wisely.  (Scottish  Liberal  Democrats:  Make  the  Difference,  2003: 
11) 
45 parties  are  of  the  centre-left  and  therefore  not  traditionally  committed  to  `rolling  back 
the  state'  in  the  sense  Conservatives  mean  to  make  government  smaller.  None  of  the 
Scottish  centre  parties  really  conceive  of  bureaucracy  in  the  neo-Conservative  sense, 
rather  they  frame  it  in  terms  of  waste  and  inefficiency  that  hinders  the  delivery  of 
public  services. 
On  taxation  policy  there  is  again  a  great  deal  of  agreement  in  the  centre- 
ground,  but  also  notable  disagreement  depending  on  the  context  in  which  taxation  is 
being  framed.  As  was  illustrated  above,  Scots  have  been  shown  to  have  different 
policy  expectations  than  those  in  England  and  that  some  of  those  expectations  appear 
to  fall  outside  the  remit  of  the  Scottish  Parliament.  The  Parliament  currently  only  has 
very  limited  taxation  powers,  nevertheless  the  centrist  parties,  especially  the  Liberal 
Democrats  and  SNP,  still  present  policies  on  taxation.  What  is  evident  from 
comparing  the  manifestos  is  that  even  though  many  of  the  powers  associated  with 
general  taxation  lie  outwith  the  parliament  the  parties  can  still  debate  on  the  issues  by 
the  way  they  choose  to  frame  the  debate.  For  example,  there  is  a  three  way  consensus 
on  not  using  the  limited  tax  varying  powers  within  the  current  devolved  situation17. 
This  consensus  is  a  qualified  one  for  both  the  Liberal  Democrats  and  the  SNP.  For  the 
Liberal  Democrats  not  using  tax  varying  powers  is  conditional  on  there  not  being  a 
change  of  economic  or  political  circumstances  at  the  UK  level  (2003:  12).  By  a 
change  of  government  at  Westminster  the  Liberal  Democrats  refer  to  the 
Conservatives  who  may  wish  to  reduce  expenditure  on  public  services  and/or  cut 
taxes,  which  would  run  against  the  centre-left  consensus  in  Scotland.  Non  use  of 
taxation  powers  is  context  dependent  for  the  SNP  as  well;  under  the  constitutional 
status  quo  of  a  devolved  Scotland  they  would  not  use  the  powers  (2003:  3-4). 
Other  similarities  over  finance  exist  as  both  Labour  (Labour:  On  your  side: 
2003:  40)  and  the  Liberal  Democrats(Liberal  Democrats:  Make  the  Difference,  2003: 
11)  support  the  maintenance  of  the  Barnett  Formula  g;  however,  the  SNP  and  Liberal 
17  'We  will  not  use  the  income  tax  varying  power  of  the  Scottish  Parliament'  (Scottish  Labour:  On  your 
side,  2003:  40) 
`The  SNP  will  not  increase  income  tax.  You  are  already  paying  higher  taxes  for  public  services'.  (SNP: 
Release  our  potential,  2003:  4) 
'We  do  not  propose  to  use  the  tax-varying  power.  '  (Scottish  Liberal  Democrats:  Make  the  Difference, 
2003:  12) 
's  The  Barnett  Formula  was  developed  in  1978  by  the  Chief  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  Joel  Barnett  and 
came  into  operation  in  1980.  Bogdanor  explains  that  the  'formula  entails  that  public  expenditure  in 
Scotland,  Wales,  and  Northern  Ireland  is  driven  by  the  level  of  public  expenditure  in  England,  since  it 
is  the  change  in  the  English  Level,  agreed  by  English  departmental  ministers  in  Cabinet,  which 
46 Democrats  also  differ  from  Labour  on  other  finance  policies.  The  Liberal  Democrats 
and  the  SNP  appear  to  concur  over  business  rates:  the  Liberal  Democrats  advocate 
reform  of  local  government  to  `allow  local  authorities  power  over  business  rates  - 
including  the  power  to  reduce  them  to  attract  business'  (2003:  33):  and  the  SNP  state 
`We  will  reduce  Scottish  business  rates  to  below  the  UK  rate  within  the  first  term  of 
our  government'  (2003:  4). 
A  significant  divergence  over  fiscal  policy  between  the  parties  of  the  centre 
occurs  when  the  SNP  refer  to  Scottish  independence;  clearly  political  and  therefore 
fiscal  autonomy  is  a  markedly  different  ideological  and  policy  position  between  the 
SNP  and  the  other  two  centre  parties  of  Scotland.  Therefore,  the  parties  of  the  Scottish 
centre,  when  discussing  financial  policy  at  devolved  elections,  can  evoke  different 
contexts  to  discuss  policies  which  are  ultra  vices.  This  is  particularly  so  with  the  SNP, 
who  at  devolved  elections  are  at  least  in  part  campaigning  for  Scottish  Independence. 
In  a  similar  vein  Scottish  Labour  evoke  Labour's  economic  record  in  the  UK  political 
context19  even  though  governance  at  the  UK  is  not  the  issue  at  the  devolved  level  i.  e. 
Labour  Scottish  Executive  ministers  cannot  claim  individual  credit  for  measures  taken 
in  the  Cabinet  at  Westminster.  Therefore,  over  issues  to  do  with  taxation,  although 
one  can  observe  notable  agreement  one  can  equally  see  that  Scotland's  constitutional 
status  still  plays  a  large  role  in  framing  the  debate  at  devolved  elections. 
2.4.5  Democracy 
Devolution  of  power  to  communities  and  public  services  and  choice  for  the  public  in 
the  use  of  those  public  services  form  a  large  part  of  all  three  centre  parties' 
democratic  agendas.  Electoral  reform  of  local  authority  elections  is  also  shared  by  two 
of  the  three  parties  of  the  centre. 
determines  the  sum  available  to  other  parts  of  the  United  Kingdom'  (Bogdanor,  2001:  243).  The 
formula  is  a  contentious  issue  as  some  view  it  as  Scotland  getting  its  fair  share  (or  more  than),  while 
the  SNP  have  based  much  of  their  argument  for  Independence  on  Scotland  not  getting  its  fair  share, 
`Scotland's  oil'  being  a  case  in  point. 
i9  'We  will  use  the  opportunity  provided  by  the  strength  of  the  UK  economy  with  the  lowest  interest 
rates,  inflation  and  unemployment  of  my  adult  life,  to  invest  in  the  future'  (Scottish  Labour:  On  your 
side,  2003:  4)  and 
'Devolution  offers  Scottish  business  the  best  of  both  worlds.  The  sound  management  of  the  UK 
economy  by  Labour  and  the  independence  of  the  Bank  of  England  have  shown  us  that  our  future  need 
not  be  tied  to  the  roller  coaster,  boom  and  bust  economics  of  yesterday'  (Scottish  Labour.  On  your 
side,  2003:  6) 
47 Labour  and  the  SNP  make  similar  broad  statements  about  the  need  to  devolve 
power  in  the  running  of  the  public  services,  however,  the  tenor  of  those  statements 
differs  in  terms  of  the  nature  of  the  devolution.  Labour's  commitments  focus  on 
empowering  those  who  work  in  education  and  health  care  sectors20,  whereas  the  SNP 
concentrate  on  those  who  use  those  services21.  The  Liberal  Democrats  propose  a 
similar  policy  to  Labour  over  devolving  power  in  education,  stating  `[We  will] 
Devolve  more  power  down  to  schools,  including  more  budgetary  control  for  head 
teachers'  (2003:  20)  and  also  pledge  to  empower  people  and  their  communities,  but 
unlike  the  SNP  this  is  less  specifically  for  the  use  of  public  services  but  for 
community  regeneration  22. 
Proportional  representation  (PR),  for  local  authority  elections,  features  as  a 
policy  commitment  for  both  the  SNP  (2003:  27)  and  the  Liberal  Democrats(2003:  33); 
both  parties  share  a  longstanding  commitment  to  a  reduction  of  the  voting  age  to  16. 
These  positions  on  PR  for  local  government  are  not  advocated  by  Scottish  Labour;  a 
change  in  the  electoral  system  would  enact  a  tremendous  effect  on  the  composition  of 
20  'We  have  taken  the  first  steps  to  devolve  decision  making  to  those  at  the  front  line  [of  public 
services]'  (Scottish  Labour:  On  your  side,  2003:  15) 
'In  our  first  four  years,  we  have  worked  hard  to  devolve  responsibility  and  decision  making  to  our  head 
teachers.  In  the  next  four  years  we  will  do  more  so  that  they  have  responsibility  for  90  per  cent  of  the 
school  budget  through  devolved  school  management.  We  will  introduce  greater  flexibility  for  schools 
and  education  authorities'.  (2003:  17) 
'We  will  enhance  the  head  teacher's  role  by  devolving  90%  of  decision  making  on  the  school  budget' 
(Scottish  Labour:  On  your  side,  2003:  18) 
'Our  commitment  to  devolving  power  and  decision  making  to  front  line  public  sector  staff  is  seen 
clearly  in  the  approach  we  are  actively  taking  to  modernise  our  health  service  and  put  the  patient  at  its 
heart'.  (Scottish  Labour:  On  your  side,  2003:  24) 
21  `public  services  should  be  under  the  control  of  the  communities  who  use  them'.  (SNP:  Release  our 
potential,  2003:  5) 
'There  are  also  some  vital  structural  reforms  to  undertake  which  will  strengthen  the  delivery  of 
healthcare  nationwide.  We  want  to  simplify  the  structure  and  create  a  more  accountable  and  transparent 
service,  with  devolved  powers  to  allow  communities  to  shape  services  according  to  their  needs'.  (SNP: 
Release  our  potential,  2003:  8) 
'The  SNP  does  not  believe  that  politicians  should  have  exclusive  ownership  of  education  policy.  That 
is  why  we  re-affirm  our  commitment  to  establishing  an  Education  Convention  consisting  of 
representatives  of  teachers,  parents,  pupils,  employers  and  wider  civic  Scotland'.  (SNP:  Release  our 
potential,  2003:  12) 
22  'Scottish  Liberal  Democrats  aim  to  empower  people  and  communities  to  help  themselves  to  achieve 
their  fullest  potential...  We  will: 
"  Make  people's  votes  count  by  introducing  the  proportional  Single  Transferable  Vote  for  Local 
Governance  Bill.  Councils  must  be  far  more  accountable  to  the  people  who  elect  them. 
"  Reform  local  government  finance.  Replace  council  tax  with  a  local  income  tax  related  to 
ability  to  pay  and  allow  local  authorities  power  over  business  rates  -  including  the  power  to 
reduce  them  to  attract  business.  '  (Scottish  Liberal  Democrats:  Make  the  Difference,  2003:  33) 
'Giving  people  power  over  their  homes  and  communities.  People  are  the  key  to  community 
regeneration.  We  will  help  the  homeless  and  support  people  in  all  types  of  housing  tenure  to  improve 
their  homes  and  communities  to  suit  their  needs'.  (Scottish  Liberal  Democrats:  Make  the  Difference, 
2003:  39) 
48 local  councils,  many  of  which  are  currently  dominated  by  the  Labour  Party.  One 
major  policy  not  mentioned  here  is  the  SNP's  policy  over  independence  which  is 
clearly  one  connected  with  democracy,  but  which  has  been  discussed  in  other  areas  of 
this  and  other  chapters. 
Labour,  the  SNP  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  share  a  commitment  to  choice  in 
education.  Labour23  and  the  SNP24  focus  on  choice  for  children  while  the  Liberal 
Democrats25  also  include  parental  choice.  The  three  parties  propose  to  increase  or 
enhance  pupil  choice  in  relation  to  their  curriculum,  the  SNP  and  Labour  specifically 
identifying  vocational  training  in  comprehensive  education.  The  Liberal  Democrats 
also  propose  to  increase  choice  in  the  funding  of  public  service  provision  (2003:  12, 
33),  emphasising  the  non-profit  agents  in  PPP  funding  discussed  above. 
Powers  of  international  affairs  are  not  devolved  to  the  Scottish  Parliament,  yet 
all  three  parties  on  the  centre  ground  dedicate  space  in  their  manifesto  to  discussing 
Europe.  They  make  positive  statements  with  regard  to  the  European  Union,  but  again 
it  is  the  parties'  relative  positions  on  Scottish  independence  that  is  of  central 
importance  in  differentiating  them.  All  articulate  positive  statements  about  working 
with  other  EU  member  states26.  The  Liberal  Democrats  and  Labour  both  make 
representations  for  working  positively  for  Scotland  in  Europe  for  business  and  for 
representing  Scottish  needs  in  European  legislation:  they  do  this,  however,  within  the 
rubric  of  constitutional  union  in  the  United  Kingdom27.  In  contrast,  the  SNP  argue  for 
23  'We  will  improve  the  comprehensive  system  with  increased  pupil  choice'  (Scottish  Labour:  On  your 
side,  2003:  17). 
24  'We  will  initiate  a  major  consultation  on  extending  pupil  choice'  (SNP:  Release  our  potential,  2003: 
11). 
25  'Enhance  education  choices  and  opportunities,  involving  parents  and  seeking  to  empower  children 
by  involving  them  in  decisions  about  their  personal  curriculum,  while  ensuring  that  literacy  and 
numeracy  remain  central'.  (Scottish  Liberal  Democrats:  Make  the  Difference,  2003:  18) 
'We  seek  to  involve  parents  more  constructively  in  the  education  of  their  children  and  empower 
children  by  giving  them  more  choice  in  a  diverse  curriculum'.  (Scottish  Liberal  Democrats:  Make  the 
Difference,  2003:  18) 
26  'We  support  the  enlargement  Europe  and  will  work  with  the  EU  Accession  States  to  develop  close 
links  between  Scotland  and  the  new  EU  members'  (Scottish  Labour:  On  your  side,  2003:  42) 
'we  will  increase  our  links  to  Europe  and  the  wider  world'.  (SNP:  Release  our  potential,  2003:  2) 
'We  will:  Build  on  the  interest  the  establishment  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  has  generated  by  forging 
links  with  new  EU  members  states  and  developing  countries'.  (Scottish  Liberal  Democrats:  Make  the 
Difference,  2003:  11) 
27  'We  will  ensure  that  the  Scottish  Parliament  plays  an  increasing  role  in  helping  to  scrutinise 
European  legislation.  We  will  work  to  represent  Scotland  in  the  EU,  both  directly  and  through  the 
strength  of  the  UK  government.  We  will  continue  to  champion  Scotland's  interests  in  appropriate 
Council  meetings  of  the  EU  and  inside  the  UK  and  will  work  with  Scotland's  MEPs  to  help  promote  a 
united  voice  in  the  European  Parliament'.  (  Scottish  Labour:  On  your  side,  2003:  42) 
49 independence  in  Europe28,  which  they  argue  would  give  Scotland  their  rightful  level 
of  representation  and  a  greater  opportunity  at  prosperity.  In  this  respect,  the  SNP  are 
off  public  opinion  as  a  majority  of  Scots  do  not  favour  further  European  integration. 
As  noted  above,  slight  majorities  in  each  ideological  group  are  opposed  to  the  Euro 
and  of  ceding  further  powers  to  the  EU  (Curtice  et  al.,  2002).  The  Liberal  Democrats 
are  also  off  public  opinion  over  the  Euro;  they  are  more  clearly  committed  than 
Labour  to  the  introduction  of  the  Euro29. 
2.4.6  Agriculture/Aquaculture 
The  decline  of  rural  fishing  communities  became  a  notable  campaign  issue  during  the 
2003  election  campaign,  and  related  strongly  to  the  above  issue  of  Europe  and  the 
associated  Common  Fisheries  Policy  (CFP).  Again,  one  can  see  striking  levels  of 
similarity  between  the  centre  parties  is  over  how  they  propose  to  deal  with  the 
problems  of  rural  fishing  communities;  and  again  where  there  are  differences  they  can 
be  drawn  from  ideological  differences  over  Scottish  independence.  All  three  parties 
call  for  reform  of  the  CFP.  Alongside  reform  of  CFP,  all  three  argue  for  more  local 
management  of  offshore  fishing,  creating  a  sustainable  industry  and  support  for  the 
fishing  industry  and  its  coastal  communities.  On  support  Labour  notes  they  are 
already  delivering  short  term  aid  but  also  that  they  will  assist  in  part  by  aiding  fishing 
in  diversifying  the  economy  of  the  local  communities.  They  state, 
To  aid  the  sustainable  diversification  of  these  communities  and  meet  public 
health  demands  we  will  support  the  development  and  marketing  of 
commercial  salmon  market  and  the  emerging  markets  of  shellfish  and  new 
marine  fin-fish  (2003:  14) 
Labour  speak  of  a  move  to  a  `sustainable  diversification'  of  the  local  fishing  economy 
along  side  sustainable  (preferably)  local  management  of  fish  stocks.  The  Liberal 
28  'Other  small  European  counties  have  the  power  to  compete  on  their  own  terms.  They  are  led  by 
politicians  whose  utmost  priority  is  creating  a  better  future  for  their  people  and  their  country.  They 
have  the  advantage  of  sitting  at  Europe's  top  table  and  of  arguing  for  their  own  interests  and 
industries'.  (SNP:  Release  our  potential,  2003:  4) 
`Independence  in  Europe  is  our  gateway  to  the  representation  we  deserve.  With  independence,  our 
Ministers  will  sit  at  the  top  table  in  Europe  fighting  for  the  best  deal  for  Scotland'.  (SNP:  Release  our 
potential,  2003:  24) 
7'  'We  will:  Encourage  Scottish  business,  large  and  small,  to  accept  the  Euro  where  appropriate,  prior 
to  its  introduction  in  the  UK'.  (Scottish  Liberal  Democrats:  Make  the  Difference,  2003:  16) 
50 Democrats  have  a  similar  agenda;  however,  the  focus  is different:  they  too  note  the 
financial  support  already  given  by  the  Liberal-Labour  Executive  and  also  link  local 
management  with  sustainability.  The  Liberal  Democrats  articulate  sustainability  in 
terms  of  managing  fish  stocks,  rather  than  the  economic  diversification  of  local 
communities  (2003:  32).  The  SNP  also  call  for  the  development  of  local  management 
and  direct  financial  support  for  the  industry  and  local  communities.  On  the  second 
point  the  SNP  give  more  detail  that  Labour  and  the  Liberal  Democrats,  outlining  plans 
for  fleet  management,  business  rates  relief,  and  financial  aid30.  The  SNP  go  on  to 
comment  that  the  fault  for  the  `current  crisis'  lies  with  the  UK  government,  stating 
that  Scottish  fishermen  have  received  `second-class  treatment...  under  successive  UK 
governments'  (2003:  24). 
2.4.7  Environment 
This  comparison  is  done  across  Labour,  the  SNP  and  the  Liberal  Democrats'  main 
manifesto  documents.  The  Liberal  Democrats  also  produced  a  separate  Environmental 
Manifesto  which  is  a  more  detailed  document  on  this  subject,  which  they  point  to  as 
an  indication  of  their  commitment  to  environmental  issues.  Over  environmental  issues 
again  there  appear  to  be  large  areas  of  consensus  in  the  centre-ground.  All  three 
advocate  a  green  jobs  strategy:  Labour  state  `we  will  work  with  business  to  develop 
and  implement  a  green  job  strategy'  (2003:  8);  the  SNP  provide  a  little  more  detail  in 
their  commitment,  `A  Green  Jobs  Strategy  will  be  placed  at  the  heart  of  our  economic 
policy  -  offering  employment  growth  in  areas  such  as  waste  recycling,  renewable 
energy,  agriculture  and  public  transport'  (2003:  14);  the  Liberal  Democrats  state 
30  `To  tackle  the  current  crisis  facing  our  fishing  communities,  an  SNP  government  will  take  five 
immediate  steps. 
First,  we  will  implement  a  Recovery  Plan  that  will  include  a  range  of  fleet  support  measures, 
including  tie-up  schemes,  allowing  the  industry  to  retain  its  critical  mass  in  the  face  of  current  quota 
cuts.  Although  there  may  be  a  case  for  a  limited  voluntary  decommissioning  scheme,  the  wholesale 
decommissioning  of  the  Scottish  fleet  will  be  rejected. 
Second,  we  will  provide  a  package  for  onshore  businesses  including  rates  relief  for  fishing- 
related  businesses  adversely  affected  by  the  current  restrictions,  and  further  provide  a  support  scheme 
to  offset  the  loss  of  harbour  dues  caused  by  tie-ups.  We  will  seek  to  take  full  advantage  of  EU  financial 
support  and  demand  assistance  from  the  UK  Treasury  given  that  the  UK  Government  signed  up  to  the 
Brussels  agreement.  Specific  measures  will  be  provided  to  support  the  fish-processing  sector. 
Third,  we  will  move  immediately  to  renegotiate  the  current  EU  fisheries  deal  and  insist  that 
Scottish  ministers  lead  the  UK  delegation  from  now  on. 
Fourth,  we  will  use  European  and  bi-lateral  negotiations  to  begin  tackling  industrial  fishing. 
And  fifth,  we  will  take  steps  to  prevent  quota  falling  into  the  hands  of  foreign  fleets  or  being 
retained  by  individuals  not  actively  fishing.  '  (SNP:  Release  our  potential,  2001:  17) 
51 Our  programme  for  government  includes  a  strong  focus  on  measures  to  protect 
and  replenish  the  environment.  Many  of  these,  particularly  recycling  of  waste 
and  development  of  renewable  energy,  offer  new  opportunities  for  enterprise, 
innovation  and  business.  Studies  have  suggested  that  more  than  5,000  jobs 
could  be  created  in  developing  renewable  energy  from  wind,  wave  and  tidal 
power.  (2003:  16) 
The  Liberal  Democrats  provide  more  detail  than  the  other  two  parties  on  how  the 
green  job  strategy  would  be  achieved  (2003:  16).  Waste  management  features  in  all 
three  parties'  policy  agendas. 
Labour  (2003:  35)  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  (2003:  38)  propose  action  to 
address  environmental  justice,  particularly  in  urban  areas;  and  both,  as  part  of  their 
green  jobs  strategies,  propose  supporting  business  in  the  research  and  development  of 
renewable  energy  sources  and  the  SNP  commit  themselves  to  reducing  greenhouse 
gas  emissions  in  line  with  the  Kyoto  Protocol  (2003:  14),  and  improving  air  quality 
(2002:  15).  And  the  SNP31  and  Liberal  Democrats32  propose  policies  of  energy 
efficiency,  particularly  in  new  buildings. 
2.5  Conclusion 
This  chapter  has  investigated  the  policies  that  function  as  an  expression  of  the 
ideological  centre  of  Scottish  politics.  In  doing  so,  it  situated  the  political  parties 
within  a  Scottish  political  culture,  which  was  defined  as  being  different  from  the 
political  culture  in  England.  More  left  of  centre  in  attitudes  and  policy  preferences, 
both  the  Scottish  electorate  and  the  party  political  makeup  was  shown  to  be  markedly 
different  to  England.  These  differences  have  resulted  in  the  Conservative  Party  being 
politically  and  ideologically  isolated  in  the  governance  of  a  devolved  Scotland.  The 
other  three  parties,  Labour,  the  Liberal  Democrats  and  the  SNP  hold  the  popular 
political  centre.  In  the  context  of  the  devolved  parliament,  where  no  party  is  likely  to 
gain  a  majority,  and  three  of  the  parties  are  ideologically  centre-left,  coalition  politics 
31  'We  will  examine  regulations  to  ensure  the  highest  standards  of  insulation  and  construction  methods 
deliver  improved  energy  efficiency  in  all  sectors.  We  will  also  encourage  energy  efficiency  by  setting 
targets  and  by  consulting  on  the  inclusion  of  a  system  of  Energy  Ratings  for  buildings  in  any  schedule 
for  sale  or  let.  '  (SNP:  Release  our  potential,  2003:  14) 
32  'We  will:  Define  a  new  energy  banding  system  to  classify  houses  according  to  energy  efficiency, 
offering  tangible  benefits  to  homeowners  for  energy  conservation  improvements  they  make  to  their 
homes'.  (Scottish  Liberal  Democrats:  Make  the  Difference,  2003:  41) 
52 is  more  likely.  McCrone  (2001:  126)  has  commented  that  `In  an  important  sense, 
Scotland's  politicians  are  all  Nationalists  now'  and  along  with  public  opinion  Scottish 
national  identity  is  politicised  in  a  way  that  it  is  not  South  of  the  border.  All  three 
parties  of  the  centre  are  seen  as  pro-Scotland  by  the  general  public.  This  nationalistic 
trend  was  shown  to  be  a  defining  feature  of  Scottish  political  culture,  and  the  centre- 
left  parties  have  successfully  linked  national  identity  with  centre-left  social 
democratic  ideals,  effectively  isolating  the  Conservatives  and  helping  propagate  the 
opinion  that  the  Conservatives  are  a  pro-England  party.  However,  the  three  parties' 
differing  positions  on  the  constitutional  status  of  Scotland  play  a  determining  role  in 
the  potential  patterns  of  coalition.  As  Labour  and  the  SNP  are  the  two  largest  parties 
in  the  Scotland  Parliament,  with  Labour  the  most  unionist  and  the  SNP  the  most 
separatist,  a  coalition  between  the  two  in  the  current  political  climate  is  unlikely, 
therefore  the  federalist  Liberal  Democrats,  the  fourth  largest  party  in  devolved 
elections,  hold  the  balance  of  power. 
The  latter  section  illustrated  that  while  by  no  means  identical  in  their  policy 
programmes,  the  three  parties  of  the  centre  in  Scotland  share  a  great  deal  across  a 
broad  range  of  issues  in  terms  of  both  ideological  goals  and  policy  preferences. 
However,  where  there  was  significant  difference  the  nationalist  agenda  could  be  seen 
at  play.  Labour  contextualised  arguments  within  a  `successful'  UK  framework,  while 
the  SNP  framed  issues  in  terms  of  a  need  for  independence.  The  economy  and  Europe 
were  two  such  examples  where  the  constitutional  status  of  Scotland  was  brought  into 
play.  An  extract  of  Jack  McConnell's  introduction  to  Labour's  manifesto  was  used  to 
illustrate  that  Labour  at  least  felt  a  need  to  claim  that  politicians  and  parties  `are  not 
all  the  same'.  This  claim  is  important  in  light  of  this  investigation  which  illustrates 
that  the  centre  in  Scotland  is  indeed  crowded.  The  later  part  of  McConnell's 
introduction  further  demonstrates  the  importance  of  framing  the  nationalist  debate  in 
Scottish  politics, 
It  is  a  choice  between  two  futures.  We  can  build  on  what  we've  started,  inside 
the  UK,  using  the  powers  of  devolution  to  take  our  country  forward  or  we  can 
rip  it  all  up  and  start  again  with  the  Nationalist's  plans  for  a  separate  Scottish 
state  and  risk  all  the  upheaval  and  uncertainty  that  would  create  at  this  difficult 
and  challenging  time  in  Scotland  and  elsewhere.  (2003:  5) 
53 This  chapter  has  mapped  the  ideological  centre  in  Scotland  and  spotlighted  the 
importance  of  both  a  centre-left  consensus  and  nationalist  agenda  to  Scotland's 
political  culture.  This  begs  many  more  issues,  which  the  following  discussion  will  try 
to  address.  For  example,  now  that  more  has  been  established  about  the  content  of  the 
centre  parties'  ideologies,  the  thesis  will  explore  the  discursive  strategies  employed 
to:  negotiate  centre-left  and  nationalist  ideological  positions;  project  an  image  of 
themselves  and  their  ideologies;  and  construct  their  opponents.  In  short,  the  thesis  will 
further  explore  the  discursive  negotiation  of  the  ideological  landscape  of  devolved 
Scottish  party  politics. 
54 CHAPTER  3:  THE  CONSTRUCTION  AND  NEGOTIATION  OF  IDEOLOGICAL 
IN  AND  OUT-GROUPS  IN  ELECTION  MANIFESTOS 
3.1  Introduction 
As  the  previous  chapter  explored  the  content  of  Scottish  party  political  ideology,  this 
chapter  will  investigate  the  ways  in  which  these  ideologies  are  rhetorically 
constructed  (portrayed  in  discourse)  and  negotiated  (argued  for  in  a  competitive 
electoral  environment).  This  is  important  because,  as  will  be  evident,  the  content  of 
ideologies  is  not  necessarily  the  same  as  how  they  discursively  interact  as  instances  of 
competing  systems  of  group  belief.  In  addition  to  these  observations,  the  effects  of  the 
new  devolved  Scottish  electoral  system  on  the  campaign  discourse  of  parties  will  be 
considered.  Where  new  systems  of  governing  and  competing  for  power  have  arisen, 
corresponding  systems  of  discursive  negotiation  and  competition  for  that  power  will 
be  investigated.  Initially,  this  chapter  will  provide  an  account  of  the  environment,  or 
rhetorical  context,  in  which  electoral  discourse  occurs.  The  importance  of  the  context 
in  which  an  utterance  occurs  and  how  this  affects  an  analysis  of  political  discourse 
will  be  emphasized  and  a  framework  of  analysis  will  be  suggested.  Once  established 
the  methodology  will  then  be  employed  to  investigate  examples  of  devolved  Scottish 
electoral  discourse  from  the  2003  manifestos. 
3.2  Rhetorical  Context 
Elections  are  argumentative  contests,  with  the  electorate  as  final  judge.  Electoral 
campaigns  form  a  significant  part  of  the  rhetorical  context  and  the  rules  of  their 
operation  are  heavily  regulated  by  legal  statute.  How  frequently  elections  should 
occur,  rules  of  conduct  and  campaign  financing,  access  to  and  balance  in  media 
coverage  are  all  rule  governed  in  the  UK,  with  quasi-public  bodies  set  up  to  oversee 
and  regulate  fair  play  (e.  g.  OfCom  and  the  Electoral  Commission).  The  regularity  of 
elections  is  an  important  factor  in  the  rhetorical  context  because  it  allows  for  parties  to 
be  judged  on  their  performance.  Those  in  power  are  judged  on  their  actions  and 
achievements,  while  those  in  opposition  are  evaluated  on  their  success  at  critiquing 
and  holding  the  government  to  account.  This  electoral  context  predisposes  parties' 
arguments  to  `take  place  in  a  rhetorical  context  of  justification  and  criticism'  (Billig, 
55 1996:  124).  That  is  to  say  the  rules  of  the  game  predispose  the  game  to  be  played  out 
as  an  argument.  The  nature  of  that  argument  is  about  attacking  and  defending  one's 
own  position,  so  that  at  the  end  of  the  game  an  external  judge  (the  electorate)  decides 
who  has  won. 
The  reader  with  an  interest  in  semantics  will  have  noticed  the  conspicuous  use 
of  a  gaming  metaphor  in  the  previous  sentence.  Chapter  five  will  go  on  to  discuss  the 
importance  of  metaphor  in  conceptualising  political  competition,  illustrating  how 
`conflict'  is  intimately  related  to  our  understanding  of  political  elections,  and  that  this 
is  constructed  through  the  intertwining  use  of  metaphors  from  the  target  domains  of 
war,  pugilism/sport  and  argument.  For  now  the  pertinent  issue  is  that  the  process  and 
context  of  argument  is  central  for  understanding  the  discursive  performances  of 
politicians. 
In  his  book  Arguing  and  Thinking  (1996)  Michael  Billig  discusses  the 
importance  of  the  context  in  which  an  argument  occurs  to  the  explication  and 
understanding  of  its  meanings.  He  comments  that  the  meaning  of  words  is  not  fixed 
and  that  `the  same  word,  or even  sentence,  may  possess  different  meanings  when 
applied  in  different  contexts'  (Billig,  1996:  121).  This  focus  on  the  context  of 
utterances  resonates  with  the  British  linguistic  tradition  from  J.  R.  Firth  (1957) 
through  Halliday  (1978  and  1985)  to  the  present  day  discourse  and  critical  discourse 
analysts,  such  as  Chilton  (2004;  2005),  Fairclough  (1995a;  1995b;  2001)  van  Dijk 
(2002;  2006b)  and  Wodak  (2001  and  Wodak  et  al  1999).  Register  (context  of 
situation)  and  genre  (context  of  culture)  are  essential  analytical  perspectives  of  this 
tradition  of  linguistic  analysis.  Investigations  situate  instances  of  language  as  social 
products,  which  have  connection  to  present  and  past  texts;  and  are,  especially  in  the 
CDA  methodology,  examples  of  social  action.  To  fully  explore  the  meanings  in 
electoral  discourse  its  texts  must  be  viewed  in  relation  to  their  context  of  situation  and 
culture.  In  a  CDA  analysis,  such  as  this,  instances  of  electoral  discourse  are  explored 
from  the  tripartite  perspectives  discussed  in  the  introductory  chapter,  combining  the 
social  perspective  of  the  previous  chapter  with  a  cognitive  approach.  That  is,  the 
investigation  describes  the  linguistic  features  of  texts,  seeking  to  relate  its  features  and 
meanings  to  the  texts'  context  of  production  and  reception,  and  the  cultural 
significance  of  those  meanings.  The  argumentative  tradition  in  political  discourse  is 
an  aspect  of  culture,  and  therefore  central  to  appreciating  the  form  of  the  discourse. 
Also,  the  time  (election),  mode  of  production  (written  manifesto)  and  current  social 
56 concerns  (devolution,  bureaucracy,  youth  crime  etc...  )  as  features  of  register,  are 
important  for  understanding  the  content  and  arguments. 
An  obvious  factor  in  the  context  is  that  participants  in  elections  argue  from 
different  positions.  The  positions  as  indicated  in  the  previous  chapter  can  be 
ideological.  In  addition,  parties'  positions  are  to  do  with  their  relationship  with 
institutions  of  power:  whether  they  are  in  or  out  of  government.  In  Scotland  this  is 
complicated  by  the  fact  that  there  are  major  and  minor  members  of  the  executive.  A 
smaller  party  holds  the  balance  of  power  between  two  larger  parties.  There  is  also  a 
superordinate  context,  the  UK  government,  which  is  drawn  on  in  arguments.  The 
different  positions  are  ideological,  in  that  different  parties  have  different  sets  of 
beliefs  which  inform  and  guide  their  arguments.  In  exploring  the  nature  of  electoral 
discourse,  contributions  to  the  argument  must  be  put  in  their  appropriate  rhetorical 
context,  be  that  in  terms  of  a  party's  position  in  relation  to  holding  power  or  their 
ideological  beliefs.  The  following  analysis  will  continue  to  add  detail  to  this  initial 
precis  of  the  rhetorical  context. 
The  following  analysis  seeks  to  explain  ideological  discourse  in  terms  of  its 
patterns  and  structures.  This  is  achieved  through  a  critical  discourse  analysis  and  it  is 
therefore  very  much  a  linguistic  investigation  of  ideological  discourse.  It  would  be 
inconvenient  to  become  bogged  down  in  the  vast  canon  of  literature,  ancient  and 
modern,  available  on  rhetoric  -  as  interesting  and  engaging  as  that  work  is. 
Occasionally,  insights  may  be  drawn  upon  where  appropriate  and  useful  to  this 
investigation.  The  use  of  the  term  `rhetoric'  is  twofold:  firstly  it  is  difficult  to  get 
away  from  the  similarities  between  the  work  done  here  and  the  insights  of  the 
rhetorical  tradition,  particularly  in  treating  political  orations  as  systematic  and 
persuasive  instances  of  language;  and  secondly  `rhetoric'  is  a  word  so  closely 
associated  in  the  popular  vernacular  with  the  discourse  of  contemporary  political 
parties  (though  admittedly  with  quite  pejorative  connotations)  that  it  would  perhaps 
be  perverse  not  to  use  it.  `Discourse'  might  be  the  preferred  term  of  some,  particularly 
when  exploring  the  operations  of  `ideology'  and  `hegemony'.  `Rhetoric'  carries 
suitable  party  political  meanings  for  the  analysis  of  political  discourse,  functioning 
like  a  sub-category  of  discourse  with  its  wider  social  meaning.  Unlike  the  context  that 
inspired  Fairclough's  critique  of  the  marketization  of  public  discourses  (1995),  in 
election  contexts  the  protagonists  are  quite  clear  and  present  in  a  way  which  makes 
the  use  of  `rhetoric',  with  all  its  connotations  of  explicit  persuasion,  more  appropriate 
57 for  describing  inter-party  competition.  `Discourse'  and  `rhetoric'  are,  therefore,  used 
quite  interchangeably  throughout  this  investigation;  however  the  former  will  often  be 
prefixed  with  `political',  `party-political'  or  `electoral'  where  appropriate  for 
clarification.  This  modern  study  of  political  rhetoric  differs  from  the  classical 
approach  in  that  its  interest  also  lies  outwith  the  text  (Fairclough:  1997:  87).  This 
study  is  interested  in  how  language  interacts  with  context  and  attempts  to  make  `clear 
links  between  linguistic  choices  and  strategic  functions'  (Chilton  and  Schaffner,  1997: 
215)  of  electoral  locutions. 
3.2.1  Exploring  the  rhetorical  context 
Thus  far  it  has  been  argued  that  when  investigating  party  political  and  electoral 
rhetoric  that  discourse  must  be  socially  and  culturally  situated,  and  that  these  are 
important  perspectives  from  which  to  analyse  texts,  in  order  to  glean  their  meanings 
effectively.  An  investigation  also  requires  tools  to  perform  this  analysis.  The  rest  of 
this  section  will  introduce  the  tools  of  analysis  for  this  chapter,  which  will  also  form 
part  of  the  analytical  framework  for  further  investigation.  There  are  two  main 
approaches  employed,  augmenting  more  traditional  semantic  and  systemic  functional 
approaches:  the  first  is  van  Dijk's  (1998)  `ideological  square';  the  second  is  drawn 
from  Chilton's  (2004)  deictic  axes. 
In  Ideology  (1998:  263-276)  van  Dijk  summarises  the  ways  in  which 
ideological  discourses  are  ordered  and  constrained  at  both  cognitive  and  social  levels. 
Rather  than  just  offering  an  investigation  of  the  content  and  history  of  particular 
ideologies,  van  Dijk  suggests  a  model  to  account  for  how  ideologies  in  general  are 
communicated  internally  to  ideological  group  members,  as  well  as  to  external  groups 
and  audiences.  Most  notably  he  postulates  a  cognitive  strategy  by  which  group  beliefs 
are  organised  in  competitive  communication,  referring  to  it  as  the  `ideological  square' 
(1998:  267).  Prefacing  this  strategy  is  the  notion  that  ideology  functions,  in  part,  to 
maintain  group  identity  and  solidarity  and  that  group  identity  is  contextually 
important  in  situations  where  groups  are  competing  for  scarce  resources  or  power. 
Therefore,  in  competitive  environments  discursive  strategies,  derived  from  `mental 
models',  will  have  a  semantic  effect  in  terms  of  the  selection  (or  non-selection)  and 
representation  of  information.  Mental  models  are:  `representations  in  personal 
memory  of  events  or...  of  episodes'  (van  Dijk,  1998:  79);  these  models  are  also 
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of  the  world.  Therefore  discursive  strategies,  founded  on  subjective  mental  models, 
operate  with  the  `function  of  expression  or  suppression  of  information  in  the  interests 
of  the  speaker/writer'  (van  Dijk,  1998:  267)  in  competitive  scenarios.  This  strategy  is 
the  `ideological  square',  and  is  formulated  as  follows: 
1  Express/emphasize  information  that  is  positive  about  Us 
2  Express/emphasize  information  that  is  negative  about  Them 
3  Suppress/de-emphasize  information  that  is  positive  about  Them 
4  Suppress/de-emphasize  information  that  is  negative  about  Us.  (van  Dijk, 
1998:  267) 
The  model  represents  a  general  principle  in  the  organisation  of  competitive 
ideological  communication:  positive  self  representation  and  negative  other 
representation. 
This  investigation  is interested  in  the  above  model  because  it  provides  a 
framework  for  examining  the  discourse  of  political  parties  as  instances  of  inter-group 
competition.  Or  to  use  previously  adopted  terminology,  to  account  for  party  rhetoric 
in  terms  of  the  dynamics  of  group  cognition  and  communication.  These  dynamics 
form  significant  aspects  of  the  rhetorical  context,  as  well  as  other  contextual  features 
which  are  not  directly  associated  with  group  belief  and  communication,  such  as 
constraints  on  the  field  (e.  g.  election  debate  on  the  economy  versus  parliamentary 
debate  on  income  tax)  and  mode  (e.  g.  manifesto  versus  televised  interview)  of 
communication. 
As  ideologies  are  shared  systems  of  belief,  van  Dijk  links  his  work  on 
ideology  to  theories  of  group  identity.  Given  his  `socio-cognitive'  approach  it  is 
perhaps  unsurprising  that  van  Dijk  finds  theories  emanating  from  social  psychology 
the  most  useful,  particularly  Social  Identity  Theory  and  latterly  Self  Categorisation 
Theory.  These  theories  are  most  appropriately  represented  by  the  studies  of  Tajfel 
(1981,1982)  and  Turner  (1984),  Hogg  and  Abrams  (1988)  and  Abrams  and  Hogg 
(1990).  For  the  purposes  of  van  Dijk's  work,  as  well  as  this  thesis,  Social  Identity 
Theory  and  Self  Categorisation  Theory  are  important  because  they  stress  the 
significance  of  categorisation  in  the  formation  of  groups  and  their  identities.  Billig 
observes  of  these  approaches  to  group  behaviour  that  `[t]he  theory  stresses  that 
categorization  is  divisive,  because  categories  segment  the  world...  to  be  a  member  of 
an  `ingroup'  entails  a  categorical  distinction  from  an  `outgroup"  (1995:  66).  In 
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or  otherwise)  between  themselves  and  others.  The  motivation  for  creating  and 
maintaining  groups  is  driven,  so  the  theories  suggest,  by  an  individual's  need  for  a 
positive  social  identity  which  is  satisfied  by  group  membership  (Tajfel,  1981). 
Positive  identity  is  then  maintained  by  encoding  the  in-group  in  positive  terms  which 
can  then  be  re-inforced  by  inverse  comparisons  with  out-groups.  At  this  point  one 
more  clearly  sees  the  connection  between  Social  Identity  Theory  and  Self 
Categorisation  Theory  and  van  Dijk's  (1998)  ideological  square.  The  need  for  group 
membership  to  achieve  a  positive  social  identity,  in  conjunction  with  the  necessity  of 
categorisation  to  demarcate  group  identity,  underpins  the  operations  of  the  ideological 
square:  principled  distinction  between  in  and  out-group  memberships,  with  strategies 
for  positive  self  and  negative  other  representation  to  maintain  a  positive  social 
identity. 
Language  plays  a  large  part  in  the  process  of  categorisation  as  it  is  one  of  the 
primary  resources  available  to  individuals  by  which  they  can  signal  their  differences 
(this  may  also  be  achieved  through  other  semiotic  means,  such  as  choice  of  clothing, 
or  by  physical  means,  such  as  building  a  wall  to  divide  a  community).  Categorisation 
is  most  obviously  achieved  through  the  use  of  nouns,  adjectives,  collective  pronouns, 
such  as  `we'  and  `them',  and  possessive  determiners  such  as  `ours'  and  `theirs'.  These 
are  the  small  words  which  point  to  the  in-group  `us'  and  the  out-group  `them'.  In 
collectively  labelling  groups,  utterers  implicitly  and/or  explicitly  construct  audiences 
for  their  locutions.  They  speak  for  proximal  groups  and  against  distal  groups.  This 
brings  the  investigation  to  the  second  of  its  analytical  tools:  deictic  analysis. 
Paul  Chilton  asserts  in  Analysing  Political  Discourse  that  utterances  are 
`generated  and  interpreted  in  relation  to  the  situation  in  which  the  utterer(s)  and 
interpreter(s)  are  positioned'  (2004:  56).  The  word  `positioned'  here  can  be 
understood  (in  this  political  study)  in  similar  terms  to  the  left-right  ideological  cline 
discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  where  `left'  and  `right'  describes  parties' 
ideological  differences  through  a  spatial  metaphor.  According  to  Chilton,  utterers  and 
audiences  can  use  three  axes  on  which  an  utterance  and  its  subjects  (actions,  actors, 
events,  and  audience)  can  be  plotted:  constructing  spatial  metaphors  to  orient 
interlocutors  between  features  of  the  text,  text  production  and  text  reception.  These 
features  may  be  understood  as: 
9  where  an  utterance  occurs  or  is  received 
60 "  what  an  utterance  is  about 
"  where  interlocutors  are  in  the  proceedings  of  the  utterance 
"  what  is  happening  at  the  time  of  the  utterance's  production  and  reception 
"  what  the  social  relationship  is  between  interlocutors  and  the  subjects  of  the 
utterance. 
This  mapping  is  achieved  through  the  use  of  `deictic  expressions'  or  `indexical 
expressions'  which  are  the  `linguistic  resources  used  to  perform  deixis'  (Chilton, 
2004:  56).  Deixis  functions  to  orientate  an  utterance  to  situational  features  of  an 
interlocutor's  environment,  or  rather  it  anchors  an  utterance  to  particular  aspects  of 
the  context  of  situation  of  the  utterance  (Brown  and  Levinson,  1987). 
There  are  three  main  types  of  deixis  in  English.  Personal/social  deixis  marked 
pronominally  by  `I',  `me',  `you',  `he',  `she',  `us'  and  `them'  and  by  possessive 
determiners  `my',  `yours',  `ours'  and  `theirs'.  In  English,  personal  deixis  makes  a 
distinction  between  first  personal  (singular  and  plural),  second  person  and  third 
person  and  most  clearly  indicates  individuals  and  groups  as  distinct  entities.  Then 
there  is  temporal  deixis,  where  adverbs  ('here',  `there',  `now'  and  `then'),  determiners 
('before'),  prepositions  ('after'  and  `since')  point  to  temporal  positions  in  the 
discourse  world"  of  an  utterance.  And  there  is  spatial  deixis,  in  which  the  definite 
article  `the'  and  the  adverbs  `here'  and  `there'  can  denote  a  spatial  position.  From  the 
perspective  of  ideological  group  discourse,  the  deictic  centre  i.  e.  the  point  from  which 
the  utterance  emanates  is  the  `we'  of  the  group,  situated  in  the  spatial  `here'  and  the 
temporal  `now'.  All  other  subjects  are  plotted  in  relation  to  this  centre. 
Chilton's  (2004)  analysis  proposes  three  dimensions  of  deixis,  which  he  calls 
`axes'.  The  spatial  and  temporal  dimensions  are  probably  most  familiar  to  readers  and 
are  representative  of  the  above  examples.  The  spatial  axis  plots  an  antithetically  distal 
position  relative  to  the  `here'  of  an  utterance:  for  example  `here  in  the  West  we 
believe  in  democracy,  unlike  in  the  Middle  East',  deictic  expressions  `here',  `in'  and 
`the  West'  point  to  the  physically  present  context,  whereas  `in'  and  `the  Middle  East' 
plot  distal  points  for  subjects  removed  from  that  physically  present  context.  Similarly, 
the  temporal  axis  plots  points  relative  to  the  `now'  of  an  utterance,  where  subjects  are 
encoded  as  either  in  the  past  or of  the  future.  These  two  axes  also  facilitate  the 
encoding  of  personal/social  deixis,  where  individuals  or  groups  are  plotted  and 
33  That  is  the  discursive  representation  of  the  world  created  by  an  utterance,  which  is  not  the  same  as,  though  it  stands  in  relation  to,  the  `real'  world.  See  Chilton  (2004:  54-56). 
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the  `I'  or  `we'  of  the  utterance.  Chilton  does  not  separate  personal/social  deixis  out 
from  the  spatial  or  temporal  axes  (though  he  does  note  that  they  usually  are)  probably 
because  `them'  or  `you',  realised  as  psychologically  distal,  implicitly  encodes 
separateness  from  `I'  or  `we'.  This  is  to  underline  a  more  general  point  about  all  the 
deictic  axes:  they  are  all  conceptually  realised  through  spatial  metaphors  (or  in  Lakoff 
and  Johnson's  (1980)  term  `orientational  metaphors'). 
Chilton  then  adds  a  third  axis:  that  of  `modality'.  This  third  dimension  proves 
particularly  interesting  in  an  analysis  of  political  discourse  as  it  plots  relative  positions 
of  truth  and  rightness.  Chilton  explains, 
The  general  idea  is  that  Self  is  not  only  here  and  now,  but  also  the  origin  of  the 
epistemic  true  and  the  deontic  right.  The  m  [modality]  axis  seems  to  involve 
several  strands.  For  instance,  there  are  close  connections  between  epistemic 
modality  (having  to  do  with  degrees  of  certainty),  and  deontic  modality 
(having  to  do  with  permission  and  obligation)  and  negation.  (2004:  59) 
This  dimension  is  therefore  closely  connected  to  morality  and  ideology;  and  again  this 
is  conceptualised  in  terms  of  proximity  to  the  deictic  centre.  Expressing  rightness  and 
trueness  in  terms  of  physical  locations  appears  to  be  borne  out  by  familiar 
expressions,  for  example,  `he  is  way  out  in  left  field  on  this  issue',  `you  are  a  long 
way  off  the  mark',  `the  parties  are  far  from  reaching  an  agreement',  `the  Minister's 
answers  could  not  be  further  from  the  truth',  or  `the  Greens  are  closer  to  us  on  this 
issue  than  the  Tories'.  Therefore,  the  morality  of  `rightness'  and  `trueness',  in 
ideological  terms,  is  expressed  as  proximal  to  the  in-group,  whereas  antithetical 
positions  appear  as  relative  degrees  of  distance  from  that  point.  Chilton  asserts, 
The  polysemy  of  `right'  and  `wrong'  supports  the  idea  that  epistemic  and 
deontic  scales  are  closely  related:  what  is  right  is  both  truth-conditionally 
`right'  and  legally  or  morally  `right',  and  correspondingly  for  `wrong'.  (2004: 
60) 
The  further  away  from  the  deictic  centre  one  moves  the  further  from  the  truth  and  less 
righteous  one  is.  Closed  class  words  such  as  modal  verbs  are  most  typically  cited 
(Simpson,  1993)  to  represent  deontic  and  epistemic  modality  e.  g.  should/shouldn't, 
will/won't,  can/can't  and  must/mustn't.  Open  class  word  choices  (or  paralinguistic 
features  like  intonation  in  spoken  discourse)  may  also  perform  the  same  function  e.  g. 
62 `good/evil',  `honest/dishonest',  which  are  opposite  values  and  therefore  represent 
cognitively  separate  positions.  Chilton  then  postulates  that  political  discourse  in 
particular  tends  to  construct  notions  of  truthfulness  and  righteousness  as  being  values 
associated  with  the  in-group  party  whereas  the  opposite  values  are  characteristics  of 
other  out-group  parties.  This  cognitive  and  discursive  strategy  appears  to  fit  very 
closely  to  the  socio-cognitive  approach  of  van  Dijk  (1998)  and  Social  Identity  Theory 
and  Self  Categorisation  Theory  outlined  above.  Chilton's  deictic  axes  expand  well  on 
van  Dijk's  initial  framework,  so  that  one  can  map  the  relative  positions  given  to  in 
and  out-groups  by  in-group  utterances.  Taken  together  this  framework  provides  not 
only  principles  by  which  ideological  discourses  are  motivated  and  ordered  but  also 
how  their  meanings  are  constructed. 
t  past 
t  future 
Figure  3.1  Deixis  Axes  (From  Chilton  2004:  60) 
One  can  represent  the  three  dimensions  of  deixis  schematically,  illustrated  by 
Figure  3.1.  The  purpose  of  this  discussion  is  to  suggest  those  who  create  discourses 
and  those  who  receive  and  process  them  will  try  to  mentally  `locate  arguments  and 
predicates  by  reference  to  points  on  the  three  axes  s,  t  and  m'  (Chilton,  2004:  60-61), 
which  are  indexed  by  textual  features  of  the  discourse.  Interlocutors  identify 
coordinates  on  the  three  axes  and  use  them  to  navigate  and  find  meaning  in  the 
discourse  as  it  progresses. 
However,  it  should  be  noted  that  Chilton  uses  additional  linguistic  features  to 
plot  positions  on  the  deixis  axes.  Going  beyond  the  traditional  markers  of  deixis 
outlined  above,  also  included  are  linguistic  items  drawn  from  open  class  words  that 
still  perform  a  similar  pointing  or  anchoring  function.  For  example  `our'  would  be  a 
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party  to  point  to  the  in-group,  but  `Labour',  `Conservative'  or  'SSP'  are  lexical 
choices  that  still  deictically  point  to  the  political  in  or  out-group.  Similarly,  the 
difference  between  traditional  deixis  and  the  expanded  sense  could  be  summed  up  by 
the  distinction  between  the  closed  class  word  `here'  and  the  open  class  word 
`Scotland',  both  of  which  could  be  used  to  deictically  point  to  the  same  space 
(assuming  the  speaker  is  in  Scotland).  These  latter  examples  are  similar  to  what 
Higgins  (2004a)  refers  to  as  `location  lexical  tokens'.  In  addition,  months  of  the  year, 
days  of  the  week  or  numerals  can  perform  this  pointing  or  anchoring  function  within  a 
text. 
This  does  not  mean  that  meaning  is  fixed  and  predetermined  and  that  the 
coordinates  which  the  utterer  uses  are  read  and  interpreted  in  the  same  way  by 
receivers  of  the  utterance.  On  the  contrary,  audiences  are  not  passive  and  the 
meanings  they  potentially  read  are  many  and  varied.  There  is  a  wealth  of  material 
available  on  meaning  and  audiences  and  it  will  not  be  regurgitated  at  great  length 
here34.  For  the  purpose  of  this  argument,  nevertheless,  something  of  the  subjectivity 
of  meaning  should  be  broached.  Fiske  suggests  that, 
The  production  of  meaning  from  a  text  follows  much  the  same  process  as  the 
construction  of  subjectivity  within  society.  The  reader  produces  meanings  that 
derive  from  the  intersection  of  his/her  social  history  with  the  social  forces 
structured  into  the  text.  The  moment  of  reading  is  when  the  discourses  of  the 
reader  meet  the  discourses  of  the  text.  When  these  discourses  bear  different 
interests  reading  becomes  a  reconciliation  of  this  conflict.  (1987:  82-83) 
While  the  meanings  of  a  text  are  constrained  by  contextual  features  (partly  in  terms  of 
contexts  of  situation  and  culture  touched  on  earlier)  but  also  in  the  representations  an 
utterer  selects,  each  individual  reader  brings  an  equally  unique  set  of  `diverse  cultural 
resources'  (Lunt  and  Livingson,  2001:  590)  to  the  decoding  of  a  text.  In  this 
understanding  meaning  is  negotiated  quite  actively,  with  individuals  using  their 
different  knowledge,  experiences,  histories  and  opinions  to  decode  meaning. 
Members  of  the  same  social  group,  who  share  similar  social  experiences  and 
beliefs,  might  then  be  expected  to  produce  similar  meanings  from  a  reading  (still 
allowing  for  individual  variability).  Correspondingly,  an  alternate  social  group  with 
34  Good  overviews  of  the  text  reception  literature  are  available  in  Fiske  (1987:  62-83)  and  more 
recently  in  Lunt  and  Livingston  (2001). 
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a  word  like  `privatisation'  might  be  read  as  a  positive  predicate  by  a  Conservative 
Party  supporter  and  plotted  as  proximal  to  the  deictic  centre  on  the  m  axis.  However, 
the  same  word  might  receive  an  inverse  reading  by  a  traditional  Labour  Party 
supporter  and  as  such  the  predicate  would  be  plotted  as  distal  on  the  m  axis.  The 
variability  of  the  social  position  and  experience  of  discourse  participants  is  essential 
in  explaining  the  subjectivity  and  vacillating  nature  of  meaning.  Social  variability  of 
individuals  explains  how  meanings  can  change  over  time:  as  society  moves  on  its 
changes  inevitably  affect  the  positions  from  which  discourse  participants  encode  and 
decode  their  discursive  representations  of  the  world.  This  is  how  a  party  can  advocate 
a  policy  at  one  point  in  time  but  then  change  its  support  for  it  at  a  later  date,  in  light  of 
new  experiences:  for  example,  as  the  evidence  of  climate  change  has  mounted 
mainstream  political  parties  have  begun  to  prioritise  environmental  policies. 
This  chapter  now  has  a  framework  with  which  to  explore  the  party  political 
rhetoric  of  manifestos.  The  framework  includes:  socio-cultural  explanations  of  the 
rhetorical  context  of  argumentative  election  campaigns;  cognitive  linguistic  tools  for 
the  analysis  of  political  discourse  as  a  phenomenon  of  competitive  group  behaviour; 
and  explanations  of  how  the  meaning  of  those  group  discourses  is  encoded  and 
decoded.  This  chapter  will  now  turn  from  general  discussion  of  the  analytical  tools  to 
their  practical  application. 
3.3  Rhetorical  strategies  for  inter-group  competitions 
If  manifestos  in  parliamentary  elections  are  the  site  of  ideological  conflict  there 
should  be  evidence  of  the  various  party  political  protagonists  trying  to  curry  favour 
with  the  electorate.  In  line  with  the  ideological  square  one  would  expect  parties  to 
make  positive  claims  of  their  ideological  in-group,  while  seeking  to  discourage 
support  amongst  voters  for  out-group  opposition  parties,  by  constructing  negative 
claims  about  them.  What  follows  will  investigate  how  the  ideological  square  is  being 
negotiated  in  the  manifestos  of  the  devolved  Scottish  elections.  There  appears  to  be 
evidence  for  a  material  effect  on  the  devolved  political  discourse  practices  because  of 
a  change  in  social  practices,  i.  e.  campaigning  under  a  mixed  and  more  proportional 
electoral  system.  The  adversarial  arguments  are  still  in  evidence  but  they  exist 
alongside  more  co-operative  rhetorical  stances.  Different  strategies  are  dependent  on  a 
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form  political  coalitions  and  with  whom  determines  the  nature  and  focus  of 
ideological  attacks. 
This  analysis  will  be  subdivided  into  three  sections:  the  first  will  investigate 
the  construction  of  positive  in-group  representations  and  the  mitigation  of  in-group 
criticisms;  the  second  focuses  on  rhetorical  strategies  employed  by  political  parties  for 
identifying  with  the  electorate;  and  thirdly,  discursive  techniques  for  negative 
portrayal  of  out-groups  will  be  considered.  The  first  two  sections  deal  with  the 
construction  of  the  deictic  centre  of  the  ideological  in-group  whereas  the  latter  section 
considers  deictically  distal  positions  of  out-groups. 
3.3.1  Constructing  positive  in-group  representations 
Positive  rhetorical  construction  of  the  in-group  will  be  described  by  reference  to 
particular  features.  A  group  can  be  described  in  terms  of  its  attributes,  actions  and 
achievements,  and  these  are  encoded  as  being  in  the  past,  present  or  future.  Positive 
rhetorical  stances  might  involve  combining  multiple  representations  of  attributes, 
actions  and  achievements,  at  different  points  in  time:  for  example,  `we  believe  in 
honesty  and  fairness  (attributes-present  continuous  time)  that  is  why  we  did  X  and  Y 
(achievements-past  time),  and  why  we  will  go  on  to  do  A  and  B  (actions-future 
time)35.  In  describing  in-group  representations  in  this  way,  contextual  reasons  for 
particular  choices  will  be  given.  However,  as  Billig  (1996)  points  out  in  his  discussion 
of  rhetoric,  common  sense  is  a  valuable  attribute  for  the  rhetorical  analysis  of 
persuasive  discourse.  That  is  not  to  say  that  pointing  out  what  might  to  some  appear 
obvious  is  not  a  productive  part  of  analysis,  as  from  sometimes  simple  propositions 
interesting  conclusions  may  be  deduced. 
35  Chilton  (2004)  does  not  elaborate  his  description  of  the  temporal  axis  to  include  aspect.  This  may  be 
because  as  Quirk  et  al  assert, 
`[A]spect  is  so  closely  connected  in  meaning  with  tense,  that  the  distinction  in  English  grammar 
between  tense  and  aspect  is  little  more  than  a  terminological  convenience  which  helps  us  to 
separate  in  our  minds  two  different  kinds  of  realization:  the  morphological  realization  of  tense  and 
the  syntactic  realization  of  aspect'  (1985:  189) 
While  tense  is  deictic,  aspect  is  not;  instead  aspect  encodes  the  way  verb  action  is  experienced  or 
viewed  in  relation  to  time  (Quirk  et  al,  1985:  188).  For  these  reasons  the  temporal  axis  is  a  sufficient 
descriptive  tool  in  terms  of  the  cognitive  representation  of  temporality.  Aspect,  however,  provides  an 
additional  tool  of  the  linguistic  description  of  time  in  discourse,  but  it  does  not  alter  the  nature  of  the 
continuum  of  the  temporal  axis,  running  from  the  past,  through  the  present,  to  the  future. 
66 In  the  following  example  Labour  constructs  a  positive  representation  of  itself 
in  terms  of  past  achievements,  `In  our  first  four  years  we  have  secured  the  highest 
ever  levels  of  participation  in  higher  and  further  education  -  abolishing  tuition  fees 
and  introducing  a  new  Graduate  Endowment'  (On  your  side:  Scottish  Labour's 
Manifesto  2003:  8).  Through  the  possessive  determiner  `our',  Labour  ascribes  positive 
achievements  to  the  in-group.  The  noun  phrase  in  the  initial  clause  `the  highest  ever 
levels',  indicates  a  positive  assessment  of  Labour's  achievements,  applying  an 
orientational  metaphor  (Lakoff  and  Johnson,  1980:  14-21),  to  the  numbers  of 
individuals  participating  in  higher  and  further  education.  The  verb  `abolishing'  has 
positive  connotations  as  it  refers  to  the  ending  of  what,  at  the  very  least  the  Scottish 
Labour  Party  and  the  Liberal  Democrat  Party,  consider  a  negative  levy  on  students. 
This  extract  is  an  example  of  a  party  indicating  positive  achievement,  which  carries 
the  implication  that  if  they  have  previously  performed  good  actions,  they  will  do  so  in 
the  future.  A  party  of  government  has  the  rhetorical  advantage  of  being  able  to  draw 
on  actual  achievements  from  their  time  in  office.  However,  an  important  point  to  bear 
in  mind  is  that  two  parties  shared  power  prior  to  this  election  and  as  such  two  parties 
potentially  campaign  on  the  same  policy  record.  Both  Labour  and  the  Liberal 
Democrats  cite  abolition  of  tuition  fees  and  the  establishment  of  the  Graduate 
Endowment  as  positive  policies  of  the  in-group. 
A  key  aspect  to  Labour's  construction  of  the  ideological  in-group,  is  how  it 
portrays  the  relationship  between  Labour  in  the  Scottish  Parliament  and  UK  and 
Westminster  Labour  Party.  As  might  be  expected  the  relationship  between  the  two  is 
depicted  favourably,  for  example, 
With  the  benefit  of  Labour's  sound  management  of  the  UK  economy,  we  have 
made  historic  levels  of  investment  in  health  and  education.  In  the  next  4  years 
we  are  committed  to  a  further  increase  of  30  per  cent  in  health  spending  and  to 
taking  our  investment  on  education  to  over  £4  billion.  We  have  set  national 
standards  for  quality  and  introduced  inspection  to  maintain  those  standards 
and  we  have  begun  to  take  action  to  tackle  poor  performance  where  it  exists. 
(On  your  side:  Scottish  Labour's  Manifesto,  2003:  15) 
The  in-group  is  portrayed  positively  through  the  representation  of  actions  and 
achievements  of  the  past,  present  and  future.  The  preposition  phrase  `With  the 
benefit'  indicates  positive  value,  while  `Labour'  in  the  first  clause  assigns  that 
positive  value  to  the  wider  British  party,  of  which  the  Scottish  party  is  clearly  a 
67 constituent.  The  next  two  clauses  illustrate  both  a  modulation  between  UK  Labour 
and  Scottish  Labour  and  representations  of  past  present  and  future  actions  and 
achievements.  With  `we  are  committed  to'  (attribute-present)  and  `our  investment' 
(action-present  continuous)  of  the  second  sentence,  and  the  `We  have  set'  (action- 
past)  and  `we  have  begun  to  tackle'  (action-past)  of  the  third  sentence  refers  to 
Scottish  Labour  in  the  Scottish  Parliament,  though  the  pronominal  usage  is  slightly 
ambiguous.  Ambiguity  adds  to  the  construction  of  a  positive  and  close  relationship 
between  the  two  levels  of  UK  governance  under  Labour,  at  least  in  this  context.  As 
noted  in  chapter  2,  Scottish  Labour  draws  on  the  achievements  of  the  UK  Labour 
government,  even  though  decisions  taken  at  that  level  lay  outwith  the  Scottish 
Parliament. 
The  relationship  between  Labour  in  the  Scottish  Parliament  and  Labour  in  the 
UK  is  made  more  explicit  in  the  following  examples,  `The  work  we  have  embarked 
on  with  our  partners  in  the  UK  government,  to  guarantee  a  minimum  wage  of  £5.18 
an  hour  for  NHS  staff...  '  (2003:  25)  and  `Working  in  partnership  with  the  UK 
government  we  have  already  made  real  progress  in  tackling  poverty  in  Scotland' 
(2003:  33).  Labour  in  government  at  Westminster  is  metonymically  referred  to  as  `the 
UK  government',  and  the  relationship  between  the  two  levels  of  government,  and 
indeed  the  party  at  those  two  levels  is  described  as  a  `partnership'  (implying  equality 
rather  than  a  constituent  or  subservient  relationship).  This  `partnership'  is  positively 
characterised  by  attributed  achievements,  such  as  a  guaranteed  minimum  wage  and 
`progress  in  tackling  poverty  in  Scotland'.  Therefore,  both  Scottish  Labour  and  the 
Labour  government  at  Westminster  are  defined  as  the  ideological  in-group.  This 
demonstrates  the  point  made  in  the  previous  chapter;  the  limited  powers  of  the 
Parliament  do  not  constrain  the  frames  of  reference  drawn  on  in  making  political 
arguments,  when  the  parties  discuss  policy  in  the  devolved  elections.  Therefore,  in 
this  example  Labour  draw  on  perceived  UK  successes/strengths  in  the  positive 
discursive  construction  of  the  in-group.  Unionism  is  therefore  ideologically  at  play 
here  in  the  identity  of  the  in-group. 
The  SNP  employ  strategies  which  differ  from  Labour  because  they  are  the 
main  party  of  opposition  in  the  devolved  assembly.  Because  they  are  not  in  power  it  is 
difficult  for  the  SNP  to  construct  representations  which  encode  achievements, 
therefore,  one  would  expect  a  greater  emphasis  on  attributes  and  future  actions  (if 
they  obtain  power).  Early  on  in  their  manifesto  the  SNP  explicitly  state  what  it 
68 considers  to  be  attributes  of  the  ideological  in-group,  `Our  values  in  government  will 
be  fairness,  honesty  and  equality  of  opportunity'  (Release  our  potential:  SNP 
manifesto:  2)  and  `Our  decisions  will  be  determined  by  fairness  not  cronyism,  honesty 
not  fiddled  figures,  and  equality  of  opportunity  not  jobs  for  the  boys'  (Release  our 
potential:  SNP  manifesto:  2).  Both  examples  state  that  `fairness',  `honesty'  and 
`equality  of  opportunity'  are  part  of  the  SNP's  attributes  not  just  now  but  also  in  the 
future.  The  implication  these  statements  carry  is  that  the  opposite  is  true  of  the  SNP's 
political  opponents,  therefore,  negatively  characterising  the  out-group,  consistent  with 
the  operation  of  the  ideological  square.  However,  it  will  be  shown  below,  in  the 
discussion  of  mitigations,  that  the  SNP  have  found  ways  around  this  problem  of  not 
having  concrete  policy  achievements  to  draw  on. 
In  positively  characterising  the  in-group  the  Liberal  Democrats  occupy  a 
position  currently  unique  in  devolved  Scottish  politics.  They  are  the  only  party  to 
have  been  minority  partners  in  a  formally  established  and  stable  peacetime-coalition 
in  UK  politics,  and  are  the  only  party  then  to  go  into  an  election  campaign  likely  to  be 
in  coalition  with  either  main  party.  One  might  expect  rhetorical  strategies  to  adapt  to 
the  demands  of  this  new  situation. 
As  minority  partners  the  Liberal  Democrats  may  suffer  from  the  potential 
perception  of  ineffectuality  and  therefore  in  positively  constructing  the  in-group  they 
attempt  to  address  this  problem, 
From  free  personal  care  to  the  abolition  of  tuition  fees,  Liberal  Democrats 
have  made  the  difference  in  the  last  four  years.  With  bold  new  plans  to 
promote  better  health,  recruit  more  teachers  and  cut  crime,  people  can  trust  the 
Liberal  Democrats  to  make  the  difference  again.  (Make  the  Difference:  2) 
Not  only  are  the  Liberal  Democrats  stating  what  it  is  that  they  have  achieved,  listing 
two  policies  in  the  areas  of  health  and  education,  but  they  also  explicitly  state  they 
`have  made  a  difference'  (achievement-past)  and  that  they  will  `make  the  difference 
again'  (achievement-future).  When  compared  to  the  Labour  Party's  claims  of 
achievements  one  notices  that  the  addition  of  the  emphatic  assertion  of  achievement 
(which  the  Labour  Party  do  not  do)  is  not  only  functioning  as  a  positive 
characterisation  of  the  in-group  but  also  as  a  mitigation  of  potential  criticisms  of  the 
in-group. 
69 Other  positive  constructions  of  in-group  by  the  Liberal  Democrats  include:  the 
projection  of  the  parties'  attributes,  stating  they  are  `ambitious  for  Scotland' 
(attribute-present);  and  actions  `[Liberal  Democrats]  want  to  improve  people's  health, 
raise  standards  in  education,  make  Scotland  safer  and  establish  a  better  environment' 
(actions-future)  (Making  the  Difference:  2).  But  then  they  again  emphasis  their  `vital 
role'  and  their  place  in  the  political  system, 
It  is  the  Liberal  Democrats  who  are  best  placed  to  deliver  on  the  great 
expectations  people  have  for  the  Scottish  Parliament.  We  played  a  vital  role  in 
establishing  it  and  have  been  responsible  for  many  of  its  most  radical  reforms, 
including  free  personal  care,  the  abolition  of  tuition  fees  and  land  reform. 
Liberal  Democrats  are  determined  to  change  people's  lives  for  the  better. 
(Make  the  Difference:  3) 
The  in-group  is  represented  positively  by  encoding  past  achievements.  A  `role' 
implies  that  there  was  more  than  one  role  and  therefore  more  than  one  actor  in 
establishing  the  Scottish  Parliament,  and  they  feel  the  need  to  define  their  own  role  as 
`vital'.  This  is  not  a  comment  on  the  relative  goodness  or  badness  of  the  devolution 
(its  goodness  is  an  implied  given),  it  is  a  comment  on  the  quality  of  their  contribution 
to  the  policy  of  devolution.  In  contrast,  Labour  as  the  majority  partner  in  the  coalition 
and  the  party  in  office  at  Westminster  do  not  feel  the  need  to  state  their  centrality  to 
the  delivery  of  devolution;  after  all  they  are  the  party  that  delivered  the  Bill  in  the 
Westminster  Parliament. 
One  can  see  positive  in-group  statements  in  the  Conservative  manifesto  (Time 
To  Do  Something  About  It,  2003)  for  example  in  relation  to  policies  on  crime, 
`Scottish  Conservative  will  reduce  crime  and  the  fear  of  crime'  (2003:  7):  on  health, 
`Scottish  conservatives  are  committed  to  a  health  service  which  is  universal  in  its 
reach  and  available  to  everyone  wherever  they  live.  '  (2003:  11):  and  on  business  and 
industry,  `We  recognise  the  importance  of  the  whisky  industry  to  the  Scottish 
economy  and  will  continue  to  argue  that  it  should  be  treated  fairly.  '  (2003:  19).  The 
Conservatives  demonstrate  a  strong  commitment  to  these  policy  areas  through  the  use 
of  epistemic  modality  such  as  `will  reduce  crime'.  Then  they  use  the  non  modalised 
form  `are  committed'  expressing  the  definiteness  of  Conservative  commitment  to  law 
and  order.  The  former  is  encoding  a  pledge  to  future  action,  while  the  latter  encodes 
an  attribute  in  the  present.  However,  there  are  fewer  instances  of  positive  statements 
about  the  in-group  in  the  Conservative  manifesto,  as  compared  with  other  parties. 
70 This  is  perhaps  because  of  the  ideological  principles  of  shrinking  the  state  and 
devolving  responsibility  to  individuals  and  communities.  Therefore,  there  are  more 
instances  of  the  Conservatives  pledging  to  do  something  which  empowers  others  to 
then  achieve  particular  goals.  For  example, 
We  will  scrap  these  targets  and  restore  to  head  teachers  the  ability  to  set  their 
own  discipline  policies  including  expulsions,  detention  and  uniforms  as  well 
as  the  positive  incentives  towards  good  behaviour...  This  will  enable  them  to 
exclude  disruptive  pupils  and  we  will  reinforce  this  by  giving  teachers  the 
right  to  refuse  to  teach  pupils  with  a  record  of  violence.  (Time  To  Do 
Something  About  It:  16-17) 
In  the  first  two  coordinated  clauses  the  `we'  of  the  Scottish  Conservative  Party 
pledges  to  perform  certain  acts,  namely  the  scrapping  of  targets  to  reduce  pupil 
exclusions  and  to  give  power  back  to  head  teachers.  Therefore,  power  is  devolved  to 
another  group  and  they  then  have  the  power  to  act.  In  this  manner  head  teachers  can 
`set  their  own'  policies  on  school  discipline.  The  Manifesto  then  goes  on  to  suggest 
causatively  that  `This  will  enable  them  [the  head  teachers]'  to  do  x  for  themselves. 
The  verbs  `restore'  and  `giving'  both  denote  the  passing  of  something  between  agents, 
and  it  is  this  language  which  reflects  part  of  the  Conservative  ideology  of  shrinking 
the  state  and  devolving  power.  Therefore,  in  making  pledges  which  the  Conservatives 
claim  will  achieve  particular  goals,  they  promise  to  do  x  or  y  which  then  empowers 
others  to  achieve  the  goals  of  the  policies  and  ideologies.  One  should  be  careful,  of 
course,  on  the  basis  of  a  few  examples  not  to  overstate  a  claim  which  links  certain 
patterns  of  transitivity  to  a  specific  party's  discourse.  This  could  prove  an  interesting 
area  of  future  investigation,  but  to  explore  it  further  here  would  be  to  neglect  the 
current  investigation. 
Positive  construction  of  the  in-group  by  the  Green  Party  can  be  seen  in  the 
following  examples,  `Greens  champion  locally-owned  business...  '  (Reach  for  the 
Future:  5)  and  `Scottish  Green  Party  policies  are  geared  towards  making  a  lasting 
improvement...  '  (Reach  for  the  Future:  7)  and  `The  Scottish  Green  Party  is  alone  in 
insisting  that  we  must  face  up  to  this  problem.  Our  policies  are  designed  to  address  it' 
(Reach  for  the  Future:  2).  The  Greens'  actions  are  positively  presented  in  the  use  of 
verb  phrases  `champion',  `are  geared  towards  making'  and  `are  designed'.  These 
represent  their  present  actions  as  policies  which  will  make  `lasting  improvement'  and 
achieve  potential  future  benefits. 
71 There  are,  therefore,  patterns  which  can  be  identified  running  through  the 
various  parties'  rhetorical  contributions.  In  positively  presenting  the  in-group  in  their 
texts  political  parties  generally  encode  the  deictic  centre  of  `we'  in  positive 
representations  of  their  actions,  attributes  and  achievements,  in  either  the  past,  present 
or  future. 
Mitigation  against  negative  portrayal  of  the  group,  as  the  ideological  square 
indicates,  is  another  aspect  of  positive  in-group  representation.  These  rhetorical 
strategies  work  in  similar  ways  to  the  above  examples,  in  that  mitigations  defend 
against  negative  perceptions  or  accusations  of  in-group  attributes,  actions  and 
achievements.  Like  positive  projections,  strategies  for  employing  mitigations  are 
determined  by  the  current  political  context  and  a  party's  status  in  it. 
Contemporary  political  parties  have  begun  to  be  criticised  for  the  lack  of  an 
ideological  divide  and  the  increasing  personalisation  of  the  political  process  (Fowler, 
1991  and  Stanyer  and  Wring,  2004:  2).  Being  seen  to  be  different  is  important  to 
campaigning  parties  for  two  reasons.  The  first  is  in  respect  to  the  rhetorical  context  of 
the  election:  voters  have  to  make  a  choice.  Even  when  the  electorate  has  two  votes,  as 
in  the  Scottish  Parliament  election,  a  choice  which  privileges  one  or  more  parties  over 
others  is  still  necessary.  Difference  is  then  a  prerequisite  of  being  able  to  make  a 
choice.  In  a  system  where  there  appears  to  be  a  lack  of  choice  because  the  parties  are 
perceived  to  be  `all  the  same',  the  worry  is  that  voters  feel  it  is  not  a  real  choice  and 
so  choose  not  to  vote  at  all  (Institute  of  Governance,  2003).  Therefore,  the  criticism  of 
the  similarity  of  parties  is  motivated  by  a  concern  over  political  apathy  and  declining 
voter  turnouts,  as  much  as  the  lack  of  difference  in  and  of  itself.  The  second  reason 
difference  is  important  to  political  parties  is  because  of  the  psychological  dynamics  of 
group  identity.  If  Social  Identity  Theory  and  Self  Categorisation  Theory  are  right  and 
a  positive  social  identity  is  bound  up  in  group  membership,  then  political  parties  need 
to  maintain  a  distinctive  identity  in  order  to  ensure  the  utility  of  party  identity  to 
individual  members.  Parties  need  to  make  clear  their  distinctiveness  so  as  to  satisfy 
the  expectations  of  their  affiliates. 
As  noted  earlier,  Labour  certainly  felt  a  need  to  mitigate  the  `lack  of 
difference'  criticism,  stating  in  Jack  McConnell's  opening  statement  in  their 
manifesto, 
72 The  choice  Scotland  faces  in  the  election  on  1  May  is  not  a  personality  contest 
between  people  with  the  same  priorities,  not  a  potluck  between  parties  who 
have  the  same  policies,  and  not  incidental  to  the  future  of  our  country. 
Politicians  are  not  the  same  and  parties  do  have  different  priorities.  (On  your 
side:  Scottish  Labour's  Manifesto  2003:  5) 
Labour  uses  this  mitigation  to  establish  a  positive  ideological  position  for  themselves 
and  a  negative  one  for  their  opponents.  The  final  sentence  serves  to  set-up  a  niche  for 
Labour's  manifesto,  which  will  stand  in  opposition  to  other  political  parties' 
manifestos.  Saying  that  `parties  do  have  different  priorities'  evokes  the  presupposition 
that  Labour  presumably  has  the  right  priorities.  However,  this  claim  of  difference 
between  the  parties  may  seem  questionable  when  considered  against  the  analysis  of 
the  previous  chapter,  comparing  policy  positions  of  the  main  political  parties. 
An  opposition  party  faces  a  problem  when  campaigning;  parties  of  office  can 
draw  on  the  laws  and  actions  of  their  previous  term(s),  but  as  the  opposition  do  not 
hold  office  it  can  be  problematic  demonstrating  the  party's  achievements.  This  is 
particularly  so  for  the  SNP  which  until  devolution  had  no  numerical  chance  of 
holding  office.  However,  there  are  rhetorical  strategies  which  can  be  employed  to 
assert  achievements  and  therefore  positively  characterise  the  actions  of  the  in-group, 
for  example,  `Since  1999  much  of  the  SNP's  drugs  policy  has  been  adopted  by  the 
Labour-LibDem  coalition'  (Release  our  potential:  SNP  manifesto:  8).  Ideas  of  the 
SNP  have  therefore  been  `adopted'  by  the  out-group  of  the  `Labour-LibDem 
coalition'.  Positively  characterised  SNP  ideas  and  actions  can  then  be  proved  to  have 
demonstrable  effect  and  validity.  However,  what  this  may  also  illustrate  is  the 
closeness,  in  terms  of  policy,  of  the  three  centre-left  parties  of  power  in  Scotland  and 
their  compatibility  in  terms  of  power-sharing. 
Further  mitigations  by  the  Liberal  Democrats  as  ideological  in-group  are 
illustrated  by  the  subsequent  two  extracts, 
Scottish  Liberal  democrats  believe  the  Parliament  has  achieved  a  great  deal, 
but  must  be  given  time  to  reach  its  full  potential.  We  campaigned  for  a 
Parliament  that  will  succeed  over  the  long-term  and  do  not  favour  hasty  or 
destabilising  changes  in  its  powers.  (Make  the  Difference:  10) 
Scottish  Liberal  Democrats  believe  that  the  bureaucracy  of  government  has 
adjusted  rapidly  to  devolution  but  seek  to  improve  it  further.  (Make  the 
Difference:  11) 
73 The  Scottish  Parliament  and/or  the  Executive  have  faced  criticisms  of  achieving  little 
and  not  living  up  to  the  public's  expectations.  Overspending  on  the  parliament 
building  and  the  Conservative's  characterisation  the  building  as  `Follyrood'  are  a  case 
in  point.  Therefore,  the  Liberal  Democrats  as  part  of  the  coalition  and  the 
constitutional  convention  that  helped  bring  about  the  Parliament,  attempt  to  mitigate 
criticism  of  the  institution  and  themselves.  That  is  why  they  state  they  `believe  the 
Parliament  has  achieved  a  great  deal',  but  then  go  on  to  say  it  needs  more  time to 
achieve  its  potential.  The  metonymical  use  of  `the  Parliament'  is  a  further  mitigation 
of  the  ideological  in-group  as  it  obfuscates  the  party's  role  in  the  perceived  legislative 
shortcomings  of  devolution.  The  Liberal  Democrats  also  claim  that  the  `bureaucracy 
of  government'  somewhat  ambiguously  `adjusted  to  devolution',  however  they  `seek 
to  improve'  the  situation.  However,  the  point  remains  here  that  the  Liberals  seek  to 
mitigate  a  potential  criticism  of  them  as  a  party  of  government.  There  is  a 
presupposition  that  there  is  bureaucracy  and  an  implication  that  devolution  is 
something  that  one  would  expect  to  effect  bureaucracy.  It  is  the  personified 
bureaucracy  which  has  `adjusted  rapidly'  which  again  contributes  to  making  unclear 
the  Liberal  Democrats'  responsibility  for  bureaucracy  in  government 
As  a  party  of  coalition  in  Scotland  one  might  expect  to  see  the  Liberal 
Democrats  create  space  discursively  for  the  possibility  of  partnerships  and  this  is 
indeed  the  case,  for  example  `We  will:  Develop  partnerships  with  the  UK 
Government  where  appropriate'  (Make  the  Difference:  11).  This  example  states  the 
Liberal  Democrats  desire  to  `Develop  partnerships'  with  an  out-group  the  'UK 
Government',  illustrating  an  instance  of  a  more  co-operative  discourse  between  two 
competing  political  groups.  However,  the  manifesto  still  contextualises  this 
accommodating  position  with  the  ambiguous  qualifying  adverbial  phrase  `where 
appropriate'  -  what  amounts  to  an  appropriate  situation  remains  unstated.  The  Liberal 
Democrats'  more  co-operative  rhetoric  will  become  more  apparent  when  the 
antonymic  side  of  the  ideological  square  is  discussed  below,  in  the  investigation  of 
out-group  characterisation. 
3.3.2  Identifying  with  the  electorate 
Parties  are  not  necessarily  campaigning  to  persuade  electors  to  become  prototypical, 
6  card  carrying'  party  members,  but  instead  to  convince  them  to  identify  with  the  party 
74 enough  to  give  them  their  support,  or  to  vote  tactically  in  the  party's  favour.  To  this 
end,  the  campaign  discourse  of  mainstream  political  parties  is  aimed  at  broad  national 
audiences  (as  per  the  discussion  of  the  centre  ground  in  the  previous  chapter),  as  well 
as  more  specific  groups  or  sections  of  the  electorate.  These  targeted  groups  tend  to 
reflect  policy  areas,  in  which  those  groups  might  have  the  most  interest.  Therefore,  in 
campaigning  on  the  business  rates  small  business  men  would  be  addressed,  whereas 
on  equal  opportunities  policies  women,  homosexuals  and/or  ethnic  minorities  would 
be  focused  on.  One  would  expect  Scottish  parties  to  address  electors  in  a  variety  of 
different  ways,  and  in  doing  so  attempt  to  inculcate  those  groups  with  the  interests  of 
the  party  in-group.  Indeed  this  is  evident  but  what  is  also  notable  about  the  Scottish 
electoral  context,  as  indicated  in  chapter  2,  is  the  prominence  of  a  nationalist  agenda. 
How  national  audience(s)  and  party  political  in-groups  are  conceived  in  relation  to  the 
UK  state  differs  in  accordance  with  separatist  and  unionist  doctrines,  and  this 
conception  correspondingly  effects  how  electoral  audiences  are  addressed.  This  is 
apparent  in  both  the  construction  of  in-group's  deictic  centres  and  deictically  distal 
out-groups. 
In  the  following  example  Labour  describe  the  party  in  positive  terms,  while  at 
the  same  time  identifying  those  positive  attributes  or  actions  with  specified  groups  of 
voters: 
Labour  is  on  the  side  of  people  who  want  to  set  up  their  own  businesses  and 
on  the  side  of  those  who  want  their  businesses  to  grow.  We  will  streamline 
support  and  practical  help  government  offers  them...  (On  your  side:  Scottish 
Labour's  Manifesto  2003:  7). 
Business  people  are  constructed  as  part  of  Labour's  `in-group',  as  they  attempt  to 
discursively  construct  an  ideological  position  that  encompasses  a  voting  group  that  in 
the  recent  past  might  not  have  been  traditional  Labour  voters.  This  is  achieved  with 
the  use  of  a  conflict  metaphor36  contained  in  the  prepositional  phrase  `on  the  side', 
metaphorically  including  business  people  on  the  same  army  or  sports  team  as  the 
Labour  Party  and,  if  elected,  the  same  side  as  the  `government'.  As  expected,  there  is 
evidence  of  Labour  constructing  positive  descriptions  of  itself  and  also  an  attempt  to 
inculcate  their  ideology  within  the  minds  of  voters  by  constructing  their  values  and 
actions  as  the  values  of  hypothetical  voters.  A  similar  example,  which  encodes  the 
36  See  chapter  5  for  a  detailed  discussion  of  metaphors  of  conflict  in  Scottish  political  discourse. 
75 values  of  business  and  finance  in  the  Labour  Party  ideology,  is  as  follows  'We  will 
build  on  the  success  of  our  financial  services  sector'  (2003:  7).  Labour  is  committing 
itself  to  future  actions  with  the  use  of  the  modalised  verb  phrase  `will  build'.  The 
`financial  services  sector'  is  denoted  as  `our',  which  refers  to  not  just  the  Labour 
Party  but  the  Labour  Party  and  the  electorate.  Labour  is  constructing  the  entire 
electorate  and  the  party  as  the  ideological  in-group. 
Parties  who  already  hold  office  can  face  two  conflicting  problems  when 
running  for  an  additional  term:  firstly,  they  must  demonstrate  that  they  have  achieved 
things  while  in  office,  thus  demonstrating  that  they  are  effectual  and  worth  voting  for; 
secondly,  they  must  create  a  space  for  themselves  illustrating  that  there  are  still  things 
they  need  to  do,  without  looking  as  though  they  have  failed  in  not  already  doing  these 
things.  That  is  why  Labour  asserts,  `A  lot  has  been  done,  but  there  is  so  much  more  to 
do.  Together  we  can  build  a  better  Scotland'  (2003:  5).  The  first  sentence  of  this 
example  fulfils  both  the  need  to  demonstrate  achievements  and  that  Labour  is  still 
needed.  In  making  these  claims  the  Labour  Party  discursively  align  the  electorate  with 
the  party  in-group  by  use  of  the  adverb  `Together'  and  the  pronoun  `we',  which 
rhetorically  partners  Labour  and  people.  The  people  are  the  Scottish  people  in  this 
instance,  but  as  was  noted  above  Labour  can  modulate  between  which  national/state 
`us'  they  are  referring  to.  At  times  it  is  a  purely  Scottish  `us',  sometimes  a  UK  `us', 
while  at  other  times  it  may  be  ambiguous  as  to  which  they  are  referring  to. 
In  contrast  to  the  Labour  Party  the  SNP  have  a  more  centrally  Scottish 
conception  of  their  ideological  in-group.  Like  the  Labour  party,  and  as  one  might 
expect,  they  construct  Scotland  as  part  of  that  in-group,  for  example,  `Only  together 
can  we  release  Scotland's  potential'  (2003:  2)  and  `Our  approach  will  put  Scotland  in 
control'  (2003  :  3).  In  the  first  example,  the  adverb  `together'  along  with  the 
collective  pronoun  `we'  aligns  Scottish  voters  with  the  SNP  as  the  ideological  in- 
group.  The  second  example  carries  the  implication  that  Scotland  is  not  in  control,  and 
that  the  SNP  are  distinctive  in  emphasising  that  Scotland  is  at  the  centre  of  their 
concerns.  This  point  is  further  illustrated  by,  `We  will  give  our  economy,  the  engine 
of  our  prosperity  and  our  future,  all  the  attention  that  it  needs'  (2003:  2)  and  `We  will 
get  our  public  services  back  on  track  after  years  of  neglect  and  mismanagement' 
(2003:  2).  The  possessive  determiner  `our'  refers  to  Scotland  the  nation,  whose  public 
services  have  been  `mismanaged'  by  implied  out-groups,  but  `we'  of  the  SNP  will 
manage  the  public  services  properly,  therefore,  positively  characterising  the  actions  of 
76 the  ideological  in-group.  In  the  context  of  the  SNP's  separatist  discourse  the  out- 
groups  are  groups  outwith  Scotland,  UK  and  Westminster  based,  as  will  be  illustrated 
below. 
Identifying  with  the  electorate  is  a  rhetorical  practice  which  all  the  parties 
enact  and  it  would  not  be  particularly  interesting  or  illuminating  to  catalogue  every 
instance  of  the  strategy  here.  Needless  to  say,  one  can  briefly  summarise  examples 
from  the  other  campaigning  parties.  For  example,  here  the  Liberal  Democrats  speak  as 
advocates  for  patients  in  healthcare,  `We  will  put  the  patient  at  the  centre  of  the  NHS' 
(2003:  4).  The  Scottish  Socialist  Party  constructs  the  in-group,  often  in  terms  of  the 
nation  and  the  people,  for  example  `the  SSP  reflects  the  diversity  of  modern 
Scotland.  '(2003:  1).  The  SSP  even  list  all  those  they  consider  to  be  part  of  their  in- 
group.  The  SSP  as  a  socialist  party  claim  to  represent  the  working  class;  who  is 
considered  part  of  that  class  is  defined  quite  broadly, 
Our  members  span  the  whole  range  of  working  class  Scotland:  fire  fighters, 
nurses,  call-centre  workers,  students,  lone  parents,  shipyard  workers, 
pensioners,  ancillary  workers,  teachers,  construction  workers,  clerical  workers. 
(2003:  1) 
All  these  various  professions  are  presented  as  paratactic,  equivalent  in  their  status  as 
`working  class'.  A  list  such  as  this  is  rhetorically  trying  to  extend  the  normal 
definition  of  what  might  normally  be  considered  the  working  class  (for  example  to 
include  students  and  teachers),  and  demonstrate  a  broad  appeal  to  potential  voters.  In 
similarly  broad  terms,  the  leader  of  the  Scottish  Conservatives  identifies  with  an 
inclusive  national  electorate  with  'I  want  the  best  for  Scotland  -  for  all  of  Scotland 
and  its  people'  (2003:  2). 
3.3.3  Constructing  negative  out-group  representations 
This  section  will  explore  how  the  various  parties  rhetorically  construct  their 
opponents,  applying  the  analytical  framework  outlined  earlier.  Out-groups  are 
constructed  as  deictically  distal  and  consequently  analysis  has  been  broken  down  to 
illustrate  the  use  of  the  three  axes  (spatial,  temporal  and  modal)  and  presented  in 
tables  which  demonstrate  the  construction  of  each  party's  out-groups.  Tables  are 
77 presented  with  three  columns:  `Out-groups',  indicating  the  type  of  group(s)  identified 
by  the  uttering  party;  `Statements',  giving  a  specific  textual  example  from  the  party's 
manifesto;  and  `Deictic  Axes',  subdivided  into  spatial,  temporal  and  modal  columns, 
which  illustrate  the  linguistic  cues  which  construct  the  out-group(s)  as  distal.  The 
initial  column  `Out-groups'  is  subdivided  in  three  on  the  horizontal  axis  into  `Party 
Political',  `Non-Party  Political'  and  `Locational',  indicating  three  different  types  of 
groups.  The  first  two  are  self  explanatory,  being  the  difference  between  `Tories'  and 
`big  business',  whereas  the  third  type  of  group  needs  a  little  introduction.  `Locational' 
groups  are  those  which  are  specifically  identified  as  being  located  outside  Scotland. 
The  location  of  out-groups  represented  in  the  persuasive  orations  and  rhetorical 
arguments  of  parties  appears  to  be  an  important  facet  of  Scottish  political  discourse. 
The  data  in  the  tables  below  is  not  exhaustive;  examples  have  been  chosen  from  the 
corpus  of  manifesto  documents,  for  their  illustrative  purposes. 
Table  3.1  illustrates  the  SNP's  construction  of  out-groups  in  their  manifesto 
and  the  evidence  here  demonstrates  important  aspects  of  the  SNP's  separatist 
ideology,  as  well  as  the  nature  of  the  party  political  debate  they  are  engaged  in  at  the 
devolved  election.  Note  that  the  modal  column  represents  moral  degrees  of 
righteousness  and  truthfulness,  so  that  an  out-group's  `piecemeal  approach'  marks 
out-group  actions  as  morally  distal. 
SNP 
Out-groups  Statements  Deictic  Axis 
Party  Political  Spatial  Temporal  Modal 
Labour  We  have  suffered  because  'successive  `We  have 
successive  Tory  and  Labour  Tory  and  suffered' 
&  governments  have  taken  a  Labour 
piecemeal  approach  to  governments  piecemeal 
Tory  Scottish  transport.  (2003:  21)  have  taken'  ipproach' 
New  Labour  The  Tory  de-regulation  of  has  not  been 
buses  has  not  been  a  success  success  and 
&  and  neither  has  New  Labour's  either 
attempts  to  deal  with  the  as...  ' 
Tory  situation  in  Parliament.  (2003: 
22) 
Tory  For  too  long  our  public  sector  `For  too  at  best 
has  been  neglected.  The  needs  long'  mismanaged 
Labour  of  services,  staff,  and  and  at  worst  infrastructure  have  been  at  `successive  ignored' 
&  best  mismanaged  and  at  worst  Tory, 
ignored  by  successive  Tory,  Labour  and 
Labour-LibDem  Labour,  and  now  Labour-  now  Labour- 
Coalition  LibDem  coalition  policies.  LibDem 
(2003:  4)  coalition 
olicies' 
78 Labour-LibDem  The  PFI-privatisation  policy  of  `beginning'  PFI- 
Coalition  the  Labour-LibDem  coalition  rivatisation' 
is  beginning  to  unravel.  (2003 
8)  is  beginning 
to  unravel' 
Non-Party  Political. 
N/A 
Locational 
London  government  London  government  regards  `London  'successive'  'their  only 
the  south  east  of  England  as  government'  economic 
the  only  powerhouse  in  the  priority' 
UK  economy,  with  successive  'UK 
Chancellors  regarding  it  as  economy' 
their  only  economic  priority. 
2003:  3 
Westminster  The  Westminster-driven  'Westminster'  'The  'has  been 
fragmentation  and  Westminster-  damaging' 
&  privatisation  of  our  railways  the  UK  riven 
has  been  damaging  for  our  Government'  ragmentation  'has  been 
the  UK  Government  economy..  . 
The  privatisation  d  acknowle- 
of  railway  and  signalling  has  rivatisation'  dged  as  a 
been  acknowledged  as  a  failure  even 
failure  even  by  the  UK  by...  ' 
Government.  (2003:  21 
Table  3.1  SNP  out-group  deixis 
The  above  table  shows  that  the  SNP  identify  three  other  party  political  out- 
groups.  Labour,  the  Tories  and  the  Labour-Liberal  Democrat  coalition  are  the 
unfavourable  out-groups,  opposed  to  a  positive  formulation  of  the  SNP.  In  one  of  the 
tabulated  examples  `our'  is  used  to  formulate  the  ideological  in-group  as  both  the 
SNP  and  the  voters,  with  `our  public  sector'  denoting  that  the  public  sector  is 
important  to  the  in-group.  Note  that  this  is  also  an  example  of  identifying  with  the 
electorate  discussed  previously.  On  the  temporal  axis  these  groups  are  constructed  as 
having  done  things  in  the  past  and  up  until  the  present.  These  negative  actions  are  also 
plotted  distally  on  the  modal  axis,  negatively  characterising  the  Conservatives,  Labour 
UK  governments  and  the  Labour-Liberal  Democrat  coalition's  management  of  the 
public  sector  as  `mismanaged'  with  its  needs  `ignored'.  Figure  3.2  further  illustrates 
that  the  `us'  of  the  SNP  and  the  Scottish  nation  is  portrayed  as  deictically  proximal  on 
both  the  s  and  m  axes  while  out-groups  and  their  actions  are  distal  from  the  deictic 
centre  of  the  in-group. 
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Figure  3.2  SNP  out-group  deixis:  Tory  and  Labour  governments 
The  SNP  were  the  main  party  of  opposition  before  the  election  and  so  quite  as 
expected  they  criticise  the  current  administration,  identifying  the  `Labour-LibDem 
coalition'  as  one  of  their  out-groups.  In  addition  to  PFI  and  public  sector  criticisms  in 
the  examples  in  Table  3.1  the  SNP  also  identify  the  coalition  as  being  at  fault  in  the 
following:  `[t]he  Labour  -LibDem  coalition  has  ignored  these  views  and  continues  to 
press  ahead  with  dangerous  and  unwanted  GM  field  trials'  (2003:  16);  and  `[u]nder 
the  Labour-LibDem  coalition,  Council  Tax  has  risen  by  one  third,  yet  local  services 
have  been  pared  to  the  bone'  (2003:  26).  The  SNP  label  Private  Finance  Initiatives 
which  contribute  to  public  sector  funding  as  `PFI-privatisation'.  `Privatisation' 
connotes  negativity  in  the  discourse  of  the  SNP,  which  is  illustrated  by  verb  phrase 
which  further  negatively  characterised  the  actions  of  the  policy  as  `beginning  to 
unravel'  -  connoting  failure  and  lack  of  control.  The  negativity  which  `privatisation' 
connotes  here  is  context  dependent,  as  noted  earlier.  One  would  expect  Conservative 
readers  to  derive  more  positive  meaning  from  the  word.  Labour  and  the  Liberals  do 
not  describe  PH  or  PPP  (public,  private  partnerships)  as  `privatisation',  as  that  word 
carries  negative  connotations  in  the  political  vernacular  of  the  left37.  The  coalition 
37  How  political  parties  discursively  accommodate  shifts  in  political  position  would  be  a  fruitful  area  of 
analysis.  As  a  party  moves  left  or  right  in  the  political  spectrum,  which  involves  adopting  policies  and 
ideologies  of  previously  unaccepted  positions,  they  must  reconcile  this  with  their  membership.  Norman 
Fairclough  discusses  changes  in  the  language  of  New  Labour  in  New  Labour,  New  Language?  (2000). 
Particularly,  in  chapter  3  `The  making  of  the  language  of  New  Labour',  he  discusses  the  effects  of 
Thatcherism  and  Neo-Liberalism  on  the  language  of  Labour.  The  Labour  leadership  has  often  tried  to 
80 `ignored'  public  views  on  GM  field  trials,  which  are  further  described  as  `dangerous 
and  unwanted'.  Where  taxes  have  risen,  services  have  not  improved;  in  fact  they  have 
metaphorically  been  `pared  to  the  bone',  describing  a  result  which  negatively 
characterises  their  opponents.  Therefore,  the  coalition's  policies  and  actions  in  these 
areas  are  located  distally  on  the  m  axis,  away  from  the  SNP  and  public's  deictic 
centre. 
At  first  this  rhetorical  behaviour  appears  quite  normal  and  expected;  however, 
on  a  closer  look  at  the  manifesto  the  Liberal  Democrats  do  not  feature  once  as  a 
singular  object  of  criticism.  In  relation  to  the  negotiation  of  the  ideological  square  the 
Liberal  Democrats  are  not  labelled  as  an  out-group  by  themselves;  only  in  coalition 
with  Labour  are  they  an  out-group.  This  is  regardless  of  the  fact  that  the  Liberal 
Democrats  are  also  a  unionist  party;  yet  they  do  not  receive  the  negative  criticism  for 
this  ideological  position  that  the  other  two  unionist  parties  of  British  politics  do  (see 
below).  This  is  not  in  accordance  with  van  Dijk's  conception  of  the  ideological 
square.  In  this  instance  one  might  postulate  that  a  lack  of  direct  criticism  is  most 
likely  functioning  as  a  tacit  mitigation  of  the  Liberal  Democrat  out-group's  beliefs 
and  actions.  A  rhetorical  accommodation  of  this  type  is  most  likely  due  to  features  of 
the  rhetorical  context,  created  by  the  mixed,  proportional  system  of  voting,  which 
makes  the  Liberal  Democrats  the  most  likely  coalition  partners  for  Labour  and  the 
SNP.  The  latter  parties  must  be  careful  not  to  alienate  the  party  which  holds  the 
balance  of  power;  neither  can  they  embrace  it  wholeheartedly. 
Van  Dijk's  ideological  square  cannot  account  for  such  an  eventuality  and 
therefore  the  ideological  square  requires  some  adaptation.  In  a  competitive 
environment  which  is likely  to  require  at  least  two  competing  parties  to  cooperate,  to 
obtain  and  maintain  power,  then  potential  partners  cannot  be  characterised  negatively, 
as  the  normal  functioning  of  the  ideological  square  would  demand.  Such 
circumstances  create,  for  want  of  a  better  term,  a  quasi-in-group,  which  is  afforded 
some  of  the  latitude  of  the  in-group  without  being  fully  conceptualised  as  the  in- 
group.  Language  here  plays  a  key  role  in  mediating  these  new  identities.  By  referring 
to  the  coalition  through  a  superordinate  term  like  the  `Labour-LibDem  coalition'  the 
Liberal  Democrats  can  occupy  a  rhetorical  space  in  SNP  discourse  which  avoids 
criticism  and  doesn't  block  potential  future  collaborations.  The  importance  of  re- 
reconcile  the  adoption  of  free  market  policies  and  ideological  principles  by  claiming  they  ultimately 
succeed  in  achieving  `social  justice',  a  central  ideological  principle  of  the  left  in  British  politics. 
81 categorisation  in  reducing  inter-group  prejudice  is  supported  by  work  such  as 
Gaertner  et  al  (2001)38.  The  SNP,  however,  can  still  claim  they  have  been  critical  of 
the  Liberal  Democrats  as  the  conditions  of  the  ideological  square  and  electoral 
competition  require.  This  is  an  important  rhetorical  process  which  will  be  explored 
further  in  chapter  4. 
As  a  nationalist  and  separatist  party,  the  SNP  look  upon  those  who  hold 
political  power  over  Scotland  but  reside  outside  it  as  out-groups.  Modal  and  spatial 
axes  coalesce  as  out-groups  are  both  spatially  and  morally  distal  from  the  in-group. 
The  spatial  location  of  out-groups  within  the  UK  bears  a  direct  correlation  to  their 
moral  remoteness.  Therefore,  `London',  `Westminster'  and  `the  UK  Government'  are 
all  objects  of  negative  out-group  characterisation.  The  metonymy  of  `London 
government'  in  Table  3.1  emphasises  the  theme  of  the  sentence  that  the  `south  east  of 
England'  is  the  priority  of  UK  governments  based  at  Westminster,  and  therefore 
Scotland  is  not  their  priority.  `Westminster'  is  deployed  as  a  negative  epithet  to  an 
undesirable  policy  in  `The  Westminster-driven  fragmentation  and  privatisation'. 
London  and  Westminster  are  locations  that  function  as  metonymies  for  out-group 
governments  that  pursue  policies  which  are  not  in  the  interests  of  Scotland.  Similarly, 
`Tory  and  Labour  governments',  which  are  London  governments,  have  their  actions 
negatively  described  as  taking  a  `piecemeal  approach'  to  a  Scottish  matter.  However, 
Brussels,  Europe  or  the  EU,  although  spatially  distal,  do  not  feature  as  out-groups. 
The  lack  of  criticism  is  most  obviously  because  this  is  not  a  European  election,  but 
then  neither  is  it  a  Westminster  election.  Another  reason  is  that  the  SNP's  stated 
policy  was  for  independence  with  full  EU  membership. 
Therefore,  for  the  SNP  ideological  out-groups  are  defined  as  those  political 
powers  residing  outside  of  Scotland,  but  within  the  UK,  such  as  `Westminster',  `the 
UK  government'  and  `London  government'.  In  addition  to  those  out-groups  defined 
by  location,  the  SNP  identify  party  political  out-groups,  including  the  `Tories', 
`Labour/New  Labour',  and  the  `Labour-LibDem  coalition'.  For  the  SNP,  whose  most 
pointed  criticism  is directed  at  the  unionist  Labour  and  Conservative  parties,  it  is 
unionism  that  remains  the  main  criterion  for  an  ideological  out-group.  The  unionist 
38  This  work  follows  on  in  the  tradition  of  Self  Categorisation  Theory  and  Social  Identity  Theory. 
Gaentner  et  al  (2001)  postulate  that  `With  a  one-group  representation,  bias  should  be  reduced  primarily 
because  the  social  distance  with  former  out-group  members  has  decreased  and  the  social  distance  with  former  in-group  members  has  remained  relatively  close'  (2001:  357) 
82 parties  are  defined  as  promoting  the  interests  of  London  or  the  South  East  of  England 
and  not  Scotland. 
Labour's  manifesto  contains  relatively  few  attacks  on  their  opponents;  this 
may  be  because  they  were  the  main  party  of  power  and  the  incumbent  administration. 
Manifestos  in  general  appear  to  contain  fewer  direct  attacks  on  opponents  than  party 
election  broadcasts.  This  is  probably  because  manifestos'  rhetorical  purpose  is  more 
geared  towards  laying  out  the  in-group's  intentions.  However,  Labour  does  make 
several  notable  attacks,  which  clearly  indicates  who  they  see  as  their  political 
enemies. 
Labour 
Out-groups  Statements  Deictic  Axes 
Party  Political  Spatial  Temporal  Modal 
The  Nationalists/SNP  We  can  build  on  what  we've  'inside  the  'at  this  'We  can 
started,  inside  the  UK,  using  UK'  difficult  and  build  on 
the  powers  of  devolution  to  challenging  what  we've 
take  our  country  forward  or  `our  country'  time'  started...  or 
we  can  rip  it  all  up  and  start  we  can  rip  it 
again  with  the  Nationalist's  'a  separate  all  up  and 
plans  for  a  separate  Scottish  Scottish  start  again' 
state  and  risk  all  the  upheaval  state' 
and  uncertainty  that  would  'risk  all  the 
create  at  this  difficult  and  'in  Scotland'  upheaval 
challenging  time  in  Scotland  and 
and  elsewhere.  (2003:  uncertainty' 
Tories  No  service  suffered  more  'our  'under  'No  service 
under  eighteen  years  of  Tory  National  eighteen  suffered 
rule  than  our  National  Health  Health  years'  more' 
Service.  Turning  the  tide  on  Service' 
almost  two  decades  of  under-  'two  decades'  'Turning 
investment  and  neglect  has  the  tide 
been  one  of  the  biggest  'first  four  on...  under- 
challenges  Labour  has  faced  in  years'  investment 
our  first  four  years.  (2003:  21)  and  neglect' 
The  first  term  of  the  'The  first 
Parliament  has  also  given  a  term'  'that  was 
voice  to  Scotland's  civic  missing' 
society  in  a  way  that  was  'during  the 
missing  during  the  Tory  years.  Tory  years' 
(2003:  40) 
Non-Party  Political 
N/A 
Locational 
N/A 
able  3.2  Scottish  Labour  Party  out-group  deixis 
The  first  opponent  in  the  Scottish  context  is  the  SNP.  In  Table  3.2  Labour  and 
the  electorate,  partnered  pronominally  in  the  use  of  `we',  are  positioned  positively  in 
the  ideological  square,  metaphorically  building  Scotland;  whereas  the  Nationalist's 
83 want  to  `rip  it  all  up',  destroying  the  collective  `we'  of  the  nation's  good  work39.  The 
`we'  of  the  nation  is  also  functioning,  as  Billig  (1995)  would  say,  to  deictically  mark 
the  homeland.  The  `Nationalists'  plans'  on  independence  are  negatively  characterised 
as  a  `risk'  to  Scotland  and  this  risk  would  cause  `upheaval  and  uncertainty'  at  a 
`challenging  time',  plotting  the  SNP  distally  on  the  m  axis.  This  attack  on  the  SNP's 
policy  on  independence  is  a  recurrent  theme  in  the  Labour  campaign  and  chimes  with 
other  attacks,  for  example  in  one  of  their  PEBs  (see  Appendix  Text  C),  conference 
speeches  and  press  releases.  The  Labour  party  as  a  unionist  party  refers  positively  to 
the  UK,  placing  the  constitutional  arrangement  on  the  positive  side  of  the  ideological 
square  and  closer  to  the  deictic  centre  of  `our  country'  Scotland.  Labour  make  a 
contrast  in  the  above  example,  between  positive  actions  `inside  the  UK'  and  potential 
negative  outcomes  in  `a  separate  Scottish  state'.  The  two  sides  of  the  ideological 
square  are  used  to  contrast  unionist  and  separatist  ideologies,  unionist  concepts  are 
deictically  proximal  whereas  separatism  is  distal. 
The  second  ideological  out-group  explicitly  identified  in  Labour's  manifesto  is 
the  Conservatives.  Table  3.2  cites  all  the  explicit  attacks  on  the  Conservative  Party  in 
the  manifesto.  There  is  one  other  less  explicit  example  below  in  which  the  one  can 
infer  that  the  Conservatives  are  the  object  of  a  rhetorical  sortie. 
I  still  feel  angry  about  all  those  wasted  years  when  Scotland  suffered  under- 
investment  and  decline,  and  we  did  not  have  the  opportunity  to  make  our  own 
decisions  to  change  life  in  our  communities.  (2003:  3) 
These  attacks  are  constructed  as  part  of  Scotland's  past.  Jack  McConnell  reminisces 
about  `those  wasted  years',  in  which  `Scotland  suffered  underinvestment  and  decline'. 
Although  the  Conservatives  are  not  mentioned  they  form  part  of  the  global  coherence 
of  `those  wasted  years',  `underinvestment  and  decline'  being  the  progeny  of 
Conservative  rule  at  Westminster.  In  Table  3.2,  the  suffering  of  the  NHS  `under 
eighteen  years  of  Tory  rule',  is  the  period  of  time  since  the  last  Labour  government  in 
Westminster.  On  the  t  axis  the  proximal  positive  present  of  Labour  administrations 
in  Westminster  and  Scotland  has  given  a  `voice'  to  `Scotland's  civic  society', 
39  The  building  metaphor  is  a  recurrent  theme  of  Labour's  election  discourse  and  appeared  to  be  used 
without  irony,  despite  the  controversy  over  escalating  costs  of  the  parliament  building  at  the  Holyrood 
site. 
84 proximal  on  the  m  axis.  This  is  contrasted  with  a  modally  and  temporally  distal  Tory 
past. 
Describing  the  Conservative  Party  only  in  terms  of  a  historical  period,  as 
`those  wasted  years',  `years  of  Tory  rule'  and  `during  the  Tory  years',  renders  them 
archaic,  serving  to  contrast  a  positive  Labour  present  with  a  negative  Conservative 
past  on  the  ideological  square.  The  Tories  are  constructed  as  part  of  a  negative  past 
which  was  endured  by  the  people  of  Scotland,  a  meaning  conferred  by  the 
orientational  metaphor  `under'  in  `under  eighteen  years  of  Tory  rule'.  The  metaphor 
of  being  `under'  something  implies  oppression,  and  the  negativity  of  lowness  (Lakoff 
and  Johnson,  1980:  15).  Placing  them  in  the  past  not  only  contrasts  the  Conservatives 
with  Labour  but  relegates  them  to  history:  Tories  are  not  the  direct  object  of  criticism 
but  `Tory'  is  a  pejorative  epithet  to  describe  a  period  of  the  past  which  carries 
negative  connotations,  functioning  as  a  metonymy  for  the  events  of  that  period. 
What  is  significant  by  its  omission  is  the  lack  of  criticism  of  other  parties, 
most  notably  the  Liberal  Democrats.  Labour  conceptualise  both  the  SNP  and  the 
Conservative  Party  as  their  ideological  opponents,  though  the  SNP  is  perceived  as  a 
more  serious  threat,  being  the  second  party  in  the  devolved  parliament  and  opinion 
polls.  Smaller  parties  might  not  be  viewed  as  a  threat  to  Labour's  vote  and  therefore 
not  worthy  of  attack;  however,  the  Liberal  Democrats  as  a  centre  left  party  and  of 
significant  electoral  standing  is  a  threat  to  the  Labour  vote,  but  is  not  the  object  of 
attack,  indicating  the  mitigation  by  omission  of  an  ideological  out-group.  The 
implication  of  this  is  again  that  the  Liberals  are  past  and  potential  coalition  partners 
and  so  a  direct  or  indirect  attack  on  them  may  affect  further  opportunities  to 
successfully  obtain  power.  This  parallels  the  SNP's  rhetorical  strategy  towards  the 
Liberal  Democrats  and  on  this  initial  evidence  amounts  to  something  out  of  the 
ordinary  for  traditionally  adversarial  British  political  discourse. 
As  the  minority  partner  of  coalition  with  Labour  and  a  potential  partner  for  the 
SNP  the  Liberal  Democrats  are  constrained  by  this  context  in  their  production  of 
election  discourse.  The  SNP  receive  only  one  attack,  early  on  in  the  manifesto,  which 
plots  their  policy  on  independence  as  modally  distal,  i.  e.  that  it  is  morally  wrong  to 
put  independence  above  education  and  health  policy.  In  this  example  the  t  and  m  axes 
converge  as  the  modal  auxiliary  helps  construct  the  potential  future  actions  of  the 
SNP,  which  are  also  characterised  in  terms  of  epistemic  certainty.  Similarly,  the 
Conservatives  receive  only  one  rhetorical  attack,  which  rehashes  the  traditional 
85 argument  of  the  left  against  the  right  that  tax  cuts  will  be  at  the  expense  of  public 
services.  More  interesting  is  the  Liberal  Democrats'  treatment  of  their  coalition 
partners  Labour  and  of  agents  external  to  Scotland. 
=  Liberal  Democrats 
Out-groups  Statements  Deictic  Axis 
Party  Political  Spatial  Temporal  Modal 
SNP  `The  SNP  will  put  will  put'  will  put 
independence  as  a  priority  independ- 
before  schools  and  hospitals.  '  ence  as  a 
(2003:  3)  priority 
before...  ' 
Conservatives  'The  Conservatives  only  'only 
propose  to  cut  services  to  pay  propose  to 
for  tax  cuts.  '  (2003:  3)  cut  services 
to  pay  for 
tax  cuts' 
Labour  'We  have  scrapped  tuition  fees  'Labour...  'Labour 
and  brought  back  grants.  We  in  England'  have 
have  made  personal  care  free  blocked 
for  the  elderly.  Labour  have  '...  can't  these' 
blocked  these  things  in  trust  Labour 
England.  People  can't  trust  ruling  on  'People 
Labour  ruling  on  their  own.  their  own'  can't  trust 
The  more  votes  we  get,  the  Labour... ' 
more  difference  we  can  make.  ' 
(2003:  2) 
Non-Party  Political 
Whitehall  We  are  sceptical  of  the  value  'by  'has  been  set  'We  are 
of  proliferating  government  Whitehall'  up'  sceptical 
targets.  A  whole  industry  has  of...  ' 
been  set  up  by  Whitehall  to  'the  UK 
measure  the  performance  of  Govern- 
the  UK  government.  (2003: 
11 
ment' 
Locational 
London  Labour  The  choice  is  clear.  Labour's  'London  'has  not 
London  government  has  not  government'  scrapped  ' 
scrapped  tuition  fees  or 
... 
introduced  free  personal  care. 
(2003:  2) 
Table  3.3  Scottish  Liberal  Democrat  out-group  deixis 
The  out-group,  Labour,  are  defined  here  as  `Labour's  London  government, 
which  is  negatively  characterised  as  not  having  done  things  which  the  Scottish 
Executive  have  claimed  to  have  achieved,  i.  e.  the  abolition  of  higher  education 
student  tuition  fees  and  the  so  called  `free  personal  care'  for  the  elderly.  London 
Labour  is,  therefore,  both  spatially  and  modally  distal  from  the  in-group.  Labour  is 
`London'  Labour,  and  not  necessarily  Scottish  Labour,  as  the  third  example  in  Table 
86 3.3  illustrates.  Who  Labour  is  in  this  extract  is  somewhat  ambiguous;  one  might 
assume  that  it  is  Labour  in  general,  with  the  prepositional  phrase  `in  England' 
providing  specific  spatial  deixis  for  non  action  by  the  party.  Therefore,  there  appears 
to  be  mitigation,  or  avoidance  of  criticism  of  Scottish  Labour. 
The  `We'  of  the  first  clause,  in  the  third  tabulated  example,  denotes  the 
Liberal  Democrats  as  achieving  certain  policies.  Other  statements  in  the  manifesto 
include  `People  can't  trust  Labour  ruling  on  their  own.  The  more  votes  we  get,  the 
more  difference  we  can  make'  (2003:  3)  and  `Labour,  on  their  own,  would  have  been 
a  disappointment'  (2003:  43),  which  carries  the  implication  that  people  should  vote 
for  the  Liberal  Democrats  as  coalition  partners.  The  Liberal  Democrats  seem  to 
accept,  without  explicitly  stating  so,  that  they  will  not  be  the  largest  or  majority  party 
after  the  election.  From  this  position  they  then  argue  for  as  many  votes  as  possible  to 
make  them  effective  (that  is  influential)  coalition  partners.  There  is  no  outright  attack 
on  the  Scottish  Labour  Party  but  rather  on  Labour  in  general  or  with  an 
English/London  focus.  Like  the  SNP  whose  attacks  on  the  Liberal  Democrats  were 
mitigated  by  including  them  with  Labour  in  the  coalition,  the  Liberal  Democrats' 
attacks  on  Labour  are  in  terms  of  their  behaviour  in  distal  England  and  London. 
Therefore,  the  Liberal  Democrats  are  discursively  creating  an  ideological  position 
which  includes  coalition,  and  then  do  not  directly  attack  one  of  their  potential 
coalition  partners  in  the  Scottish  Labour  Party.  Their  statements  here  suggest  that 
they  do  not  expect  an  outright  win  but  rather  seek  greater  influence  in  the  coalition. 
`Whitehall'  and  the  'UK  government'  are  also  out-groups,  negatively 
characterised  as  creating  bureaucracy.  Again  the  s  and  m  axes  converge,  constructing 
out-groups  that  reside  outside  Scotland;  this  is  a  rhetorical  strategy  for  developing  an 
ideological  position  that  appears  to  foreground  Scotland,  which  is  also  to  be  expected 
in  a  devolved  election  where  Scotland  is  more  proximal  to  voters.  The  Liberal 
Democrats  criticism  of  external  (from  Scotland)  political  agents  is  not  from  a 
constitutional  perspective.  Criticism  of  `Whitehall'  is  denouncing  only  a  small  part  of 
the  overarching  state,  not  the  system  as  a  whole.  Though  they  favour  a  federal  system 
for  the  entire  UK,  the  bureaucracy  criticism  is  not  used  as  an  argument  for  it.  If 
anything,  holding  power  in  Scotland  has  added  legitimacy  to  the  Liberal  Democrats  at 
Westminster  elections.  They  can  now  parry  attacks  which  claim  they  can  promise 
anything  because  they  will  not  win  office. 
87 Applying  the  deictic  analysis  one  can  identify  that,  like  the  other  three 
mainstream  political  parties  of  Scotland,  the  Conservatives  construct  the  alternative 
mainstream  parties  as  out-groups.  In  addition,  the  Scottish  Executive  is  also  subject  to 
rhetorical  attack  as  Table  3.4  below  illustrates. 
Conservatives 
Out-groups  Statements  Deictic  Axis 
Party  Political  Spatial  Temporal  Modal 
Labour  Labour's  return  to  tax  and  'Labour's  'return  to  its 
spend  and  its  obsession  with  return  to  tax  tax  and  obsession... 
piling  on  new  regulations  and  spend'  spend'  threatens  to 
threatens  to  impoverish  us  all.  impoverish 
(2003:  19)  'us  all'  us  all' 
Labour  This  has  happened  because  'This  has 
Labour,  the  Liberal  Democrats  happened 
Liberal  Democrats  and  the  SNP  all  believe  that  because... 
greater  government  control,  all  believe 
&  higher  public  spending  and  the  that...  They 
increased  taxes  and  are  wrong' 
SNP  regulations  that  follow  are  the 
answers  to  all  our  problems. 
They  are  wrong.  (2003:  2) 
Non-Party  Political 
The  Scottish  The  Scottish  Executive  is  'The  'they  are 
Executive  spending  more  on  the  health  Scottish  entitled  to  a 
service,  but  the  people  of  Executive'  better 
Scotland  have  paid  the  extra  service' 
taxes  to  finance  this  and  they 
are  entitled  to  a  better  service 
in  return.  (2003:  11 
Locational 
N/A 
Table  3.4  Scottish  Conservative  Party  out-group  deixis 
The  first  and  most  obvious  out-group  is  the  Labour  Party.  The  first  example  in  Table 
3.4  of  `Labour's  return  to  tax  and  spend'  besides  being  a  typical  criticism  of  the  left 
by  the  right  in  British  politics,  is  interesting  deictically  because  it  plots  Labour  as  both 
spatially  distal  but  roots  the  criticism  as  temporally  in  the  here  and  now.  For  a 
Conservative  reader,  tax  and  spend  is  ideologically  wrong  (in  this  instance,  the 
implication  of  the  utterance)  and  therefore  plotted  ideologically  distal  on  the  m  as  the 
negative  actions  of  the  Labour  out-group.  The  metaphor  of  `returning'  characterises 
Labour  as  travelling  through  space,  back  to  an  old  position  on  the  ideological  road, 
but  simultaneously  anchors  the  negative  behaviour  of  the  out  group  in  the  present. 
Labour  as  the  object  of  criticism  modulates  in  specificity;  the  distinction  between 
Labour  at  the  UK  and  Scottish  level  is  sometimes  unclear.  In  this  respect  the 
Conservatives  mirror  Labour,  as  the  most  unionist  of  Scotland's  parties,  in 
obfuscating  the  distinction  between  parties  operating  at  different  levels  of 
88 government.  As  the  party  of  power,  Labour  do  so  to  construct  a  positive  picture  of  the 
in-group,  whereas  the  Conservatives  employ  the  opposite  side  of  the  ideological 
square. 
Under  the  Scotland  Act  1998,  although  the  Scottish  Parliament  does  not  have 
fully  devolved  economic  powers,  it  does  have  the  ability  to  vary  the  basic  rate  of 
income  tax  by  three  percent  and  it  has  control  of  local  authority  finance  and  business 
rates  (Bogdanor,  2001:  205);  therefore  at  first  sight  Labour  in  either  political  location, 
Westminster  or  Holyrood,  could  be  the  object  of  criticism.  Whichever  form  of  the 
Labour  Party  is  the  out-group,  the  Conservatives  firmly  identify  themselves  with  the 
in-group  of  the  electorate  with  the  collective  pronoun  `us'  in  `threatens  to  impoverish 
us  all'.  The  ambiguity  between  UK  and  Scottish  identification  is  furthered  as  one 
reads  on.  The  manifesto  goes  on  to  castigate  Gordon  Brown  with  the  generic  `it  is  the 
taxpayer  who  is  funding  the  Chancellor's  excessive  spending  spree...  '  (2003:  19), 
referring  to  a  Westminster  politician,  before  returning  the  focus  to  Scotland  with  `in 
the  coming  year  the  average  family  in  Scotland  will  be  paying  an  extra  £225  a  year' 
(2003:  19). 
The  Conservative  manifesto  also  identifies  the  Liberal  Democrats  and  the 
Labour-Liberal  Democrat  coalition  as  an  out-group,  referred  to  as  the  metonym  of  the 
`Scottish  Executive'  in  the  third  example  in  Table  3.4.  The  coalition  is  negatively 
characterised  by  `they  [the  people  of  Scotland]  are  entitled  to  a  better  service  in 
return',  which  carries  the  presupposition  that  the  electorate  are  not  receiving  a  good 
service  for  the  taxes  they  are  paying.  This  presupposition  is  therefore  distal  on  the  m 
axis  as  the  negative  and  wrong  actions  of  the  out-group.  Therefore,  actions  the 
coalition  performed  badly  are  subject  to  criticism.  The  Liberal  Democrats  and  Labour 
are  directly  referenced  for  criticism  with  the  relational  clause  `Labour  and  the  Liberal 
Democrats  are  responsible'  (2003:  4)  for  the  public's  negative  impression  of  the 
Scottish  Parliament.  The  negative  characterisation  of  public  waste  by  the  coalition  is 
reinforced  by  the  use  of  the  pun  `Follyrood'  for  the  Parliament  building  at  the 
Edinburgh  Holyrood  site. 
Along  with  Labour  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  the  SNP  are  also  an  out-group, 
constructed  negatively  as  all  being  ideologically  similar;  the  second  example  of  Table 
3.4.  The  adverb  `all'  denotes  that  the  three  parties  are  alike  in  their  belief,  a  belief 
which  the  Conservative  manifesto  emphatically  disagrees  with  and  negatively 
characterises  with  `They  are  wrong',  plotting  them  distally  on  the  m  axis.  Therefore, 
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ideology  of  the  three  main  centre-left  parties  of  Scotland  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
square. 
The  Greens  in  their  manifesto  break  with  the  rhetorical  conventions  of  the 
above  parties  and  do  not  directly  label  any  other  Scottish  party  political  out-groups. 
Scottish  Greens  . 
Out  -  rou  s  Statements<<,:  '  -`  .-  Deistic  Axis 
Party  Political  Spatial  Temporal  Modal 
N/A 
Non-Party  Political 
National  Local  councils  have  either  `national'  `have  either 
governments  been  undermined  or  been 
undervalued  in  the  past,  undermined 
despite  their  far  greater  impact  or 
on  day-to-day  life  than  the  undervalued 
national  government.  ... 
despite' 
(2003:  9) 
The  car  lobby  Too  often  attempts  to  `Too  often' 
introduce  greener  transport 
policies  are  blocked  by  the  `attempts... 
powerful  car  lobby.  (2003:  12)  are  blocked 
b' 
Shareholders  This  would  produce  a  `This  would 
transport  system  geared  produce... 
towards  the  needs  of  rather 
passengers  rather  than  the  than...  ' 
profits  of  shareholders.  (2003: 
12 
Locational 
N/A 
Table  3.5  Scottish  Greens  out-group  deixis 
In  Table  3.5's  first  example  `national  government'  must  represent  current  and 
previous  Labour  and  Conservative  administrations,  but  who  is  responsible  for 
undermining  and  undervaluing  local  government  is  left  unstated  in  an  agentless 
passive  clause.  `National'  provides  a  spatial  anchor  for  the  utterance,  which  is  the 
antithesis  of  `Local  councils'.  The  national  government's  actions  are  ordered  on  the 
negative  side  of  the  ideological  square  and,  therefore,  plotted  as  distal  on  the  m  axis, 
having  `undermined'  and  `undervalued'  local  government. 
Although  the  Greens  do  not  construct  many  political  out-groups,  this  is  not  to 
say  that  they  do  not  construct  any  identifiable  out-groups,  it  is  just  that  they  are  non- 
party  political  in  nature.  Business,  particularly  the  `car  lobby'  and  `shareholders',  are 
the  out-groups  of  the  second  and  third  tabulated  examples,  who  negatively  block 
90 `greener  transport  policies',  and  who  reward  `shareholders'  rather  than  passengers. 
The  Greens  construct  their  version  of  the  ideological  square  with  environmentalism 
(including  social  and  environmental  justice)  on  the  positive  side,  while  Western 
consumer  capitalism  is  on  the  opposing  negative  side  of  the  ideological  square. 
Correspondingly  `business's'  actions  and  attributes  are  modally  distal  as  they  `block' 
positive  action  by  the  in-group.  These  antithetical  positions,  of  positive  and  proximal 
in-group  versus  negative  and  distal  out-group  are  discursively  plotted  in  example 
three  of  Table  3.5,  where  the  adverb  `rather'  grammatically  sets  in  opposition  the  two 
sides  of  the  Greens'  ideological  square. 
Finally,  unlike  the  Greens,  the  SSP  link  big  business  and  what  they  term 
`establishment'  parties.  As  such  the  in-group  is  defined  in  opposition  to  the  out- 
groups  of  establishment  parties  and  big  business  or  the  `godfathers  of  global 
capitalism'  (2003:  2).  Establishment  parties  are  identified  as  `the  big  four'  (2003:  3) 
of  Labour,  the  Conservatives,  the  SNP  and  the  Liberal  Democrats,  and  this  negatively 
characterised  orthodoxy  is  also  referred  to  as  `jaded  mainstream  politicians'  (2003:  3) 
and  by  the  metonymy  of  the  `Scottish  establishment'  (2003:  2).  As  the  in-group 
therefore  the  SSP  is  anti-establishment  and  as  such  they  state  that  they  will  not  follow 
the  practices  of  those  parties,  `Our  politics  are  not  dictated  by  electoral  pragmatism. 
We  do  not  sanitise  our  principles  in  pursuit  of  media  respectability'  (2003:  1). 
Therefore,  the  in-group  is  positively  constructed  by  defining  it  in  opposition  to  the 
out-group(s). 
As  a  nationalist  party,  the  SSP  like  the  SNP  identifies  holders  of  political 
power  outwith  Scotland  as  ideological  out-groups.  Metonymies  of  external  political 
power  such  as  Westminster,  London,  Washington  and  Brussels  mark  those  out-groups 
as  both  spatially  and  modally  distal.  The  establishment  parties  and  their  interests  are 
linked  to  those  agents  of  global-capitalism,  whose  power  and  influence  is  an 
antagonism  to  the  in-group.  One  sees  evidence  of  constructing  a  link  between  big 
business  and  establishment  parties  in  the  third  example  of  Table  3.6.  Not  only  in  the 
eyes  of  the  SSP  is  there  a  consensus  in  favour  of  big  business  but  the  proximal  `we'  of 
the  party  is  said  to  be  up  against  antithetical  and  distal  `wealthy  opponents,  bankrolled 
by  rich  business  interests'  (2003:  3).  Therefore,  wealth  and  business  interests  are 
values  and  attributes  of  the  out-group,  the  antonyms  of  which  are  the  values  and 
attributes  with  which  the  `we'  of  the  working  class  in-group  can  identify.  The  SSP  go 
on  to  state  explicitly  that  if  they  win  power  they  `will  stand  up  to  the  economic  power 
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(2003:  6),  clearly  defining  the  opposing  sides  of  the  ideological  square. 
SSP 
Out-groups  Statements  Deictic  Axis 
Party  Political  Spatial  Temporal  Modal 
Establishment  parties  'Some  of  these  policies  will  'the  Scottish 
provoke  palpitations  at  the  establish- 
heart  of  the  Scottish  ment' 
establishment.  '  (2003: 
The  Big  Four  'In  this  election,  we  are  up  we  are  up  'In  this  we  are  up 
(Labour,  against  wealthy  opponents,  against  election'  against 
Liberal  Democrats,  bankrolled  by  rich  business  wealthy  wealthy 
SNP  &  interests.  As  a  young,  rising  opponents'  opponents' 
Conservatives)  party  which  is  rooted  in  the 
working  class  we  cannot  hope  'we  cannot 
to  compete  financially  with  hope  to 
the  big  four'  (2003:  3)  compete 
financially 
with  the  big 
four' 
Non-Party  Political 
Big  Business  'The  Pro-big  Business  'establish-  'has  generated 
consensus  of  the  establishment  ment'  widespread 
parties  that  has  generated  disillusion- 
widespread  disillusionment  in  'widespread'  ment  in 
politics'  (2003:  politics' 
Multinationals  'The  SSP  has  the  ambition  of  'multi-  'will  stand  up 
winning  power  and  nationals'  to  the 
establishing  an  independent  economic 
socialist  republic  that  will  'Washing-  power  of  the 
stand  up  to  the  economic  ton,  London  multinationals 
power  of  the  multinationals  and  and  the 
and  the  political  power  of  Brussels'  political 
Washington,  London  and  power  of...  ' 
Brussels'  (2003: 
Godfathers  of  global  'Entire  continents  are  being  'Entire  'turned  into 
capitalism  turned  into  gigantic  slave  continents'  gigantic  slave 
labour  camps,  their  natural  labour  camps' 
resources  stripped  bare  by  the  'global'  'their  natural 
godfathers  of  global  resources 
capitalism'  (2003:  stripped  bare' 
Locational 
Washington  'will  stand  up  to  the  economic  'multi-  'will  stand  up 
London  power  of  the  multinationals  nationals'  to' 
and  the  political  power  of 
&  Washington,  London  and  'Washing- 
Brussels 
Brussels'  (2003:  6)  ton,  London 
and 
Brussels' 
Westminster  'Nonetheless,  as  it  stands,  the  'the  Scottish  'are  heavily 
Scottish  Parliament  is  a  PG  Parliament'  censored  by 
certificate  parliament  whose  the  grown- 
powers  are  heavily  censored  'in  West-  ups' 
by  the  grown-ups  in  minster' 
Westminster'  (2003: 
ante  s.  e  Sir  out-group  aeixis 
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The  findings  of  this  chapter  can  be  summarised  as  follows.  Firstly,  it  can  be  seen  that 
not  every  party  has  the  same  vision  of  who  their  ideological  opponents  are,  as  this 
varies  considerably  across  the  political  spectrum.  For  the  four  dominant  parties  of 
Scottish  politics  (Labour,  the  SNP,  the  Conservatives  and  the  Liberal  Democrats) 
their  out-groups  are  predominantly  party  political  in  nature.  However,  even  among 
those  parties  there  are  differences.  Labour  and  the  Conservatives  tend  to  construct 
their  out-groups  mainly  as  Scottish  in  location,  though  the  Conservatives  are 
occasionally  ambiguous  as  to  whether  they  are  referring  to  Labour  as  a  UK  party  or 
just  as  the  Labour  Party  in  Scotland.  These  two  parties  are  the  most  pro-union  of  the 
Scottish  parties.  Labour  is  the  party  of  UK  government  at  the  time  of  campaigning, 
therefore  they  are  less  likely  to  construct  out-groups  which  would  politically 
compromise  the  union.  The  SNP,  the  Liberal  Democrats  and  the  SSP  also  add  a 
locational  facet  in  defining  ideological  out-groups.  Both  the  SNP  and  SSP  parties  are 
pro-independence  for  Scotland  (as  are  the  Greens)  and  therefore  identify  political 
agents  outwith  Scotland  as  ideological  opponents.  Although  ideologically  federal- 
unionists  in  nature,  the  Liberal  Democrats  also  define  out-groups  locationally.  As  the 
minority  coalition  partner  that  is  not  in  power  in  the  UK  government,  the  Liberals  try 
to  characterise  government  without  them  as  negative,  i.  e.  `People  can't  trust  Labour 
ruling  on  their  own'  (2003:  2).  The  final  major  difference  is  illustrated  by  the  two 
minority  parties  of  Scottish  politics.  Both  the  SSP  and  the  Greens  identify  non- 
political  out-groups,  namely  agents  of  global  capitalism,  such  as  `the  car  lobby'  and 
`multinationals'.  This  is  unsurprising  from  parties  with  either  socialist  or 
environmentalist  ideologies.  The  Greens,  however,  do  tend  to  be  less  pejorative  in 
their  characterisations  and  ambiguous  when  defining  political  out-groups,  which 
reflects  their  stated  desire  to  run  a  positive  campaign. 
Devolution  as  the  political  system  forming  the  context  for  these  displays  of 
ideology  can  be  seen  to  effect  those  ideological  utterances.  For  the  Labour  Party 
describing  positively  a  `partnership'  between  Scottish  devolved  government  and  UK 
Westminster  government  necessarily  optimistically  draws  on  the  newly  established 
constitutional  context,  between  national  and  devolved  parliaments.  Therefore,  the 
Labour  Party,  in  government  north  and  south  of  the  border  and  as  ideologically 
unionist,  defines  the  party  in  both  locations  as  the  in-group.  For  nationalist  parties  like 
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the  in-group  with  Scottish  voters  and  constructs  political  foes  that  have  no  immediate 
relevance  to  the  groups  participating  in  the  devolved  elections. 
The  chapter  further  demonstrated  how  the  campaigning  parties  rhetorically 
constructed  in  and  out-groups.  This  construction  is  affected  by  the  ordering  processes 
of  the  ideological  square,  which  were  demonstrable  in  manifesto  discourse.  In 
addition  to  the  ideological  square  ordering  groups  on  an  antithetical  basis,  it  was 
shown  that  in  and  out-groups  are  plotted  discursively  as  being  in  proximity  to  and 
distant  from  the  deictic  centre  of  a  discourse.  Chilton's  (2004)  deictic  analysis 
illustrated  that  the  in-group  was  plotted  as  deictically  proximal,  whereas  out-groups 
were  deictically  distal  on  the  basis  of  at  least  one  of  three  axes:  spatial,  temporal  and 
modal.  Proximal  positions  tend  to  correspond  to  positive  sides  of  the  ideological 
square,  whereas  distal  positions  plot  the  negative  sides.  However,  the  descriptive 
power  of  van  Dijk's  (1998)  ideological  square  was  found  to  be  inadequate  when 
applied  to  certain  aspects  of  devolved  Scottish  electoral  discourse.  The  ideological 
square  is  discussed  further  in  the  next  chapter. 
The  mixed  proportional  electoral  system  in  particular  can  be  seen  to  have  a 
material  effect  in  the  discursive  construction  of  ideological  in  and  out-groups, 
especially  for  the  three  parties  most  likely  to  form  a  government.  Labour  do  not 
strongly  identify  the  Liberal  Democrats  as  an  ideological  out-group,  whereas  the  SNP 
only  ever  define  the  Liberals  as  an  out-group  in  conjunction  with  Labour,  as  in  `the 
Labour-Liberal  Democrat  coalition'.  Labour  as  an  out-group  for  the  Liberals 
generally  focuses  on  Labour  as  a  UK  party,  ruling  alone  at  Westminster;  no  direct 
criticism  of  Scottish  Labour  is  made.  Although  the  SNP  are  defined  negatively  as  an 
out-group,  it  is  only  once  in  the  entire  manifesto.  The  negative  comment  occurs 
within  the  UK  Party's  leader's  comments,  at  the  beginning  of  the  document  and  not  as 
part  of  the  Scottish  leader's  comments.  The  constitutional  arrangements  of  devolution 
can  therefore  be  seen  to  have  a  material  effect  on  the  ways  in  which  parties 
discursively  negotiate  the  political  field.  As  the  two  dominant  parties  of  Scottish 
politics  and  the  two  parties  most  likely  to  be  either  in  office  or  the  main  opposition 
party,  Labour  and  the  SNP  construct  adversarial  positions  in  relation  to  each  other. 
This  antagonism  reflects  old  adversaries,  which  are  traditionally  played  out  in  the 
Single  Member  Simple  Plurality  (SMSP)  system  of  the  Westminster  elections,  and 
also  reflect  the  benefit  both  parties  receive  from  the  `first  vote'  in  the  mixed  system 
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neither  party  is  likely  to  obtain  a  majority  in  the  Parliament.  The  Liberal  Democrats 
obtain  more  seats  than  they  would  under  a  purely  SMSP  system  and  as  they  are 
centre-left  ideologically  they  are  more  natural  bedfellows  for  both  Labour  and  the 
SNP  (unlike  the  Conservatives).  Therefore,  because  of  the  conditions  created  by  the 
devolved  constitutional  arrangements,  there  are  less  than  antagonistic  positions 
constructed  between  the  two  main  parties  and  the  Liberals,  discursively  leaving  room 
for  the  possibility  of  coalition.  The  ideological  square  requires  augmentation  to 
adequately  account  for  discourse  which  involves  instances  of  out-group 
accommodation  and  compromise.  In  such  conditions,  a  quasi  in-group  category  is 
necessary,  where  an  out-group  can  be  constructed  in  terms  similar  to  the  in-group:  an 
allied  out-group's  negative  actions/attributes/achievements  can  then  be  discursively 
mitigated  on  their  behalf,  either  directly  or  by  omission.  This  is  another  point 
explored  further  in  the  following  chapter. 
The  proportional  aspect  of  the  electoral  system  confers  a  more  tangible 
opportunity  for  minority  parties  like  the  Greens  and  SSP  to  obtain  elected 
representatives.  These  minority  parties  can  obtain  seats  despite  them  being  typically 
seen  as  being  peripheral  to  the  traditional  mainstream  of  British  politics.  They  can 
campaign  more  effectively  on  ideological  ground  either  neglected  or  long  since 
abandoned  by  the  four  dominant  parties  in  Scottish  politics.  The  `second  vote' 
encourages  voters  to  make  an  additional  choice  and  although  nothing  prohibits  voters 
from  marking  two  votes  for  the  same  party,  a  second  vote  does  afford  an  opportunity 
to  make  a  distinct  second  choice.  The  minority  parties,  and  the  Liberal  Democrats, 
have  been  quick  to  realise  the  potential  of  the  second  vote  for  their  electioneering. 
Both  the  Greens  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  ran  a  `use  your  second  vote'  campaign 
message  in  the  2003  campaign  to  encourage  voters  to  make  a  different  choice  than  the 
first  vote.  The  presupposition  of  a  `use  your  second  vote'  is  that  voting  for  the  same 
party  twice  is  somehow  not  using  the  second  vote.  This  message  implies  that  a  voter 
should  make  an  alternative  choice,  which  is  a  very  different  method  of  voting  than  in 
Westminster  SMSP  elections.  A  voter  can  more  easily  vote  tactically  for  a 
multiplicity  of  voices  in  Parliament,  rather  than  bipartite  division  between  a 
government  and  an  opposition  party.  It  was  suggested  that  this  situation  has  also 
affected  the  type  of  rhetorical  proposition  which  the  Liberal  Democrats  employ  in 
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their  own. 
This  chapter  has  attempted  to  demonstrate  the  material  effect  on  the  linguistic 
construction  of  party  political  positions  in  the  manifestos  by  the  constitutional 
arrangements  of  devolution  in  Scotland  for  the  Scottish  Parliament  Elections  of  2003. 
The  detail  contained  in  the  manifestos  afforded  an  opportunity  to  look  in  some  length 
at  the  ideological  negotiation  of  the  political  field  in  these  elections.  This 
investigation  illustrated  that  the  familiar  battleground  of  nationalism  and  unionism 
still  plays  a  part  in  the  fight  for  democratic  representation  in  Scotland.  However, 
because  of  the  contextual  conditions  of  the  electoral  system  the  two  opposing  sides  of 
the  argument  have  to  construct  potential  alliances,  i.  e.  between  the  unionist  Liberal 
Democrats  and  the  nationalist/separatist  SNP.  The  parties'  conceptions  of  what  the 
nature  of  the  relationship  between  Scotland  and  the  UK  is  and  should  be  still  affect 
the  manner  in  which  ideological  positions  are  constructed.  Unionist  Labour  constructs 
a  position  of  partnership,  while  the  Conservatives  tend  not  to  draw  heavily  on 
negative  comparisons  between  Scotland  and  the  UK.  The  Conservatives  in  utilising  a 
large  degree  of  ambiguity  when  employing  referential  labels  to  Labour  obfuscate  the 
distinction  between  Labour  in  Scotland  and  Labour  in  the  UK.  Conservatives  present 
UK  Labour  and  Scottish  Labour  as  a  unitary  body  and  in  doing  so  illustrate  the  unity 
of  their  constitutional  conception  of  Scotland's  relationship  with  the  rest  of  the  UK. 
Therefore,  nationalist  parties  defined  locational  non-Scottish  out-groups,  such  as 
`Westminster'  and  `the  UK  government'.  The  exception  to  this  was  the  Liberal 
Democrats  who  because  of  their  need  to  demonstrate  their  effectiveness  in  a  power- 
sharing  executive  constructed  the  'UK  government'  and  `London  Labour'  as  out- 
groups.  And  finally,  the  electoral  system  for  the  Scottish  Parliament  has  given 
minority  parties  a  greater  voice,  as  they  can  utilise  the  `second  vote'.  The  SSP  identify 
the  traditional  parties  of  UK  politics  as  `the  establishment'  and  link  them  with  non- 
traditional  political  out-groups  of  capitalist  industry.  Whereas  the  Greens,  similarly 
identify  industrial  organisations  as  out-groups  they  do  not  directly  criticise  other 
political  parties. 
The  following  chapter  will  further  explore  the  rhetorical  strategies  which  are 
in  evidence  in  the  2003  manifestos,  particularly  those  of  which  mediate  the 
relationship  between  the  centre  parties  of  Scottish  devolved  politics.  However,  these 
strategies  will  be  investigated  in  relation  to  their  manifestation  in  party  election 
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that  these  strategies  are  repeated  across  different  modes  of  electoral  discourse, 
reproducing  aspects  of  the  rhetorical  form  and  content  of  ideological  discursive 
strategies. 
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BROADCASTS:  REDEFINING  THE  IDEOLOGICAL  SQUARE  IN  THE  CENTRE 
OF  DEVOLVED  SCOTTISH  ELECTIONS 
4.1  Introduction 
Party  election  broadcasts  (PEBs)  like  manifestos  are  a  major  set  of  campaign  texts  in 
a  party's  electioneering  arsenal;  so  it  is  those  texts  that  will  now  be  addressed.  This 
chapter  will  investigate  rhetorical  strategies  voiced  through  the  broadcasts.  In  doing 
so  this  discussion  will  expand  on  the  analysis  of  ideological  negotiation  carried  out  in 
the  previous  chapter.  The  initial  observations  made  concerning  the  operations  of  van 
Dijk's  (1998)  ideological  square  will  be  further  investigated.  Both  chapters  2  and  3 
indicated  that  adversarial  and  cooperative  rhetorical  strategies  are  in  operation  in 
devolved  Scottish  elections;  and  that  of  particular  interest  were  the  three  centre-left 
parties,  Labour,  the  SNP  and  the  Liberal  Democrats.  As  such,  specific  attention  will 
be  paid  to  the  ways  in  which  the  three  centre-left  parties  of  Scottish  politics  negotiate 
and  construct  positions  in  relation  to  each  other,  in  the  rhetorical  space  of  Scottish 
political  discourse.  It  will  be  shown  that  these  observations  add  support  to  the 
previous  chapter's  call  for  a  redefining  of  the  ideological  square;  the  implication  of 
which  is  that  the  character  of  Scottish  devolved  electoral  politics  is  somewhat 
different  to  the  traditional  adversarial  paradigm  of  British  politics  (Bogdanor,  2001: 
285-286). 
Like  manifestos,  PEBs  have  received  little  scholarly  attention;  instead  research 
has  tended  to  focus  on  the  impact  of  campaign  reportage  in  the  media  (Pattie  and 
Johnston,  2002:  334).  However,  of  the  work  that  has  been  carried  out  there  are  some 
noteworthy  investigations.  Pattie  and  Johnston  (2002)  assessed  the  impact  of  party 
broadcasts  on  voting  behaviour  in  the  1997  British  general  election,  finding  that  there 
were  effects  on  those  who  viewed  them.  Broadcasts  were  shown  to  make  voters  more 
favourably  disposed  to  parties  and  their  leaders.  Although  there  was  no  impact  on 
Labour  and  Conservative  supporters'  voting  intentions  for  that  election,  there  was  a 
positive  swing  towards  support  for  Liberal  Democrats  after  viewing.  Pearce  (2001  and 
2005)  has  taken  a  CDA  approach  to  analysis,  investigating  personalisation  and 
informalization  in  party  broadcasts.  Most  interestingly,  Pearce  (2005),  in  a  corpus 
stretching  form  1966  to  1997,  found  an  increase  in  informality  over  time.  Rosenbaum 
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inception  in  the  early  1950s  through  to  the  late  1990s.  His  study  is  situated  within  a 
wider  discussion  of  the  development  of  British  campaigning  methods.  Many  of 
Rosenbaum's  observations  supply  the  background  detailing  of  the  genre  illustrated 
below. 
The  work  of  Pattie  and  Johnston,  and  Pearce  is  relevant  to  this  thesis  because 
it  has  begun  to  investigate  PEBs  as  texts  involved  in  persuasive  discourse.  The  latter 
explores  some  of  the  processes  involved  in  persuasive  public  discourse  while  the 
former  deals  with  effects  of  that  discourse.  The  studies  represent  a  meagre,  but 
fruitful,  beginning  to  the  investigation  of  PEBs.  More  work  is  still  to  be  done  to  build 
on  Pearce's  initial  sorties  into  investigating  the  rhetorical  strategies  used  in  these 
largely  under-researched  political  texts.  This  chapter  will  attempt  to  add  to  this  work, 
by  investigating  some  of  the  argumentative  strategies  employed  in  broadcasts  by 
competing  parties.  At  the  time  of  writing  there  appeared  to  be  no  published  research 
on  PEBs  for  devolved  Scottish  Parliament  elections;  therefore  this  chapter  will  also 
begin  to  fill  that  gap. 
The  first  televised  PEBs  were  broadcast  during  the  1951  general  election 
campaign,  with  Labour,  Conservatives  and  the  Liberals  all  receiving  one  15  minute 
broadcast.  Rosenbaum  (1997)  divides  the  evolution  of  PEBs  into  three  phases.  The 
first  phase,  1951-68,  was  characterised  by  their  length,  their  monopoly  on  electoral 
broadcasting  and  a  lack  of  sophistication.  Broadcasts'  simplicity  were  constrained  by 
both  the  newness  of  the  medium  and  the  limitations  of  technology  i.  e.,  large, 
unwieldy  cameras  and  expensive,  time  consuming  editing.  Broadcasts  tended  to 
consist  of  a  leading  party  member(s)  (not  necessarily  the  leader)  often  talking  straight 
to  camera,  reading  from  prepared  notes,  a  so-called  `talking  heads'  format  still  seen 
today.  Other  formats  included  a  scripted  interview  and  staged  press  conferences. 
Before  1959  general  elections  received  no  TV  or  radio  news  coverage  and,  therefore, 
PEBs  occupied  a  monopoly  of  election  broadcast  material.  Phase  two,  1969-78, 
benefited  from  improvements  in  technology,  which  allowed  for  cheaper  and  non- 
studio  based  filming.  This  period  also  saw  a  greater  degree  of  creativity  in  production, 
with  soap-opera,  TV  advert  and  broadcast  news  formats  being  used,  and  in  general  a 
greater  use  of  visuals.  By  phase  three,  1978-present,  Rosenbaum  notes  that  `talking 
heads  [were]  decreasing'  (1997:  59).  Broadcasts  became  part  of  more  integrated 
advertising  strategies,  coordinating  with  other  party  campaign  materials.  This  more 
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Conservative  appointment  of  the  advertising  agency  Saatchi  and  Saatchi  (Bruce, 
1992;  Rosenbaum,  1997).  By  this  later  phase  broadcasts  are  shorter  and  now  range 
between  3  and  5  minutes  in  length.  Reductions  in  length  and  the  use  of  advertising 
agencies  have  led  to  accusations  that  PEBs  amount  to  political  adverts,  though  in  the 
UK,  broadcasts  are  still  longer  than  their  U.  S  counter  parts.  Unlike  adverts  political 
broadcasts  have  little  regulation  in  terms  of  content  and  fairness.  They  are  regulated 
by  OfCom  and  the  Electoral  Commission  regarding  allocation  of  scheduling  slots, 
which  is  decided  by  previous  electoral  representation.  In  practice  the  regulators  rarely 
get  involved,  negotiations  are  carried  out  between  broadcasters  and  parties. 
Although,  PEBs  are  rarely  considered  examples  of  fine  political  programming, 
they  still  reach  a  mass  audience,  broadcast  during  prime-time  scheduling,  as  well  as  at 
other  times  of  day.  Unlike  manifestos,  their  audiences  can  be  in  the  millions.  The 
2001  and  2005  UK  general  elections  saw  Labour's  initial  broadcast  receive  10  and 
11.9  million  viewers  respectively,  the  Conservative's  8.9  and  12.8  million,  and  the 
Liberal  Democrats  8.9  and  13.2  million  (http:  //news.  bbc.  co.  uk/1/hi/ukcpolitics, 
03.07.2006).  Although  Scotland  is  roughly  one  tenth  of  the  population  of  the  UK, 
proportionate  viewing  figures  would  still  represent  a  notable  mass  audience  for  any 
party's  broadcast.  Since  their  post-war  beginnings  PEBs  have  been  thought  to  have 
reduced  in  importance.  Rosenbaum  comments,  `[t]his  is  due  not  so  much  to  their  own 
content  as  to  a  major  change  in  the  broadcasting  environments  -  the  fact  that  other 
political  broadcasting  has  greatly  increased'  (1997:  74).  This  shift  to  more  emphasis 
on  campaign  reportage  may  well  negatively  affect  the  primary  importance  and  impact 
of  PEBs  in  directly  reaching  voters.  However,  broadcasts  still  have  an  important  place 
in  the  overall  campaign  strategy  of  political  parties.  Party  broadcasts  represent  free 
airtime  unaffected  by  journalistic  questions  or  interpretation,  an  opportunity  to 
communicate  a  message  in  precisely  the  way  a  party  wishes  it  to  be  portrayed.  And 
like  manifestos,  PEBs  are  political  set  pieces  from  which  spin-off  media  coverage 
occurs,  something  discussed  in  the  following  chapter.  Due  to  their  shorter  length 
PEBs  have  a  much  narrower  focus  than  manifestos,  perhaps  only  dealing  with  one  or 
two  issues.  In  general,  of  the  broadcasts  investigated  here,  they  also  tend  to  be  more 
adversarial  and  negative  in  style;  a  point  explored  further  below. 
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This  section  will  focus  on  how  politicians  structure  their  arguments  to  advocate  their 
party's  position.  The  structuring  effects  of  van  Dijk's  ideological  square,  as  in  the 
previous  chapter,  will  be  shown  to  be  at  play.  However,  also  as  with  the  discussion  of 
the  previous  chapter,  evidence  will  be  presented  to  suggest  a  reformulation  of  the 
ideological  square  to  account  for  instances  of  cooperative  discourse.  In  exploring 
these  argumentative  strategies  the  linguistic  tools  employed  will  be  investigated. 
This  analysis  has  categorised  four  main  types  of  argumentative  strategy  in  the 
texts  analysed:  firstly,  those  with  an  adversarial  structure,  which  constructs  the 
addressing  party  and  its  policies  in  positive  terms  and  the  opposition  and  their  policies 
in  negative  terms;  secondly,  single-sided  positive  arguments,  where  only  the  positive 
side  of  an  argument  is  presented  without  making  negative  comparisons  with 
opposition  parties;  thirdly,  mitigating  arguments  made  against  negative  accusations; 
and  fourthly,  rhetorical  strategies  for  discursively  negotiating  power  sharing  and 
shared  policy  achievements  in  an  adversarial  campaign.  This  is  not  intended  to  be  an 
exhaustive  list  of  rhetorical  strategies.  Instead,  these  particular  strategies  have  been 
investigated  because  they  relate  to  the  negotiation  of  parties'  ideological  positions  in 
relation  to  each  other,  rather  than  strategies  for  presenting  various  policies.  Placing 
these  argumentative  strategies  within  the  wider  context  of  the  devolved  Scottish 
political  environment  will  facilitate  the  interpretation  of  their  meanings.  Reflexively, 
this  interpretation  will  further  elucidate  understanding  of  the  nature  of  post  devolution 
political  discourse. 
Data  in  this  study  is  referenced  from  transcripts  of  each  party's  broadcasts. 
Texts  are  labelled  A  through  to  F  and  a  complete  transcript  of  each  is  located  in  the 
Appendix. 
4.2.1  Adversarial  strategies 
This  strategy  most  comprehensively  reproduces  the  structural  properties  of  van  Dijk's 
ideological  square.  That  is  to  say,  it  structures  arguments  around  the  positive 
representation  of  in-group  actions,  attributes  and  achievements  and  correspondingly 
equivalent  negative  representations  of  out-groups.  As  indicated  in  the  previous 
chapter,  whether  a  party  does  or  does  not  hold  power  when  the  election  is  called 
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legitimately  point  to  achievements  over  the  preceding  term  of  office.  Similarly,  for  an 
opposition  party  their  rhetorical  position  allows  them  to  point  to  the  actions  and 
achievements  of  the  government,  which  they  would  necessarily  characterise 
negatively.  Nevertheless,  adversarial  strategies  reproduce  both  sides  of  the  ideological 
square,  whether  adopted  by  the  opposition  or  governing  party. 
The  positive  side  of  this  strategy  may  be  summarised  with  the  following 
possible  moves  (where  X  represents  a  positive  value  and  Ya  negative  value): 
"  We  have  done  X 
"  We  will  continue  to  do  X 
"  We  are  doing  X 
"  We  will  do  X 
"  We  believe  in  X/We  are  X 
The  first  four  moves  can  apply  to  actions  and  achievements  i.  e.  `we  have  reduced 
waiting  lists'  (achievement),  `Scottish  Labour  continues  to  fight  poverty'  (action),  `we 
have  introduced  harsher  sentences  and  continue  to  speak  out  against  racism' 
(achievement  and  verbal  action).  The  fifth  move  encodes  in-group  attributes,  as  in  `we 
believe  in  honesty'  or  `we  are  whiter  than  white'.  A  statement  such  as  `we  believe  in 
our  actions  on  child  poverty'  could  be  interpreted  as  embodying  several  moves.  It 
could  be  an  assertion  of  belief  or an  attribute,  where  actions/achievements  have 
ideological  connotations,  and/or  as  an  assertion  of  action/achievement.  The  point  is 
that  the  above  represent  possible  functional  moves  that  necessarily  require 
contextualised  interpretation.  As  discussed  in  chapter  3,  tense  and  aspect  also  play  a 
role  in  representing  actions,  attributes  and  achievements,  for  example,  in  the  encoding 
of  past,  present  and  potential  future  actions.  As  in  the  difference  between  the 
following  assertions  `we  have  put  more  money  into  the  NHS'  (present  tense  -  perfect 
aspect)  and  `we  are  reducing  waiting  lists'  (present  tense  -  progressive  aspect).  The 
former  claims  to  have  achieved  something  (past  action  with  a  positive  present 
consequence),  while  the  latter  encodes  an  action  which  is  ongoing.  As  per  the 
previous  chapter,  aspect  would  be  used  to  encode  the  future. 
Similarly,  the  negative  side  of  this  strategy  may  be  formulated  in  the  following 
potential  moves  such  as: 
"  They  will  not  do  X 
"  They  did  not  do  X 
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"  They  will  do  Y 
"  They  will  continue  to  do  Y 
"  They  believe  in  Y/They  are  Y 
"  They  said/promised  they'd  do  X  but  did  Y 
"  They  said/promised  they'd  do  X  but  did  not 
The  second,  third,  seventh  and  eighth  points  would  probably,  though  not  exclusively, 
be  found  in  the  discourse  of  opposition  parties,  where  they  are  critiquing  the  actions 
and  achievements  of  those  in  office.  Again  these  represent  potential  functional  moves, 
rather  than  surface  representations;  and  this  is  not  meant  to  represent  an  exhaustive 
list,  but  represents  examples  from  the  forthcoming  discussion.  A  more  extensive 
study,  focusing  on  the  categorisation  of  potential  rhetorical  moves,  could  be  carried 
out.  However,  what  is  of  interest  to  this  investigation  is  not  the  cataloguing  of 
strategies  but  how  and  why  strategies  are  used,  and  the  meanings  they  produce  when 
interpreted  in  context.  That  is,  the  focus  on  interpreting  and  understanding  the 
implications  and  meanings  of  the  presence  or  absence  of  particular  strategies. 
In  sum,  adversarial  argumentative  moves  are  a  formulaic  discursive  strategy 
employed  in  PEBs  (and  other  spheres  of  political  discourse),  which  presents  a  party's 
policies  as  a  positive  alternative  to  an  opposition's  negatively  presented  policies.  The 
above,  essentially,  reduce  to  the  propositions  `vote  for  us  because  of  X'  and  `do  not 
vote  for  them  because  of  Y'.  It  is  a  rhetorical  device  designed  to  persuade  an 
audience.  That  audience  is  presented  with  two  alternatives:  a  positive  and  a  negative 
choice,  as  in,  `Scotland  faces  a  choice'  (Text  A),  `you  have  a  simple  choice'  (Text  D), 
`a  massive  choice  (Text  B)  and  `there  is  a  choice'  (Text  Q.  In  constructing  this 
argument,  linguistic  tools  are  used:  modality  to  emphasise  obligation  and  duty  or a 
lack  thereof,  and  a  desire  or  degree  of  commitment;  transitivity  to  realise  agency  and 
responsibility  in  events;  grammatical  repetition  and  lists,  expressing  emphasis, 
equivalence  or  formulating  contrasts  (Atkinson,  1984);  and  similes,  metaphors  and 
puns  to  construct  complex  meanings.  This  adversarial  rhetorical  strategy  mirrors  the 
adversarial  tradition  of  British  politics  and  is  used  by  Labour,  the  SNP  and  the 
Conservative  and  Unionist  Party  in  their  PEBs  for  the  2003  Scottish  Parliamentary 
Election.  The  Conservatives  and  Labour  are  traditional  adversaries  in  Westminster, 
whereas  Labour  and  SNP  reflect  the  main  adversaries  on  the  Scottish  scene.  The  way 
these  parties  choose  to  construct  their  relationship  in  language  (their  rhetorical 
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discussed,  the  electoral  system  and  resulting  make-up  of  the  Scottish  Parliament 
somewhat  complicates  the  traditional  paradigm  of  adversarial  British  politics. 
Nevertheless,  this  strategy  provides  some  familiar  ground  from  which  to  further  the 
investigation  begun  in  chapters  2  and  3;  and  it  is  to  specific  examples  of  the 
adversarial  strategy  that  this  chapter  now  turns. 
This  first  example  is  drawn  from  Labour's  broadcast  (Appendix  Text  Q.  The 
nationalist  agenda  has  already  been  identified  as  a  salient  and  defining  issue  in 
Scottish  politics.  Therefore,  it  may  be  fitting  to  begin  with  a  representation  of  the 
adversarial  strategy  which  focuses  on  this  issue.  Labour  asserts,  `If  Scotland  votes 
SNP  on  May  151,  on  May  2"d  the  Nationalists  will  begin  the  process  of  breaking  up 
Britain.  '  In  this  extract  the  SNP's  policy  of  independence  for  Scotland  is formulated 
as  a  negative  value  by  metaphorically  referring  to  the  process  of  creating  an 
independent  Scotland  as  `breaking  up  Britain'.  Using  conditional  `If...  '  helps 
construct  a  possible  future  action;  and  `Scotland'  is  the  Actor  in  this  hypothetical  act. 
The  listener  is  the  potential  voter  but  the  negative  connotations  of  voting  for  the  SNP 
are  not  formulated  in  a  direct  address  to  voters,  as  in  `If  you  vote  SNP...  '  using  the 
second  person  pronoun  `you'.  Voters  are  collectively  referred  to  as  the  nation,  with 
the  metonymical  use  of  `Scotland'.  Possibly,  `Scotland'  is  used  here  to  evoke 
nationalistic  responsibility  or  pride  and  an  implied  set  of  responsibilities  to  the  nation. 
In  the  main  clause  `the  Nationalists'  fill  the  role  of  Actor  and  are  then  responsible  for 
the  destructive  process  of  `breaking  up  Britain'.  An  SNP  policy  is  characterised  as  a 
negative  value  by  portraying  the  SNP  as  the  Actor  carrying  out  a  destructive  process. 
Therefore,  voting  for  the  SNP  ('If  Scotland  votes  SNP')  would  result  in  the 
implementation  of  that  `negative'  policy. 
The  hypothetical  future  constructed  by  `If  Scotland  votes  SNP'  indicates  a 
strong  prediction  of  result.  Through  the  epistemic  use  of  the  modal  auxiliary  verb 
`will'  in  `the  Nationalists  will  begin  the  process  of  breaking  up  Britain'  a  complex 
policy  is  represented  in  more  definite  terms.  Alternative  realisations  such  as,  `the 
Nationalists  would/could/may/might  begin  the  process  of  breaking  up  Britain' 
certainly  express  a  weaker  prediction  of  result.  The  SNP's  stated  policy  at  the  point  of 
the  election  was  to  hold  a  referendum  (if  obtaining  office),  which  would  ask  the 
electorate  whether  or  not  they  wanted  an  independent  Scotland.  However,  this  SNP 
policy,  is  transformed  into  a  more  certain  (`will')  process. 
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Labour  presents  itself  as  the  positive  electoral  alternative  with,  `In  Scotland  today, 
there  are  more  people  in  work  and  unemployment  is  at  a  record  low'.  Labour's 
responsibility  is  left  implicit;  their  role  forms  part  of  the  global  coherence  of  the 
discourse,  with  Labour  in  office  north  and  south  of  the  boarder.  That  is,  Labour's 
position  as  the  power-holding  party  is  a  defining  characteristic  of  the  rhetorical 
context  of  their  and  other  parties'  utterances.  Instead,  the  discourse  in  situated  in  both 
time  and  place.  (The  following  analysis  is  in  the  Systemic  Functional  tradition  of 
grammatical  analysis.  See  Leech,  Deuchar  and  Hoogenraad  (1982)  for  a  more  detailed 
guide  to  the  nature  and  use  of  transitivity  labels  employed  in  this  analysis.  ) 
circ:  loc/place  circ:  loc/time 
[  (In  Scotland)  (today)... 
PP  pr  n  AvP  av 
This  provides  the  context  -'here'  and  `now'  -  for  the  following  positive  values  of 
`more  people  in  work'  and  `unemployment  is  at  a  record  low'.  Low  unemployment 
and  economic  success  are  salient  policy  issues  in  election  campaigns,  with  governing 
parties  claiming  economic  success  and  opposition  parties  attempting  to  criticise  the 
government's  economic  success  and  suggest  alternative  solutions40. 
Labour's  role  in  the  positive  reality  is  implicit  throughout.  `Scotland'  either 
forms  a  circumstance  of  location,  as  above,  or  fills  the  role  of  carrier/possessed,  as  in, 
carrier/possessor  pr:  possession  attribute:  possessed 
{[(Scotland)  (has)  (the  lowest  mortgage  rates)... 
NP  n  VP  v  NP  d  adj  nn 
Labour,  in  leaving  itself  implicit  in  the  positive  propositions  of  Scotland's  proposed 
economic  success,  is  closely  associating  itself  with  Scotland,  the  nation  and  its 
successes,  implying  the  proposition,  `voting  for  labour  is  a  vote  for  economic 
success'.  It  should  be  noted,  though,  as  was  illustrated  in  the  previous  two  chapters, 
Labour  is  more  explicit  in  its  manifesto  in  relating  itself  with  UK  and  Scottish 
economic  success 
ao  Ipsos  Mori  is  one  of  the  UK's  largest  pollsters.  From  1995-2005  they  record  issues  related  to 
education,  health,  law  and  order  and  the  economy  as  consistently  the  most  salient  issues  to  voters 
(http:  //www.  ipsos-mori.  com/polls/trends/importance-of-key-issues.  shtml). 
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with  negative  formulations  of  the  SNP,  forms  the  overall  pattern  in  the  discourse  of 
Labour's  PEBs  and  typifies  the  adversarial  structuring  of  campaign  arguments. 
`Scotland',  with  Labour  implicit,  is  portrayed  in  positive  terms  ('Scotland  has  the 
lowest  mortgage  rates  ever'  and  `In  Scotland,  we  are  building  new  schools,  cutting 
class  sizes,  investing  in  education')  and  then  the  SNP's  policy  on  independence  is 
depicted  as  putting  `all  that  at  risk'.  This  strategy,  therefore,  encodes  the  rhetorical 
binary  contrasts  Atkinson  (1984)  explicates,  which  matches  the  discursive  strategies 
of  the  ideological  square.  Labour  choosing  to  use  the  unionist/separatist  issue  in  their 
PEBs  affirms  the  importance  of  the  issue  in  Scottish  politics  as  suggested  in  the 
previous  two  chapters. 
The  SNP's  PEB  (Text  D)  use  the  same  rhetorical  strategy  as  the  above  Labour 
example.  In  a  short  film  where  the  audience  sees  an  old  man  waiting  for  treatment  in 
the  NHS  and  eventually  dying,  intermittent  messages  are  flashed  on  screen,  before  the 
then  party  leader  John  Swinney  directly  addresses  the  viewers.  The  argument  begins 
with  negative  assessments  of  Labour's  policies  on  health. 
Labour  said  they'd  reduce  waiting  lists.  They  haven't. 
Labour  said  they'd  deal  with  bed  shortages.  They  haven't. 
Labour  said  they'd  tackle  staff  shortages.  They  haven't. 
In  all  three  propositions  Labour  is  said  to  have  promised  something,  encoded 
by  the  projected  clause  with  a  verbal  process  `said'  and  a  modalised  form  `would'  or 
`they'd',  which  indicates  strong  commitment,  from  the  epistemic  system  of  modality 
(Simpson,  1993:  50).  This  forms  the  first  half  of  an  adversarial  strategy;  however,  in 
this  variation  (Text  D)  instead  of  an  opponent's  position  being  constructed  in  terms  of 
negative  policies  which  they  have  done  or  will  do,  it  is in  terms  of  positive  policies 
they  promised  to  do  but  failed  to  deliver.  Later  in  the  broadcast,  John  Swinney  goes 
on  to  reinforce  the  negative  propositions  of  Labour  policies  in  a  direct  address  with 
informal  syntax  and  a  modalised  categorical  statement,  `Vote  Labour  and  you'll  wait 
and  you'll  wait'.  As  with  the  previous  example  from  Labour,  this  strategy  encodes  a 
cause  +  consequence,  i.  e.  `if  you  do  X,  Y  will  happen',  as  in  `Vote  Labour  and  you 
will  wait'  versus  `Vote  SNP  and  they'll  begin  breaking  up  Britain'.  Waiting  for 
hospital  treatment  on  long  waiting  lists  is  formulated  into  a  pun  on  waiting  for  change 
under  a  Labour  administration.  This  message  recalls  the  preceding  short  film  as  well 
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waiting',  in  a  pastiche  of  the  black  and  white  headshots  of  a  United  Colours  of 
Benetton  advert. 
The  positive  side  to  this  strategy  mirrors  the  negative  formulations,  putting 
forward  the  positive  SNP  proposition,  `Vote  for  the  SNP...  and  you'll  see  a 
difference'.  Instead  of  `and  you'll  wait'  it  is  `and  you'll  see  a  difference'.  This  time 
the  use  of  deontic  modality  with  `will',  emphasising  commitment  to  a  positive 
position,  employing  the  metonymy  of  `a  difference'.  The  metonymy  functions  as  an 
abridgement  of  `we  will  reduce  waiting  lists,  we  will  deal  with  bed  shortages,  we  will 
tackle  staff  shortages'. 
In  this  adversarial  rhetorical  strategy  Labour  is  the  object  of  the  SNP's 
criticism.  However,  The  SNP  do  not  focus  their  criticism  on  Labour's  power  sharing 
partners  the  Liberal  Democrats.  As  suggested  in  the  previous  chapter,  this  is  possibly 
because  of  the  Liberal  Democrats'  position  as  a  probable  coalition  partner  for  the 
SNP.  Therefore,  both  Labour  and  the  SNP's  omission  of  criticism  of  the  Liberal 
Democrats  in  their  PEBs  seems  to  support  the  assertion  made  in  the  previous  chapter. 
This  point  will  be  developed  further  below,  as  more  evidence  is  considered. 
4.2.2  Non-adversarial  positive  strategies 
Unlike  the  previous  strategy,  the  single  positive  case  does  not  seek  to  persuade  by 
presenting  the  voter  with  positive  and  negative  alternative  choices.  Instead,  only  the 
positive  case  of  the  addressing  party  is  constructed.  The  moves,  therefore,  are  the 
same  as  those  available  on  the  positive  side  of  the  adversarial  strategy  above.  The 
actions  or  existence  of  other  competing  out-group  parties  are  not  evident,  they  are  left 
unmentioned.  The  Liberal  Democrats  provide  an  example  of  this  type  of  rhetorical 
strategy  in  one  of  their  election  broadcasts  (Text  F).  In  this  PEB  the  in-group  party's 
position  is  set  out  in  positive  terms.  For  example,  `Jim  Wallace  takes  particular  pride 
in  what  the  Scottish  Liberal  Democrats  have  done  for  older  people'.  Using  present 
perfect  aspect,  the  Liberal  Democrats  refer  to  achievements  in  the  recent  past,  with 
present  consequences.  This  statement  is  personalised  and  anchored  in  the  present  by  a 
statement  in  the  present  tense  simple  aspect  `Jim  Wallace  takes  particular  pride', 
which  models  the  party  leader's  feelings  (now)  on  a  presupposition  of  a  particular 
policy  achievement  (of  the  recent  past). 
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Democrat  ethos  and  policy  again  in  terms  of  the  experience  of  its  leader.  The 
broadcast  asserts,  `With  teenage  daughters  Jim Wallace  knows  the  importance  of 
education.  He  was  determined  to  get  university  tuition  fees  abolished  and  he 
succeeded'  (Text  F).  Here  Jim Wallace,  `he',  is  a  Carrier  assigned  an  Attribute, 
`determined  to  get  university  tuition  fees  abolished'.  Jim  Wallace  did  not  just  plan  to 
do  something  but  he  was  `determined'  to  do  something  and  in  addition  `he  succeeded' 
in  the  abolition  of  tuition  fees,  where  `he'  (Jim  Wallace)  is  the  Actor  in  the  clause  and 
`succeeded'  a  material  process.  The  Liberal  Democrats  through  Jim  Wallace, 
according  to  this  construction,  tangibly  achieved  a  policy  objective;  and  it  is  an 
education  policy,  which  along  with  crime  and  the  economy  are  mainstays  of  election 
campaigning  in  Britain. 
The  broadcast  does  not  need  to  go  into  a  detailed  explanation  of  tuition  policy 
for  it  to  be  used  as  a  persuasive  tool.  This  again  underlines  the  point  made  in  chapter 
3,  that  a  feature  of  ideological  persuasion  is  that  detailed  content  of  an  ideology  need 
not  be  communicated  for  it  to  be  persuasive.  For  example,  the  Labour  Party's  1997 
general  election  slogan  `education,  education,  education'  was  not  a  detailed 
explanation  of  education  policy  but  an  expression  of  its  value  and  importance.  The 
educational  mantra  is  also  a  three  part  list,  the  rhetorical  force  of  which  Atkinson 
(1984)  explored  at  some  length.  Referring  back  to  the  Liberal  Democrats  claim  on 
tuition  fees,  `abolition'  might  normally  be  associated  with  the  ending  of  some 
negative  practice,  particularly  a  law  or  regulation,  such  as  the  abolition  of  slavery,  or 
the  abolition  of  apartheid.  Use  of  `abolition'  therefore  confers  meanings  of  negative 
restriction  and  oppressiveness  onto  that  which  is  being  abolished,  in  this  case  the 
`upfront'  payment  of  university  fees  by  students.  Therefore,  abolition  from  tuition 
fees  implies  freedom  from  paying  fees;  freedom  carries  particularly  positive 
connotations  which  are  conferred  onto  the  tuition  fee  issue.  Lakoff  (2002)  has 
commented  on  the  power  of  language  to  evoke  cognitive  schema  and  persuasively 
frame  policy  issues.  Meanings  from  one,  perhaps  unrelated,  source  domain  are 
transferred  onto  a  target  domain,  in  a  semantic  process  typically  understood  in 
metaphor.  A  similar  process  may  be  seen  at  work  with  the  tuition  fee  issue.  It  is  true 
that  Scottish  students  do  not  have  to  pay  tuition  fees,  and  in  practical  terms  that  means 
at  the  point  of  delivery.  Students,  or  rather  graduates  still  have  to  contribute 
something  to  the  cost  of  university  education,  only  this  is  now  after  graduation  rather 
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graduates  are  paying  to  support  the  education  of  undergraduates  from  less  well  off 
backgrounds,  rather  than  retrospectively  repaying  the  cost  of  their  own  tuition. 
The  most  notable  point  about  non-adversarial  positive  strategies,  in  relation  to 
competitive  political  discourse,  is  the  absence  of  criticism  of  competing  parties.  The 
following  chapter  discusses  how  `negative  campaigning'  became  a  salient  issue 
during  the  2003  campaign.  Non-adversarial  discourse  may  well  be  a  campaign 
strategy  to  present  a  positive  image  to  voters.  However,  it  could  also  be  a  method  of 
negotiating  potential  power-sharing  relationships  with  other  parties.  This  point  will  be 
developed  in  a  subsequent  section.  Both  the  adversarial  and  non  adversarial  strategies 
discussed  above  relate  to  the  construction  of  positive  in-group  representations 
introduced  in  chapter  3,  as  do  mitigation  strategies  which  will  now  be  discussed. 
However,  as  will  be  shown,  evidence  points  to  the  use  of  mitigations  beyond  the 
positive  representation  of  the  in-group  party,  which  suggest  a  need  to  amend  van 
Dijk's  ideological  square. 
4.2.3  Mitigation  strategies 
In  van  Dijk's  (1998)  ideological  square  those  constructing  a  discourse  that  involves 
conflict  between  groups  in  society,  will  not  only  emphasise  their  in-group's  good 
qualities/actions  but,  when  necessary,  also  try  to  mitigate  their  bad  qualities/actions. 
Thus  far  the  first  two  functional  moves  of  van  Dijk's  ideological  square  have  been 
focused  on,  in  relation  to  the  rhetorical  strategies  of  PEB  discourse,  concentrating  on 
positive  in-group  description  and  negative  out-group  description.  The  second  half  of 
the  ideological  square  is  now  explored:  the  mitigation  of  negative  in-group  and 
positive  out-group  actions,  attributes  and  achievements.  Parties  in  power  might  well 
be  associated  with  negative  policies,  actions  or events,  or  opposition  parties  would 
characterise  them  as  such.  It  is  not  in  a  party's  interest  to  highlight  its  errors  or 
perceived  faults,  but,  with  opposition  parties  (and  the  media)  constructing  criticisms 
on  the  basis  of  perceived  or actual  errors  and  faults  negative  criticism  must  be  dealt 
with.  It  is  sometimes  necessary  for  these  faults  to  be  downplayed  or  mitigated  in  order 
to  achieve  their  overall  purpose  to  persuade  voters. 
The  three  parties  of  the  Scottish  centre  all  have  different  critical  issues  they 
mitigate,  due  to  their  different  rhetorical  positions  in  the  political  field.  The  previous 
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in  their  manifestos.  These  observations  are  supported  by  evidence  from  the  party 
broadcasts.  The  appearance  of  the  same  issues,  mitigated  in  two  different  political 
texts,  both  of  which  are  important  in  campaigning  terms,  indicates  the  validity  of  the 
previously  stated  deductions.  The  first  example,  illustrated  here,  is from  the  Labour 
party  on  the  issue  of  the  perceived  lack  of  success  of  the  parliament  (Paterson  et  al., 
2001:  92-100).  Second  is  the  SNP's  mitigation  of  their  policy  concerning 
independence  for  Scotland.  And  third  are  mitigations  of  critical  issues  concerning  the 
effectiveness  and  credibility  of  the  Liberal  Democrats. 
4.2.3.1  Labour 
Heading  into  the  2003  election  Labour  faced  claims  that  the  Parliament  in  Scotland, 
or  at  least  its  Labour  led  administration,  had  achieved  little.  Such  claims  were 
formulated  in  the  Scottish  media  and  in  opinion  polls  monitoring  voter  opinion 
(Paterson  et  al.,  2001).  These  claims  were  significant  enough  for  Labour  to  attempt  to 
address  and  mitigate  them  in  two  of  their  election  broadcasts  (Text  A  and  B). 
In  first  broadcast  Text  A  their  mitigation  begins  as  follows, 
Sensor  Pr:  material  Proj  Token  Pr:  intensive  Value 
{[  (You)  (might  think)  11  (the  Scottish  Parliament)  (has  been)  (a  disappointment).  ]} 
NP  pn  VP  av  NP  d  adj  n  VP  av  NP  dn 
Sensor  Pr:  material  Proj  Actor  Pr:  material  Range  Pr:  material 
{[  (You)  (might  think)  II  (it)  ('s  achieved)  (nothing).  ])  {[(Setting  up) 
NP  pn  VP  aV  NP  pn  VP  av  NP  pn  VP  phrasal  v 
Range  Pr:  intensive  Attribute/Cir:  accomp  x  Circ:  extent 
(  (the  Scottish  Parliament)  (hasn't  been)  (without  its  challenges)  but  [  (in  (just 
NP  d  adj  n  VP  a  neg  v  PP  pr  dnc  PP  pr  AjP  av 
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four)  short  years)  (Labour)  (has  laid)  (strong  foundations).  ]  ) 
adj  adj  n  NP  n  VP  av  NP  adj  n 
Labour  foregrounds  two  proposed  criticisms,  placing  them  at  the  start  of  the  PEB's 
discourse.  The  mitigation  is  negotiated  through  several  linguistic  means.  Firstly, 
through  transitivity,  the  metonymy  of  `the  Scottish  parliament'  hides  Labour's  role. 
Secondly,  Labour  constructs  the  criticisms  as  a  possible  mental  phenomenon  of  the 
listener/viewer,  directly  addressed  with  the  second  person  singular  `You'.  The  face 
threatening  effects  of  this  accusation  are  mitigated  by  employing  the  modalised  form 
`might  think',  where  `might'  indicates  weaker  possibility.  Formulating  the  criticisms 
`the  Scottish  Parliament  has  been  a  disappointment'  and  `it's  achieved  nothing'  as 
potential  projected  opinions  instead  of  material  facts  makes  such  criticism  easier  to 
refute.  `You  might  think  X'  evokes  a  contradictory  response  `but  you  are 
wrong/mistaken'  in  argumentative  discourse:  this  response  might  be  perceived  as 
face-threatening,  and  therefore  Labour  avoids  constructing  a  contrasting  clausal 
relation  (Winter,  1977)  such  as  `but  you  are  wrong'.  Labour  does  not  construct  a 
direct  challenge  to  the  proposed  beliefs  about  the  Scottish  Parliament;  instead  they 
move  to  refuting  the  propositions  without  the  use  of  a  clause  relational  `but'  e.  g.  `You 
might  think  it's  achieved  nothing.  Setting  up  the  Scottish  Parliament  hasn't  been 
without  its  challenges'.  This  is  a  qualified  acknowledgment  of  the  criticism;  however, 
bearing  in  mind  that  Labour  was  the  main  proponent  of  devolution,  one  sees  little 
evidence  of  them  as  responsible  agents  in  the  establishment  of  the  parliament.  In  the 
two  projected  mental  clauses  above,  it  is  the  parliament  that  is  `a  disappointment'  and 
`achieved  nothing'.  Therefore,  Labour's  role  is  grammatically  obfuscated. 
The  Labour  broadcast  (Text  A)  then  goes  on  to  state,  `Setting  up  the  Scottish 
Parliament  hasn't  been  without  its  challenges'.  Any  problems  the  Scottish  Parliament 
or  the  executive  have  had  are  euphemistically  referred  to  as  `challenges'.  Again  there 
is  no  evidence  of  Labour  as  agents  of  the  `setting  up',  or of  them  taking  responsibility 
for  the  `challenges'  of  the  parliament.  Finally,  Labour  appear  as  Actors  in  a  clause, 
framed  in  positive  terms, 
Actor  Pr:  material  Range 
(Labour)  (has  laid)  (strong  foundations) 
NP  n  VP  av  NP  adj  n 
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years'  (a  Circumstance  of  Extent)  which  precedes  the  claims  to  have  laid  `strong 
foundations'  in  the  clause  complex.  Transitivity  analysis  clearly  reveals  Labour's 
absence  when  referring  to  criticism  that  could  easily  be  formulated  as  Labour's 
responsibility.  Faults  are  presented  as  criticisms  of  the  parliament;  Labour's 
responsibility  for  the  perceived  negative  actions  or  inactions  of  the  parliament  is  not 
evident.  In  obscuring  their  role,  Labour  is  attempting  to  mitigate  criticisms  that  might 
be  levelled  at  them. 
In  terms  of  semantic  moves,  the  two  initial  negative  propositions  in  Text  A  are 
local  moves  constructed  as  potential  criticisms  which  are  then  refuted  by  subsequent 
propositions.  Van  Dijk  comments  on  such  rhetorical  strategies,  `The  very  strategies 
on  which  local  moves  are  based  are  intended  precisely  to  manage  opinions  and 
impressions,  that  is,  what  our  conversational  partners  will  think  of  us'  (1998:  40). 
Taking  the  text  as  a  whole,  Labour  mitigates  criticism  by  initially  foregrounding  it 
and  formulating  it  in  terms  which  obscure  their  role.  The  rest  of  the  PEB  refutes  the 
initial  negative  propositions,  laying  out  in  positive  terms  Labour's  achievements, 
demonstrating  that  things  have  been  achieved  and  presumably  therefore  these  are  not 
things  to  be  disappointed  in.  In  a  further  attempt  to  mitigate  and  refute  criticism  the 
broadcast  (Text  A)  goes  on  to  list  achievement  after  achievement,  `Whether  it's  a  free 
nursery  place  for  every  three  and  four  year  old,  whether  it's  free  bus  travel  for  all 
Scotland's  pensioners'.  Labour's  responsibility  in  the  clause  is  positively 
foregrounded,  where  they  are  the  Carrier  in  the  following,  `Labour  is  also  committed 
to  helping  Scotland's  hard  working  families'  and  an  Actor  in,  `Scottish  Labour  has 
worked  everyday  to  make  every  Scottish  community  safer  for  our  children  and 
families'. 
Labour  follows  a  similar  strategy  in  the  second  broadcast  Text  B.  The  main 
criticism  dealt  with  is  that  `nothing  has  changed'  in  Scotland.  Jack  McConnell 
formulates  the  criticism  as  follows, 
Phenomenon  ------------------------------------ 
Senser  Pr:  Mental  Proj.  x  Cir:  Frequency  Dummy  subject 
{[  (I)  (know)  (that)  (sometimes)  (it) 
NP  pn  VP  vc  AvP  av  NP  pn 
112 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Phenomenon  ----------------------------------------- 
Pr:  Mental  x[  Cir:  Location  Actor/Neg  Pr:  Material  ] 
(seems)  (that)  (in  Scotland)  (nothing)  (has  changed).  ]} 
VP  vc  PP  pr  n  NP  pn  VP  av 
As  in  Text  A  criticisms  are  formulated  as  a  phenomenon.  The  Phenomenon  in  the 
main  clause  is  given,  i.  e.  we  know  that  it  is  true,  given  the  authority  of  the  speaker. 
The  embedded  Phenomenon  is  less  certain,  it  `seems'  (to  the  implied  viewer)  and  is 
likely  to  be  refuted.  McConnell  linguistically  constructs  himself  as  an  authority  who 
can  distinguish  fact  from  occasional  illusion.  The  strength  of  the  criticism  is  softened 
by  using  a  circumstance  of  frequency  `sometimes',  so  that  it  is  not  `I  know  that  it 
seems...  '  but  `I  know  that  sometimes  it  seems'.  If  it  is  only  sometimes  it  is  not  all  the 
time,  hence  it  is  a  weaker  formulation  and  easier  to  refute.  The  rest  of  McConnell's 
contribution  to  the  broadcasts  goes  on  to  refute  the  initial  negative  proposition,  setting 
up  a  binary  contrast  within  the  structure  of  the  text  (negative  proposition  versus 
positive  refutation  of  the  negative  proposition).  In  this  way,  mitigation  as  a  rhetorical 
strategy  is  built  into  the  overall  global  coherence  of  the  text. 
4.2.3.2  SNP 
The  SNP  mitigate  criticism  of  their  policy  of  independence,  which  Labour  attacked  in 
both  the  1999  and  2003  campaigns  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  mention  in  the 
introduction  to  their  2003  manifesto.  The  SNP's  mitigation  strategy  is  constructed 
differently  to  the  above  Labour  mitigations.  Instead  of  formulating  the  negative 
proposition  at  the  beginning  of  the  text  or  section  of  text,  to  then  be  refuted  by 
forthcoming  propositions,  the  mitigation  forms  an  aside  at  the  end  of  the  PEB.  The 
reason  for  this  positioning  in  the  text,  in  contrast  to  Labour,  may  be  a  reflection  of  the 
parties'  differing  circumstances.  Labour  has  a  record  in  office  to  draw  on  to  refute 
negative  claims.  The  SNP  in  contrast  are  not  in  office  and  the  focus  of  their  discourse 
is  on  attacking  the  party  in  office  and  stating  what  they  would  do  differently  -  the 
inverse  of  the  party  in  power.  For  the  SNP,  therefore,  foregrounding  criticism(s)  of 
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weakness41. 
The  first  half  of  the  SNP  broadcast  (Text  D)  is  a  short  film  following  an  old 
man  waiting  for  treatment  on  the  NHS.  The  second  half  is  a  piece-to-camera  by  John 
Swinney,  sitting  in  a  chair  in  what  looks  like  a  smart  home  office.  Towards  the  end  of 
his  address  Swinney  leans  in  to  camera,  before  cutting  to  a  close-up,  indicating  a 
change  of  tone  to  a  more  personal  address.  Swinney  then  says  the  following, 
And  as  for  independence,  I  think  it  will  be  good  for  Scotland.  I  want  it  but  it's 
not  for  me  to  decide,  that  decision  lies  with  you.  Our  priority  as  a  party  is  to 
prove  ourselves  to  you... 
Independence  is  framed  in  terms  of  John  Swinney's  individual  belief  `I  want  it'  and  `I 
think  it  will  be  good  for  Scotland',  in  contrast  to  Swinney's  preceding  discourse  which 
employs  `we'  as  in  `we  the  SNP'  or  `we  the  Scottish  people'.  Independence  is 
personalised,  `I  think  it  will  be  good  for  Scotland'  or  `I  want  it'.  Personalising  the 
issue  might  be  a  strategy  intended  to  draw  on  Swinney's  personality  as  either  a  tool 
for  mitigation  or  persuasion.  Individuals  are  perhaps  easier  to  trust  or are  less 
threatening  than  groups  or  institutions. 
Two  further  points  should  be  noted  in  this  mitigation.  The  first  is  that  Swinney 
characterises  the  SNP's  policy  on  independence  as  a  decision  that  `lies  with  you', 
referring  to  the  referendum  which  the  SNP  pledged  would  precede  any  decision  on 
independence  for  Scotland.  The  second  point  is  that  the  issue  of  independence  is 
introduced  with  a  phrase  that  marks  the  following  discussion  as  an  aside,  even  a 
minor  issue  in  that,  `And  as  for  independence'.  This  downplays  the  importance  of  the 
issue,  indicating  its  mitigation  and  positioning  it  marginally  within  the  structure  of  the 
text.  Independence  is  not  a  policy  at  the  vanguard  of  the  SNP's  electioneering, 
appearing  at  the  end  of  the  PEB  and  dealt  with  briefly. 
To  emphasise  that  independence  is  a  marginal  issue  (at  least  in  the 
representation  of  the  SNP's  broadcast)  within  the  mitigation  there  is  a  clause  which 
shifts  the  focus  of  the  PEB  to  the  relationship  between  the  party  and  `you'  the  public, 
`Our  priority  as  a  party  is  to  prove  ourselves  to  you,  that  we  can  make  a  difference  to 
41  A  longer  term  study  of  election  discourse,  contrasting  the  discourse  of  parties  in  office  and  in 
opposition  would  be  able  to  better  bear  out  this  point  concerning  rhetorical  strategies  of  mitigation. 
114 your  lives,  here  in  Scotland'.  The  SNP's  `priority'  is  not  independence  but  to  `prove' 
themselves  to  the  Scottish  public.  In  mitigating  criticism  of  a  policy  of  independence 
the  SNP  make  a  semantic  move  away  from  criticism  to  a  broader  political  agenda. 
4.2.3.3  Liberal  Democrats 
The  Liberal  Democrat  mitigation  strategies  differ  from  that  of  both  Labour  and  the 
SNP.  Whereas  criticism  of  Labour  and  the  SNP  focused  mainly  on  policy  issues  or 
events  (potential  or otherwise),  the  Liberal  Democrats  face  criticism  that  they  are 
ineffectual  and  lack  credibility  as  a  party  of  government.  Liberal  Democrats  at 
Westminster  elections  have  faced  similar  criticism  that  they  lack  experience  and  that 
because  they  are  not  likely  to  be  voted  into  office  their  policies  are  not  practical. 
The  Liberal  Democrat  mitigation  differs  from  Labour  and  the  SNP  in  that  it 
does  not  form  a  definite  semantic  move.  Instead,  the  whole  of  the  Liberal  Democrat 
broadcast  is  a  discourse  intended  to  establish  credibility.  As  such,  at  first  sight  the 
example  below,  from  the  Liberal  Democrat  broadcast  (Text  F)  does  not  appear  to  be 
mitigating  criticism. 
Actor  Pr:  Material  Range 
{[(The  Liberal  Democrats  (in  Scotland))  (have  made)  (a  big  difference)]) 
NP  dn  PP  pr  n  VP  av  NP  d  adj  n 
But  this  statement  may  function  as  mitigation  against  criticism  that  the  Liberal 
Democrats  are  ineffectual  as  a  minority  coalition  partner.  Contextualised  in  this  way, 
then  other  positive  statements  on  in-group  achievements  may  be  viewed  in  a  different 
light.  For  example, 
Actor  Pr:  Material  Range 
(  (They)  (`ve  increased)  (coverage  (by  GPs))] 
NP  pn.  VP  av  NP  n  PP  pr  n 
In  both  examples  above  the  Liberal  Democrats  are  the  Actor  in  the  clause  and  use 
Material  Processes,  their  responsibility  for  actions  and  events  in  the  clause  are  not  at 
all  obfuscated.  They  are  clearly  stating  that  they  were  responsible  for  improvements 
to  GP  services;  their  coalition  partners  are  not  mentioned  at  all. 
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the  abolition  of  tuition  fees,  in  terms  of  the  personal  qualities  of  their  leader  Jim 
Wallace,  who  was  `determined'  to  achieve  the  policy  and  `succeeded'.  This 
rhetorically  demonstrates  that  the  Liberal  Democrats  can  achieve  objectives  as 
minority  partners  in  a  coalition.  This  point  is  then  emphasised  by  a  young  woman 
claming,  `they  have  done  a  lot  for  students'  and  confirming  that  she  will  be  voting  for 
them.  The  use  of'have  done',  an  intensive  process,  demonstrates  the  definiteness  of 
the  Liberal  Democrats'  achievements.  There  are  then  three  quite  hyperbolic  claims 
made  by  unidentified  participants  in  the  broadcast.  Male  1  asserts,  `Jim  Wallace,  of 
course,  has  been  the  guiding  force  behind  all  these  changes',  which  implicitly 
characterises  the  Liberal  Democrats  as  a  `force'  causing  `changes'.  Therefore,  things 
are  achieved  under  the  Liberals.  Female  2  then  claims,  `The  Liberal  Democrats  in 
Scotland  have  made  a  big  difference'.  Claiming  to  make  a  `big  difference'  again 
challenges  any  notion  of  ineffectiveness. 
Another  aspect  to  this  mitigation  strategy  is  found  in  the  following  example 
which  sees  the  Liberal  Democrats  construct  not  a  policy  achievement  but  a  list  of  the 
political  qualities  they  wish  to  demonstrate.  For  example,  `It  is  the  Liberal  Democrats 
who  have  the  ideas,  the  energy,  the  credibility  and  the  track-record'.  Fairclough  notes 
of  lists,  `In  traditional  grammatical  terms,  lists  are  `paratactic'  (their  elements  are 
equal,  one  is  not  subordinate  to  another.  Items  in  lists  are  equivalences'  (2003:  162). 
A  `track  record'  is  something  which  is  more  tangible  or  demonstrable  than  `energy', 
`ideas'  and  `credibility',  but  in  listing  them  as  equivalences  they  are  represented  as 
equally  tangible  and  demonstrable.  Expressing  these  qualities  in  the  present  tense  also 
indicates  their  immediacy;  they  are  not  something  of  the  past  or  future  but  here  and 
now. 
Labour  and  the  SNP,  therefore,  use  quite  different  mitigation  strategies  from 
the  Liberal  Democrats.  Labour  construct  their  mitigation  as  a  negative  premise  at  the 
beginning  of  the  text,  setting  up  an  opportunity  for  the  subsequent  refutation:  this  is  a 
definite  semantic  move  from  a  negative  proposition  to  a  positive  refutation.  The 
SNP's  mitigation  over  a  policy  of  Scottish  independence  is  carried  out  by  situating  the 
mitigation  at  the  end  of  the  text.  They  place  the  contentious  issue  just  before  the 
closing  remarks,  marginalising  and  isolating  the  issue  from  the  rest  of  the  discourse. 
The  audience  is  addressed  in  more  familiar  tone  and  the  issue  framed  as,  an  aside,  an 
issue  of  less  importance  than  the  rest  of  the  party's  policy  agenda,  and  as  a  personal 
116 belief  of  the  party  leader.  In  contrast,  the  Liberal  Democrats  use  the  whole  of  their 
broadcast  (Text  F)  to  establish  their  credibility,  sometimes,  in  exaggerated  terms. 
Both  Labour  and  the  SNP  mark  textually  what  the  criticism  of  them  is,  the  Liberal 
Democrats  do  not. 
4.2.4  Strategies  for  negotiating  power  sharing,  shared  policy  achievements  and 
potential  coalition  partnerships 
The  centre  ground  of  Scottish  politics  and  the  new  devolved  apparatus  of  Scottish 
governance,  which  the  previous  two  chapters  began  to  explore,  raise  interesting  issues 
concerning  the  manner  in  which  political  discourse  manifests  itself  in  devolved 
elections. 
This  section  will  further  explore  how  a  coalescence  of  centre-left  parties  and 
potential  and  actual  coalition  partnership  affect  campaign  discourse.  Chapter  2 
compared  the  details  of  party  ideology  in  the  centre;  and  chapter  3  investigated  the 
ways  in  which  party  ideology  and  identity  are  constructed  and  communicated  in 
manifestos.  This  section  will  expand  on  the  investigation  of  those  chapters  in  order  to 
further  our  understanding  of  how  the  relationships  between  the  parties  of  the  Scottish 
centre  are  constructed  and  negotiated. 
During  an  election  campaign  Labour  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  run  on 
separate  tickets  but  because  of  power-sharing  they  both  campaign  on  the  same  policy 
record.  This  raises  questions  of  how  the  two  parties  negotiate  responsibility  for  the 
same  policy  achievements,  how  they  maintain  a  separate  identity,  and  how  they 
discursively  position  themselves  in  relation  to  each  other.  In  other  words,  how  do  they 
refer  to  each  other  (if  at  all)  in  an  election  campaign  when  they  could  potentially  have 
to  share  power  together  again  after  the  election?  For  the  Liberal  Democrats  this  is  a 
particularly  important  campaigning  point  as  they  are  the  most  likely  partner  in  a 
power-sharing  executive  for  both  Labour  and  the  SNP.  From  the  alternative 
perspective,  how  Labour  and  the  SNP  rhetorically  position  themselves  in  relation  to 
the  Liberal  Democrats  is  equally  important  to  investigate. 
Like  most  party  election  broadcasts  by  parties  which  hold  office  both  Labour 
and  the  Liberal  Democrats  make  claims  about  policy  achievements  from  their  time  in 
office.  The  achievements  of  the  1999-2003  administration  are  the  achievements  of 
both  parties  in  the  coalition.  The  executive  is  a  joint  venture,  working  in  partnership 
117 as  one  administration  and  therefore  the  results  of  the  administration  are  the 
achievements  of  both  parties.  Various  policies  may  have  come  from  one  side  or  the 
other,  for  example,  the  abolition  of  tuition  fees  for  university  students  in  Scotland  is 
widely  credited  to  the  Liberal  Democrats  (Paterson,  2002).  However,  as  has  already 
been  mentioned,  elections  are  not  run  on  a  joint  ticket,  with  Labour  and  Liberal 
Democrats  as  running  mates,  like  a  presidential  and  vice  presidential  candidate 
campaigning  on  the  basis  of  a  joint  package.  Rather,  a  potential  coalition  forms  part  of 
the  context  and  sub-text  of  the  election,  not  explicitly  stated  but  still  negotiated  in  the 
party  discourse  of  the  election  campaign.  The  policy  achievements  of  the  Labour- 
Liberal  Democrat  coalition  form  part  of  this  negotiation. 
In  their  broadcast  (Text  F)  the  Liberal  Democrats  claim  four  policy 
achievements:  free  personal  care  for  the  elderly;  abolition  of  tuition  fees  for  university 
students;  an  increased  coverage  of  GP  services;  and  pre-school/nursery  places  for 
three  and  four  year  olds.  Three  of  these  four  achievements  are  also  claimed  by  Labour 
in  their  three  broadcasts  (Texts  A,  B  and  C),  however  Labour  omit  the  abolition  of 
university  tuition  fees  as  an  achievement. 
Not  claiming  responsibility  for  tuition  fees  policy  is  a  significant  omission  for 
the  Labour  broadcasts  to  make,  especially  when  it  is  a  popular  policy  which  falls  into 
the  holy  trinity  of  electioneering  issues,  health,  crime  and  education.  Also 
conspicuous  by  their  absence,  in  the  Liberal  Democrat  broadcasts,  are  achievements 
relating  to  crime;  they  fail  to  make  claims  about  crime, either  as  past  achievements  or 
in  terms  of  future  plans.  Law  and  order  issues  are  dealt  with  by  the  Liberal  Democrat 
manifesto,  as  illustrated  in  chapter  2.  Law  and  order  was  a  major  campaigning  issue 
for  Labour  and  it  is  an  issue  which  is  often  central  in  election  campaigns  for  parties 
competing  for  power.  Crime  may  have  been  left  to  Labour,  at  least  in  the  PEBs,  with 
the  Liberal  Democrats  left  to  claim  responsibility  for  the  abolition  of  tuition  fees.  It  is 
difficult  to  assert  with  any  confidence  whether  these  omissions  were  coordinated  by 
the  two  parties.  Because  of  the  salience  of  the  issues  it  is  worth  noting.  However,  it  is 
claims  which  both  parties  do  make  that  will  now  be  discussed. 
In  the  example  below  from  their  broadcast  (Text  A),  beginning  `Whether  it 
is...  '  Labour  lists  its  achievements  embedded  within  a  metaphor  of  `building'  in  the 
initial  long  sub-clause.  This  sub-clause  functions  as  the  Theme  that  contextualises  the 
main  clause,  i.  e.  establishing  a  frame  in  which  the  main  clause  is  to  be  understood. 
118 The  Labour  party  is  clearly  the  actor  in  the  clause,  responsible  for  these  policies.  The 
Liberal  Democrats  are  not  mentioned.  For  example, 
x  Cir:  extent  Actor  Pr:  material  Range 
{[  (in  (just  four)  short  years)  (Labour)  (has  laid)  (strong  foundations.  )]} 
PP  pr  AjP  av  adj  adj  n  NP  n  VP  av  NP  adj  n 
x  Token  Pr:  Relational  Value  1  Cir:  Beneficiary  ---  x 
Whether  {[  (it)  (`s)  (a  nursery  place  (for  every  <  three)  and 
c  NP  pn  VP  v  NP  dnn  PP  pr  adj  nc 
x  Value  2  ---  x 
(four  years  old>)  or  (<free  nursing)  and  (personal  care>) 
NP  dn  adj  c  NP  adj  nc  NP  adj  n 
x  Cir:  beneficiary  Actor  Pr:  material 
(for  Scotland's  older  people)]...  [  (Scottish  Labour)  (has  worked) 
PP  pr  adj  adj  n  NP  adj  n  VP  av 
Cir:  location  in  time  Cir:  Reason  Range 
(everyday)  [  (to  build)  (a  better  Scotland)]} 
AvP  av  VP  av  NP  d  adj  n 
`In  just  four  short  years',  a  circumstance  of  extent  emphasises  time  is  important, 
illustrates  that  things  were  achieved  in  a  short  period  of  time  (expressed  by  the  adverb 
`just').  These  policies  are  metaphorically  a  `strong  foundation'  to  then  `build  on'  and 
it  is  Labour  who  is  doing  the  building.  For  example,  `Labour  has  laid  strong 
foundations',  where  `Labour'  is  the  actor  in  the  clause  who  `has  laid'  (material 
process)  the  `strong  foundations'  (Range). 
After  listing  its  achievements,  including  nursery  places  and  free  personal  care 
for  the  elderly  in  a  co-ordinated  sub  clause,  again  Scottish  Labour  is  the  actor  which 
`had  worked'  (material  process)  to  `build  a  better  Scotland'  presumably  by  achieving 
its  previously  stated  policy  goals.  A  direct  relationship  between  policy  achievements 
and  Labour  being  responsible  for  them  is  not  constructed;  Labour's  responsibility  is 
suggested  by  the  building  metaphor.  The  subordinate  clause,  indicated  by  `whether', 
expresses  contextualising  topics  to  which  the  viewer  is invited  to  relate  the  main 
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from  responsibility  for  policy  achievements. 
In  accordance  with  the  ideological  square  and  the  PEB  typology  we  discussed 
earlier,  Labour's  broadcast  (Text  A)  represents  achievements  in  the  Scottish 
Parliament  in  positive  terms,  ideologically  foregrounding  Labour  whilst  obfuscating 
the  Liberal  Democrats'  role.  Using  the  `building'  metaphor,  Labour  does  not,  at  least 
at  the  level  of  the  clause,  take  direct  responsibility  for  policies.  This  way  of 
representing  Labour's  achievements  is  a  rhetorical  strategy  for  ideologically 
foregrounding  Labour  positively.  At  the  same  time  the  Liberal  Democrats'  role  is 
obfuscated  in  a  non  adversarial  manner,  avoiding  either  directly  crediting  them  (for 
nursery  places  and  free  personal  care  for  the  elderly)  or  directly  criticising  them. 
Crediting  the  Liberal  Democrats  might  raise  questions  about  the  point  of 
differentiating  between  Labour  and  the  Liberal  Democrats,  providing  opponents  with 
an  opportunity  for  a  discursive  attack.  Equally,  criticising  the  Liberal  Democrats 
might  cause  problems  when  trying  to  negotiate  a  coalition  partnership  after  the 
election. 
The  Liberal  Democrats  in  their  election  broadcast  (Text  F)  also  lay  claim  to 
`making  personal  care  free  for  the  elderly',  as  in  the  extract  below, 
(Unseen  female  narrator) 
Jim  Wallace  takes  particular  pride  in  what  the  Scottish  Liberal  Democrats 
have  done  for  older  people.  If  they  are  no  longer  able  to  wash,  feed  or  dress 
themselves  they  no  longer  have  to  pay  for  care.  It's  a  big  worry  lifted. 
(Jim  Wallace) 
It  seems  very  odd  that  if  you  were  say  suffering  from  cancer  there  are  certain 
care  packages  that  you  got  free  but  if  you  were  suffering  from  Alzheimer's 
you  didn't.  And  that  seemed  to  be  totally  arbitrary  and  that's  what  we've 
addressed  in  what  we  did  by  making  personal  care  free  for  the  elderly.  (Text  F, 
2003). 
Wallace  presents  an  argument  of  justification,  delivered  in  a  more  informal  style. 
Wallace's  use  of  conditional  'if'  lause  expresses  a  hypothetical  scenario  in  which 
cancer  sufferers  receive  free  `care  packages'.  The  conjunction  `but'  signals  the 
alternative  negative  scenario,  where  Alzheimer's  sufferers  do  not  receive  free  care 
packages.  This  forms  local  grammatical  coherence  in  the  text  as  well  as  creating  a 
contrasting  argumentative  structure,  facilitating  the  elaboration  of  the  policy 
achievement.  The  disparity  between  the  two  propositions  is  then  asserted  to  be 
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prefaced  by  a  perception  `seems'  (an  intensive  process)  that  mitigates  the  forthcoming 
argument  with  a  more  personal  informality.  Such  informality  is  also  expressed  by  the 
Value  `very  odd',  which  contrasts  with  more  formal,  professional  lexis  such  as  `care 
packages,  `Alzheimer's'  and  `what  we've  addressed'.  The  use  of  `arbitrary', 
mentioned  above,  is  intensified  by  a  more  informal  usage  of  `totally'. 
Jim  Wallace  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  are  consistently  shown  as  responsible 
actors,  e.  g.  `Jim  Wallace  takes  particular  pride'  and  `the  Scottish  Liberal  Democrats 
have  done'.  The  presumption  is  that  older  people  (who  are  target  voters)  have 
benefited  and  that  there  is  a  track  record  to  point  to.  As  Labour  elided  the  role  of  the 
Liberal  Democrats  in  the  formulation  of  their  policy  achievements,  so  too  the  Liberal 
Democrats  elide  Labour  from  the  formulation  of  their  policy  achievements. 
In  addition  to  investigating  how  these  two  parties  refer  to  shared  policies,  it 
would  also  be  useful  to  illustrate  some  other  strategies  the  Liberal  Democrats  use 
when  advocating  their  policy  goals.  The  first  example  below,  illustrates  how  they 
present  a  past  achievement;  while  the  second  concerns  a  method  they  use  to  represent 
future  policy  goals.  These  are  interesting  in  light  of  the  Liberal  Democrats'  position  as 
an  actual  and  potential  coalition  partner. 
The  first  example,  is  the  policy  of  abolition  of  university  tuition  fees,  also 
discussed  above.  The  policy  is  articulated  in  terms  of  the  Liberal  Democrat  leader's 
desire. 
Carrier  Attribute  Pr:  material  Range 
... 
Mcl[  (he)  (was  determined)  Scl[  (to  get)  (university  tuition  fees) 
NP  pn  VP  av  VP  av  NP  nnn 
Pr:  material  x  Actor  Pr:  material 
(abolished)]]  and  [(he)  (succeeded)]} 
VP  vc  NP  pn  VP  v 
The  above  extract  asserts  that  Jim  Wallace  ('he')  was  successful  in  what  he  was 
`determined'  to  do;  but  in  saying  that  `he  was  determined'  implies  that  this  was  a 
difficult  thing  to  do  or  that  there  was  some  obstacle  to  achieving  the  policy.  Whatever 
obstacle  or  difficulty  it  might  have  been  is  left  unsaid.  Therefore,  it  may  be  inferred 
that,  for  the  Liberal  Democrats,  achieving  policy  goals  is  not  a  straightforward 
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not  a  straightforward  process;  theirs  is  a  position  of  a  minority  partner  in  a  coalition. 
Therefore,  they  must  negotiate  for  certain  policies  with  Labour  in  return  for  positions 
in  office.  As  such,  voting  for  the  Liberal  Democrats  is  not  necessarily  a  vote  for  their 
whole  policy  agenda,  but  a  few,  selected  polices  which  they  can  agree  on  with 
Labour.  When  claiming  a  policy  achievement  it  is  not  only  a  demonstration  of  the 
Liberal  Democrats'  honesty  in  doing  what  they  said  they  would  do,  not  just  an 
example  of  an  achievement  but  also  a  demonstration  of  their  ability  to  achieve  goals 
as  a  minority  partner  within  a  coalition  government.  Therefore,  they  are  still  worth 
voting  for  and  are  not  just  there  to  make  up  the  numbers  for  Labour  to  achieve  its 
policy  agenda.  This  is  a  non  adversarial  way  of  illustrating  the  Liberal  Democrats 
effectiveness  in  government  and  to  demonstrate  they  are  prepared  to  struggle  to 
achieve  their  goals.  However,  Labour,  the  party  with  whom  they  presumably  struggle, 
remains  invisible  in  the  PEB. 
This  second  example  illustrates  how  the  Liberal  Democrats  represent  future 
policy  goals,  bearing  in  mind  their  minority  party  status.  As  with  the  above  examples 
from  Text  F  this  is  a  non-adversarial  strategy. 
Circ:  Location  X  Pr:  Existential  ----------------  Existent  ------ 
([(In  the  next  Scottish  Parliament)  (there)  ('s)  (much  more)  [(Jim  Wallace)(wants  to 
PP  pr  d  adj  adj  n  AvP  adv  VP  v  AvP  av  av  NP  nn  VP  a 
------>  ----------------  Circ:  Matter  ---------------------------- 
achieve)],  [  (free  <  eye)  and  (dental  checks  >)  (for  a  start)]]) 
v  NP  adj  nc  NP  adj  n  PP  pr  dn 
Future  policy  achievements  are  not  constructed  in  terms  of  a  strong  commitment, 
expressed  through  the  use  of  the  deontic  system  of  modality,  such  as  `we  will  do  V. 
Instead,  they  are  represented  as  the  result  of  an  individual's  desire  (boulomaic 
modality)  e.  g.,  `Jim  Wallace  wants  to  achieve'  and  not  in  more  concrete  material 
process  `we  will  do  X'.  Because  of  the  Liberal  Democrats'  position  as  minority 
coalition  partner  they  are  not  in  a  realistic  position  to  employ  strong  deontic 
commitment  of  `will'  and  state  `we  will  do  V.  It  is  likely  they,  the  Liberal 
Democrats,  might  have  to  negotiate  a  deal  with  the  SNP  after  the  election  or  re- 
negotiate  with  Labour  Party.  The  use  of  the  non  adversarial  strategies  might  be  a 
122 rhetorical  method  of  negotiating  a  political  position  which  will  be  compatible  with 
two  different  parties.  Compatibility  with  either  the  SNP  or  Labour  could  prove 
difficult  come  the  end  of  the  election  if  too  strong  a  commitment  to  certain  policies 
was  asserted  throughout  the  campaign.  If  a  party  were  to  make  strong  commitments 
and  then  not  implement  them  they  could  be  accused  of  a  U-turn,  of  not  making  good 
their  promises  or  of  being  ineffectual.  These  criticisms  are  certainly  something  the 
Liberal  Democrats  are  bearing  in  mind  in  constructing  their  electoral  discourse. 
Liberal  Democrats  complicate  van  Dijk's  conception  of  the  ideological  square. 
Is  Labour  an  out-group  `them'  to  the  Liberal  Democrats'  in-group  `us'?  The  answer 
is  both  yes  and  no  because  of  the  reasons  outlined  above,  associated  with  coalition 
government.  In  line  with  the  theory  of  the  ideological  square  the  Liberal  Democrats 
construct  their  own  achievements  and  action,  attributes  and  achievements  in  terms  of 
positive  values,  but  they  do  not  refer  to  Labour  or  the  SNP  (or  any  other  party)  in 
negative  terms.  The  previous  chapters  illustrated  that  in  their  manifesto  the  Liberal 
Democrats  only  criticised  the  Labour  Party  in  the  Westminster  context  and  never  just 
as  Scottish  Labour.  The  Liberal  Democrats'  second  PEB,  not  transcribed  here, 
mirrored  the  manifesto,  making  comparisons  between  England  and  Scotland:  where 
because  of  the  Liberal  Democrats,  people  in  Scotland  had  free  personal  care  for  the 
elderly  and  the  abolition  of  tuition  fees.  The  Liberal  Democrats'  strategy  is  to  suggest 
voters  `cannot  trust  Labour  on  their  own'  but  also  not  to  criticise  Scottish  Labour 
directly.  For  Labour  and  the  SNP  each  is  the  focus  of  the  other's  rhetorical  attack. 
Therefore,  for  Scottish  Labour  and  the  SNP  the  ideological  square  appears  to  operate 
just  as  van  Dijk  discusses,  at  least  in  relation  to  each  other.  However,  Labour  and 
SNP's  relationship  with  the  Lib  Dems  complicates  van  Dijk's  conception  of  the 
ideological  square.  Neither  the  SNP  nor  Labour  mentions  the  Liberal  Democrats.  This 
is  significant  for  both  Labour  and  the  SNP,  as  traditionally  they  are  all  left  of  centre 
parties  that  would  be  competing  for  similar  sections  of  the  vote.  The  Liberal 
Democrats  were  part  of  the  executive  responsible  for  policy  initiatives  as  well  as 
Labour,  but  only  Labour  receives  SNP  criticism.  Labour,  as  we  have  already  shown, 
do  not  mention  the  Liberal  Democrats'  role  in  their  achievements. 
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In  attempting  to  account  for  the  linguistic  behaviour  exhibited  by  the  Scottish  centre- 
left  parties  during  elections,  the  effects  of  a  new  and  (in  UK  terms)  different  electoral 
system  must  be  investigated.  The  mixed  form  of  PR,  which  is  likely  to  result  in 
coalition,  is  changing  the  traditionally  adversarial  discourse  of  British  politics.  For 
Labour  and  the  SNP  attacking  each  other  discursively  marks  out  their  differences;  and 
this  behaviour  fits  into  the  ideological  square.  That  is  they  positively  characterise  the 
in-group's  actions,  attributes  and  achievements,  while  negatively  characterising  the 
out-group's  actions,  attributes  and  achievements.  Although,  ideologically  similar  on 
many  issues,  as  chapter  2  illustrated,  the  nationalist  issue  still  divides  Labour  and  the 
SNP,  making  cooperation  extremely  unlikely  in  the  current  political  environment. 
However,  Labour  and  the  SNP  do  not  criticise  or  even  mention  the  Liberal  Democrats 
in  their  PEBs  or  manifestos.  This  is  unusual  in  comparison  with  Westminster 
campaigning.  Therefore,  the  conclusion  may  be  drawn  that  this  behaviour  is  an 
attempt  by  both  the  SNP  and  Labour  to  remain  compatible  with  the  Liberals,  ready  for 
a  potential  coalition. 
For  the  Liberal  Democrats,  highlighting  their  own  good  points  fits  with  the 
ideological  square  but  not  attacking  either  Labour  or  the  SNP  is,  as  has  already  been 
demonstrated,  a  rhetorical  move  to  remain  compatible  with  those  parties.  Choosing 
not  to  attack  an  opponent  could  be  viewed  as  a  tacit  mitigation  of  an  opponent's 
negative  actions,  attributes  and  achievements,  which  runs  counter  to  the  ideological 
square.  This  is  particularly  important  as  all  three  centre  left  parties  occupy  similar 
ideological  space  and  are  therefore  often  competing  for  similar  sections  of  the  vote. 
Such  ideological  similarity  makes  coalition  more  practical  between  Labour  and  the 
Liberal  Democrats  or  between  the  Liberal  Democrats  and  the  SNP.  However,  in  an 
election  campaign  one  might  expect  all  three  parties  to  be  aggressively  competing  for 
each  other's  votes,  which  as  we  have  seen  they  are  not.  The  potential  outcome  of  the 
election,  therefore,  affects  the  nature  of  the  discourse  of  the  election  campaign. 
Although  difference  or  distinctiveness  is important  for  all  parties  in  appealing  to 
voters  of  different  kinds,  compatibility  is  possibly  as  important  to  Labour,  the  Liberal 
Democrats  and  the  SNP.  Only  through  cooperation  will  the  parties  be  able  to  form  a 
coalition  government  likely  to  achieve  stable  government  and  able  to  implement  a 
policy  agenda. 
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strategy  of  ideological  self-interest,  which  appear  in  social  conflicts  and  actions' 
(1998:  33).  Labour,  Liberal  Democrats  and  the  SNP  are  engaged  in  the  ideological 
self-interested  social  conflict  that  is  an  election;  however,  as  shown,  there  are 
numerous  examples  of  non  adversarial  rhetorical  strategies  from  all  three  centre  left 
parties.  In  light  of  the  devolved  context,  potential  coalition  partners  become  (at  least 
for  the  period  of  an  election  campaign)  `quasi  in-group'  members.  `Quasi  in-group' 
members  are  not  afforded  the  privileges  of  full  in-group  status  but  neither  are  they 
completely  an  `out-group'.  Therefore,  under  the  conditions  considered  here  van  Dijk's 
ideological  square  begins  to  break  down  under  a  strict  application  of  its  properties. 
The  ideological  square  needs  reformulating  to  account  for  competitive  discursive 
ideological  contexts  where  cooperation  and  compromise  form  important  structural 
features  of  the  context,  that  is,  where  competing  groups  maximise  self-interest 
through  cooperation. 
125 CHAPTER  5:  THE  MUTUAL  CONSTRUCTION  OF  POLITICAL  DISCOURSE: 
PARTY  ELECTION  BROADCASTS  AND  THEIR  MEDIA  RECEPTION. 
5.1  What  is  press  reception? 
This  chapter  analyses  the  manner  in  which  the  PEBs  of  the  Scottish  2003  election 
were  received  in  the  press.  During  the  four  weeks  of  an  election  campaign42  more 
airtime  and  more  column  inches  are  given  over  to  politics  and,  therefore,  more 
journalists  cover  politics  than  normally  would.  Garton,  Montgomery  and  Tolson  note 
that  `The  perception  that  the  media  play  a  constitutive  role  in  British  political  life, 
especially  during  general  elections,  is  now  very  familiar'  (1991:  101).  The  media  is  an 
integral  part  of  election  communication;  the  start  of  every  day  in  the  modern  election 
starts  with  each  party  holding  their  own  press  conference  where  a  room  of  journalists 
congregate  before  the  party's  leading  politicians  and  communicators.  Election 
hustings  are  no  longer  the  mass  public  address  of  Gladstone  or  the  soapbox  orations 
of  local  candidates.  Opportunities  for  public  addresses  have  been  transformed  by 
technology  and  now  reach  mass  national  audiences  via  newspapers  and  the 
electorate's  televisions,  radios  and  computers.  The  media  play  a  central  role  in 
communicating  the  events  of  elections;  and  in  turn,  these  events  have  become 
increasingly  national  and  media  centred  in  their  design  and  focus.  Poster  launches, 
election  broadcasts,  manifesto  launches  and  publicity  stunts  now  form  the  staple  of 
election  set-pieces,  designed  to  facilitate  media  coverage.  Rosenbaum  (1997:  85)  has 
commented  that  the  popular  press  and  television  form  a  `duopoly'  in  provision  of 
political  information  to  the  public.  Parties  do  not  communicate  directly  with  the 
electorate  for  much  of  the  campaign;  their  messages  are  mediated  through  the  organs 
of  the  media  before  they  reach  the  public.  Any  assessment  of  contemporary  election 
discourse  should  therefore  attempt  to  investigate  the  impact  of  the  media  on  those 
discourses  produced.  Therefore,  this  chapter  will  attempt  to  address  issues  such  as: 
how  campaign  events  and  messages  are  reproduced;  whether  messages  are 
transformed  or altered  in  any  way;  and  if  there  are  any  effects  on  the  reproduction  of 
political  messages,  what  the  possible  implications  might  be  for  the  nature  of  public 
debate  in  elections.  In  dealing  with  these  issues  this  chapter  will  illustrate  two 
42  In  the  UK  official  electioneering  is  limited  to  a  four  week  period  commencing  after  the 
announcement  of  an  election  and  the  dissolution  of  Parliament. 
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press  coverage;  demonstrating  the  success  of  one  and  the  failure  of  the  other.  Only 
these  two  messages  and  parties  are  focussed  on  because  in  the  reportage  of  all  the 
PEBs  they  were  the  only  parties  and  issues  which  received  coverage.  It  is  suggested 
below  that  this  selectivity  in  reporting  and  comment  is  a  result  of  cognitive  aspects  of 
discourse  representation  of  elections  and  the  discourse  practices  of  politicians  and 
journalists. 
Because  of  the  importance  of  the  media  in  politics  and  elections,  political 
parties  have  become  increasingly  skilled  at  using  the  media.  They  attempt  to  design 
their  discourse  to  make  their  messages  consistent  throughout  the  campaign,  across 
differing  media  and  between  different  candidates  (Bruce,  1992;  Rosenbaum,  1997).  In 
doing  so,  the  parties  hope  to  deliver  a  consistent  and  convincing  message  to  the 
public,  through  the  filter  of  the  media.  It  is  demonstrable  that  specific  instances  of 
language  are  repeated  in  conference  addresses,  PEBs,  in  press  briefings  and  by  the 
press  itself.  It  is  also  evident  that  the  popular  press  creates  its  own  discourses  and 
sparks  its  own  political  debates,  which  politicians  and  other  media  sources  are  drawn 
into. 
This  chapter  will  demonstrate  that  the  language  used  by  the  press  and 
politicians  to  discuss  and/or  represent  elections  habitually  characterises  those 
elections  as  a  war,  argument  or  pugilistic  contest,  all  of  which  are  typified  as  a  contest 
between  two  sides.  The  utility  of  this  conceptualisation  will  be  questioned  in  terms  of 
whether  the  language  used  can  be  said  to  represent  appropriately  the  post-devolution 
Scottish  political  context.  The  analytical  approach  is in  keeping  with  this  thesis' 
critical  discourse  perspective.  By  exploring  the  dynamics  between  the  socio-political 
context  and  discourse  practices  this  investigation  will  seek  to  offer  alternative 
readings  to  existing  hegemonies. 
A  key  point  of  concern  to  this  investigation  is  the  manner  in  which  the  press 
cover  these  PEBs.  Coverage  is  not  in  terms  of  the  policy  issues  which  the  broadcasts 
raise,  e.  g.  issues  of  devolution  and  healthcare.  Instead,  reportage  of  PEBs  is  framed  as 
a  discourse  topic  of  negative  campaigning.  Negative  campaigning  as  an  item  of  news 
is  not  an  event  in  itself  but  an  interpretation  given  to  other  events  (in  this  instance  two 
election  broadcasts).  The  issue  then  appears  to  be  self  perpetuating,  no  longer 
dependent  on  the  original  events  but  on  the  contributions  of  journalists  and  politicians 
who  recursively  contribute  to  the  discussion  of  negative  campaigning.  Claims  and 
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basis  for  the  accusation  of  negative  campaigning.  This  will  be  shown  to  be  partly  due 
to  two  related  phenomena.  The  first  is  the  similitude  of  political  and  journalistic 
discourse  practices.  The  second  is  that  the  discourse  representations  of  negative 
campaigning  constitute  part  of  a  larger  schematic  representation  of  politics.  Such  a 
schema  structurally  privileges  particular  parties  in  the  Scottish  context.  Therefore,  this 
investigation  will  illustrate  some  of  the  ways  in  which  ideological  dominances  are 
reproduced  and  maintained. 
The  corpus  for  analysis  in  this  chapter  is  formed  from  27  articles  (see 
Appendix  II)  taken  from  the  Scottish  popular  press.  These  represent  the  vast  majority 
of  coverage  of  the  PEBs  from  this  election  in  the  newspapers  concerned.  A  systematic 
and  comprehensive  collection  was  carried  out,  covering  every  day  of  the  four  week 
campaign.  Every  article  with  content  associated  with  the  election  was  archived.  The 
newspapers  from  which  the  articles  came  were  The  Daily  Record,  The  Herald,  The 
Scotsman,  The  Evening  Times,  The  Evening  News,  The  Sunday  Herald,  Scotland  on 
Sunday,  the  Sunday  Mail  and  BBC  News  (online).  These  are  the  main  indigenous43 
publications,  which  have  a  uniquely  Scottish  focus.  The  27  texts  focus  exclusively  on 
the  PEBs  of  Labour  and  SNP  and  the  debate  that  grew  up  around  them.  Articles 
concerning  other  parties'  broadcasts  in  the  election  were  rare;  in  fact,  only  one  other 
article  could  be  found  in  the  author's  larger  corpus  of  1,200  articles  covering  the 
entire  election.  The  one  other  article  only  briefly  commented  on  a  Conservative 
broadcast.  It  is  difficult  to  discuss  evidence  which  is  not  present.  However,  this 
chapter  will  discuss  the  significance  of  the  omission  of  debating  other  parties' 
broadcasts.  The  dynamics  of  political  messages  in  the  print  press  are  complex;  in 
order  to  compare  data  in  a  manageable  fashion  in  the  space  available,  this  chapter 
concentrates  on  one  issue.  Even  though  the  present  analysis  focuses  on  the  reception 
of  PEBs,  it  will  be  clear  from  the  discussion  below  that  a  myriad  of  processes  are 
simultaneously  at  work. 
Garton,  Montgomery  and  Tolson  (1991:  112)  comment  that  there  seems  to  be 
a3  to  5  day  life  cycle  (which  this  thesis  will  call  the  `reportage  cycle')  for  stories  in 
43  Law  (2001)  in  his  analysis  of  the  Scottish  press,  makes  a  distinction  between  `indigenous'  and 
`interloper'  publications.  Indigenous  titles  are  those  who  have  historically  been  based  in  and  focused  on 
Scotland.  Whereas  interlopers  are  those  publications  which  have  latterly  begun  to  publish  Scottish 
versions  of  their  traditionally  London  and  English  focused  newspapers  e.  g.  The  Scottish  Sun  and  The 
Scottish  Times. 
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supports  their  claim,  as  the  majority  of  the  press  coverage  of  PEBs  ran  for  5  days, 
from  13-04-03  to  17-04-03,  although  there  is  one  other  article  relating  to  the  same 
issue  that  occurred  on  20-04-03.  Therefore,  this  investigation  focuses  on  a  week  of 
press  coverage,  from  roughly  the  third  week  of  the  campaign. 
5.2  Methods  and  concepts:  from  metaphor  and  schemata  to  recycling 
This  chapter  will  question  the  representations  that  language  has  been  used  to  create.  In 
doing  so,  the  relationship  between  metaphor  and  mental  schemata  will  be  drawn  upon. 
The  way  in  which  language  both  reflects  and  creates  representations  of  reality  will  be 
explored.  The  linguistic  usages  of  the  press  and  politicians,  in  the  production  of 
political  discourse,  will  be  critically  commented  on  in  reference  to  the  devolved 
Scottish  context. 
The  following  analysis  borrows  significantly  from  the  work  of  Montgomery 
(2005)  and  Garton,  Montgomery  and  Tolson  (1991).  Their  investigations  continue  the 
critical  tradition,  pay  particular  attention  to  the  mediating  role  of  the  press  in  political 
discourse  and  emphasise  the  contemporary  similitude  of  discourse  practices  of  media 
and  political  agents.  Montgomery  (2005)  and  Garton,  Montgomery  and  Tolson  (1991) 
also  consider  schemata  and  metaphor  as  significant  features  of  discourse.  They  relate 
specific  instances  of  linguistic  representation  to  the  ideological  and  cognitive 
processes  of  agents  in  the  public  sphere.  Such  an  approach  is  highly  compatible  with 
the  work  of  Fairclough  (1992,1995a,  1995b)  and  van  Dijk  (1998,2002).  Insights  into 
metaphor  and  schemata  illustrate  the  potential  power  of  discourse  to  construct  a 
particular  reality,  which  can  then  be  a  determining  factor  in  social  action.  For 
example,  Montgomery  (2005)  suggests  representing  reality  in  some  specific  way, 
such  as  a  mass  terrorist  atrocity  as  an  `act  of  war',  implies  a  different  set  of  values  and 
potential  responses  by  social  agents  than  referring  to  that  same  event  as  `mass 
murder'.  Even  so,  the  relationship  between  cognitive-linguistic  representations  and 
social  action  is  one  of  influence  rather  than  determination. 
To  begin  the  present  analysis,  examples  of  metaphorical  use  will  be  given, 
from  which  two  broad  topics  emerge.  The  first  is  characterised  as  a  general  campaign 
issue,  that  of  combative  campaigning,  with  a  particular  emphasis  on  negative 
campaigning.  The  election  is  characterised  as  a  conflict  between  two  sides  and  that 
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negative  campaigning  is  Labour's  portrayal  of  the  SNP  policy  of  independence  as 
`divorce  and  separation'  from  the  rest  of  the  UK.  These  two  topics  -  the 
characterisation  of  a  campaign  as  a  conflict,  and  the  tone  of  campaign  discourse  as 
negative  -  appear  divergent  in  type  at  first  sight;  however,  there  is  uniformity  in  the 
use  of  language  and  discourse  processes  which  underpin  their  production.  The 
schemata  which  the  metaphors  evoke  will  be  explicated,  with  reference  to  the 
effect(s)  on  the  global  coherence  of  the  discourse  produced.  After  this  it  will  be 
necessary  to  discuss  the  similitude  of  discourse  practices  of  political  and  media 
agents,  which  will  be  a  study  of  the  processes  of  intertextuality  and  message 
recycling.  The  features  of  discourse  focused  on  in  this  chapter  are  the  party  political 
issue  of  independence,  and  the  campaign  issue  of  negative  campaigning. 
Penultimately,  this  chapter  will  critically  question  the  hegemonic  inferences  of  these 
metaphors  and  their  associated  schemata  with  reference  to  the  devolved  Scottish 
context,  before  concluding  with  the  possible  implications  this  analysis  has  for  Scottish 
political  discourse. 
For  clarity  it  will  be  useful  to  introduce  some  of  the  terminology  and  concepts 
which  this  chapter  will  use.  The  first  important  concept  is  that  of  metaphor,  which 
will  feature  as  an  important  focus  of  this  analysis.  Metaphor  can  perhaps  be  simply 
defined  as  describing  something  in  terms  of  another  thing:  `Metaphors  allow  us  to 
understand  one  domain  of  experience  in  terms  of  another'  (Lakoff  and  Turner,  1989: 
135).  That  is,  the  meaning  of  one  concept  is  explained  and  understood  with  reference 
to  another  (Saeed,  1997:  302-303).  A  basic  linguistic  description  of  metaphors  can  be 
understood  in  terms  of  source  and  target  domains.  The  target  domain  is  the  thing 
being  described,  while  the  source  domain  provides  analogous  meaning(s).  For 
example,  `The  legal  settlement  was  a  slap  in  the  face  for  justice'.  In  this  example  the 
legal  settlement  is  the  target  domain,  it  is  the  thing  given  meaning  by  the  application 
of  a  metaphor.  The  slap  in  the  face  is  the  source  domain;  the  action  of  physical  insult 
confers  meaning  as  to  the  nature  of  the  legal  settlement. 
There  are  several  competing  theories  of  metaphor,  including  the  classical  and 
the  romantic.  The  former  envisages  metaphor  as  a  poetic  feature  which  is  situated 
outside  normal  usages  of  language.  The  latter  sees  it  as  `integral  to  language  and 
thought  as  a  way  of  experiencing  the  world'  (Saeed,  1999:  303).  This  thesis  adopts  a 
third  perspective,  a  cognitive  approach  to  metaphor,  typified  by  Lakoff  and  Johnson 
130 (1980),  Lakoff  (1987)  and  Lakoff  and  Turner  (1989).  This  theory  owes  much  to  the 
romantic  tradition;  however  unlike  the  romantic  tradition  room  is left  for  non- 
metaphorical  instances  of  language  (Saeed,  1999:  304).  The  cognitive  approach 
affords  an  opportunity  not  to  view  metaphor  as  a  mere  rhetorical  flourish  but  as  a 
significant  property  of  language  and  mind.  Therefore,  metaphor  is  considered  as  a 
`cognitive  operation'(Chilton  and  Schäffner,  2002:  28).  Language  is  linked  to 
cognitive  structures  (such  as  the  ideological  complex  and  schemata).  Language  is 
thereby  given  a  greater  role  in  the  representation,  mediation  and  construction  of 
ideology  and  reality.  This  chapter  will  discuss  metaphor  in  terms  of  its  role  in 
constructing  a  particular  representation  of  the  devolved  2003  Scottish  election,  and  in 
the  mediated  discourse  of  the  Scottish  print  press.  The  election  is  portrayed  as  a 
conflict  and  this  meaning  is  constructed  out  of  three  main  metaphors,  war,  argument 
and  pugilistic  contest.  These  metaphors  are  closely  related  in  the  language  of 
politicians  and  journalists,  and  there  is  a  substantial  evidence  of  mixing  of  these  in 
any  single  text.  Metaphors  are  also  an  important  feature  of  political  discourse  because 
they  are  an  integral  part  of  our  conceptual  systems  and  as  Lakoff  and  Johnson  assert, 
`...  our  conceptual  system  is  not  something  we  are  normally  aware  of'  1981:  3). 
Therefore  metaphors  are  a  potential  source  of  conscious  and  unconscious 
representations  of  speakers'  and  writers'  beliefs.  Chilton  and  Schaffner  (2002) 
contend  that  metaphor  may  provide  a  systematized  ideology  with  a  conceptual  (that  is 
cognitive)  structure.  These  beliefs  may  be  constructed  as  taken  for  granted  or 
common  sense  representations  of  the  world. 
Schemata  are  conceptual  systems  for  organising  knowledge  and  experience  of 
the  world.  Van  Dijk  defines  schemata  as  `higher-level  complex  (and  even 
conventional  or  habitual)  knowledge  structures'  (1981:  141).  Brown  and  Yule 
elaborate,  informing  us  that,  `...  schemata  can  be  seen  as  the  organised  background 
knowledge  which  leads  us  to  expect  or  predict  aspects  in  our  interpretation  of 
discourse'  (1983:  248).  Therefore,  schemata  are  an  aspect  of  memory  as  well  part  of 
discourse  interpretation.  They  are  organised  mental  representations  of  past  knowledge 
which  are  then  triggered  by  an  encountered  discourse  and  drawn  on  to  help  construct 
understanding  of  that  discourse  (Bartlett:  1932).  Metaphors  can  be  important  triggers 
for  particular  mental  schemata,  implying  an  organised  set  of  associated  meanings. 
This  process  is  in  part  constructive  in  nature,  privileging  one  set  of  meanings  in 
preference  to  other  meanings  in  the  reading  of  a  discourse.  For  example,  the  use  of 
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politics,  privileges  meanings  which  imply  winners  and  losers.  Agents  are  represented 
as  antagonists,  adversaries  and  rivals.  These  representations  are  at  the  expense  of 
those  aspects  of  politics  which  do  not  fit  the  modelling  of  conflict  metaphors,  such  as 
compromise,  negotiation  and  alliances  (Beard,  2000:  22).  Non-adversarial  meanings 
might  be  more  appropriate  in  a  political  system  more  likely  to  produce  coalition  or 
minority  governance.  Because  the  focus  of  this  chapter  is  on  instances  of  metaphor 
and  the  schematic  structures  they  represent,  the  terms  metaphor  and  schema  are  often 
used  interchangeably.  That  is  not  to  say  that  schemata  only  occur  as  a  product  of 
metaphor,  only  that  other  cognitive-linguistic  features  of  schemata  are  not  the  locus  of 
this  chapter's  interest. 
This  investigation  shares  an  analytical  focus  with  the  work  of  Garton, 
Montgomery  and  Tolson,  centring  attention  on  the  role  of  schemata  in  the  discursive 
reproduction  of  ideologies.  It  also  agrees  with  the  assertion  that  schemata  have 
implicit  presuppositions,  `which  construct  chains  of  imaginary  consequences,  and 
which  make  metaphorical  connections  which  are  historically  vague  and  yet  universal 
in  common-sense  terms'  (Garton,  Montgomery  and  Tolson,  1991:  115).  Garton, 
Montgomery  and  Tolson  go  on  to  suggest  that  in  the  public  forum  of  mediated 
political  discourse: 
[P]articular  ideological  assumptions  and  narrative  scenarios  occupy  a  place  of 
dominance  within  this  forum,  to  the  extent  that  their  pervasive  solidity  as 
forms  of  common  sense  is  very  difficult  to  challenge.  (1991:  116) 
The  evidence  of  this  chapter  supports  this  assertion.  The  use  of  metaphors  and  their 
related  schemata,  in  the  discourse  of  the  press  reception  of  PEBs,  have  significant 
implications  for  public  debate.  These  implications  relate  specifically  to  the  issue  of 
interpretation  of  Scottish  electoral  politics  and  generally  to  our  understanding  of  the 
nature  of  political  discourse  in  the  public  sphere.  One  of  the  goals  of  this  chapter  is  to 
question  the  appropriateness  of  characterising  a  multi-party  system  of  election  and 
governance  as  wars,  arguments  or  pugilistic  contests. 
The  term  soundbite  has  come  into  common  currency  in  the  discourse  of 
politics  and  the  media  over  the  last  ten  years.  Rosenbaum  defines  the  soundbite  as 
`...  a  brief,  self-contained,  vivid  phrase  or sentence,  which  summarises  or  encapsulates 
a  key  point'  (1997:  91).  The  soundbite  is  the  modern  equivalent  of  a  rhetorical 
132 flourish,  but  they  are  intended  to  be  appropriate  for  media  recycling  and  not 
necessarily  for  an  immediate  and  present  audience.  Rosenbaum  explains, 
The  key  verbal  skill  for  politicians  today,  or  those  who  write  their  words  for 
them,  is  not  (as  it  once  was)  grand  and  persuasive  oratory,  but  colourful  and 
memorable  encapsulation.  Or  -  to  encapsulate  the  point  -  the  ability  to  talk  in 
headlines.  Publicity-hungry  politicians  think  consciously  in  terms  of 
soundbites.  They  never  give  a  major  speech,  interview  or  statement  on  the 
doorstep  without  planning  the  morsel  of  their  text  which  they  want  to  be 
gobbled  up  and  regurgitated  by  the  media.  (Rosenbaum,  1997:  92) 
Metaphors  can  be  a  productive  linguistic  tool  for  politicians  in  producing  soundbites. 
Their  utility  comes  from  their  analogous  properties,  often  poetic  character  and  their 
ability  to  reduce  complex  ideas,  policies  and  events  to  more  familiar  concepts. 
A  central  concept  in  this  chapter,  in  its  analysis  of  press  reception,  is  that  of 
recycling  and  the  related  concepts  of  trajectories  and  intertextuality.  Recycling  refers 
to  instances  in  the  media  where  language  from  one  discourse  domain  (text  type),  a 
political  speech,  a  press  release  or a  PEB,  may  be  reproduced  in  a  different  media 
domain,  such  as  a  newspaper  article  or  television  news  bulletin.  The  language  may 
reoccur  as  an  attributed  quote,  as  a  paraphrase  or  it  may  be  reformulated  in  an 
unattributed  fashion  in  the  commentary  of  a  journalist.  This  inevitably  involves  a  re- 
contextual  isati  on  and  transformation  of  the  initial  source  utterance  (Garton, 
Montgomery  and  Tolson,  1991:  100).  Once  recycled,  an  utterance  can  develop 
trajectories  over  time,  as  recycled  utterances  are  continually  reused  in  different  media 
and  political  domains  and  at  different  times.  The  trajectory  of  an  utterance  in  the 
media  and  associated  discourse  domains  may  see  the  meaning  of  the  initial  utterance 
change  as  it  is  re-contextualised  within  other  media  discourses  over  time  (Fiske,  1987: 
126).  Montgomery  discusses  the  trajectories  of  `the  discourse  of  war  after  9/11' 
(2005:  149),  commenting  that  the  sense  in  which  the  word  war  had  for  government 
officials  and  the  media  commentators  changed  over  time  after  the  terrorist  atrocities 
of  September  11`"  2001.  Similar,  though  obviously  less  dramatic,  instances  of 
recycling  and  discourse  trajectories  can  be  seen  in  the  evidence  presented  in  this 
chapter. 
Recycling  is  also  an  example  of  what  Fairclough  (1992,1995a,  1995b)  and 
Fiske  (1987)  call  intertextuality,  where  the  composition  of  a  (media)  text  contains 
constituents  whose  origin  lies  outside  the  text  in  question.  Examples  of  intertextuality 
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author  and  audience  in  the  articulation  of  the  text.  Obscure  cultural  references  might 
be  seen  as  marking  a  text  for  a  specialised  interest  group.  The  jargonised  language  of 
an  academic  journal,  or  the  slang  of  a  pirate  `drum  and  bass'  music  radio  station 
create  more  meanings  for  their  specific  discourse  communities  (see  chapter  3  on 
active  audience  interpretation).  That  is  not  to  say  that  a  wider  audience  cannot  obtain 
meaning  from  those  discourses;  rather,  they  would  not  obtain  as  much  meaning. 
More  generic  cultural  references,  which  might  be  understood  by  larger  numbers  of 
people,  mark  a  text  as  more  popular  in  focus,  for  example  a  TV  news  bulletin  that 
evokes  the  `Dad's  Army'  TV  series  as  a  metaphor  in  the  discussion  of  defence  policy 
(Garton,  Montgomery  and  Tolson,  1991).  In  a  general  election,  where  politicians  and 
journalists  alike  are  trying  to  communicate  with  mass  audiences,  one  would  therefore 
expect  to  find  more  generic  instances  of  intertextuality. 
Fiske  (1987)  offers  a  useful  typology  of  intertextuality,  distinguishing  between 
`vertical'  and  `horizontal'  intertextual  relationships.  He  explains, 
Horizontal  relations  are  those  between  primary  texts  that  are  more  or  less 
explicitly  linked,  usually  along  the  axes  of  genre,  character,  or  content. 
Vertical  intertextuality  is  that  between  a  primary  text,  such  as  a  television 
program  or series,  and  other  texts  of  a  different  type  that  refer  explicitly  to  it. 
These  may  be  secondary  texts  such  as  studio  publicity,  journalistic  features,  or 
criticism,  or  tertiary  texts  produced  by  the  viewers  in  the  form  of  letters  to  the 
press  or,  more  importantly,  of  gossip  and  conversation.  (1987:  108) 
Therefore,  chapters  thus  far  have  dealt  with  horizontal  intertextual  relationships, 
investigating  discourses  from  a  small  genre  of  texts.  These  are  the  primary  texts  Fiske 
refers  to,  the  party  manifestos  and  election  broadcasts.  However,  this  chapter  focuses 
on  secondary  texts.  Vertically  related,  these  secondary  `spin  off'  exts  comment  on  the 
primary  texts.  They  are  important  to  investigate  because  secondary  texts,  relating  to 
`criticism  or  publicity,  work  to  promote  the  circulation  of  selected  meanings  of  the 
primary  text'  (Fiske,  1987:  117).  The  selection  and  structuring  of  texts  and  their 
meanings  is,  as  Fiske  (1987)  points  out,  an  important  aspect  of  textual  and  social 
power.  That  is,  the  meanings  in  texts  and  the  texts  themselves  are  structured  in  the 
interest  of  the  dominant  social  group  and  their  interests.  The  operation  of  particular 
metaphors  and  schemata  will  be  shown  to  play  an  important  role  in  communicating 
meaning  across  primary  and  secondary  texts. 
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and  divorce 
The  corpus  of  27  articles  analysed  illustrates  the  importance  of  specific  metaphors  to 
both  journalists  and  politicians  alike  in  the  communication  of  political  discourse.  The 
corpus  displays  uniformity  in  the  use  of  metaphors  in  describing  events,  actions  and 
participants  across  texts.  The  initial  event(s)  which  this  collection  of  articles  stems 
from  is  not  just  a  discussion  of  the  content  of  broadcasts  themselves.  The  discourse  is 
predominantly  about  the  negative  nature  of  election  campaigning.  Although  numerous 
parties  were  campaigning,  this  discussion  was  fixed  on  only  two:  Labour  and  the 
SNP.  Three  main  metaphors  occur:  the  first  and  most  prominent  is  that  politics  is 
war;  the  second  is  that  politics  is  argument;  and  thirdly  politics  is  pugilism.  This 
analysis  will  demonstrate  the  extensive  mixing  of  these  metaphors  and  suggests  they 
form  an  overarching  schema,  referred  to  here  as  the  conflict  paradigm.  The  textual 
evidence  of  this  paradigm  suggests  the  meaning  of  all  three  metaphors  is  closely 
related  at  the  cognitive  level.  Politics  is  given  meaning  by  its  characterisation  as  a 
conflict  between  two  competing  sides.  The  fourth  metaphor  considered  represents 
Scottish  independence  as  divorce  and  separation.  This  is  an  example  from  Labour 
Party  discourse  attacking  the  SNP's  policy  of  independence  from  the  rest  of  the 
United  Kingdom. 
The  three  metaphors  of  the  conflict  paradigm  will  be  illustrated  by  the 
following  discussion  centring  on  the  tabulated  results  of  analysis.  The  tables  represent 
the  structure  and  content  of  the  mental  schema  produced  by  the  metaphor  under 
consideration.  Deductions  are  made  on  the  basis  of  evidence  contained  in  the  corpus; 
a  larger  sample  would,  undoubtedly,  produce  greater  delicacy.  The  tables  attempt  to 
represent  categories  and  subcategories  of  the  schema.  Table  headings  equate  to 
superordinate  category  branches,  the  left-hand  side  indicates  co-ordinate  branches, 
and  the  right-hand  side  provides  textual  evidence  drawn  from  the  corpus.  The  various 
headings,  therefore,  act  as  functional  interpretations  of  the  textual  data,  from  which 
the  investigative  discussion  flows. 
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From  the  corpus  a  prominent  schema  emerged.  In  this  model,  political  events,  agents 
and  their  actions  are  all  understood  in  terms  of  militaristic  references.  The  source 
domain  provides  analogous  concepts  for  politics  drawn  from  names  for  events  in  war. 
Elections,  manifesto  launches,  election  broadcasts  and  conference  speeches  become 
wars,  battles,  campaigns  and  phases.  Table  5.1  illustrates  this, 
Table  5.1  Politics  is  war  schema:  types  of  conflict 
Types  of  Conflict 
. 
Campaigns:,  '  `Labour  prepare  scare  campaign  in  response',  `an  escalation  of  the 
media  campaign',  `positive  campaign',  `drawn  into  a  negative 
campaign',  `issue-based  campaign',  `TV  campaign' 
Phases.  ',  ".  ''s,  `negative  phase',  `attack  phase',  `the  election  campaign  will  enter  a 
n  new  and  brutal  phase  today' 
a  d 
tles 
'!  Battles  'Battle  for  Hol  ood  war',  'fighting  dies  down',  yr  'phoney  'infighting', 
other  `a  bitter  war  of  words',  `a  day  of  bitter  clashes',  `tired  old  attacks  on 
Clashes:  ý,  =  independence',  `parties  clash  over  hospital  waiting  lists' 
For  example,  `Battle  for  Holyrood  set  to  hot  up  [Headline]...  Labour  will  go  on  a 
counter-offensive  tomorrow,  with  an  anti-independence  campaign'  (Sunday  Mail,  13 
April  2003)  [italics  added].  Internal  disagreement  is  described  as  `infighting'  as  if 
party  members  are  mutinous  foot-soldiers  and  elections  themselves  are  military 
campaigns,  presumably  with  the  aim  of  conquering  all  others  or  at  the  very  least 
winning. 
It  may  be  useful  to  briefly  consider  the  etymology  of  key  terms  to  establish 
some  evidence  of  the  history  of  metaphors  and  how  metaphorical  meaning  was 
established.  The  Oxford  English  Dictionary  (OED)  records  `campaign'  as  entering  the 
English  language  in  the  17th  century,  from  the  French  `campagne'.  Its  meanings 
centred  on  concepts  associated  with  open  country  or  field.  Of  `campaign',  the  OED 
comments  it  was, 
136 at  first  occasionally  used  in  all  the  senses  of  the  earlier  campaign,  but  was  at 
length  differentiated,  and  restricted  to  the  military  sense,  for  which  it  is  now 
the  proper  term.  (www.  oed.  com,  05-06-2006) 
From  the  mid  1600s  `campaign'  is  used  predominantly  militaristically.  However, 
from  the  earlier  10  century  the  OED  records  `campaign'  used  politically.  In  the 
earlier  1800s,  then  one  can  see  evidence  of  meaning  radiating  from  the  militaristic  to 
the  political  domain. 
The  politics  is  war  schema  divides  campaigns  into  strategic  phases,  employing 
different  tactics  to  outmanoeuvre  opponents  on  the  battle  field.  As  the  following  table 
indicates,  tactics  and  strategies,  therefore,  play  an  important  role  in  the  militaristic 
metaphor.  An  election  campaign  as  a  planned  and  strategic  event  is  strongly 
congruent  with  war.  In  this  schema,  the  events  of  the  campaign  can  then  be 
characterised  as  weapons  that  strategically  target  an  opponent's  weak  spots.  Under 
pressure,  tactics  may  have  to  shift  as  if  to  repel  an  unexpected  cavalry  charge.  In  such 
a  schema,  the  military  arts  of  subterfuge  are  also  important;  party  strategists  are  then 
said  to  `disguise  their  plans',  or  tactics  are  employed  to  `unnerve  opponents'  and  less 
conventional  actions  can  be  used  such  as  `terrorism'  or  possibly  guerrilla  warfare. 
Stratagems  , 
Tactics:  'shock  tactics',  `tactical  shifts',  `tactics  designed  to  confuse  and  fool 
us',  `scare  tactic' 
'Strategy:,  ",,,  `the  SNP's  strategy',  `rethink  their  strategy',  'concentrating  attention 
on  your  opponent's  weak  spots',  `campaign  objectives',  `negative 
campaign  to  unnerve  opponents',  `scaremongering',  `if  you  can't  beat 
them,  join  them' 
Targeting:  `Nationalist  target...  ',  `directly  targeted  Jack  McConnell'  `targeted 
, 
resources',  `has  focused  Labour's  energies  on  attacking...  ' 
Subterfuge:  `attempts  to  disguise  their  plans',  `the  video  terrorism',  `tactical 
shifts  to  hoodwink  Scotland',  `tactics  deliberately  chosen  to  fool...  ' 
, 
`tactics  designed  to  confuse  and  fool  us' 
Risk:  `the  latest  desperate  move  came',  `...  it  represents  a  hostage  to 
`1"  fortune',  `must  enter  enemy  territory' 
ante  :  ).  L  routics  is  war  scnema:  stratagems 
137 The  actions  of  parties  are  conceptualised  as  attacks  and  defences  of  positions.  As  the 
`Types  of  Combative  Action'  Table  5.3  demonstrates,  statements  criticising 
individual  politicians  are  `personal  attacks'.  Policies  are  attacked  by  opponents  and 
defended  by  proponents.  For  example,  `When  the  SNP  launched  a  series  of  personal 
attacks  on  McConnell,  Labour  said  they  would  not  use  "negative'  tactics'  (Daily 
Record,  15`h  April  2003)  [italics  added].  Policies  are  themselves  conceived  of  as 
positions  to  attack,  as  if  they  were  an  effective  sniper  in  a  bell  tower  or  dominating 
hilltop  position.  Politicians  `dig  in'  and  defend  their  policy  as  if  it  were  a  vital  spot  on 
the  battlefield  which  must  be  held  by  men  in  fox  holes.  They  can  also  launch 
`counter-offensives'  as  a  means  of  defence,  presumably  because  the  best  form  of 
defence  is  to  attack.  Statements  can  also  be  a  naval  broadside,  where  the  speaker 
becomes  a  cannon,  their  words  potentially  lethal  shot.  An  exchange  of  words  between 
differing  parties  over  a  policy  or  campaign  strategy  is  a  clash  or  perhaps  a  skirmish. 
,a 
Types  of  Combative  Action 
Offensive:,;  `prepared  tö  go  on  the  offensive',  `crosses  the  line' 
ýDefensive:  `defended  the  negative  slant',  `counter-offensive',  `defended', 
. 
ý'  `launched  a  series  of  personal  attacks',  `the  Nationalists  launched  their 
"I  broadside  against  Labour's...  ' 
Attacks:  ,.  } 
`powerful  attack',  `launched  a  series  of  personal  attacks',  `launching 
vicious,  negative  attacks' 
Broadside:  `the  Nationalists  launched  their  broadside  against  Labour's...  '  `the 
, 
Tory  broadside' 
`Jack  McConnell  yesterday  turned  his  fire  on  the  SNP' 
Out-gun.  `out-gun  the  small  calibre  snipers' 
Terrorise,;:  `terrorise  the  vulnerable' 
Blast',,:,,,  -,,  :,;  `Labour  blast  over  independence' 
able  S.  3  Politics  is  war  schema:  types  of  combative  action 
Just  as  the  actions  and  events  are  subsumed  into  the  logic  of  the  politics  is  war 
schema,  so  are  the  participants  in  the  election.  For  example: 
138 Agents,  &  Participants 
Opponents  `if  the  opponent's  vote  is  such  it  will  defect',  `if  the  opposition's  vote  is 
such' 
:  Strategists'.  'SNP  strategists',  `party  strategists' 
Leaders  `Tory  leader...  '  `LibDem  Leader...  ' 
Snipers  .  °;  `small  calibre  snipers  of  the  SNP' 
Casualties  `first  casualty' 
vulnerable. 
`terrorise  the  vulnerable' 
Table  5.4  Politics  is  war  schema:  agents  &  participants 
Those  who  plan  the  campaign  are  therefore  `strategists'  trying  to  out-think  and  out- 
manoeuvre  their  opponents.  Those  that  verbally  criticise  are  `attackers',  the  truth  can 
be  the  `first  casualty',  and  voters  exposed  to  `shock  tactics'  of  controversial  PEBs  can 
be  `the  vulnerable'  like  inhabitants  of  a  besieged  town.  The  public  can  also  `defect' 
like  once  loyal  troops  who  see  their  best  chances  with  the  army  most  likely  to  win,  or 
who  may  have  become  disenchanted  with  the  strategies  of  their  generals. 
Just  as  there  are  agents  who  perform  actions  there  are  results  to  those  actions 
which  take  on  equally  militaristic  connotations,  as  in  Table  5.5. 
:,  Effects  &  Results  of  Combative  Action 
Physical  °  `successfully  damaged  the  SNP',  `was  brutally  effective',  `totally  out- 
gun  ',  `if  the  opposition's  vote  is  such  it  will  defect' 
Mental  `terrorise  the  vulnerable',  `tactics  designed  to  confuse  and  fool  us', 
`negative  campaign  to  unnerve  opponents',  `tactical  shifts  to  hoodwink 
Scotland',  `panicked' 
Win/Lose  `losing  to  the  Tory  broadside',  `their  defeat' 
Table  5.5  Politics  is  war  schema:  effects  &  results  of  combative  action 
There  are  bipartite  characteristics  here,  and  perhaps  the  above  table  could  have  been 
two  separate  representations.  The  first  two  sub-categories  form  a  pair,  demonstrating 
the  physical  and  mental  effects  of  combat.  Physically  opponents  are  said  to  be  `out- 
gunned'  in  an  attack  on  a  policy.  A  party's  credibility  can  be  `successfully  damaged' 
139 by  a  strategic  campaign.  The  result  of  a  negative  campaign  can  be  that  voters  `defect' 
to  the  opposition.  People  and  things  are  materially  harmed  and  damaged  by  the 
physical  effects  of  war.  Equally,  one  can  see  the  mental  effects  of  war.  Those 
affected  seem  to  endure  unstable  psychological  states,  after  being  terrorised.  Also, 
individuals  can  be  tricked  and  fooled  by  tactics.  A  logical  result  of  the  physical  and 
mental  effects  of  war  is  that  they  can  amount  to  the  war  being  won  or  lost.  The  second 
two  sub-categories  in  Table  5.5  illustrate  as  much,  forming  an  important  bipartite 
distinction:  wars  are  won  or  lost.  It  would  be  a  less  prototypical  representation  of  a 
war  where  the  protagonists  agreed  to  disagree  and  decide  to  call  it  a  draw.  A  party 
might  lose  a  few  battles  (equating  to  several  policy  issues  or  key  parliamentary  seats) 
but  still  win  the  war  and  be  elected  as  the  majority  party.  Therefore,  there  are  two 
sides,  the  winners  and  the  losers.  This  last  point  will  prove  important,  as  the  schema 
structures  the  war  and  politics  as  a  battle  between  two  sides. 
alues' 
Immora 
`courage',  `discipline',  `he  had  guts',  `what  we  stand  for',  `lead  a 
nation' 
`crosses  the  line  of  decency' 
Table  5.6  Politics  is  war  schema:  values 
Finally,  Table  5.6  illustrates  that  the  politics  is  war  metaphor  evokes  the  moral 
aspects  of  armed  conflict.  Leaders  have  courage  to  do  what  is  difficult,  they  lead  and 
they  stand  for  something.  The  strong  party  has  discipline:  the  weak  party  is 
undisciplined  and  panics.  Just  as  an  army's  success  relies  on  their  troops'  ability  to 
follow  orders  and  to  hold  the  line  in  the  midst of  battle,  so  is  a  political  party's.  If 
war  has  its  moral  warriors,  its  perpetrators  can  also  be  immoral  and  unprincipled. 
They  can  transgress  the  rules  of  engagement  to  gain  unfair  advantage.  This  part  of  the 
schema  relates  back  to  tactical  aspects  discussed  earlier,  and  as  such  a  campaign  can 
be  fought  positively  or  negatively. 
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The  second  metaphor  which  was  particularly  salient  in  the  press  reception  of  the 
Labour  and  SNP  broadcasts  was  that  politics  is  characterised  as  an  argument.  As 
above,  evidence  is  presented  in  tables,  partly  to  illustrate  the  structure  of  the  schema 
evoked  by  the  politics  is  argument  metaphor.  As  with  the  previous  metaphor  the 
agents,  actions  and  events  of  the  political  field  are  transposed  to  the  schematic 
ordering  of  the  politics  is  argument  metaphor. 
Type  of  Argument 
Informal  Tormal  -  "T 
Rows  I-I,, 
I,, 
-I_:  'the  row  came  after',  `dirty  Critique  '. ';  w  `to  launch  a  prolonged 
tricks  row',  `apolitical  row  critique  of  the  Nationalists' 
has  erupted',  're-ignited  the  Dispute,  -',,,  `embroiled  in  a  bitter 
bitter  row',  `ad  sparks  dispute' 
furious  row'  Debate  .'.  `deterioration  in  Labour's 
debate' 
'Arguments  `Labour's  argument  that...  ',  War  J;,  `a  bitter  war  of  words' 
`the  SNP's  argument' 
Table  5.7  Politics  is  argument  schema:  types  of  argument 
Elections  and  the  locutions  which  occur  during  the  campaign  appear  variously  as 
`furious'  and  `bitter  rows',  `arguments',  `critiques',  `disputes'  and  `debates'. 
Characteristically,  argument  can  be  subdivided  into  the  formal  and  informal,  and  as 
illustrated  by  Table  5.8  this  has  a  relational  effect  on  the  processes  of  argument. 
Arguments  themselves  are  also  realised  as  metaphors,  such  as  the  combative  `war  of 
words'  where  argument  is  war.  This  suggests  that  argument  and  war  metaphors  are 
closely  related  at  the  cognitive  level.  Politics  as  the  target  of  a  metaphor  can  be 
realised  in  both  the  source  domains  of  war  and  argument.  In  addition  argument  can  be 
the  target  of  a  metaphor  which  can  be  realised  by  the  source  domain  of  war.  The 
interrelatedness  of  the  schematic  representation  of  these  metaphors  will  be  discussed 
in  greater  detail  below. 
If  politics  is  argument,  verbal  processes  are  obviously  an  important  aspect  of 
the  schematic  representations  of  the  argument  metaphor.  Table  5.8  demonstrates  these 
141 processes  from  the  analysed  corpus,  indicating  the  manner  in  which  political 
argument  can  occur. 
Processes'of  Argument 
'Accusing  :  `accused  of  trying  to  terrorise...  ',  `opponents  accused',  `accusing 
them',  `Mr  Swinney  yesterday  accused  Mr  McConnell',  the  SNP 
accused  Labour',  `Labour  accused  the  SNP' 
, Arguing  `other  political  parties  argued'  , 
`the  Scottish  Labour  leader  argued 
that  the  SNP' 
; Apologising  `Mr  Swinney  was  unapologetic',  `the  SNP  has  been  forced  to  admit' 
Admitting,, 
Challenging  `John  Swinney...  challenged  Mr  McConnell' 
Criticising  `slagging  each  other',  `negative  personality  slagging',  `they  exchange 
(informally)',  insults' 
Criticisingt°°,  `The  Conservative  criticised  Labour  and  SNP',  `Liberal  Democrats 
(formally),,.  ",,,  '  poured  contempt  on  both  SNP  and  Labour',  `but  speak  disparagingly 
of  `divorce" 
-Lyin  `SNP  are  telling  a  pack  of  lies' 
Threatening  `threatening' 
Warning;  `ý,,  r  `Tories  have  warned  that...  ',  `Tony  Blair  today  warned  that...  ' 
Table  5.8  Politics  is  argument  schema:  processes  of  argument 
Those  engaged  in  political  discourse  are  said  to  `argue',  `accuse',  `criticise', 
`challenge',  `warn',  `insult',  `threaten',  `lie',  `slag',  `apologise'  and  `admit'.  There  are 
more  formal  types  of  argument,  such  as  debating  in  which  people  are  `criticised', 
`warned'  or  where  contempt  is  poured  on  opponents  (note  the  other  metaphor,  where 
contempt  is  constructed  as  a  liquid  that  is  then  emptied  onto  something).  There  are 
also  less  formal  types  are  argument,  such  as  rows,  where  people  are  said  to  be 
`slagging'  and  insulting  each  other  tit-for-tat.  This  schema  does  not  explicitly  re- 
categorise  those  agents  involved  in  the  arguing,  as  happens  in  the  politics  is  war 
metaphor.  Therefore,  one  does  not  see  `arguers'  or  `debaters'  lexicalised  as 
equivalents  of  `leaders',  `strategists'  and  `snipers' 
142 5.3.3  Politics  is  pugilism 
Next,  there  is  evidence  of  a  metaphor,  which  recasts  politics  as  an  encounter  between 
pugilistic  adversaries.  Typically,  the  textual  processes,  both  written  and  spoken,  of 
political  argument  become  the  physical  actions  of  a  boxing  match,  where  words  are 
punches. 
Types"of  Strikes 
f 
Hitting  `hard-hitting  Nationalist  election  broadcast',  `Jim  Wallace  hit  out 
g`.  at  negative  campaigning',  `Labour  hit  back  by  stressing...  ',  `we 
are  simply  hitting  back',  `the  SNP  didn't  know  what  had  hit  it' 
'Blaste  `Labour  blast  over  independence' 
; Throw  your.,.  `Mr  Blair  threw  his  weight  behind...  ' 
weight  behind 
Boot  or  put  the  ,,  `refused  to  put  the  boot  into  the  opposition' 
boot  in 
Rip  `ripped  the  SNP  to  pieces' 
Thrust  `Our  thrust  will  be  to  give  people  positive  reasons  to  vote  for  us' 
Table  5.9  Politics  is  pugilism:  types  of  strikes 
When  leaders  support  a  party's  election  campaign  they  are  said  to  `throw  their  weight 
behind'  it.  The  campaign  is  the  fist  at  the  end  of  a  punch,  while  the  leader  lends  his 
body  weight  to  his  strike  as  if  to  add  additional  force,  the  purpose  of  which  is  to 
knock  out  his  opponent.  Politicians'  retorts  to  criticisms  of  policy  or  campaign 
strategies  are  the  defensive  responses  of  a  boxer  under  fire,  `hitting  back'  at  their 
opponents,  or a  response  in  anger  or  frustration  is  to  `hit  out'. 
143 zTypes  of  Fights  # 
..: 
4n 
'ti'p  Y 
Fair/Clean  `refused  to  put  the  boot  into  the  opposition',  `McConnell  is fighting  a 
cleaner  campaign',  `Jim's  clean  fight  plea' 
Unfair/Dirt  y,  `below  the  belt',  `Nat's  gutter-fighting  posters...  ' 
Bare-  `the  gloves  came  off  in  the  election  campaign' 
knuckle 
No-holds='', 
- 
`...  but  sit  up  and  take  notice  when  a  fight  starts,  especially  one  with 
barred  ;  FT,  '  no  holds  barred' 
Duels:  ý.  y-ýv  `television  showdown' 
Table  5.10  Politics  is  pugilism:  types  of  fights 
The  events  of  an  election  become  various  kinds  of  boxing  encounter,  which 
suggest  to  an  audience  the  character  of  those  events.  There  can  be  clean  fights  but 
increasingly  in  contemporary  elections  there  are  dirty  fights,  another  way  of 
characterising  negative  campaigns.  Some  encounters,  when  considered  extreme,  are 
portrayed  as  brutal  and  bare-knuckle,  where  `the  gloves  came  off'.  The  origin  of  this 
well  known  metaphor  may  well  pre-date  the  1838  Rules  of  the  Pugilistic  Association 
(commonly  known  as  the  Queensberry  Rules).  Before  1838  boxers  would  often  train 
with  gloves  or  `muffles'  to  avoid  injury,  but  on  the  occasion  of  a  set-to  in  the  prize 
ring  they  would  strip  to  the  waist  and  fight  without  gloves.  Or  the  metaphor  may  be 
contrasting  the  two  periods  of  boxing,  divided  by  the  introduction  of  the  8th  Marquess 
of  Queensberry's  rules44.  The  rules  were  introduced  to  make  boxing  matches  safer 
and  the  rules  clearer.  Other  metaphors  from  the  bare-knuckle  era  of  prize  fighting 
have  become  fossilised  in  English,  their  origin  for  most  speakers  opaque.  For 
example,  a  common  metaphor  used  in  political  leadership  races  is  `to  throw  your  hat 
into  the  ring',  which  was  the  formal  way  boxing  matches  would  be  declared  between 
combatants  when  the  two  fighters'  seconds  would  toss  their  hats  over  the  ropes  into 
the  ring.  Another  common  metaphor,  used  to  express  whether  someone  or  thing  is  of 
44  Before  the  Queensberry  rules  it  was  not  the  case  that  formal  boxing  matches  had  no  rules,  far  from  it. 
The  Broughton  Rules,  named  after  the  boxer  Jack  Broughton,  were  generally  used  during  the  later  part 
of  the  18`h  century  up  until  1838.  Broughton  formulated  his  rules  after  one  of  his  opponents  died 
following  a  fight.  In  these  rules,  fighters  still  fought  bare  knuckle  and  there  were  no  timed  rounds. 
Instead  a  round  ended  when  a  fighter  was  either  struck  or  thrown  to  the  floor,  and  punches  could  also 
be  thrown  in  the  clinch.  Broughton  was  a  prominent  enough  figure  of  Georgian  London  to  be  buried  in 
Westminster  Abbey.  His  prominence  bears  testament  to  the  past  popularity  of  boxing  in  Britain  to  the 
extent  that  boxing  has  left  its  linguistic  mark  on  the  language  ever  since. 
144 sufficient  quality,  is  to  say  whether  they  are  `up  to  scratch'  or  `brought  up  to  scratch'. 
The  scratch  was  a  yard  square  chalked  or  marked  in  the  middle  of  the  ring.  In  the 
bare-knuckle  era  rounds  were  not  timed  as  in  contemporary  boxing,  instead  a  round 
ended  when  a  man  was  struck  or  thrown  to  the  ground.  Fighters  then  had  an  allotted 
amount  of  time,  usually  thirty  seconds,  in  which  to  come  to  the  scratch  ready  to  fight. 
Failure  to  be  brought  up  to  the  scratch,  either  by  oneself  or  one's  seconds,  resulted  in 
defeat.  Hence,  the  ability  to  come  up  to  the  scratch  was  the  difference  between 
success  and  failure,  as  the  better  quality  fighter  would  always  be  stood  ready  at  the 
scratch. 
Effects  of  Fights 
Opponents  Voters' 
=Disorientation,  -ýa  `those  who  have  seen  'Excitement  =;:  °;  `...  but  sit  up  and 
this  SNP  film  have  take  notice  when  a 
been  stunned  by  its  fight  starts, 
simple  power',  especially  one  with 
`the  SNP  didn't  know  no  holds  barred' 
what  had  hit  it' 
'Dismemberment  `ripped  the  SNP  to  Support  `Our  thrust  will  be  to 
pieces'  give  people  positive 
reasons  to  vote  for 
us, 
Table  5.11  Politics  is  pugilism:  effects  of  fights 
Following  the  logic  of  the  pugilistic  schema,  if  words  are  punches  then  the 
effects  of  those  words  are  also  described  in  terms  of  physical  and  mental  effects.  As 
Table  5.11  demonstrates,  there  are  two  different  groups  affected  by  the  metaphorical 
punches  thrown.  The  first  and  perhaps  most  obvious  are  opponents,  who  according  to 
the  corpus  evidence  can  be  either  disorientated  or  dismembered  in  some  way. 
Disorientation  could  cover  degrees  of  sensory  impairment,  opponents  could  be  merely 
stunned  or  disorientated  but  they,  presumably,  can  be  knocked-out  if  the  force  of  the 
argument  were  strong  enough.  As  in  a  prize-fight,  in  addition  to  an  adversary,  the 
audience  or  voters  can  also  be  affected  by  the  fight.  Therefore,  voters  can  be  excited 
145 be  the  skills  or  barbarity  of  the  pugilists  and  their  support  can  be  swayed.  In  the  above 
table  the  quote  suggests  that  votes  would  support  the  `positive'  `thrusts'  of  the  party 
as  if  supporting  a  fighter  who  always  abides  by  the  rules  and  fights  a  clean  fight. 
,,:  Tactics 
Wweak  spots'  concentrating  attention  on  your  opponents' 
. 
Posture  `new  stance' 
. 
Fair.  play,  -,, -,  `refused  to  put  the  boot  into  the  opposition' 
Cheating  `below  the  belt' 
Table  5.12  Politics  is  pugilism:  tactics 
Boxing  also  employs  tactics  and  so  a  political  debate  is  described  in  terms  of  a 
pugilistic  encounter.  Political  arguments  are  portrayed  as  punches  strategically  aimed 
at  `weak  spots',  like  a  boxer  throwing  punches  to  the  torso  of  a  poorly  conditioned 
adversary.  When  a  tactic  is  not  working  politicians  can  take  up  a  `new  stance',  to 
launch  punches  from  different  angles,  to  overcome  a  fighter's  defences.  Table  5.12 
also  shows  that  political  brawlers  can  choose  to  play  by  the  rules  or  cheat  and  throw 
low  blows.  This  illustrates  that  there  are  opinions  as  to  the  right  and  wrong  ways  in 
which  to  engage  in  political  fisticuffs.  There  is,  therefore,  a  strong  similarity  with  the 
politics  is  war  schema,  where  there  are  positive  (and  right)  and  negative  (and  wrong) 
ways  in  which  to  wage  war. 
5.3.4  A  conflict  paradigm 
A  common  theme  to  all  three  of  these  metaphors  is  that  they  involve  some  kind  of 
conflict,  which  is  either  verbal  or  physical.  The  conflict  is  usually  between  two 
competing  sides:  there  are  two  boxers  in  a  fight;  there  are  two  sides  to  an  argument 
(Billig,  1996);  and  wars  are  usually  conceptualised  as  a  conflict  between  right  and 
wrong,  allies  and  enemies  or  `us'  verses  `them'.  The  similarity  of  these  metaphors 
goes  further,  as  they  appear  interrelated  at  a  cognitive  level,  as  everyday  experience  of 
language  would  suggest.  In  English,  it  is  not  only  that  politics  is  understood  in  terms 
of  war,  argument  and  pugilism  but  also  that  these  three  metaphors  are  understood  in 
terms  of  each  other.  An  argument  is  war,  `a  war  of  words'  and  war  is  argument  `a 
146 bloody  quarrel  between  two  nations'.  War  is  pugilism,  `the  RAF  delivered  a  knock- 
out  blow  tonight'  and  pugilism  is  war,  `Lennox  Lewis  and  Mike  Tyson  will  go  to  war 
tomorrow'.  And  argument  is  pugilism,  `the  Chancellor  gave  his  young  opponent  a 
bloody  nose  in  the  commons  today'  and  pugilism  is  argument,  `I'll  let  my  fists  do  the 
talking'. 
The  interrelated  nature  of  these  three  metaphors  is  supported  by  the  evidence 
of  all  27  articles  in  the  corpus.  There  was  no  single  text  which  did  not  display  one  of 
the  three  conflict  metaphors  just  described.  Often  at  least  two  of  the  metaphors  are 
mixed.  For  example,  in  the  following  two  examples  the  dominant  politics  is  war 
metaphor  is  mixed  at  different  times  with  either  the  argument  or  pugilism  metaphors. 
In  the  first  example,  politics  is  both  war  and  argument, 
Scare  tactic...  she  defended  the  negative  slant...  it  would  not  attack 
personalities,  but  was  prepared  to  go  on  the  offensive...  the  SNP  has  been 
forced  to  admit...  slagging  each  other...  what  we  stand  for.  (The  Scotsman, 
15  `h  April  2003) 
In  the  following  example  politics  is  both  war  and  pugilism, 
Nationalists'  brutal  broadcast...  on  the  receiving  end  of  Labour's  attacks...  the 
SNP  didn't  know  what  had  hit  it...  SNP  strategists...  was  brutally  effective... 
the  Nationalists  know  they  must  enter  enemy  territory..,  but  sit-up  and  take 
notice  when  a  fight  starts,  especially  one  with  no  holds  barred...  using 
negative  campaigning...  part  of  the  aim  in  negative  campaigning  is  to  unnerve 
opponents...  campaigning  has  been  subdued...  attacks  on  independence.  (The 
Herald,  16  `h  April  2003) 
In  the  example  from  The  Scotsman  an  event  in  the  Scottish  election  is  metaphorically 
defined  as  war,  in  lexical  choices  such  as  `tactics',  `attack'  and  `offensive',  and  as  an 
argument,  with  phrases  like  `forced  to  admit'  and  `slagging  each  other'.  The  Herald 
example  provides  similar  evidence.  One  can  see  the  war  schema  in  choices  such  as 
`strategists'  and  `enemy  territory'  and  the  pugilistic  metaphor  in  phrases  like  `didn't 
know  what  had  hit  it'  and  `no  holds  barred'.  Then  there  are  examples  where  all  three 
metaphors  are  mixed  together.  The  follow  three  examples  clearly  illustrate  this, 
1.  `Battle  for  Holyrood  set  to  hot  up...  TV  broadcast  could  set  alight  election... 
dirty  tricks  row  over  shock  new  TV  film..,  hard-hitting...  accused...  tactic... 
counter  offensive.  '  (Sunday  Mail,  13th  April  2003) 
147 2.  `A  political  row  has  erupted...  the  row  came  after...  Jim  Wallace  hit  out  at 
negative  campaigning...  other  politicians  argued...  fight  a  positive 
campaign...  Mr  Swinney  defended  tactics...  the  SNP's  argument...  '  (BBC 
News  Online,  14th  April  2003) 
3.  `Scare  tactics  worked...  party  strategists...  new  stance..,  weakening  of  the 
SNP's  commitment...  other  political  parties  will  accuse  the  SNP  of  hiding 
their  true 
. 
purpose...  they  argue...  their  defeat...  a  model  for  its  own  strategy.  ' 
(Evening  News,  17th  April  2003) 
The  high  level  of  congruence  between  these  metaphors  and  the  field  of  politics  is 
quite  clear  in  examples  1  to  3.  This  is  a  familiar  pattern  throughout  the  corpus  of  texts 
that  cover  the  party  broadcasts  and  the  meanings  appear  highly  conventionalised  in 
the  political  field. 
Politics  is  war  appears  to  be  the  dominant  metaphor,  which  is  then  augmented 
by  the  addition  one  or  more  of  the  other  two  metaphors.  The  extent  of 
interrelatedness  suggests  that  these  three  metaphors  are  conceptually  ordered  together 
into  an  overarching  conflict  paradigm.  The  meanings  of  the  three  metaphors  and  their 
associated  schematic  representations  often  reproduce  meanings  which  encode  a  binary 
conflict:  good  versus  bad,  fair  versus  unfair,  right  versus  wrong,  us  versus  them.  As 
metaphors  transfer  meaning  the  target  domain  which  the  conflict  paradigm  is  applied 
to  is  also  subject  to  the  logic  of  antithetical  encounters.  War,  argument  and  pugilism 
metaphors  are  essentially  metaphors  that  predominantly  coalesce  around  those 
meanings  that  represent  conflict.  Any  target  domain  such  as  politics  will  therefore 
privilege  meanings  within  that  domain  which  best  suit  the  conflict  paradigm.  The 
importance  of  this  paradigm  and  the  material  implications  of  the  meanings  it 
represents  will  be  expanded  on  in  Section  5.4  below,  with  particular  reference  to  the 
discourse  practices  of  journalists  and  politicians. 
5.3.5  Scottish  independence  is  divorce 
As  should  be  evident  through  the  discussions  of  the  previous  chapters,  Scotland's 
constitutional  relationship  with  the  UK  is  important  to  the  ideological  debate  of 
Scottish  politics.  Independence  is  the  issue  that  most  divides  Scotland's  two  main 
parties:  Labour  and  the  SNP.  Bearing  that  in  mind,  the  Labour  Party  employed  a 
148 consistent  divorce  and  separation  metaphor  to  describe  the  SNP  policy  of 
independence  for  Scotland  from  the  British  state.  The  state  of  union  between  Scotland 
and  England  is  the  target  domain  and  marriage  is  the  source  domain.  Therefore, 
Scotland  is  wedded  to  the  rest  of  the  UK  and  the  Nationalist's  policy  of  an 
independent  Scotland  is  divorce  and  separation.  For  example,  `The  party  [Labour] 
focused  on  what  it  called  the  nationalist  threat  to  divorce  from  the  rest  of  the  UK.  ' 
(BBC  Online,  14`h  April  2003). 
Lakoff  (2002)  has  commented  on  the  importance  of  metaphors  associated  with 
family  in  politics  (specifically  of  the  U.  S.  ).  He  notes  that  experiences  of  family  life  are 
important  to  people's  interpretation  of  morality  and  that  metaphors  from  this  domain 
are  well  suited  to  and  often  used  in  politics.  It  is  perhaps  unsurprising  to  find  the 
application  of  a  metaphor  referring  to  family  life  in  Scottish  politics.  The  divorce  and 
separation  metaphor  is  important  to  this  thesis  because  it  relates  to  the  observation 
made  earlier  that  Scotland's  constitutional  status  is  still  important  in  the  negotiation  of 
political  discourse  in  Scotland.  Labour  also  used  the  language  of  divorce  and 
separation  in  the  1999  election;  therefore,  they  clearly  feel  that  the  independence  issue 
is  still  current  to  devolved  election  campaigning. 
The  `divorce  and  separation'  metaphor  is  accompanied  by  language  from  the 
overarching  conflict  paradigm.  For  example,  the  SNP's  policy  is  also  labelled  by  Jack 
McConnell  as  `Tactics  deliberately  chosen  in  an  attempt  to  fool  Scotland's  voters'  and 
as  `Deceit  to  hide  their  goal  of  separation'  (Daily  Record,  15`h  April  2003).  Tony 
Blair  on  the  15th  repeats  the  above  messages,  `For  all  their  attempts  to  disguise  their 
plans  for  divorce'  and  `He  [Tony  Blair]  warned  that  voters  had  a  choice  between 
continued  stability  under  Labour  or  the  `instability  and  isolation  that  a  Nationalist 
victory  would  bring'  (BBC  Online,  15`h  April  2003).  On  the  same  day  The  Scotsman 
reports  Jack  McConnell  as  saying  at  the  STUC  `the  SNP's  goal  of  independence 
would  result  in  a  "hugely  expensive  divorce"'  (The  Scotsman,  15`h  April  2003)  and 
that  `the  SNP  are  trying  to  "fool"  Scotland's  voters  that  there  was  no  real  risk  in  a 
vote  for  separation'  (The  Scotsman,  15`h  April  2003).  Negative  aspects  of  the  conflict 
paradigm  are  transferred  to  the  divorce  metaphor.  The  subterfuge  element  of  the 
conflict  schema  appears  particularly  prominent;  and  conflict  (and  dishonest  aspects  of 
conflict)  is  not  normally  viewed  as  a  positive  facet  of  marriage. 
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Labour  (in  line  with  the  structuring  of  the  ideological  square45)  which  continues  the 
schema  of  the  `divorces  and  separation'  metaphor.  McConnell  is  paraphrased  and 
directly  quoted  as  saying  `He  contrasted  this  scenario  with  Scotland  under  a  Labour 
Executive,  by  repeatedly  using  the  words  "build",  "improve"  and  "partnership  within 
the  UK"'  (The  Scotsman,  15th  April  2003).  A  building  metaphor  for  Labour's  policy 
programme  is  also  a  recurrent  feature  of  the  party's  discourse  in  the  2003  election  but 
there  is  not  space  to  explore  it  fully  here.  Building  and  divorce  metaphors,  however, 
are  an  example  of  different  metaphors  combining.  As  with  the  three  conflict 
metaphors  values  and  meanings  are  transferred  from  one  metaphor  to  another. 
`Divorce  and  separation'  are  defined  in  negative  terms,  destructive  in  character. 
Divorce  is  unstable,  uncertain  and  isolating  whereas  partnership  is  stable,  certain  and 
inclusive.  And  divorce  is  costly  whereas  in  partnership  there  is  prosperity. 
The  Evening  Times  on  the  15th  April  reports  Tony  Blair  as  saying  in  a  speech 
to  party  activists  that  deciding  to  vote  for  either  Labour  or  the  SNP  `represented  a 
stark  choice  "between  devolution  and  divorce,  between  investment  and  cuts,  between 
stability  and  security  and  instability  and  isolation"'.  The  divorce  metaphor  is 
employed  by  Blair  as  part  of  a  rhetorical  contrast  of  positive  and  negative  states 
associated  with  the  adversarial  sides  of  the  ideological  square.  In  the  Labour  election 
broadcast  the  connection  is  initially  made  between  the  `divorce  and  separation' 
metaphor  and  the  `building'  metaphor.  The  unseen  narrator  of  the  broadcast  declares, 
`If  Scotland  votes  SNP  on  May  the  first,  on  May  the  second  the  Nationalists  will 
begin  the  process  of  breaking  up  Britain'.  This  message  is  then  reported  in  The 
Scotsman  on  the  16`h  April  in  a  satirical  article  criticising  Labour's  broadcast.  Also  on 
the  16`h  April,  in  an  analysis  of  campaign  strategies,  The  Herald  recycles  the  Labour 
messages  as,  `Negative  campaigning  works.  Four  years  ago,  the  SNP  was  on  the 
receiving  end  of  Labour's  attacks  portraying  independence  as  an  expensive  divorce' 
(16th  April  2003). 
The  divorce  metaphor  privileges  negative  meanings  of  the  break-up  of  a 
marriage,  reinforced  via  the  transference  of  meaning  from  a  building  schema.  The 
meanings  from  divorce  and  building  metaphors  reflect  underlying  cultural  values  and 
as  As  a  conceptual  system,  metaphors  and  their  associated  cognitive  schemata,  when  being  used  to 
encode  ideological  positions,  are  most  likely  subsumed  under  the  organisational  structure  of  the 
ideological  square,  i.  e.  in  the  positive  and  negative  characterisations  of  in-groups  and  out-groups 
respectively. 
150 opinions  on  divorce,  i.  e.  that  it  is  a  negative  and  destructive  event.  James  Mitchell  in 
The  Herald  commented  during  the  campaign  on  Labour's  use  of  the  divorce  and 
separation  metaphor  and  its  cultural  meanings  in  a  Scottish  context.  He  asserts, 
For  many  Scots,  especially  women,  divorce  is  liberating,  but  the  SNP  is 
struggling  to  respond  effectively.  Social  conservatism,  encouraged  by 
Presbyterianism  and  Catholicism  alike,  is  alive  and  politicians  dare  not 
suggest  divorce  is  good...  The  Nationalists  must  find  a  convincing  alternative 
analogy  or  embrace  divorce.  (The  Herald,  16  `h  April  2003) 
Many  metaphors  have  cultural  salience  in  the  construction  and  representation  of 
cultural  meanings  and  values  (Lakoff,  2002).  This  cognitive-linguistic  process  is 
what,  in  the  terminology  of  political  communication,  gives  particular  phrases  or 
soundbites  `resonance'  with  voters  (Rosenbaum,  1997).  The  conflict  metaphors 
discussed  above  are  not  merely  instances  of  prosaic  language  but  also  culturally 
specific  examples  of  how  British  (and  probably  Western)  culture  understands  politics. 
If  the  dominant  meanings  of  divorce  in  British  culture  are  negative  ones  then  it  is 
those  meanings  which  will  be  privileged  in  the  minds  of  the  individuals  who  produce 
and  interpret  a  discourse.  For  example,  if  divorce  is  viewed  as  expensive,  destructive 
and  represents  a  failure,  then  when  used  as  a  metaphor  those  will  be  the  dominant 
meanings  transferred  to  the  target  domain. 
5.4  Language,  discourse  practices  and  the  press  reception  of  party  election  broadcasts 
This  section  will  look  more  specifically  at  the  professional  practices  and  cultural 
background  that  constitute  the  production  of  news  copy  and  in  doing  so  the  effects  on 
party  messages  will  be  analysed.  The  overall  theme  of  the  press  coverage  of  the  2003 
election  broadcasts  was  that  of  negative  campaigning,  which  in  turn  was  characterised 
as  negative  campaigning  between  two  sides:  Labour  and  SNP.  The  effects  of  the  use 
of  metaphor  and  the  schematic  knowledge  they  represent  will  be  investigated,  i.  e.  the 
practical  effects  of  characterising  the  field  of  politics  or  a  policy  in  a  certain  way.  The 
language  produced  by  the  conflict  paradigm  bears  scrutiny  here,  as  elements  of  that 
conceptual  schema  are  deployed  to  critical  effect  by  both  journalist  and  politicians  in 
the  language  that  constitutes  the  discourse  of  press  reception  of  PEBs. 
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The  negative  campaigning  theme  formed  a  meta-topic  of  discussion  in  the  press.  The 
primary  focus  of  press  reporting  was  not  of  the  policy  claims  and  criticisms  made  in 
the  broadcasts.  Although  coverage  in  the  PEB  corpus  coalesced  around  certain  events, 
the  press  commented  on  the  overall  style  of  campaigning  by  Labour  and  the  SNP. 
Negative  campaigning  as  a  topic  is  connected  to  the  `politics  is  conflict'  paradigm 
discussed  above.  It  is  drawn  from  those  parts  of  the  conflict  schema  that  are 
concerned  with  aspects  of  the  fairness  of  behaviour.  For  example,  one  can  think  of  the 
rules  of  war  and  that  there  are  (in  terms  of  cultural  norms)  proper  ways  for  armies  to 
conduct  themselves.  There  are  strategies  which  are  honourable  and  likewise  there  are 
improper  and  dishonourable  strategies  as  well,  such  as  terrorism,  targeting  non- 
military  targets  or  the  use  of  certain  weapons.  Similarly,  in  pugilistic  or  sporting 
metaphors  the  notion  of  a  fair  fight  or  fair  play  has  strong  consonance  with  notions  of 
conduct  in  war  and  right  and  wrong.  Negative  campaigning  is  therefore  seen  as  an 
inappropriate  way  to  electioneer.  In  congruence  with  the  adversarial  sides  of  the 
ideological  square,  individual  parties  are  unlikely  to  openly  concur  that  their  election 
practices  are  negative  but  they  are  more  likely  to  comment  that  the  campaigning  of 
others  is.  Therefore  features  of  the  conflict  paradigm  are  drawn  on  in  competitive 
ideological  discourse.  Dishonourable  and  unfair  practices  are  likely  to  be  drawn  on  to 
describe  metaphorically  the  particular  political  activities  of  various  groups  or 
individuals  one  is  opposed  to. 
Negative  campaigning  was  a  theme  that  continued  in  the  press  and  other 
media  throughout  the  election.  However,  it  became  more  focussed  in  the  third  week 
with  the  airing  of  the  Labour  and  SNP  PEBs  discussed  here.  It  is  apposite  to  discuss 
the  issue  of  negative  campaigning  because  it  elucidates  several  relevant  points 
concerning  media  coverage  of  Scottish  elections.  Firstly,  the  consistency  of  language 
used  to  discuss  negative  campaigning,  by  both  journalists  and  politicians,  illustrates  a 
similitude  of  professional  discourse  practices.  Secondly,  and  related  to  the  first  point, 
the  negative  campaigning  issue  further  illustrates  the  nature  of  recycling  and 
trajectories  of  particular  discourses.  Thirdly,  the  issue  illustrates  the  complexity  of 
strategic  communication  by  political  agents  in  the  mediated  discourse  of  the  press. 
Garton,  Montgomery  and  Tolson  (1991)  suggest  that  certain  metaphors  evoke 
particular  imaginary  scenarios  and  common-sense  discourses  and  are  an  integral  part 
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metaphors  are  such  integral  metaphors.  Garton,  Montgomery  and  Tolson  (1991)  also 
assert  `there  is  a  certain  consonance  between  the  scripts  and  metaphors  used  by  some 
politicians  and  those  used  in  news  narration'  (Garton,  Montgomery  and  Tolson,  1991: 
114).  It  can  be  seen  below  that  both  journalists  and  politicians  reproduce  this  conflict 
schema  time  and  time  again  in  the  written  press. 
Pub. 
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Date:  ,  Quotation  , ý,  _ 
.. 
ý.  '  .. 
Sunday  13/04/03  `Labour  will  go  on  the  counter  offensive  tomorrow  with  an 
Mail  , 
anti-  independence  campaign.  '  Journalist 
The  14/04/03  `David McLetchie,  the  Scottish  Tory  leader,  said:  "There  are 
Scots-  lines  of  decency  that  politicians  should  not  cross...  "'  [Quoted 
man  politician] 
Daily  15/04/03  `Wallace  refused  to  be  drawn  into  negative  campaigning 
Record  , 
which  he  claimed  was  "a  major  turn-off"  for  voters.  He  has 
written  to  other  party  leaders  urging  them  to  'fight  a  clean 
r  ht"'.  [Quoted  and  paraphrased  politicianj 
The  15/04/03  `John  Swinney  last  night  defended  the  SNP's  controversial 
Herald  party  election  broadcast  to  be  shown  tonight  by  telling 
Labour:  "You  can  say  it  is  sick  in  bad  taste  and  below  the  belt  , 
-  but  the  one  thing  you  can't  say  it  is  not  true"'.  [Journalist 
and  quoted  politician] 
The  15/04/03  `Patricia  Ferguson,  Labour's  campaign  co-ordinator,  claimed 
Scots-  that  the  broadcast  set  out  the  stark  choices  facing  the 
man  electorate.  And  she  defended  the  negative  slant  of  the  film 
,  saying  the  party  had  made  it  clear  all  along  that  it  would  not 
attack  personalities  but  was  prepared  to  go  on  the  offensive 
over  the  issues.  '  [Journalist  paraphrasing  a  party  activist 
Evening  17/04/03  `Nationalist  critics  of  this  new  stance  claim  it  shows  a 
News  weakening  of  the  SNP's  commitment  to  its  core  policy  of 
(Edin-  independence.  And  the  other  political  parties  will  accuse  the 
burgh  SNP  of  hiding  their  true  purpose.  '  [Journalist  comment  and 
News)  paraphrasing  of  un-attributed  political  agents] 
Table  5.13  Shared  discourse  practices  ot-journalists  &  politicians:  the  conflict 
paradigm 
153 Table  5.13  illustrates  that  politicians,  party  activists  and  journalists  alike 
continuously  evoke  the  same  conflict  paradigm,  and  they  effectively  talk/write  about 
politics  in  the  same  way.  This  is  to  the  extent  that  politics  as  conflict  is  constructed  as 
representing  common-sense  assumptions  about  the  political  field.  Therefore,  once  a 
theme  or subject  establishes  dominance  in  the  public  discourse  of  the  press  (evoking 
established  cultural  meanings)  it  is  self-sustaining  within  the  3-5  day  reportage  cycle. 
The  `negative  campaign'  theme  in  the  press  in  part  arises  out  of  the  established 
cultural  hegemony  that  politics  is  a  conflict.  Those  meanings  provide  an  accessible 
rubric  for  discourse  production  and  interpretation.  Actions  that  are  considered  to  be 
unfavourable  electioneering  practices  are  understood  in  terms  of  the  ordered  meanings 
of  the  conflict  paradigm.  It  is  not  only  journalists  but  politicians  and  their  spokesmen 
who  employ  this  cognitive  schema  when  producing  their  discourse.  Therefore  it  can 
be  seen  in  Table  5.13  that  a  journalist  can  define  a  political  party's  actions  in  terms  of 
a  military  campaign,  saying  `Labour  will  go  on  the  counter  offensive'.  Then 
politicians  give  responses,  clearly  demonstrating  the  same  paradigm,  so  that  the  Tory 
leader  refers  to  `lines  of  decency',  while  the  Liberal  leader  is  reported  to  have  called 
for  a  `clean  fight'. 
There  are  perhaps  unforeseen  or  unconscious  consequences  in  the  production 
of  this  discourse.  Once  the  negative  campaign  theme  has  achieved  salience  all  the 
main  political  protagonists  are  compelled  to  comment  on  it  because  of  media 
questioning.  However  the  overarching  paradigm  constitutes  the  political  field  as  a 
conflict  between  two  sides,  in  this  instance  Labour  and  the  SNP.  Political  agents  from 
smaller  parties  inadvertently  reinforce  the  dominance  of  the  two  dominant  parties  of 
Scottish  politics,  casting  the  election  as  two-party  contest  when  using  conflict 
metaphors.  Of  course,  it  may  have  also  been  the  case  that  minority  party  politicians 
did  also  comment  that  the  election  was  about  more  than  two  parties.  As  these 
comments  would  not  be  easily  compatible  with  the  established  schema  for 
representing  politics  their  utterances  may  have  gone  unreported.  Therefore,  it  can  be 
seen  from  the  analysis  of  the  negative  campaign  theme  in  the  press,  that  journalists 
and  politicians  demonstrate  a  high  degree  of  similarity  in  their  discourse  practices. 
They  produce  strikingly  similar  utterances.  Utterances  that  continuously  recycle  are 
those  which  best  fit  the  established  norms  of  journalists  and  politicians'  discourse 
practices  and  their  (and  their  audiences')  modes  of  comprehension. 
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As  noted  in  the  section  above,  reportage  of  PEBs  only  covered  two  parties  and  in 
doing  so  framed  the  debate  in  terms  of  negative  campaigning,  rather  than  debating  the 
issues  the  broadcasts  actually  discussed.  Despite  reportage  focussing  on  negative 
campaigning  this  chapter  will  suggest  there  is  evidence  that  Labour  was  more 
successful  than  the  SNP  at  getting  their  campaign  message  reported.  Therefore, 
comparatively,  Labour's  strategic  communications  can  be  considered  more  successful 
than  the  SNP's.  However,  this  is  not  to  say  that  the  SNP  were  unsuccessful  in  their 
overall  campaign.  For  example  John  Curtice  a  week  into  the  campaign  commented, 
Labour  has  already  allowed  the  SNP  to  set  much  of  the  campaign  agenda  with 
high-profile,  well  trailed  and  oft-repeated  promises  -  more  police,  better  pay  for 
nurses,  and  abolition  of  student  tuition  fees.  (The  Scotsman,  7  th  April  2003) 
This  chapter  focuses  on  the  press  reception  of  the  Labour-SNP  broadcasts  as  a 
significant  event  in  the  reportage  of  the  election  campaign,  rather  than  the  campaign 
as  a  whole. 
5.4.2.1  The  state  of  Scotland  and  England's  matrimony:  Labour's  `divorce'  metaphor 
This  section  will  now  compare  the  success  of  the  two  parties'  strategic 
communication. 
Part  of  reporting  practice  in  the  press  is  to  reproduce  direct  quotations  and 
paraphrases  of  sources  (Venables,  2005)  and  as  such  the  press  consistently  recycles 
the  Labour  message.  As  different  party  spokesmen  at  different  events  produced 
almost  identical  formations  of  the  party's  message,  reporting  of  the  party  line  was 
almost  inevitable.  Even  when  an  article  was  critical  of  Labour's  campaign  strategies 
or  their  use  of  language  the  message  was  still  consistently  reproduced. 
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.  ..  Byline  Paraphrase  of  f  Comment 
,  '.  ý.  Party  Message',,  Or,  Non=party 
uote' 
14/04/03  BBC  McConnell  `The  party  Report  of 
Online  attacks  focused  on  what  Jack 
SNP  it  called  the  McConnell's 
`deceit'  nationalist  threat  STUC 
to  divorce  from  speech 
the  rest  of  the 
UK' 
[JM]  "Just  a  little 
more  time  before 
Scotland 
separates  from 
the  UK.  " 
[JM]  "Tactics 
deliberately 
chosen  to  fool 
Scotland's  voters 
that  there  is  no 
real  risk  in  a  vote 
for  separation 
14/04/03  Scots.  SNP  `Labour  will  Comment  on 
accused  of  screen  a  party  SNP  and 
bad  taste  in  election  Labour 
broadcast  broadcast  PEBs 
tonight, 
portraying 
independence 
as  a  backward 
and  destructive 
move  which 
would  ruin 
Scotland.  ' 
15/04/03  et  Dying  [JM]  "On  May  1,  Reporting 
pensioner  we  can  keep  controversy 
ad  sparks  building  for  the  over  Labour 
furious  future  or  we  can  and  SNP 
row  rip  it  all  up  and  PEBs. 
face  upheaval 
and  uncertainty.  " 
Table  5.14  Press  coverage:  Labour's  `divorce'  metaphor 
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Date"  Pub.  Headline/  .ý 
Byline 
Direct  Quote  or"-, 
=Paraphrase  of  Party 
Message 
Journalist` 
Comment.  ' 
OrNon- 
party 
Quote 
Context 
15/04/  dr  SNP  are  `the  Labour  leader  said  the  Article 
03  telling  a  Nats  were  trying  to  "fool"  suppor- 
pack  of  the  Scottish  people  into  tive  of 
lies  splitting  from  the  United  Labour 
Kingdom.  '  criticizing 
the  SNP 
[JM]  "Tactics  deliberately  over  PEB 
chosen  in  an  attempt  to  and 
fool  Scotland's  voters  that  campaign 
there  is  no  real  risk  in  a  strategy 
vote  for  separation.  " 
15/04/  BBC  Blair  `Prime  minister  Tony  Blair  Report  of 
03  Online  launches  has  warned  Scots  they  face  Tony 
attack  on  a  "stark  choice  between  Blair's 
SNP  devolution  and  divorce"  campaign 
from  the  UK...  '  visit  and 
speech  at 
`He  [TB]  warned  that  the 
voters  had  a  choice  Burrell 
between  continued  stability  Collec- 
under  Labour  or  the  tion  in 
"instability  and  isolation"  Glasgow. 
that  a  Nationalist  victory 
would  bring.  ' 
`He  [TB]  said  "For  all  their 
attempts  to  disguise  their 
plans  for  divorce,  no-one 
should  be  in  any  doubt  that 
every  vote  for  the  SNP  will 
be  taken  by  them  as  a  vote 
for  separation".  ' 
`He  [TB]  said  it  was  "a 
choice  between  two 
futures.  Between 
devolution  and  divorce. 
Between  investment  and 
cuts.  Between  stability  and 
security  and  instability  and 
isolation".  ' 
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Byline 
Direct  Quote  or 
Paraphrase  ofParty 
Message 
'Journalist' 
Comment. 
Or  Non- 
party 
Quote 
'Context 
15/04/  Scots.  McConnel  `...  a  warning  that  the  SNP's  Report 
03  1:  SNP  goal  of  independence  would  on 
deceiving  result  in  a  [JM]  "hugely  McCon- 
voters  expensive  divorce"  that  nell's 
would  bring  cuts  to  public  speech 
services.  '  to  the 
STUC 
[JM]  "we  can  keep  building  and 
for  the  future  or  we  can  rip  it  argu- 
all  up  and  start  again  with  for  ment 
years  of  upheaval,  between 
uncertainty  and  threat.  "  SNP 
and 
`The  Scottish  leader  argued  Labour 
that  the  SNP  tactics  were  over 
deliberately  chosen  in  a  PEBs. 
attempt  to  "fool"  Scotland's 
voters  that  there  was  no  real 
risk  in  a  vote  for  separation. 
He  contrasted  this  scenario 
with  Scotland  under  a 
Labour  Executive,  repeatedly 
using  the  words  "build", 
"improve"  and  "partnership 
with  the  UK". 
15/04/  Scots.  Labour  `Throughout,  a  Vincent  Satirical 
03  plays  on  Price-style  voice-over  warns  com- 
independ-  of  the  threat  of  a  "costly  SNP  ment  on 
ence  divorce"'  Labour 
`horror'  PEB 
`...  as  the  narrator  tells  the  and 
nation  that  independence  negative 
would  "leave  Scotland  campai- 
isolated  in  an  uncertain  gning 
world".  styles. 
She  [PF]  said  the  "stark 
choice"  facing  the  electorate 
was  between  economic 
stability  and  investment 
under  Labour  or  "tax  rises 
and  cuts  to  pay  for  a  hugely 
expensive  divorce". 
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:  Date  Pub.  Headline/;,  Direct  Quote  'or:,,  '  Journalist.  ,  Context" 
Byline  Paraphrase  of  Party,  Comment, 
Message,;  Or.  Non- 
party 
... 
;'  Quote 
15/04/  et  Don't  vote  `He  [TB]  said:  "For  all  their  Report- 
03  for  attempts  to  disguise  their  ing  on 
`divorce'  plans  for  divorce,  no-one  Tony 
says  Blair  should  doubt  that  every  vote  Blair's 
for  the  SNP  will  be  taken  by  campai- 
them  as  a  vote  for  gn  visit 
separation.  "  to  Scot- 
land 
He  [TB]  represented  a  stark 
choice  "between  devolution 
and  divorce,  between 
investment  and  cute,  between 
stability  and  security  and 
instability  and  isolation". 
15/04/  Herald  Swinney  `...  Patricia  Ferguson,  Labour  Repor- 
03  defends  campaign  coordinator,  said:  ting  on 
`negative'  "the  SNP  have  been  forced  negative 
campaign  to  admit  in  recent  weeks  camp- 
separation  from  the  rest  of  aign 
the  UK  is  their  number  one  strate- 
priority.  "'  gies  of 
Labour 
and 
SNP 
16/04/  Scots.  May  the  `On  Monday  night,  we  heard  `A  map  Satire 
03  dark  force  a  bloke  on  parole  from  a  showed  on  SNP 
be  with  crypt  intoning:  "If  Scotland  Caledonia  and 
you  in  TV  votes  SNP  on  May  the  first,  severed  Labour 
election  on  May  the  second  the  physically  PEBs 
Nationalists  will  begin  the  ,  as  if  by 
process  of  breaking  up  celestial 
Britain.  "  How  awful.  '  chainsaw, 
from 
`Then  the  screen  went  wonky  Mother 
again  as  Dr  Jekyll  England. 
disappeared  behind  the  Crikey,  a 
couch  and  reappeared  as  Mr  geological 
Hyde  to  warn:  "The  disaster. 
Nationalist  divorce  would  What  a 
leave  Scotland  isolated  in  an  fearful 
uncertain  world".  prospect.  ' 
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Or  Non"p`arty  Quote 
Context 
16/04/  dr  Clear  `Unfortunately,  Leader 
03  choice  for  Swinney  is  -  in 
Scotland  committed  to  the  support 
repeatedly  rejected  of 
policy  of  Labour. 
independence  which  Election 
would  isolate  and  charact- 
eventually  bankrupt  erized 
Scotland.  '  as  a 
choice 
`But  there  is  another  between 
huge  plus  for  giving  two 
the  vote  to  Labour  sides, 
and  that  is  the  Labour 
partnership  between  and 
Blair  himself  and  SNP. 
Brown  -  national  and 
international-calibre 
politicians  who  care 
deeply  about 
Scotland.  ' 
`Under  the  SNP 
,  Scotland  would  be 
out  of  step  with  the 
times.  A  Scotland  for 
steep  personal 
taxation,  divorced 
from  reality.  The 
Daily  Record  goes 
for  the  Blair-Brown- 
McConnell 
partnership  any  day.  ' 
17/04/  en  Parties  "`If  Scotland  `Meanwhile,  Labour  Com- 
03  have  votes  SNP  on  is  trying  more  or  less  ment  on 
agreed  to  May  1,  on  May  2  the  same  message  as  Lab- 
scare  and  the  Nationalists  last  time  about  the  our's 
scare  alike  will  begin  the  threat  of  "divorce"  portray- 
process  of  posed  by  the  al  of 
breaking  up  Nationalists.  '  SNP's 
Britain",  the  policy 
party's  latest  on 
broadcast  indepe- 
declared.  '  ndence. 
160 Byline  or'  ' 
Paraphrase  of 
Par  Message 
Or  Non" 
20/04/  sh  Divorce  talk  `A  Labour  `Labour's  core  Report  on 
03  `wrong',  spokesman  said:  election  strategy  of  the 
says  anti-  "It  is  a  massive  comparing  reaction 
abuse  leap  of  logic  independence  to  of  anti- 
campaigner.  and  one  that  we  divorce  is  abuse 
would  never  inappropriate  and  campaign 
make  to  imply  sends  the  wrong  ers  to 
that  the  fact  that  message  to  separated  Labour's 
divorcing  couples  and  their  `divorce 
Scotland  from  children,  a  leading  and 
the  rest  of  the  campaigner  against  separa- 
Uk  would  domestic  abuse  has  tion' 
damage  said.  '  character- 
Scotland  means  ization  of 
that  we  would  `Margaret  McGregor,  independ- 
suggest  that  a  convenor  of  the  Zero  ence. 
woman  in  an  Tolerance  Trust, 
abusive  condemned  Labour 
relationship  for  putting  the  `fear 
should  not  seek  factor'  into  divorce, 
a  divorce.  '  when  in  reality  many 
women  in  abusive 
relationships  need  all 
the  support  they  can 
get  to  seek 
separation.  ' 
"The  whole  message 
is  very  negative,  '  said 
McGregor.  `In 
reality  it's  often  very 
difficult  for  parents 
to  decide  on  divorce 
and  separation, 
especially  if  there  are 
children  involved.  On 
top  of  that  we  have 
the  politicians  saying 
there  will  be  terrible 
consequences.  " 
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161 One  might  regard  Labour's  divorce  and  separation  metaphor  as  an  instance  of 
successful  strategic  communication  in  electoral  discourse.  The  message  is  successful 
not  in  terms  of  its  effects  on  voters46  but  in  terms  of  the  consistency  of  its 
reproduction  and  recycling  in  the  press.  This  reproduction  is influenced  by  several 
factors:  firstly,  the  consistency  in  the  production  of  the  message  by  party  agents; 
secondly,  the  location  of  this  message  production  i.  e.  at  events  designed  for  media 
consumption;  and  thirdly  because  the  message  draws  on  established  cultural  meanings 
shared  by  politicians,  journalists  and  the  public.  The  result  is  that  even  though  much 
of  the  press  reception  of  PEBs  related  to  negative  campaign  strategies,  Labour 
achieved  what  the  SNP  failed  to  do.  Labour's  message  was  consistently  and 
accurately  reproduced  and  embedded  within  the  wider  press  reception  of  the  election. 
5.4.2.2  Waiting  lists  and  the  NHS:  the  SNP's  `dying  man' 
The  SNP  faced  the  same  criticisms  of  negative  campaigning  on  this  occasion; 
however,  a  consistent  identifiable  message  was  not  put  across.  A  PEB  that  became 
known  as  the  `Dying  Man'  broadcast  had  no  narrator  and  so  there  was  no  verbal 
`hook'  for  the  press  to  recycle.  The  broadcast  flashed  up  text,  such  as  `Labour  said 
they'd  reduce  waiting  lists.  They  haven't.  Labour  said  they'd  deal  with  bed  shortages. 
They  haven't',  but  these  pieces  of  text  were  not  recycled.  Instead  many  of  the  press 
reports  recycled  the  `Dying  Man'  broadcast  by  describing  what  occurred  in  it.  For 
example, 
The  film  shows  an  elderly  man  sitting,  waiting  for  medical  treatment.  He 
slowly  gets  worse  until  he  disappears,  leaving  his  empty  chair  behind.  There 
are  no  voice-overs  or  music,  the  images  are  stark  and  clear,  and  the  man,  called 
Bill,  never  speaks.  One  of  the  final  images  is  of  a  doctor  peering  into  what 
appear  to  be  the  man's  eyes,  which  slowly  fade  to  darkness.  The  message  the 
SNP  hope  to  get  across  with  the  broadcast  is  that  Labour  has  failed  to  reduce 
waiting  lists.  It  finishes  with  the  slogan,  "How  long  can  you  wait?  "  (The 
Scotsman,  10  April  2003) 
Alternatively,  reports  reproduced  a  SNP  party  spokesmen  explaining  the  message  of 
the  broadcast  as  in  the  following  example, 
46  In  this  instance  the  effects  on  voters'  opinions  of  these  particular  political  messages  is  unknown, 
however  the  Electoral  Commission's  report  (2003)  concluded  that  negative  campaigning  did  not  have 
any  significant  affect  on  voters. 
162 Nicola  Sturgeon,  the  SNP  election  co-ordinator,  claimed  this  week's  message 
would  resonate  with  voters:  `The  election  broadcast  exposes  the  tragic  truth 
behind  Labour's  failure  to  tackle  waiting  times.  It  tells  a  simple  story  that  far 
too  many  people  the  length  and  breadth  of  Scotland  will  recognise.  It  is  the 
story  of  waiting;  waiting  for  the  care  you  need,  waiting  for  Labour  to  deliver  on 
their  promises.  (Sunday  Herald,  13  `h  April  2003) 
The  Nationalists  were,  therefore,  unable  to  have  a  consistent  party  message  recycled 
in  several  different  media  domains,  constantly  re-enforcing  a  simple  theme.  The 
`How  long  can  you  wait?  '  slogan  repeats  the  theme  of  the  Nationalists'  first  broadcast 
which  saw  different  people  singing  `Why  are  we  waiting?  '  and  a  poster  advertisement 
with  a  picture  of  Jack  McConnell  and  the  slogan  `Time's  up'.  If  these  were  slogans 
intended  to  be  repeated  in  the  press  they  were  certainly  less  effective  at  being  recycled 
than  the  equivalent  Labour  messages  on  divorce  and  separation.  Table  5.15  simply 
illustrates  the  SNP's  lack  of  success  in  terms  of  column  inches  and  the  number  of 
articles. 
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Or  Non- 
art  P  Y, 
Quote' 
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13/04/  sm  Nats  in  `The  subtitles  ask:  "How  Discuss 
03  dirty  long  can  you  wait?  "'  -ion  of 
tricks  row  SNP 
over  `Dying 
shock  new  Man' 
TV  Film  broad- 
cast. 
13/04/  sh  The  `When  it  seems  he  has  Discus- 
03  election's  collapsed,  there  is  a  doctor  sion  of 
tough  new  shinning  a  torch  into  a  SNP 
phase:  patient's  face,  as  graphics  `Dying 
SNP  say  accuse  Labour  of  failing  to  Man' 
Labour  let  keep  their  hospital  waiting  broad- 
patients  list,  bed  shortage  and  staff  cast  and 
die  shortage  pledges.  And  with  Labour/ 
the  question  `How  long  can  SNP 
you  wait?  ',  the  final  scene  argu- 
shows  the  man's  empty  ment 
chair.  '  surrou- 
ndin  it. 
able  ..  1.5  tress  coverage:  J1NY's  'IJying  man'  message 
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14/04/  Scots.  SNP  `The  broadcast  finishes  with  Discuss 
03  accused  of  the  slogan:  "How  long  can  -ion  of 
bad  taste  you  wait?  "  The  advert  Labour 
in  represents  an  escalation  of  and 
broadcast  the  SNP's  media  campaign  SBP 
which  has  been  based  around  broad- 
the  slogan:  "We  can't  wait  casts, 
any  longer.  "'  mostly 
focus- 
ing  on 
critic- 
ism  of 
the 
SNP. 
14/04/  Scots.  Morbid  `The  message  the  SNP  hopes  Report 
03  SNP  film  to  get  across  with  the  of 
`crosses  broadcast  is  that  Labour  has  criticis 
line  of  failed  to  reduce  hospital  m  of 
decency'  waiting  lists.  It  finishes  with  SNP 
the  slogan,  "How  long  can  broad- 
you  wait?  "'  cast 
`It  represents  an  escalation  of 
the  SNP's  media  campaign, 
which  has  been  based  around 
the  slogan,  "We  can't  wait 
an  loner.  "' 
14/04/  BBC  Election  "`My  message  to  Jack  Report 
03  Online  broadcast  McConnell  and  his  Labour  of 
`shocking'  Party  is  simple  -  time's  up,  "  critic- 
he  [John  Swinney]  said'.  ism  of 
SNP 
broad- 
cast 
164 Date  `Pub'  Headline/,  " 
'Byline 
Direct  Quote  or*  : n;. 
:  Paraphrase  of  Party 
Message 
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Comment' 
Or  Non- 
party. 
uote 
Context. 
15/04/  dr  John  `The  SNP  yesterday  attacked  Report 
03  sounds  Jack  McConnell,  saying  his  of  SNP 
alarm  bell  "time's  up".  Nats  leader  John  poster 
for  Jack  Swinney  unveiled  a  poster  unveil- 
showing  a  scowling  picture  ing 
of  McConnell  superimposed 
on  an  alarm  clock.  The 
slogan  reads:  "Time's  up" 
and  the  hands  of  the  clock 
point  to  seven  o'clock,  the 
time  polls  open  on  May  1.  ' 
`He  [John  Swinney]  added: 
"My  message  to  Jack 
McConnell  and  his  Labour 
Party  is  simple.  Time's  up.  "' 
Table  5.15  Press  coverage:  SNP's  `Dying  man'  message 
Table  5.15  Key: 
People:  Jack  McConnell  (JM),  Tony  Blair  (TB),  Patricia  Ferguson  (PF) 
Publications  (Pub.  ):  The  Herald  (Herald),  The  Scotsman  (Scots),  Evening  Times  (et), 
Daily  Record  (dr),  Sunday  Herald  (sh),  Evening  News  (en),  Sunday  Mail  (sm) 
Possible  reasons  for  this  lack  of  recycling  may  be  simply  that  the  PEB  slogan 
came  in  the  form  of  a  question.  It  is  the  press  that  is  usually  in  the  habit  of  asking 
questions,  even  rhetorical  ones.  Therefore,  journalists  may  have  chosen  not  to  ask  the 
question  for  the  SNP  or  to  reformulate  it  in  different  language.  This  may  not  be  a 
conscious  decision:  the  rhetorical  question  did  not  fit  the  conflict  schema  as  well  as 
Labour's.  Labour's  message  on  independence  did  not  come  in  the  form  of  a  slogan  or 
catchphrase  as  such  but  as  a  metaphor  intimately  related  to  a  speaker's  conceptual 
system,  drawing  on  common  cultural  or  common  sense  knowledge.  As  such,  Labour 
were  able  to  embed  a  consistent  party  message  within  the  reportage  of  the  PEBs.  The 
Labour  message  was  frequently  reported  in  articles  because  it  was  consistently 
repeated  at  subsequent  media  events,  which  may  not  have  been  directly  related  to  the 
party  broadcast  (for  example,  speeches  to  the  STUC).  Because  the  Nationalists  did  not 
have  a  consistent,  identifiable  and  accessible  message  the  press  coverage  could  not 
recycle  it.  Therefore  much  of  the  reportage  focussed  on  criticism  of  the  SNP's 
electioneering  strategies  and  their  defence  of  them.  The  SNP  also  lack  the  support  of 
165 any  major  newspaper  title.  In  contrast  the  Labour  Party  who  in  the  UK  context  has  the 
general  support  of  stable  mates  The  Times  and  The  Sun  and  in  Scotland  can  claim  the 
loyal  support  of  the  Daily  Record,  the  biggest  selling  daily  tabloid  in  Scotland. 
5.5  Conclusion 
This  chapter  began  with  an  analysis  of  common  metaphors  and  schemata  employed  in 
the  representation  of  the  political  field  in  media  discourse  of  the  Scottish  print  press. 
It  was  demonstrated  that  there  was  a  high  degree  of  similarity  between  journalists  and 
political  agents  in  their  application  of  said  metaphors  and  schemata.  These  metaphors 
and  their  associated  schemata  privilege  certain  meanings  and  exclude  others.  In  this 
case,  metaphorically  referring  to  the  political  field  in  terms  of  conflict  represents 
politics  as  a  contest  between  two  antagonistic  factions:  the  Labour  Party  and  the  SNP. 
Scotland's  multi-party  system  is  represented  by  both  journalists  and  politicians  of  all 
colours  as  two  party  politics,  in  the  corpus  examined  here. 
The  conflict  paradigm  is  pervasive  in  the  discourse  of  the  election,  to  the 
extent  that  it  forms  a  common-sense  value  of  how  the  political  field  is  constituted. 
This  is  at  the  expense  of  meanings  which  would  better  represent  minority  parties' 
interests.  The  multi-party  complexion  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  has  already  been 
discussed,  with  no  one  party  likely  to  form  a  majority  executive  and  with  many  other 
small  parties  and  individual  candidates  likely  to  obtain  political  office.  Therefore 
representing  politics  as  a  conflict  between  two  sides  appears  inappropriate  in  the  case 
of  Scottish  devolution.  Conflict  represents  neither  the  actuality  of  the  situation  nor  the 
interests  of  many  of  the  participants.  Even  so,  influential  agents  involved  in  Scottish 
politics  have  no  need  to  challenge  this  hegemony:  it  is  in  the  interest  of  both  Labour 
and  the  Nationalists  to  have  the  political  field  conceived  with  them  as  the  main 
protagonists.  The  press  appear  to  continue  a  tradition  derived  from  Westminster 
reportage,  of  constituting  politics  as  a  battle  between  two  opposing  ideologies.  This  is 
given  a  distinctively  Scottish  flavour  by  substituting  Labour's  Conservative 
opponents  with  Scottish  Nationalists.  Garton,  Montgomery  and  Tolson  comment  in 
their  work  on  metaphor  and  schema  that, 
Particular  ideological  assumptions  and  narrative  scenarios  occupy  a  place  of  dominance  within  this  [mediated  political]  forum,  to  the  extent  that  their 
166 pervasive  solidity  as  forms  of  common  sense  is  very  difficult  to  challenge. 
Moreover,  such  forms  of  discourse  are  not  simply  restricted  to  the  fields  of 
topics  (such  as  defence)  which  they  represent,  but  are  also  mobilized, 
metaphorically,  in  the  way  public  debate  is  reported.  (1991:  115-116) 
Therefore  the  conflict  paradigm  is  perpetuated  as  a  common-sense  representation  of 
the  field  of  politics  as  it  is  reinforced  by  the  institutional  agents  of  the  two  dominant 
parties  and  the  media.  Smaller  participants  in  the  political  field  would  find  it  difficult 
to  have  their  alternative  voices  represented  in  discursive  constructions  that  structurally 
subsume  the  meanings  they  are  trying  to  promulgate. 
This  chapter  also  suggested  that  the  negative  campaign  theme,  particularly 
prominent  of  the  third  week  of  the  election,  arose  out  of  the  conflict  paradigm. 
Although  critical  of  Labour  and  the  Scottish  Nationalists  the  commentaries  still 
propagated  the  conflict  paradigm's  structuring  of  the  political  field  as  a  binary 
conflict.  When  other  parties  were  drawn  into  the  debate,  reportage  of  their  comments 
were  more  often  than  not  limited  to  commenting  on  the  activities  of  Labour  and  the 
SNP.  This  reinforces  the  assumed  centrality  of  the  two  main  parties  to  this  political 
process  and  runs  counter  to  the  interests  of  competing  minority  parties  and  candidates. 
The  negative  campaign  theme  further  illustrates  Garton,  Montgomery  and  Tolson's 
(1991)  observation  that  schema  can  become  regulative  or  productive  mechanisms  in 
the  production  of  media  discourse.  Once  a  story  and  its  associated  language  gains 
prominence,  future  discourses  are  conceived  and  framed  in  keeping  with  the  structure 
of  the  established  schema.  In  this  instance  the  conflict  paradigm  is  the  overarching 
schema  for  representing  the  political  field.  The  negative  campaign  theme  was  the 
story  that  took  hold  and  played  out  over  the  third  week,  constantly  reinforced  by 
politicians  and  journalists  in  different  publications  day  after  day.  In  performing  a 
regulative  function,  metaphors  and  schema  privilege  certain  meanings  and  exclude 
others:  this  explains  why  the  press  only  focussed  on  Labour  and  the  SNP.  The 
Conservatives,  Liberal  Democrats,  Greens  and  Scottish  Socialist  parties  had 
broadcasts,  events  and  messages  they  wished  to  be  communicated  in  the  third  week  of 
the  campaign.  However,  as  minority  participants  the  minority  parties  were  unable  to 
compete  against  the  hegemony  of  two  party  politics  media  coverage.  Therefore,  it 
was  illustrated  that  other  activities  by  Labour  and  the  Nationalists,  such  as  poster 
launches  and  speeches  were  assimilated  into  the  binary  conflict  paradigm  and 
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represented  in  this  area  of  reportage. 
Finally,  this  chapter  compared  the  Labour  and  Scottish  Nationalist  messages 
of  the  third  week  of  the  campaign.  Although  both  parties  had  to  communicate  their 
messages  through  often  negative  commentary  about  their  campaign  methods,  Labour 
achieved  greater  success.  This  chapter  suggested  that  Labour  was  more  successful  for 
several  reasons:  they  were  able  to  stay  `on  message'  more  successfully,  partly  because 
their  message  wasn't  in  the  form  of  a  slogan  or question;  and  Labour's  choice  of 
language  was  a  culturally  salient  metaphor  that  evoked  many  common-sense 
assumptions  about  the  nature  of  divorce.  The  divorce  metaphor  could  easily  be 
transferred  to  the  target  domain  of  the  SNP's  policy  on  independence.  Although  the 
SNP  received  coverage  and  recycling  of  their  message,  instances  were  far  fewer 
occurring  over  fewer  days  than  Labour's.  These  final  observations  illustrated  the 
complexity  of  mediated  political  communication  through  the  press.  The  press' 
reportage  of  the  two  broadcasts  focussed  on  the  negative  campaign  strategies  of  the 
parties  involved.  The  Labour  party  were  able,  in  this  instance,  to  successfully  embed 
their  message  within  this  coverage;  whereas  the  SNP's  became  lost  in  the  criticism. 
168 CHAPTER  6:  IMAGINING  SCOTLAND:  `THE  NATION'  AS  IDEOLOGICAL 
TOOL 
6.1  Investigating  language  and  national  and  state  identities 
Thus  far  one  of  the  things  this  thesis  has  demonstrated  is  that  national  identity  plays 
an  important  role  in  Scottish  politics.  National  identity  creates  an  overarching 
nationalist  agenda  in  the  sense  that,  as  McCrone  (2001:  126)  suggests,  all  Scottish 
politicians  are  Nationalist  in  their  outlook.  However,  it  has  also  been  shown  that  the 
different  parties  construct  different  positions  for  Scotland  in  relation  to  the  UK,  both 
in  terms  of  ideological  content  and  in  the  labelling  of  in  and  out-groups.  Chapter  3 
illustrated  that  categorisation  of  nation  and  state  groupings  had  an  important 
ideological  aspect  when  explaining  party  political  in-group  and  out-group  labelling. 
Some  parties  are  unionist,  others  unionist  within  a  federal  framework,  while  others  are 
separatist,  wishing  to  situate  Scotland  outside  the  current  UK  constitutional 
framework.  These  ideological  positions  of  Scottish  nationalism  have  been  shown  to 
affect  the  potential  patterns  of  coalition,  with  the  federalist  Liberal  Democrats  holding 
the  balance  of  power  between  the  unionist  Labour  Party  and  the  separatist  SNP.  All 
three  parties  are  left  of  centre  and  social  democratic  in  their  ideological  orientations 
but  Labour  and  the  SNP's  differing  positions  over  Scottish  independence  preclude  a 
partnership  between  them  in  the  current  UK  political  climate. 
It  should  be  clear  by  now,  through  the  discussion  of  previous  chapters,  that 
language  plays  an  important  role  in  the  representation  of  and  public  competition 
between  ideologies.  Both  the  importance  of  the  nationalist  agenda  in  Scottish 
devolved  politics  and  the  significance  of  language  in  the  mediation  of  intergroup 
conflict  around  that  issue  have  been  investigated.  This  chapter  intends  to  continue  to 
explore  how  language  represents  the  nationalist  agenda  in  Scottish  politics. 
If  Scottish  national  identity  is  so  important  to  the  political  culture  of  Scotland, 
it  is  legitimate  to  ask,  what  do  ideological  interpretations  of  Scotland  look  like?  If  the 
different  parties  construct  different  positions  for  Scotland  within  or  outwith  the  UK 
are  their  conceptions  of  what  Scotland  is  different?  If  there  are  differences  between 
political  conceptions  of  Scotland,  are  conceptions  different  and/or  related  to  other 
socio-cultural  conceptions  of  the  nation?  For  example  chapter  2  demonstrated  that  in 
recent  times,  at  least,  Labour  and  the  SNP  have  been  successful  in  linking  in  the 
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extent  that  right-wing  Conservatism  was  often  associated  with  Englishness,  and  as 
such  the  Scottish  Conservatives  find  themselves  ideologically  isolated  in  Scotland. 
Therefore,  do  all  the  parties  of  Scotland  draw  on  any  non-political  or non-civic47 
sources  in  constructing  their  conception  of  the  Scottish  nation?  And  are  these 
conceptions  used  in  any  ideologically  competitive  way  in  devolved  Scottish  election 
discourse,  i.  e.  in  combination  with  conceptions  of  party  identity?  The  analysis  in 
sections  3  and  4  below  will  explore  statements  in  manifestos  and  PEBs  to  explore  the 
character  of  the  discursive  construction  of  Scotland  and  Scottish  national  identity  by 
Scotland's  political  parties.  The  analysis  will  show  the  effects  of  party  political 
ideology  on  the  ideological  conceptions  of  Scotland,  demonstrating  the  active  use  of 
the  nation  as  an  ideological  tool  of  persuasion. 
In  exploring  the  above  questions  this  chapter  will  firstly  place  this 
investigation  of  discursive  constructions  of  `the  nation'  within  a  broader  theoretical 
tradition.  Anderson  (1983),  Billig  (1995)  and  others  have  explored  the  `imagined' 
nature  of  modern  nations  and  the  role  of  discursive  acts  in  maintaining  what  Billig 
refers  to  as  a  `banal'  nationalism48.  Much  of  the  work  done  in  this  discursive  tradition 
has  focused  on  national  press,  including  Scottish  specific  work  (Higgins,  2004a  and 
2004b;  Law,  2001;  Schlesinger,  1998),  which  will  be  discussed  further  below.  Billig 
notes  politicians  also  play  an  important  role  in  this  process, 
Democratic  politics  is  founded  on  the  institutions  of  nationhood;  politicians 
have  become  celebrities  in  the  contemporary  age,  their  words,  which  typically 
reproduce  the  cliches  of  nationhood,  are  continually  reported  in  the  mass 
media.  (1995:  11) 
This  chapter  therefore  looks  at  the  role  of  politicians  in  the  discursive  process  of 
constructing  the  nation.  These  discursive  approaches  are  contrasted  with  the  empirical 
47  That  is  conceptions  of  nationalism  which  do  not  draw  on  the  traditional  political  ideologies  of  left 
and  right  or  public  institutions,  such  as  educational  and  legal  systems.  In  their  critical  discourse 
analysis  of  Austrian  national  identity,  Wodak  et  al  (1999)  make  the  distinction  between  Staatsnation 
and  Kulturnation  aspects  of  national  identity.  Staatsnation  is  equivalent  to  civic-nationalism,  a  kind  of 
constitutional  patriotism  associated  with  the  formal  democratic  institutions  of  society.  By  contrast, 
Kulturnation  is  equivalent  to  non-civic  nationalism,  which  draws  on  more  ethnic,  as  well  as  bounded 
conceptions  of  national  identity,  such  as  place,  landscape,  common  language  and  common  history. 
48  Banal  nationalism  refers  to  the  everyday  habits,  including  discursive  ones,  which  maintain  the 
ideological  coherence  of  a  nation,  particularly  in  Western  democracies.  The  theory  explains  how  the 
nation  is  maintained  in  the  minds  of  its  people  day-to-day  by  being  continuously  `flagged'  in  seemingly 
unobtrusive  ways.  See  page  172-176  below  for  further  explanation. 
170 work  of  Curtice  et  at  (2002),  McCrone  (2001),  Brown  et  al  (1999),  Bennie,  Brand, 
and  Mitchell  (1997)  and  Brown,  McCrone,  and  Paterson  (1996).  The  discursive 
approach  requires  a  degree  of  revision  in  light  of  the  aforementioned  empirical  work 
as  well  as  this  investigation.  In  addition,  in  light  of  this  chapter  the  empirical 
investigations  mentioned  are  also  shown  to  have  limitations  and  require  adaptation. 
6.2  Imagining  Nations:  the  National  as  Ideological  Construct 
The  following  sections  explore  what  the  actors  on  Scotland's  political  stage  conceive 
Scotland  to  be.  In  this  exploration  the  focus  is  on  the  discursive  manifestations  of 
political  parties'  imaginings  of  Scotland.  This  `imagining'  is  not  meant  provocatively; 
it  does  not  intend  to  imply  that  Scotland  is  a  fanciful  notion,  an  imaginary  and 
therefore  false  concept.  The  sense  is  that  of  Benedict  Anderson's  work,  and  is  one 
which  fits  with  this  discursive  investigation  of  ideology  and  politics.  For  Anderson 
nations  are  imagined  but  not  imaginary, 
It  [the  nation]  is  imagined  because  the  members  of  even  the  smallest  nation 
will  never  know  most  of  their  fellow-members,  meet  them,  or  even  hear  of 
them,  yet  in  the  minds  of  each  lives  the  image  of  their  communion.  (Anderson 
in  Spencer  and  Wollman,  2005:  45) 
In  this  theory  the  ubiquity  of  national  imagining  is  therefore  a  powerful  constituent  in 
what  makes  a  nation,  a  communion  of  Cartesian  egos  aggregating  their  sentiment,  `we 
think  therefore  we  are'.  Nationalism  for  Anderson  is  born  out  of  the  proliferation  of 
print  capitalism,  and  is  primarily  a  discursive  narrative.  Individuals  form  nations 
through  the  community  of  print  press  and  novelistic  audiences,  who  imagine  their 
commonality  to  be  fundamentally  limited,  that  is  sovereign  and  bordered,  connected 
through  time  and  spatial  proximity.  One  can  see  how  such  a  mass  act  of  cognition 
suits  a  cognitive-linguistic  approach,  particularly  with  its  emphasis  on  textual 
audiences.  The  `Nation'  forms  important  elements  of  accounting  for  the  context  of 
culture,  from  which  political  genres  result.  Politicians  propose  to  speak  for  `the 
people'  and  in  the  interests  of  `the  Nation'  and  audiences  do  not  have  trouble 
determining  which  people  and  what  nation  they  speak  of. 
Like  Anderson  (1983),  Gellner  (1983)  places  the  industrialisation  of  literacy 
central  to  explaining  the  contemporary  ideology  of  nations  and  nationalism.  Behind 
the  work  of  both  Anderson  and  Gellner  is  the  premise  that  nations  and  nationalism  are 
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be  really  seen  in  the  primordial  mists  of  time.  However,  though  nations  are  a  modern 
phenomenon,  they  are  not  thought  to  be  modern  by  those  who  imagine  them.  On  the 
contrary,  Hobsbawm  (1992)  and  Hobsbawm  and  Ranger  (1983)  have  discussed  both 
the  historical  emergence  of  nations  and  the  invention  of  traditions  which  portray 
nations  as  timeless  and  bounded.  They  are  bounded  in  the  sense  that  `our'  traditions 
link  `us'  together  culturally,  and  in  turn  those  traditions  differentiate  `our'  nation  from 
`theirs'  (cf.  Billig,  1995:  71).  In  these  theories,  nations  and  nationalism  are  a  product 
of  a  process  and  organisation  of  industrialised  modernity  and  nationalist  beliefs  are 
maintained  by  the  communicative  practices  of  nation  states.  Smith  (2001)  has  tried  to 
reconcile  the  above  `modernist'  accounts  of  nations,  which  heavily  emphasise  the  role 
of  elites  in  the  conceptualisation  of  the  nation  state,  with  primordialist  and  ethno- 
symbolic  theories49.  He  concludes,  `the  nation  can  be  regarded  as  a  sacred 
communion  of  citizens,  and  nationalism  as  a  form  of  `political  religion'  with  its  own 
scriptures,  liturgies,  saints  and  rituals'  (Smith,  2001:  146).  Smith's  metaphorical  use 
of  `scriptures'  and  `liturgies'  maintains  the  importance  of  discursive  devices  in  the 
maintenance  of  nations  and  national  identities,  which  leads  this  discussion  to  a  more 
general  point  about  nationalism. 
The  sense  being  given  to  nationalism  here  is  an  ideological  one;  and  like  other 
ideologies  it  can  enact  the  processes  of  hegemony.  Therefore,  nationalism  does  not 
have  to  be  foregrounded  and  openly  disputed;  it  can  also  be  `banal'  (Billig,  1995),  that 
is  to  say,  everyday  and  omnipresent  in  a  world  of  nation  states.  What  is  often 
described  as  patriotism,  under  this  paradigm,  is  a  form  of  nationalism.  Billig  (1995) 
has  gone  some  way  to  illuminate  the  ways  in  which  nationalism  is  present  in  the 
everyday  discourses  of  societies.  Nationalism  is  an  ideology  which  is  maintained  and 
communicated  through  a  complex  dialectic  of  remembering  and  forgetting.  The 
nation  is  routinely  flagged  through  the  discursive  (and  semiotic)  practices  of  everyday 
life;  and  it  is  because  of  the  naturalness  of  these  practices  that  `our'  patriotism  is  often 
unseen  but  when  brought  to  the  fore  is  always  thought  of  as  natural,  neutral  and 
rational.  This  aspect  of  Billig's  theoretical  approach  draws  on  Bourdieu's  (1990) 
concept  of  `habitus'.  Billig  explains, 
a9  For  an  overview  of  theories  of  nations  and  nationalism  see  Smith  (2001)  and  Spencer  and  Wollman 
(2005). 
172 Patterns  of  social  life  become  habitual  or  routine,  and  in  so  doing  embody  the 
past.  One  might  describe  this  process  of  routine-formation  as  enhabitation: 
thoughts,  reactions  and  symbols  become  turned  into  routine  habits  and,  thus, 
they  become  enhabited.  The  result  is  that  the  past  is  enhabited  in  the  present  in 
a  dialectic  of  forgotten  remembrance.  (1995:  42) 
Owing  to  the  forgotten  rituals  of  everyday  life  it  would  be  unusual  for  someone  to 
forget  or  be  unaware  of  their  national  identity.  Billig  (as  did  Barthes,  1983)  draws 
attention  to  the  un-waved  and  un-saluted  flags  (1995:  40-43)  on  the  wall  of  the  town 
hall  or  service  station  forecourt.  Some  flags  are  not  meant  to  be  saluted:  while  the 
union  flag  may  be  saluted  by  soldiers  trooping  the  colour,  the  same  flag  as  motif  on  a 
ladies'  t-shirt  should  not.  It  is  the  un-saluted  flags  that  form  part  of  the  habitus  of 
everyday  life;  their  presence  and  symbolic  significance  is  simultaneously  forgotten 
and  remembered.  These  everyday  practices  and  rituals  by  which  national  identity  is 
maintained  and  remembered  have  been  overlooked  by  many  academics  (Billig,  1995: 
51),  as  well  as  being  unnoticed  by  individual  citizens. 
National  identity  is  is  a  form  of  group  identity,  a  way  in  which  the  world  is 
implicitly  divided  up  topographically  and  psychologically  into  an  `us'  and  numerous 
`them'.  Here  this  investigation  returns  to  the  earlier  discussion  of  Social  Identity 
Theory  and  Self  Categorisation  theory  (see  chapters  1  and  3)  as  an  analytical  tool  for 
investigating  group  behaviour,  including  discursive  acts.  A  national  identity  is  one 
such  group  identity  and  therefore  one  would  expect  to  see  positive  in-group  and 
negative  out-group  characterisations  (for  example,  `our'  reasonable  British  patriotism 
versus  `their'  belligerent  French  nationalism).  However,  an  important  point  to  note  is 
that  Social  Identity  Theory  accounts  for  why  a  national  identity  can  be  something 
which  is  both  present  and  not  present  in  the  minds  of  fellow  countrymen.  The  theory 
predicates  that  individuals  have  multiple  identities  or ways  in  which  they  can 
categorise  themselves.  These  identities  are  both  latent  and  context  sensitive,  becoming 
active  in  an  appropriate  situation  (Billig,  1995:  69).  Billig  goes  on  to  explain, 
The  latency  of  nationalist  consciousness  does  not  depend  on  the  vagaries  of 
individual  memory:  if  it  did,  then  many  more  people  would  forget  their 
national  identity.  Nor  does  national  identity  disappear  into  individuals'  heads 
in  between  salient  situations...  The  apparently  latent  identity  is  maintained 
within  the  daily  life  of  inhabited  nations.  The  `salient  situation'  does  not 
suddenly  occur,  as  if  out  of  nothing,  for  it  is  part  of  a  wider  rhythm  of  banal 
life  in  the  world  of  nations.  What  this  means  is  that  national  identity  is  more 
173 than  an  inner  psychological  state  or  an  individual  self-definition:  it  is  a  form  of 
life,  which  is  daily  lived  in  the  world  of  nation-states.  (1995:  69) 
At  this  point  the  argument  has  come  full  circle  from  Billig's  introduction  because  it  is 
everyday  discourse  practices  which  are  therefore  an  essential  part  of  remembering  and 
forgetting  national  identities.  Billig  illustrates  his  point  with  a  linguistic  investigation 
of  daily  newspaper  journalism,  showing  that  copy  is  rooted  in  an  assumed  national 
audience.  The  nation  and  its  audience  is  signalled  by  the  routine  use  of  deictic 
markers,  which  are  `Beyond  conscious  awareness,  like  the  hum  of  distant  traffic,  this 
deixis  of  little  words  makes  the  world  of  nations  familiar,  even  homely'  (1995:  94). 
The  deictic  markers  like  `here',  `us',  `our',  `then'  and  `now'  flag  the  nation  of  place, 
of  temporal  and  demographic  continuity  and  in  doing  so  represent  much  more  than 
they  initially  encode  in  their  surface  structure.  These  `little  words'  presuppose  that  the 
readers  understand  what  `our'  nation  is,  who  its  members  are,  what  'we'  believe  in 
and  which  traditions  `we'  observe. 
For  all  the  strengths  of  Billig's  work,  Scotland  raises  some  relevant  concerns 
with  this  theory50.  These  concerns  centre  on  the  conflation  of  state  and  national 
identities,  an  homogenisation  of  state  and  national  audience.  Brown,  McCrone  and 
Paterson,  before  devolution,  referred  to  Scotland  as  a  `stateless  nation'  (1996:  25),  a 
country  with  a  definable  national  identity  separate  from  Britishness  but  lacking  `a 
fully  independent  legislature'  (1996:  25).  Similarly,  Tom  Nairn  (1977)  remarked  on 
what  he  termed  Scotland's  `sub-nationalism'.  Developing  after  the  Union,  for  Nairn 
(1977)  this  was  a  type  of  non-political,  cultural  nationalism  that  developed  and 
existed  sublimated  by  the  more  `cosmopolitan'  identity  of  the  British  state.  Billig 
himself  notes  on  several  occasions  a  less  than  uniform  `British'  arrangement  in  the 
identities  and  the  institutions  which  propagate  those  identities.  He  observes  that  the 
`British'  press  often  means  an  English  and  London-centric  press  and  that  other  parts 
of  the  Kingdom  (particularly  Scotland)  have  more  dominant  regionally  specific  media 
(1995:  111).  Billig  also  observes  that  England  is  frequently  hyper-extended  to  mean 
Britain  in  the  English  press  (1995:  70).  On  this  later  point  Smith  expands, 
In  practice,  the  English  have  always  found  it  impossible  to  distinguish  their 
own  English  ethno-nationalism  from  a  British  patriotism,  which  they  conceive 
of  equally  as  their  `own'.  This  is  not  simply  an  imperialist  reflex.  Rather,  it 
so  The  same  criticism  can  be  levelled  at  much  of  the  work  of  the  theorists  discussed  above. 
174 reflects  the  way  in  which  British  patriotism  was  felt  in  the  eighteenth  and 
nineteenth  centuries  to  be  a  `natural'  extension  of  English  ethnic  nationalism; 
and  how  a  British  nation  came  to  be  viewed  by  the  English,  and  not  a  few 
Scots...  as  a  coming  together  of  the  various  nations  inhabiting  a  united 
kingdom.  (2001:  16) 
Brown  et  al  (1999),  Curtice  et  al  (2002)  and  McCrone  (2001)  have  all  noted  that  Scots 
make  a  clear  distinction  between  a  `British'  state  identity  and  their  `Scottish'  national 
identity,  and  observe  that  the  English  tend  not  to  do  likewise.  In  these  above  studies 
(see  chapter  2  for  more  detail)  participants  were  asked  to  weight  the  importance  of 
their  identities  (i.  e.  Scottish  more  than  British,  British  more  than  Scottish,  equally 
Scottish  and  British,  just  Scottish  or  just  British)  and  in  doing  so  the  Scots,  though 
varying  the  weight  of  their  responses,  had  no  difficulty  in  understanding  the  question. 
However,  it  was  observed  that  the  question  of  distinguishing  one's  state  and  national 
identity  is  not  always  understood  in  England,  which  supports  Smith's  (2001)  assertion 
of  the  equivalency  of  Englishness  and  Britishness.  This  is  by  no  means  to  invalidate 
Billig's  analysis  of  banal  nationalism,  but  as  both  Law  (2001)  and  Higgins  (2004a, 
2004b)  have  observed  in  relation  to  press  analysis  the  theoretical  approach  perhaps 
could  be  augmented  to  account  for  the  more  complex  aspects  of  the  British  case. 
Law  observes  that  `Billig  tended  to  treat  banal  nationalism  as  a  single  genetic 
cell  coded  by  state-centred  rhetoric'  (2001:  314).  In  two  subsequent  papers  Higgins 
(2004a  and  2004b)  agrees  with  Law  (2001),  that  at  least  in  the  Scottish  media  there  is 
ample  evidence  for  a  more  complex  dialectic  in  the  projection  of  national  and  state 
identities  in  Scotland.  In  studying  press  reception  of  the  1999  Scottish  devolved 
election,  Higgins  (2004a  and  2004b)  explored  the  complex  relationship  between  state 
and  national  identities  in  the  Scottish  media,  observing  that  there  was  a  distinctly 
politicised  influence  in  the  mediation  of  the  two  identities.  This  mediation  of  national 
and  state  identities  was  not  merely  a  case  of  framing  news  stories  from  an 
ideologically  Scottish  versus  an  ideologically  British  perspective.  Instead,  national 
and  state  identities  mean  different  things  to  different  groups  in  Scotland  and 
accordingly  carry  different  balances  and  weights  of  emphasis  or  occlusion.  The 
Scottish  press  used  varying  applications  of  deixis  and  location  marking  -  or what 
Higgins  calls  `locational  tokens'  (2004a)  -  which  rhetorically  mediated  between  dual 
identities,  placing  different  levels  of  emphasis  on  particular  identities  depending  on 
political  ideology  (i.  e.  unionist  or separatist)  and  context.  Therefore,  these  are  not 
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equally  positions  could  be  more  Scottish  than  British,  or  more  British  than  Scottish,  or 
equally  Scottish  and  British.  Higgins  concluded  that  a  greater  role  should  be  given  to 
`politics  in  shaping  the  expression  of  national  identity  in  the  media'  (2004b:  467)  as 
patterns  of  discursive  categorisation  of  Scotland  match  the  constitutional  preferences 
of  newspapers. 
Thus  far  this  investigation  has  come  to  the  conclusion  that  Scotland  and 
Britain  and  their  associated  identities,  have  a  political  entailment  in  Scotland  which  is 
not  manifest  in  England  with  its  national-state  identity(s).  Britishness  does  not  have 
the  hegemonic  dominance  in  Scotland  as  it  does  in  England.  The  details  of  nationalist 
advocacy  have  been  drawn  into  and  entangled  with  party  political  arguments. 
Scotland  is  not  banally  ideological,  in  that  its  mental  image  does  not  sit  passively  and 
unnoticed  in  the  minds  of  Scotland's  politicians  or  people.  Scotland  is  strategically 
foregrounded  and  evoked  for  political  advantage.  The  existence  of  a  Scottish  nation 
and  identity  is  not  at  dispute  in  Scottish  politics;  discord  arises  in  representing  how 
that  nation  and  its  identity  sit  with  the  British  state  and  identity.  It  was  previously 
stated  that  state  and  national  identities  are  to  a  large  extent  conflated  in  England, 
while  in  Scotland  this  is  not  the  case.  The  following  analysis  supports  Law's  (2001) 
claim  that  state  and  national  identities  should  be  distinguished  and  Higgins'  (2004b) 
call  for  greater  consideration  to  be  given  to  politics  in  the  formation  of  these  identities 
in  the  analysis  of  banal  nationalism. 
The  studies  of  Brown  et  al  (1999),  Curtice  et  al  (2002)  and  McCrone  (2001) 
concur  with  that  of  Law  (2001)  and  Higgins  (2004a  and  2004b)  in  differentiating  state 
and  national  identities.  However,  Brown  et  at  (1999),  Curtice  et  al  (2002)  and 
McCrone  (2001)  tend  to  emphasise  civic  aspects  of  nationalism  as  prime  in  the 
politics  of  Scottish  identity.  Their  argument  has  largely  been  premised  on  heavy 
emphasis  on  a  civic  society.  This  distinctive  Scottish  civic-society  is  claimed  to  have 
been  kept  alive  by  the  institutions  of  law,  education  and  church  post  1707  in  the 
absence  of  sovereign  state  apparatus  (see  Brown,  McCrone  and  Paterson,  1996; 
McCrone,  2001;  and  Paterson,  1994).  The  analysis  below  will  point  to  evidence 
which  would  suggest  that  consideration  of  non-civic  aspects  of  national  identity 
should  also  be  investigated  to  give  a  more  representative  picture  of  Scottish  national 
identity  (a  conclusion  which  their  own  evidence  could  be  used  to  support). 
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Work  by  the  Manifesto  Research  Group  (MRG)  and  the  Comparative  Manifesto 
Project  (CMP)  has  taken  a  quantitative  approach,  to  statements  in  party  literature. 
This  research  has  the  strength  of  being  able  to  analyse  a  large  number  of  lengthy 
documents.  However,  MRG  and  CMP  codes  manifesto  statements  by  subject  but  does 
not  give  a  detailed  account  of  the  content  of  those  statements.  Therefore,  MRG  and 
CMP  analysis  does  not  provide  the  level  of  textual  detail  that  this  thesis  has  sought  to 
give;  and  the  quantitative  analysis  does  not  look  at  manifestos  as  part  of  wider 
discourses.  As  such,  the  following  qualitative  analysis  takes  a  systemic  functional 
approach  in  order  to  be  able  to  compare  the  detail  and  meanings  of  inter-party 
conceptions  of  Scotland.  This  section  will  look  exclusively  at  Scotland  and  Scottish 
national  identity;  whereas  the  following  section  investigates  how  Scotland  and 
Scottish  national  identity  are  negotiated  in  relation  to  Britain  and  British  identity. 
Billig  (1995)  and  Shotter  (1993)  claim  nationalism  is  a  tradition  of 
argumentation.  The  argument  concerns  who  the  national  `we'  is, 
Rival  politicians  and  opposing  factions  present  their  different  visions  of  the 
nation  to  their  electorates.  In  order  for  the  political  argument  to  take  place  with 
the  nation,  there  must  be  elements  which  are  beyond  argument.  Different 
factions  may  argue  about  how  `we'  should  think  of  `ourselves'  and  what  is  to 
be  `our'  national  destiny.  In  so  doing  they  will  take  for  granted  the  reality  of 
`us',  the  national  place.  (Billig,  1995:  95-96) 
These  `taken  for  granted  assumptions'  can  be  seen  in  the  construction  of  Scotland  the 
place  and  Scotland  the  people  which  political  parties  routinely  use  to  address  their 
audience.  Indicative  of  this  is  the  following  example  from  the  contents  page  of  the 
SNP  manifesto,  where  the  sections  are  entitled  `Our  Choice',  `Our  Prosperity',  `Our 
Public  Services',  `Our  Environment',  `Our  Nation',  `Our  Scotland'  and  `Our 
Potential'.  The  collective  possessive  determiner  roots  the  party  manifesto  in  a  national 
Scottish  audience,  as  well  as  identifying  the  party  with  the  national  interest. 
It  will  be  shown  that  all  the  Scottish  parties  address  the  nation  and  that  they 
share  many  conceptions  of  the  nation  and  its  people.  Correspondingly,  one  can 
observe  certain  grammatical  patterns  for  encoding  the  nation.  The  first  is  that  the 
nation  and  its  people  are  modelled  on  experiences  of  `being',  for  example  the  type  of 
experience  of  the  world  one  sees  encoded  by  relational  clauses,  as  opposed  to 
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sensing,  encoded  by  mental  and  verbal  projected  clauses.  A  second  common 
representation  is  one  of  `possessing',  that  is  possessing  particular  features 
(characteristics,  aspirations  and  achievements).  It  follows,  in  a  systemic  functional 
analysis,  that  possession  is  not  just  marked  by  the  genitive  inflection  ('s)  but  also  as  a 
form  of  relational  clauses.  For  example,  relational  clauses  that  encode  possession  as 
attribute  or  identity  (see  Table  6.1  for  hypothetical  examples). 
"  (i)  attributive,  "  (ii)  identifying 
,. 
is  an  attribute  of  a 
_  ._.,.,  ._r 
is-the  identitof 
.  ,..  -  ey  ..  -, 
(1)  intensive  `x  is  a'  Scotland  is  small  Scotland  is  a  world  leader 
in  child  law 
(2)  possessive  `x  has  a'  Scotland  has  an  excellent  Excellent  education  is 
education  system  Scotland's  birthright; 
Scotland's  birthright  is 
excellent  education 
(3)  circumstantial  `x  is  at  Scotland  is  at  a  crossroads  Scotland  is  the  future 
a' 
Table  6.1  The  principle  categories  of  `relational'  clause  (adapted  from  Halliday  and 
Matthiessen,  2004:  216) 
As  table  6.1  illustrates,  relational  clauses  of  `being'  are  characterised  by  intensive 
verbs,  while  relational  clauses  of  `possession'  are,  unsurprisingly,  marked  by 
possessive  verbs.  For  the  purposes  of  this  investigation,  relational  clauses  are  of 
particular  interest  because  they  are  either  attributive  or  identifying,  encoding  the 
descriptions  of  a  thing  as  an  element  of  that  thing's  being.  Circumstantial  relational 
clauses  are  of  less  interest  to  this  section  simply  because  one  sees  less  evidence  of 
them  in  the  data  analysed.  The  third  common  representation  is  the  personification  of 
the  nation.  Clearly,  this  overlaps  with  the  second  type  of  representation,  for  example, 
`Scotland  has  an  enduring  spirit'  would  be  an  example  of  a  possessive  relational 
clause  `has'  and  ascribing  `an  enduring  spirit'  to  Scotland  personifies  the  nation  as 
being  able  to  possess  something.  Personification  also  includes  instances  where  the 
nation  is  said  to  `do'  something  and  therefore  have  action.  Also  relevant  are  material 
process  clauses,  where  the  nation  is  said  to  act. 
In  these  varying  forms  of  representation  one  sees  the  nation  in  many  forms. 
There  are  the  inclusive  civic  conceptions,  so  often  foregrounded  by  political  parties 
and  academics  alike,  such  as  education,  legal,  demographic  diversity,  and  religious 
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pluralistic  and  accountable  nature  of  government.  However,  there  can  be  non- 
inclusive  civic  forms  as  well,  as  societies  are  inherently  bounded,  making  distinctions 
between  themselves  and  others  and  assigning  rights  and  responsibilities  on  that  basis. 
Inclusive  civic  values  might  be  religious  tolerance  or  universal  right  to  education, 
whereas  exclusive  values  might  be  the  exclusion  of  English  residence  for  voting  in 
devolved  Scottish  elections.  There  are  also  non-civic  and  exclusive  conceptions;  these 
include  representations  of  the  nation  in  terms  of  language,  religion,  landscape,  history, 
place  and  tribe.  The  latter  conceptions  are  ways  of  distinguishing  one's  nation  from 
others  on  non-constitutional  or  legal  grounds.  In  making  distinctions,  boundaries  are 
created  which  indicate  difference;  boundaries  which  are,  at  some  level  of  realisation, 
exclusive.  In  contrast,  the  former  civic  conceptions  encode  meanings  associated  with 
democratic  and  civic  values,  such  as  social  diversity,  inclusiveness  and  public 
institutions  and  practices  (such  as  education  and  the  law).  Therefore,  excluding 
English  residents  from  voting  in  Scotland  is  a  civic  issue;  excluding  the  English  on 
the  basis  of  their  ethnic  origin  would  be  a  non-civic  value.  Non-civic  values  can  also 
be  inclusive,  for  example  in  support  of  so  called  `community  languages'.  The 
following  tables  illustrate  the  Janus  face  of  nationalism  in  Scotland.  It  can  be  realised 
through  democratic  and  public  institutions  -  civic,  multicultural,  inclusive  -  but  still 
with  non-civic  and  exclusive  facets. 
Table  6.2  and  6.3  present  a  discourse  analysis  of  civic  and  non-civic 
conceptions  of  the  nation,  building  on  the  systemic  functional  approach  illustrated  in 
Table  6.1.  The  tables  compare  manifesto  statements  between  campaigning  parties. 
Column  one  denotes  the  party  identity  of  the  statements  represented  in  column  two. 
Columns  three  to  five  then  display  a  functional  analysis  of  those  statements:  column 
three  gives  a  systemic  functional  grammatical  analysis;  column  four  categorises 
statements  in  terms  of  civic/non-civic  and  inclusive/exclusive/neutral  conceptions  of 
the  nation;  and  column  five  labels  the  specific  types  of  civic/non-civic  and 
inclusive/exclusive  conceptions.  Greater  delicacy  is  provided  by  column  five  to 
column  four  in  describing  what  type  of  conception  of  the  nation  is  being  constructed 
discursively.  For  example,  in  row  one,  column  four,  the  statement  is  defined  as  civic 
because  is  refers  explicitly  to  the  `civic  society'  and  the  parliamentary  institution; 
because  it  is  not  clear  whether  this  is  an  inclusive  or  exclusive  statement  it  is  given  a 
neutral  label.  Column  three  pulls  out  specific  linguistic  evidence  which  points  to  the 
179 possessive  nature  of  the  utterance,  in  this  case  there  is  a  personification  and  the  use  of 
genitive  inflection  marking  possession  by  the  nation.  Row  five  then  provides 
additional  information  the  type  of  civic  nationalism  labelled  in  terms  of  the  national 
attribute  or  description,  in  this  instance  it  refers  to  `society'. 
=Party  Manifesto  Statement  Syntactic  Civic  National 
<Features  n  coding  attribute/description-,, 
Encodin  the  g  Inclusiv/ 
Nation  Eicliisive 
Labour  'The  first  term  of  the  Personification  Civic-  Societal-Civic  - 
Parliament  has  also  given  a  'voice'  neutral  'Scotland's  civic  society' 
voice  to  Scotland's  civic 
society  in  a  way  missing  Genitive 
during  the  Tory  years'  (p40)  inflection 
'Scotland's' 
Labour  'Scotland's  courts  have  a  long  Genitive  Civic-  Institutional-Legal 
history  and  many  valuable  inflection  neutral  'courts' 
traditions'  16  'Scotland's' 
Labour  'Scotland  has  a  proud  Relational  Civic-  Institutional-Education 
educational  tradition  that  we  clause  neutral  'educational  tradition' 
should  cherish  and  build  upon.  Possessive 
It  is  a  Scottish  strength...  '  process  'has' 
(p8) 
Labour  'Scotland's  diversity  is  a  Genitive  Civic  -  Societal-Diversity  - 
strength...  '  (p39)  [inclusive]  inflection  inclusive  'diversity' 
'Scotland's' 
Personification 
'Scotland's' 
'strength' 
SNP  'The  SNP  welcomes  the  Genitive  Civic  -  Societal-Diversity  - 
contribution  of  Scotland's  inflection  +  inclusive  'ethnic  minorities' 
ethnic  minorities  to  our  personification  'tradition  of  welcoming' 
national  life.  Scotland  has  a  'Scotland's' 
long  tradition  of  welcoming 
those  who  choose  to  live  here'  Possessive 
(p27)  determiner 
'our' 
Relational 
clause 
Possessive 
process  'has 
SNP  'Scotland  has  always  been  an  Relation  Civic  -  Societal-Diversity  - 
outward  looking  nation'  (p24)  clause  inclusive  'outward  looking' 
Possessive/att- 
ributive 
process  'has 
always  been' 
SNP  'We  will  ensure  that  Scottish  Phrasal  noun  Civic-  Institutional-Education 
History,  Literature,  and  'Scottish  neutral  'taught'  'schools' 
Language  are  taught  in  our  History,  'Scottish  History, 
schools...  '  (p11)  [civic  -  Literature  and  Literature  and  Language' 
education,  but  exclusive  in  Languages' 
'our'  culture] 
Possessive 
180 determiner 
`our' 
LibDem  'Liberal  Democrats  welcome  Noun  phrase  Civic  -  Societal-Diversity  - 
the  diversity  of  modern  ascribing  inclusive  'diversity',  'ethnicity', 
Scottish  society  and  seek  to  attribute  'the  'sexuality',  'gender', 
ensure  that  everyone,  diversity  of  'disability',  'treated  on  an 
regardless  of  ethnicity,  modem  equal  basis' 
sexuality,  gender,  disability  or  Scotland' 
age  is  treated  on  an  equal 
basis'  (p35)  [civic-inclusive] 
LibDem  'We  will:  Empower  the  Genitive  Civic  -  Societal-Civic  +  diversity 
voluntary  and  independent  inflection  inclusive  -  'civic  society',  'diverse' 
sector,  enabling  the  dynamism  'Scotland's' 
and  flexibility  of  Scotland's 
rich  and  diverse  civic 
society...  '  (p33) 
Conser-  'As  Scots,  we  rightly  take  Possessive  Civic-  Institutional-Education 
vatives  great  pride  in  our  tradition  of  determiner  neutral  'tradition  of  learning' 
learning.  It  is  a  passport  for  'our' 
progress  for  individuals  and 
for  society'  (p  IS) 
Conser-  'We  recognise  that  diversity  is  Possessive  Civic  -  Societal-Diversity  - 
vatives  one  of  our  defining  determiner  inclusive  'diversity' 
characteristics  as  a  nation.  '  'our' 
21 
SSP  'Scotland  has  always  had  a  Relational  Civic  -  Institutional-Education 
separate  education  system  clause  inclusive  'education',  'education 
from  the  rest  of  Britain.  Possessive  &  system' 
Today,  Scottish  education  process  'has'  exclusive 
tends  to  be  more  broadly  Societal-Inclusive  -  'less 
based  and  less  elitist  than  in  Phrasal  noun  elitist' 
other  parts  of  the  UK.  '  (p22)  'Scottish 
education'  Societal-Exclusive  - 
'separate'.  'from  the  rest' 
Table  6.2  Party  statements  of  civic  conceptions  of  the  nation 
One  can  find  ample  evidence  of  expressions  of  civic  nationalism.  In  Table  6.2 
Scotland's  civic  society  is  personified  with  `a  voice'  given  to  it  by  the  establishment 
of  the  devolved  assembly.  Legal  and  educational  practices  and  institutions  are 
articulated  by  Labour,  Conservatives,  SNP  and  SSP  alike,  as  being  `traditions' 
belonging  to  Scotland.  Traditions  imply  some  form  of  collective  practice  with 
temporal  continuity.  Labour  imbues  education  practices  in  Scotland  with  an  emotional 
value,  as  Scotland  is  said  to  possess  a  `proud  educational  tradition'  (2003:  8).  This 
emotion  is  echoed  by  the  Conservatives,  who  proclaim  `As  Scots,  we  rightly  take 
pride  in  our  traditions  of  learning'  (2003:  21).  The  SSP  mark  out  Scotland  as  different 
due  to  the  distinctiveness  of  its  education  system;  they  say  it  has  `always  had  a 
separate'  (2003:  22)  system  from  the  rest  of  the  UK. 
Diversity  is  another  important  facet  of  civic  nationalism  because  it  does  not 
constitute  national  belonging  in  exclusive  ethnic  terms.  Diversity  also  implies 
181 important  meanings  associated  with  the  salience  of  equality  and  difference  within  the 
civic  community,  which  lie  at  the  heart  of  many  conceptions  of  contemporary 
democratic  polities  (i.  e.  equality  before  the  law,  and  freedoms  of  religious  and 
political  expression).  As  Table  6.2  illustrates,  Scottish  parties  regularly  employ  these 
conceptualisations  of  the  nation,  just  as  Brown  et  al  (1999),  Curtice  et  al  (2002)  and 
McCrone  (2001)  suggest.  Labour  describe  diversity  as  a  `strength'  (2003:  39),  again 
personifying  the  nation.  Similarly,  the  SNP  state  that  Scotland  has  a  `tradition  of 
welcoming'  (2003:  27)  and  of  being  `outward  looking'  (2003:  24).  The  Liberal 
Democrats  hail  the  `diversity  of  modern  Scotland'  (2003:  35),  while  the 
Conservatives  proclaim  diversity  to  be  a  `defining  characteristic'  (2003:  21)  of 
Scotland.  The  character  of  the  Scottish  nation  is  therefore  variously  defined  as  both 
`modern'  and  as  having  `traditions'.  These  traditions  are  civic  institutions  and 
practices  such  as  education  and  the  law,  which  imbue  the  nation  with  characteristics 
of  a  civic-inclusiveness  and  the  valued  attribute  of  diversity.  Yet  this  very  diversity 
and  inclusiveness  are  characteristics  which  define  Scotland  and  therefore  presumably 
mark  it  out  as  different  from  other  nations.  Civic  and  inclusive  conceptions  of  the 
nation  and  of  national  identity  are  indeed  evident  in  the  proclamations  of  Scotland's 
politicians.  However  they  are  not  the  only  type  in  evidence. 
Party  Manifesto  Statement'  Syntactic.  ',,  _,  ',,  -.,  Non-civic  National 
Features'.,  `  Inclusive/  `attribute/description 
' 
Encoding  the  exclusive 
.  ....  Nation,  -, 
SNP  `Scotland  is  a  nation  of  Relational  Non-civic  Societal-Culture 
abundant  natural  and  cultural  clause  -  Landscape  +  culture  + 
assets.  We  have  breath-taking  Intensive  exclusive  heritage  -  `cultural 
scenery,  rich  energy  sources  process  assets'  'breathtaking 
and  fertile  agricultural  land...  'is'  scenery',  'fertile 
we  [the  party]  want  our  Relational  agricultural  land', 
vibrant  heritage,  culture,  and  clause  'heritage',  'culture' 
creativity  to  flourish  and  be  Possessive 
shared  with  our  neighbours  in  process  'have' 
the  world'  (p14) 
Possessive 
pronoun  'our' 
SNP  'We  live  in  a  beautiful  Relational  Non-civic  Place-Landscape 
country,  which  is  rich  in  clauses  -  'beautiful  country', 
natural  resources  and  energy  Intensive  exclusive  'natural  resources' 
sources.  '  (p14)  process 
`is, 
SNP  'Geographically,  Scotland  is  a  Relational  Civic  -  Societal-Diversity 
-  diverse  nation,  with  some  of  clauses  inclusive  'diverse  nation'  ' 
the  least  densely  populated  Intensive  ,  our 
strength  is  in  that 
and  most  scenic  landscapes  in  process  diversity' 
Europe.  As  a  nation,  our  'is' 
182 strength  is  in  that  diversity...  '  Non-civic  Place-Landscape  -'most 
(p19)  -  scenic  landscapes  in 
exclusive  Europe' 
SNP  'As  an  island  nation  with  a  Role  'as'  Non-civic  Place-Landscape  - 
rich  maritime  history  and  -  'island  nation' 
numerous  islands  and  Accompani-  exclusive 
archipelago  communities...  '  ment  'with'  Place-Historical  -'with  a 
(p22)  rich  maritime  history' 
SNP  'We  will  administer  Genitive  Non-civic  Societal-Culture  + 
Scotland's  culture  and  inflection  -  Language  -'culture', 
languages  with  a  new  'Scotland's'  inclusive  'languages' 
department.  '  (p  18)  [non-civic 
languages  and  culture 
Labour  'Sport  is  an  integral  part  of  our  Relational  Non-civic  Societal-Culture  - 
culture'  (p32)  clause  -  neutral  'sport',  'culture' 
Intensive 
process 
'is' 
Labour  'Scotland's  culture,  from  the  Genitive  Non-civic  Societal-Culture  - 
languages  we  speak  to  the  arts  inflection  +  -  'culture',  'languages', 
we  perform  and  applaud,  the  personification  inclusive  'arts',  'sports',  'libraries', 
sports  we  play  and  the  riches  'Scotland's'  'museums' 
we  find  in  our  libraries  and 
museums,  makes  Scotland 
unique.  '  (p36) 
Labour  'We  will  recognise  the  Genitive  Non-civic  Language/heritage  - 
importance  of  Gaelic  as  a  inflection  +  -  'Gaelic',  'living  heritage' 
unique  part  of  Scotland's  personification  exclusive 
national  living  heritage'  (p37)  'Scotland's' 
LibDem  'Scotland  has  a  distinctive  and  Relational  Non-civic  Language  -'language', 
colourful  language  heritage.  clause  -  inclusive  'speakers',  'English', 
Today  in  Scotland  there  are  Possessive  'Scots',  'Gaelic', 
speakers  of  English,  Scots,  determiner  'Chinese',  'Urdu', 
Gaelic,  many  community  'has'  'British  Sign  Language' 
languages  such  as  Chinese 
Urdu  and  British  Sign  Diversity  -  'colourful', 
Language.  Language  enriches  enriches',  'many 
our  entire  society  and  allows  community  languages' 
citizens  to  access  public 
services  and  communicate 
with  each  other'  (p36) 
LibDem  'We  will:  promote  access  to  Genitive  Non-civic  Landscape  - 
the  countryside,  mountain  inflection  -  'countryside', 
areas  and  water...  for  'Scotland's'  exclusive  'mountain',  'water', 
international  and  domestic  'unique  scenery', 
visitors  to  enjoy  Scotland's  'wildlife' 
unique  scenery  and  wildlife' 
(16 
Greens  'We  will  enable  all  schools  to  Genitive  Non-civic  Societal-Diversity  + 
offer  languages  reflecting  inflection  -  Culture  +  Racial  + 
Scotland's  cultural  and  ethnic  'Scotland's'  inclusive  Language  -'diversity'  diversity,  including,  Gaelic,  'cultural',  'ethnic', 
British  Sign  Language,  'Gaelic',  'British  Sign 
Bengali,  Urdu,  Punjabi,  and  Language',  'Bengali', 
Chinese  languages.  '  (p8)  'Urdu',  'Punjabi', 
'Chinese',  'languages' 
183 SSP  `Despite  Scotland's  sparse  Genitive  Non-civic  Landscape  -  'natural 
population  and  its  vast  tracts  inflection  -  wilderness' 
of  natural  wilderness...  '  (p29)  'Scotland's'  exclusive 
Possessive 
pronoun 
Its, 
Table  6.3  Party  statements  of  non-civic  conceptions  of  the  nation 
Table  6.3  demonstrates  that  non-civic  expression  of  national  identity  and  the 
nation  are  also  tangible  in  the  proclamations  of  the  Scottish  political  parties.  The  three 
most  evident  types  of  non-civic  conceptions  of  the  nation  are  that  of  landscape, 
culture  and  language  (though  language  is  often  conceived  as  a  constituent  element  of 
the  national  culture).  In  referring  to  the  national  landscape,  parties  are  constructing 
conceptions  of  Scotland  the  place.  This  geographical  definition  is  clearly  non-civic  as 
it  does  not  pertain  to  either  the  political  or  civic  institutions/practices  of  the  polity. 
Landscape  is  a  particularly  exclusive  definition  of  the  nation  as  well,  indicating 
boundaries  and  geographical  specificity.  For  example,  the  SNP  note  that  Scotland  is 
`an  island  nation'  (2003:  22)  and  `a  small  nation'  (2003:  24).  However,  other 
conceptualisations  use  more  emotive  lexis  in  their  instantiations  and  the  homeland  is 
flagged  in  patriotic  and  dramatic  terms.  The  nation's  geography  is  variously  described 
as  `unique'  (Liberal  Democrats,  2003:  16),  said  to  have  `vast  tracts  of  natural 
wilderness'  (SSP,  2003:  29).  Scotland  is  thought  to  be  a  `beautiful  country'  (SNP, 
2003:  14)  and  to  possess  the  `most  scenic  landscapes  in  Europe'  (SNP,  2003:  19). 
This  is  not  the  Scotland  the  democratically  open  society,  it  is  the  Scotland  of  the  glen 
and  highland  mist,  of  lochs  and  heather;  it  is  the  nation  as  the  place  of  emotional 
belonging  and  geographical  uniqueness.  Here  `our'  nation  is  more  beautiful  than 
others  and  the  national  `we'  is  connected  to  the  landscape  it  inhabits. 
Thus  far,  this  chapter  has  proposed  a  descriptive  distinction  between  civic  and 
non-civic  aspects  of  society.  However,  in  contemporary  democracies  a  strict 
distinction  is  probably  not  accurate,  as  many  aspects  of  what  would  be  considered 
non-civic  life  are  often  subsidised,  supported  and  regulated  by  the  state.  For  example 
sport,  film  and  theatre,  art  and  language  all  receive  some  form  of  state  sponsorship  in 
the  UK,  be  it  in  the  form  of  tax  breaks,  direct  subsidies  and  grants  or  forms  of 
centralised  administration.  Just  as  Benedict  Anderson  (1996)  astutely  suggested  that 
there  probably  has  never  been  a  tidy  fit  between  nations  and  states,  so  it  is  safe  to 
184 assert  the  boundaries  between  civic  and  non-civic  aspects  of  society  overlap 
somewhat.  Therefore,  it  is  unsurprising  to  see  that  expressions  of  cultural  nationalism 
are  evident  in  Table  6.3.  The  SNP  want  to  administer  `Scotland's  culture  and 
languages'  (2003:  18)  from  a  new  department  and  to  share  this  `vibrant  heritage, 
culture  and  creativity'  (2003:  14)  with  its  international  neighbours.  Labour  suggest 
sport  is  `an  integral  part'  of  Scottish  culture  (2003:  38)  and  that  `Scotland's  culture... 
makes  Scotland  unique'  (2003:  36);  whereas  the  Greens  define  Scotland  as  `culturally 
and  ethnically'  (2003:  8)  diverse.  These  conceptions  again  balance  differing 
definitions  of  the  nation;  they  are  at  once  exclusive  in  defining  `our'  national  culture, 
but  often  also  inclusive,  suggesting  that  culture  is  diverse.  This  is  perhaps  even  more 
evident  in  the  parties'  statements  about  the  nation's  languages. 
All  three  of  the  centre-left  parties  (and  the  Greens)  in  Scotland  proclaim  they 
will  give  institutional  support  for  languages.  They  make  positive  and  inclusive  claims 
about  Scotland's  languages;  they  variously  refer  to  English,  Scots  and  Gaelic  and 
`community  languages'  such  as  Urdu,  Punjabi  and  British  Sign  Language.  These 
languages  are  in  lists  and  therefore  might  appear  paratactic  and  equivalent  in  value. 
Seen  in  these  terms  the  parties'  attitudes  to  languages  would  be  culturally  inclusive. 
However,  for  the  three  centre-left  parties  some  languages  are  `more  equal  than 
others'.  Labour  states  that  Gaelic  is  part  of  Scotland's  `national  living  heritage' 
(2003:  37)  and  all  three  parties  commit  themselves  to  supporting  Gaelic,  while  the 
Liberal  Democrats  and  SNP  include  Scots  as  a  language  worthy  of  state  protection. 
To  this  end  the  Liberal  Democrats  state  `We  will:  Recognise  the  importance  to 
Scotland's  history  and  culture  of  our  heritage  languages  of  Gaelic  and  Scots'  (2003: 
36-37),  and  the  SNP  promise  `secure  status  for  the  Gaelic  and  Scots  languages'  (2003: 
18)  while  only  `encouraging  community  languages'  (2004:  18).  In  policy  terms  one 
must  assume  that  Scots  and  Gaelic  are  of  more  value  than  `community  languages'. 
Perhaps  then  the  implication  to  be  taken  is  that  Scots51  and  Gaelic  are  somehow  more 
Scottish  than  other  languages,  as  `living  heritage'  would  suggest,  which  evokes  some 
form  of  temporal  continuity  and  shared  cultural  practice  between  countrymen. 
Anderson  (1983)  Billig  (1995)  Hobsbawm  (1990)  and  Smith  (2001)  all  point  to  the 
importance  of  language  in  creating  a  sense  of  national  identity.  Scotland's  politicians 
are  no  different,  although  they  inclusively  proclaim  Scotland  to  have  a  diversity  of 
S'  That  is  not  to  say  that  defining  Scots  as  a  language  is  not  without  controversy  and  in  calling  it  a 
language  is  itself  a  political  act. 
185 languages  and  cultures,  they  also  exclusively  privilege  one  or  two  of  those  languages. 
Therefore,  Scots  and  Gaelic  are  less  languages  found  in  Scotland  and  more  the 
Scottish  languages52.  These,  non-civic  conceptions  of  the  nation  and  nationalism  by 
Scotland's  politicians  would  seem  to  sit  at  odds  with  some  of  the  empirical  literature 
discussed  earlier. 
Brown  et  al  (1999),  Curtice  et  al  (2002)  and  McCrone  (2001)  assert  that,  for 
all  the  major  parties,  conceptions  of  Scottish  national  identity  and  nationalism  are 
civic  in  nature.  McCrone  suggests, 
The  key  to  understanding  Scotland  lies  in  recognising  that  nationalism  derives 
from...  institutional  autonomy,  and  is  not  some  vague  set  of  historic  emotions 
which  politicians  can  manipulate.  (2001:  195) 
Birth,  ancestry  and  residence  are  considered  the  main  markers  of  Scottishness  by  a 
majority  of  Scots  (McCrone,  2001).  In  addition,  there  is  evidence  to  illustrate  Scottish 
icons  are  held  in  high  regard.  McCrone  notes  the  percentages  of  Scots  proud  of  the 
following  icons:  Scottish  landscape  97  percent;  Scottish  music  82  percent;  Tartan  79 
percent;  William  Wallace  76  percent  (2001:  147).  Scots  are  said  to  pragmatically 
choose  civic  democratic  solutions  for  Scotland  at  elections  (or  referenda),  and  these 
pragmatic  decisions  override  any  non-civic,  more  emotive  conceptions  of  nationalism. 
For  Brown  et  al  (1999),  Curtice  et  al  (2002)  and  McCrone  (2001),  civic  nationalism 
must  be  the  dominant  conception  of  Scottish  nationalism.  However,  at  elections  or 
referenda  voters  are  asked  to  make  a  decision  within  the  context  of  formal  state 
institutions.  It  is,  therefore,  hardly  unexpected  that  voters,  given  the  civic  context, 
make  decisions  which  fulfil  civic  conceptions  of  national  identity.  These  civic 
decisions  are  those  that  best  fit  the  habitus  of  the  democratic  culture  of  which  voters 
are  a  part.  Given  a  cultural  context,  such  as  an  international  football  match,  then  non- 
civic  exclusive  conceptions  of  the  nation  and  nationalism  are  paramount;  here 
heritage,  parentage,  commonality  of  place  of  birth  and  language  are  much  more 
important. 
However,  even  though  McCrone  comments  that  in  Scotland  nationalism  is  not 
something  which  politicians  can  manipulate  by  pushing  the  appropriate  emotional 
buttons,  Scottish  politicians  clearly  still  use  the  language  of  non-civic  nationalism.  It 
52  English  as  the  dominant  language  requires  neither  protection  nor  encouragement. 
186 is  just  that  non-civic  and  civic  and  inclusive  and  exclusive  conceptions  exist  side  by 
side.  The  overarching  context  of  an  election  may  privilege  civic  conceptions  of 
nationhood  but,  as  was  indicated  earlier,  the  distinction  between  the  non-civic  nation 
and  the  nation's  mechanism  of  state  is  not  always  clear.  Therefore,  in  a  Scottish 
election  where  the  state  has  administrative  remit  of  aspects  of  the  nation's  cultural 
life,  it  is  perhaps  predictable  to  see  cultural,  non-civic  conceptions  of  national  identity 
and  nationhood.  Pressures  to  administer  and  support  language(s),  sport,  the 
countryside,  music  and  art  necessarily  draw  cultural  conceptions  of  nationalism  into 
the  civic  arena.  As  such,  one  can  find  manifestations  of  these  non-civic  and 
sometimes  exclusive  conceptions  of  nation  and  national  identity  in  the  language  of 
politicians. 
The  important  point  is  that  while  people  are  in  a  civic  context,  like  an  election, 
they  make  decisions  appropriate  for  that  context.  Scots  may  well  have  voted  for  a 
parliament  and  continue  to  vote  in  elections  informed  by  civic-nationalism.  However, 
their  decision  is  still  underpinned  by  a  sense  of  national  place  and  national  belonging, 
which  can  never  be  fully  reconciled  with  purely  civic  and  inclusive  ends.  Sufficient 
numbers  of  Scots  felt  themselves  not  just  politically  but  culturally  different  to  desire 
greater  institutional  autonomy.  In  policy  terms,  the  North  East  of  England  and 
Yorkshire  and  Humberside  are  similar  to  Scotland  in  their  centre-left  policy 
preferences;  but  neither  had  the  political  will  to  deliver  even  a  moderate  form  of 
devolution  in  2005.  What  is  the  difference?  It  is  not  just  a  sense  of  political  difference 
but  a  sense  of  cultural  difference,  of  national  belonging. 
The  above  analysis  illustrates  that  non-civic  and  civic  and  inclusive  and 
exclusive  forms  of  nationalism  intermingle  in  the  devolved  party  literature.  This 
chapter  has  disagreed  somewhat  with  Brown  et  al  (1999),  Curtice  et  al  (2002)  and 
McCrone's  (2001)  assessment  of  Scottish  national  identity.  It  is  not  that  the 
nationalism  displayed  is  ostensibly  civic  and  inclusive,  nor  is it  purely  non-civic  and 
exclusive,  ethnic  and  tribal.  Instead,  there  is  interplay  between  differing 
manifestations.  There  is  ample  evidence  for  the  civic  and  inclusive  nationalism  but 
there  are  also  exclusive  and  cultural  expressions.  These  however  are  never  the  fully 
fledged  `hot'  (Billig,  1995)  and  irrational  forms  which  are  said  to  be  at  odds  with 
democracies.  Exclusive  and  cultural  conceptions  appear  to  co-exist  happily  with  the 
other  forms.  A  balance  is  struck  between  defining  the  national  `in-group'  as  bounded 
and  different  but  also  tolerant  and  pluralistic  as  a  democracy  requires.  Where  tensions 
187 are  manifest  is  between  party  political  conceptions  of  the  nation  and  nationalism, 
particularly  with  regard  to  how  national  identity  should  be  mediated  against  state 
identity.  The  chapter  will  now  turn  to  an  example  of  the  party  political  effects  of 
negotiating  state  and  national  identities  in  Scottish  devolved  electoral  politics. 
6.4  Party  Ideology  and  Conceptions  of  Nation  and  State 
Scottish  political  parties  all  have  distinguishable  conceptions  of  what  the  nation  is. 
These  conceptions  are  affected  by  party  political  ideology:  as  one  might  expect  each 
party  purports  to  really  speak  in  the  interests  of  the  nation.  However,  in  Scotland  it  is 
not  just  left/right  or  authoritarian/liberal  elements  of  party  policy  which  are  the  locus 
of  ideological  competition  in  elections  to  decide  the  fate  of  the  nation. 
Separatist/unionist  ideologies  enter  into  the  Scottish  ideological  mix  in  a  way  unseen 
in  English  politics  (with  the  exception  of  European  politicsS3).  Therefore,  an 
important  aspect  of  investigating  Scottish  electoral  politics  is  to  account  for  how  the 
concepts  of  nation  and  state  interact  with  each  other  and  with  other  facets  of  party 
politics.  Chapter  2  has  already  explored  the  centre-ground  of  Scottish  politics  and 
illustrated  how  an  important  and  distinguishing  feature  of  Scottish  politics  was  that 
Labour,  SNP  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  have  been  quite  successful  in  associating 
aspects  of  Scottish  identity  with  centre-left  politics.  It  was  also  demonstrated  that 
both  in  terms  of  the  ideology  and  policy  manifestations  of  those  ideologies  the  centre- 
left  parties  share  tangibly  similar  political  ground.  What  differentiated  them  are  their 
stances  on  the  constitutional  status  of  Scotland  in  relation  to  the  British  state. 
Exploring  the  discursive  processes  involved  in  constructing  ideological  out- 
groups  in  electoral  campaigning,  Chapter  3  illustrated  that  there  was  a  locational 
aspect  to  defining  one's  ideological  opponents  in  Scottish  politics.  For  unionists  like 
Labour  and  the  Conservatives  there  were  no  locational  out-groups;  their  focus  on 
Scotland  and  the  Union  did  not  present  a  context  in  which  there  were  political  out- 
groups  outwith  Scotland.  However,  Nationalists  such  as  the  SNP  and  SSP  drew 
￿  It  would  be  interesting  to  investigate  how  national  and  state  identities  are  negotiated  in  relation  to  the 
European  Union.  Little  is  given  over  to  international  affairs  in  these  manifestos  but  where  there  are 
examples  Europe  is  referred  to  generally  positively.  However,  elections  for  the  European  Parliament 
are  a  different  campaigning  context.  Anecdotally,  one  might  observe  that  across  the  UK  opinion  polls 
indicate  that  voters  are  far  from  enthusiastic  Europhiles  (see  Chapter  2).  Major  campaign  themes  in 
European  elections  tend  to  be  over  getting  the  most  out  of  the  EU  for  Britain  (or  Scotland  in  the  SNP's 
case)  and  standing  up  to  Brussels.  To  discuss  this  further  at  this  point  would  be  tangential. 
188 antithetical  comparisons  with  non-Scottish  out-groups  particularly  with 
English/UK/London  labels.  Both  Law  (2001)  and  Higgins  (2004a  and  2004b)  have 
argued  that  Billig's  (1995)  conception  of  `banal  nationalism'  be  revised  after 
exploring  the  Scottish  media.  Thus  far  this  thesis'  exploration  of  devolved  electoral 
politics  supports  this  position:  national  and  state  identities  are  not  conflated  in  the 
habitus  of  Scottish  life.  Different  parties,  depending  on  their  separatist/unionist 
credentials,  construct  the  relationship  between  national  and  state  identities  in  differing 
ways.  This  process  is  most  obvious  in  the  manner  in  which  parties  characterise  the 
nation's  relationship  with  the  state. 
Party  identity  did  not  appear  to  play  a  notable  role  in  differentiating  conceptions 
of  the  nation.  Although  the  SSP  tended  to  broadly  address  electors  as  a  working  class 
audience,  this  did  not  appear  to  affect  constructions  of  the  nation  in  the  terms 
discussed  here.  Similarly,  the  Green  Party  did  not  evoke  Scotland  as  a  `green  and 
pleasant'  land  any  more  than  the  other  parties.  If  anything  the  Greens  seemed  to 
address  a  Scottish  national  audience  less  than  the  other  parties;  perhaps  because  their 
environmentalism  makes  them  frame  issues  in  more  international  terms.  Therefore, 
although  unionism  and  separatism,  as  ideologies,  affect  how  conceptions  of  national 
and  state  identities  interrelate  discursively,  individual  party  ideology  does  not  seem  to 
differentiate  greatly  conceptualisations  of  the  nation,  with  each  party  sharing  similar 
conceptions  of  what  Scotland  is  like. 
6.4.1  Unionists 
The  Labour  Party,  as  has  been  previously  noted,  during  the  2003  (and  1999)  devolved 
elections  chose  to  portray  the  relationship  between  the  Scottish  and  Westminster 
Parliaments,  Scottish  Executive  and  UK  government  and  Scottish  Labour  Party  and 
UK  Labour  Party  as  a  `partnership'.  In  terms  of  the  ideological  square,  this  is  a 
positive  characterisation  of  in-group  members.  However,  the  noun  `partnership' 
performs  an  interesting  function,  discursively  acting  as  a  superordinate  term 
conjoining  levels  of  state  governance  and  national  and  state  identities.  For  example 
the  Labour  PEB  (Text  B)  refers  to  `partnership  and  stability  under  the  Labour 
Government',  which  could  include  government  both  north  and  south  of  the  border. 
Both  national  and  state  identities  are  represented  in  positive  terms  but  also  have  a 
common  goal  under  the  superordinate  term.  The  `partnership'  description  works  along 
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strong  foundations...  Scottish  Labour  has  worked  everyday  to  build  a  better  Scotland' 
(Text  A)  so  that  the  partnership  has  a  superordinate  goal  of  creating  a  better  future. 
This  is  the  positive  side  of  the  ideological  square;  however,  on  the  negative  side  one 
can  see  the  SNP  negatively  portrayed.  Instead  of  being  in  partnership  with  the  UK 
government,  the  SNP  is  said  to  want  `divorce  and  separation'  from  the  UK.  As  an 
alternative  to  `building',  the  Nationalists  are  characterised  as  destructively  `breaking 
up  Britain'  (Text  C),  independence  would  be  to  `rip  it  [progress]  all  up  and  start 
again'  (Scottish  Labour:  On  your  side,  2003:  5).  Therefore,  the  current  constitutional 
arrangements  are  a  partnership  which  is  positive  and  productive,  whereas 
independence  is  divorce  which  is  negative  and  destructive.  Therefore,  Labour  uses  the 
independence  issue  to  frame  the  rest  of  the  policy  debate.  Achieving  productive  goals 
in  education,  health,  law  and  order  and  the  economy  are  positively  associated  with  the 
UK  constitutional  framework,  while  preserving  the  identity  of  Scotland  within  the 
subordinate  categorisation  54.  This  observation  appears  to  chime  with  work  by  Sherif 
(2001)  and  Gaertner  et  al  (2001)  on  reducing  inter-group  bias.  Scottish  Labour 
portrays  many  policy  objectives  within  the  superordinate  goal  of  stability,  both 
economic  and  constitutional.  Superordinate  terms  like  `partnership'  and  `the  UK 
economy'  are  the  discursive  manifestations  of  these  goals.  Partnership  creates  a 
positive  frame  within  which  to  view  the  Union,  reconciling  the  division  between 
constituent  nations  and  overarching  state.  In  addition  to  this,  the  SNP's  separatist 
ideology  is  characterised  as  the  kind  of  `hot'  nationalism,  which  Billig  refers  to  (1995: 
43-46).  For  example,  `But  schools  and  education  would  be  neglected  while  the 
Nationalists  gave  priority  to  their  obsession  with  an  expensive  divorce'  (PEB,  Text 
C).  Labour  denotes  the  Nationalist's  movement  as  emotional  and  irrational,  as  they 
are  `obsessed'  with  a  divorce  rather  than  with  `rational'  policy  concerns.  This 
portrayal  of  the  SNP  follows  Billig's  (1995)  description  of  the  term  `nationalism' 
being  used  to  characterise  `their'  ideology  as  emotional  and  excessive  in  opposition  to 
`our'  rational  and  measured  patriotism.  Fitting  the  descriptive  framework  of  the 
ideological  square,  the  SNP  are  thus  depicted  negatively  as  an  out-group. 
54  For  example,  `Higher  growth  is  vital  if  all  our  other  ambitions  for  Scotland  are  to  be  realized.  We 
will  use  the  opportunity  provided  by  the  strength  of  the  UK  economy  with  the  lowest  interest  rates, 
inflation  and  unemployment  of  my  adult  life,  to  invest  in  the  future'  (emphasis  added)  (Scottish 
Labour:  On  you  side,  2003:  4) 
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groups  on  the  basis  of  the  location  outside  Scotland  and  also  seek  to  discursively 
construct  links  between  the  levels  of  nation  and  state.  The  language  mediates  discrete 
but  connected  positions  for  national  and  state  identities.  In  commenting  on  Scotland's 
culture  the  Conservatives  state  `It  is  a  vital  component  of  being  Scottish  and  British' 
(Scottish  Conservatives:  time  to  do  something  about  it,  2003:  17).  The  co-ordinating 
conjunction  `and'  indicates  that  `Scottish'  and  `British'  are  identifiably  different  yet 
related.  Partnership  is  also  a  descriptive  tool  of  the  Conservatives,  who  refer  to  a  wish 
to  `Strengthen  relationships  between  the  constituent  parts  of  the  United  Kingdom' 
(Scottish  Conservatives:  time  to  do  something  about  it,  2003:  1).  `Constituent  parts' 
and  the  preposition  `between'  indicate  elements  of  equivalence  which  come  together 
to  form  a  larger  whole  `the  United  Kingdom'.  Implicit  in  this  statement  is  the 
differentiation  of  nations  and  state,  that  it  is  a  partnership  between  nations  that 
constitutes  the  United  Kingdom.  They  also  state  that  as  unionists  the  Scottish 
Conservatives  want  to  emphasise  `the  partnership  between  Scotland's  two 
Parliaments'  which  will  `strengthen  the  United  Kingdom'  (Scottish  Conservatives: 
time  to  do  something  about  it,  2003:  5).  The  genitive  inflection  denotes  Scotland's 
stake  in  both  constitutional  levels  of  governance,  and  `partnership'  as  with  Labour's 
usage  implies  a  constructive  relationship  `between'  two  discrete  levels,  the  national 
and  state. 
A  feature  of  Scottish  unionist  ideology  therefore  is  to  recognise  the  difference 
between  nation  and  state  both  in  the  abstraction  of  identities  and  at  levels  of 
governance  post  1999  devolution.  Unionists  mediate  the  relationship  between  those 
levels  of  governance  and  manifestations  of  identity;  in  doing  so  they  seek  to  reconcile 
the  distinction  between  them,  constructing  the  relationship  as  a  productive 
partnership.  Key  to  this  investigation,  in  relation  to  Billig  (1995)  is  that  there  is  no 
conflation  of  national  and  state  identities,  they  are  separate  and  distinct  but  connected. 
As  with  Higgins  (2004a),  context  plays  a  role  in  how  the  location  of  nation  and  state 
is  referenced,  this  in  turn  reflects  different  strategies  for  mediating  those  identities. 
For  example,  in  the  following  extract  Labour  are  constructing  a  Scottish  focused 
position,  but  one  which  recognises  the  overarching  UK  state  context.  `My  [i.  e.  Jack 
McConnell's]  vision  is  of  a  Scotland  where  opportunities  to  grow  are  enjoyed  by  all 
young  Scots...  where  we  use  our  partnership  inside  the  UK'  (Scottish  Labour:  On 
your  side,  2003:  3).  `Scotland'  and  `Scots'  obviously  mark  the  national  homeland  and 
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again  point  to  the  Scottish  people  and  Scottish  Labour  party  and  their  part  in  the  UK 
`partnership'.  In  addition  to  these  elements,  the  preposition  `inside'  points  to  the 
superordinate  level  of  state,  thereby  differentiating  nation  and  state.  Scottish  Labour 
alternatively  can  also  focus  on  the  UK  level  when  it  is  beneficial.  For  example  Tony 
Blair  in  Labour's  PEB  (Text  B)  asserts  that  the  devolved  election  is  a  choice  between 
a  negative  SNP  vote  and  a  positive  vote  for  `partnership  and  stability  under  the 
Labour  Government'.  The  context  here  is  the  state  `partnership',  and  the  success  of 
the  economy's  low  inflation  and  low  mortgage  rates.  But  the  economic  successes 
mentioned  do  not  fall  under  the  responsibilities  of  the  devolved  powers.  `Labour 
Government'  is  ambiguous,  but  given  the  context  probably  includes  both  UK  and 
devolved  government,  but  reference  to  the  economy  and  partnership  projects  a 
positive  frame  from  which  to  view  the  union,  with  its  state  and  national  levels. 
Scottish  unionists  therefore  can  modulate  between  identities  depending  on  the  given 
context.  They  can  point  to  the  national  level,  `we'  Scots  and  `we'  Scottish  Labour; 
and  they  can  point  to  the  state  level  of  `we'  in  the  UK  or  `we'  the  UK  Labour  party, 
where  the  UK  state  level  necessarily  includes  the  Scottish  national  'we'. 
6.4.2  Separatists 
For  parties  like  the  SNP  and  SSP  there  is  only  one  deictic  centre,  that  of  the  Scottish 
`we'.  Either  in  terms  of  place,  people  or  party  the  in-group  or  centre  of  political 
concern  is  Scottish.  Rather  than  attempting  to  mediate  the  relationship  between  nation 
and  state  as  unionists  do  within  the  current  UK  context,  nationalists  want  to  obtain  co- 
ordinating  fit  between  nation  and  state  rather  than  a  subordinate  one.  In  the 
nationalist's  conception  of  Scotland,  the  UK  is  an  `other'  and  they  construct  out- 
groups  on  the  basis  of  their  location  outside  Scotland.  Therefore,  as  was  illustrated  in 
Chapter  3,  out-groups  are  identified  as  `London',  `London  Government', 
`Westminster'  and  'UK  Government'.  The  Scottish  deictic  centre  constructed  as  an 
antithesis  to  the  UK  is  demonstrated  by  the  following, 
And  successive  UK  governments  have  been  more  of  a  hindrance  than  a  help  to 
Scotland.  As  long  as  we  remain  part  of  the  centralised  UK,  we  will  continue  to 
see  low  growth...  '  (SNP:  Release  our  potential,  2003:  3) 
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national  level.  `[P]art  of  the  centralised  state'  implicitly  denotes  Scotland  as  a 
marginal  part  of  that  state.  The  `we'  of  the  second  clause  complex  is  specifically  a 
national  Scottish  `we'  at  the  exclusion  of  a  state  `centralised  UK'.  There  is  no 
modulation  between  different  deictic  centres  in  nationalist  rhetoric.  However,  as  with 
the  unionist  examples,  what  is  important  to  note  is  that  nationalists  make  a  clear 
distinction  between  national  and  state  levels  in  the  current  UK  context.  Nationalists 
are  arguing  for  a  union  not  of  nations  under  a  collective  UK  but  a  union  of  nation  and 
state  at  the  Scottish  level. 
6.5  Conclusion 
Initially,  this  chapter  sought  to  demonstrate  that  civic  and  inclusive  forms  of 
nationalism  are  not  the  only  important  forms  in  Scottish  politics,  contrary  to  what 
Brown  et  at  (1999),  Curtice  et  at  (2002)  and  McCrone  (2001)  maintain.  Other  non- 
civic  and  exclusive  forms  are  also  drawn  on  in  the  language  of  Scottish  politicians. 
Civic  and  inclusive  concepts  of  nationalism  are  naturally  important  in  elections  which 
are  ostensibly  imbued  with  civic  and  inclusive  meanings  in  contemporary 
democracies.  Brown  et  al  (1999),  Curtice  et  at  (2002)  and  McCrone  (2001)  conclude 
from  voting  patterns  in  elections  and  referenda  that  electors  vote  on  the  basis  of  civic 
nationalism,  and  therefore  this  must  be  the  predominating  form  of  nationalism  in 
Scotland.  However,  it  was  suggested  that  voters  perhaps  make  decisions  appropriate 
for  the  context,  i.  e.  a  democratic  election,  but  that  does  not  mean  that  other  forms  of 
nationalism  are  not  important  in  accounting  for  Scotland's  national  identity.  Brown  et 
al  (1999),  Curtice  et  al  (2002)  and  McCrone's  (2001)  work  also  indicates  non-civic 
and  exclusive  definitions  of  Scottishness  which  are  held  by  a  majority  of  the 
population.  They  overlook  these  non-civic  and  exclusive  conceptions  of  Scottishness 
as  they  do  not  fit  conclusions  drawn  from  voting  patterns  and  opinion  survey  data 
which  look  at  democratic  contexts.  This  chapter  then  illustrated  that  civic  and  non- 
civic  and  inclusive  and  exclusive  conceptions  of  the  nation  and  national  identity 
intermingle  in  the  language  of  politicians.  There  does  not  appear  to  be  a  problem  in 
this  intermingling;  these  different  conceptions  comfortably  co-occur.  It  was  suggested 
that  this  is  predictable  given  that  an  election  requires  participants  to  rhetorically 
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and  tolerance,  appropriate  for  a  democracy. 
This  investigation  provided  evidence  in  support  of  Law  (2001)  and  Higgins' 
(2004a  and  2004b)  call  for  Billig's  (1995)  account  of  banal  nationalism  to  be 
augmented  in  light  of  Scottish  examples.  In  Scotland,  politics  (as  well  as  the  media) 
plays  an  important  role  in  mediating  between  national  and  state  identities,  which  are 
clearly  not  conflated  as  they  appear  to  be  in  Billig's  (1995)  analysis.  McCrone  asserts 
that,  `actors  have  considerable  capacity  to  construct  and  negotiate  national  identities' 
(2001:  153)  and  goes  on  to  suggest  `issues  of  identity  are  essentially  comparative 
ones,  strongly  influenced  by  context'  (2001:  160).  Comparative  and  contextual  factors 
certainly  appear  to  be  of  issue  in  Scottish  devolved  elections.  Politicians  can  draw  on 
either  level  of  identity  depending  on  the  rhetorical  demands  of  the  context. 
194 CHAPTER  7:  NEW  SCOTTISH  POLITICS,  NEW  DISCOURSE?  CONCLUDING 
REMARKS  ON  A  STUDY  OF  A  SCOTTISH  DEVOLVED  ELECTION 
7.1  Introduction 
This  investigation  focussed  on  the  campaign  for  the  2003  Scottish  Parliament 
election.  The  aim  of  the  study  was  to  explore  the  discursive  strategies  employed  by 
political  parties  during  the  month  long  campaign:  with  the  aim  of  elucidating  the 
character  of  campaign  discourse  for  Scottish  devolved  elections.  The  post  1999 
political  arrangement  in  Scotland  differs  from  the  UK  Westminster  arrangement.  This 
analysis  explored  the  possible  effects  of  those  differences  on  the  discourse  of  political 
parties  during  campaigning.  As  such,  the  investigation  intended  to  explicate  relations 
between  changes  in  social  practices  with  changes  in  discourse  practices  in  the 
ideological  competition  of  Scottish  politics.  To  conduct  this  research  a  CDA 
methodology  was  developed  and  deployed  within  the  study. 
This  concluding  chapter  will  firstly  summarise  the  results  presented  in  the 
previous  chapters,  indicating  the  conclusions  and  the  contribution  of  this  study  to  an 
understanding  of  Scottish  politics  and  political  discourse  studies.  Secondly,  some  of 
the  practical  and  methodological  difficulties  and  limitations  of  analysis  will  be 
explored.  And  lastly,  suggestions  will  be  made  for  potential  future  research. 
7.2  Summary  of  Observations  and  Research  Contribution 
The  introductory  chapter  laid  out  some  of  the  recent  political  and  historical 
background  to  Scottish  devolution.  Of  particular  interest  was  the  change  in  the 
electoral  system  which  introduced  a  mixed  form  of  proportionality.  Important 
outcomes  of  this  system,  employed  in  1999  for  the  first  election  of  the  Scottish 
Parliament,  were:  no  one  party  obtained  a  majority;  the  first  voluntary  peacetime 
coalition  government  on  British  soil  was  entered  into;  the  SNP,  for  the  first  time, 
received  representation  more  in  line  with  their  levels  of  popular  support,  which  they 
have  never  been  able  to  achieve  under  a  SMSP  system  for  Westminster;  and  the 
minority  Green  Party  and  Scottish*Socialist  Party  benefited  from  proportionality 
(Paterson  et  al,  2001:  2-3).  Composition  of  both  the  legislature  and  executive  differed 
significantly  from  Westminster:  no  longer  was  there  a  political  polarisation,  divided 
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devolved  election,  the  pattern  from  1999  was  in  many  ways  repeated  and  in  some 
ways  elaborated.  For  example,  in  2003  Labour  again  won  the  most  seats  but  not 
enough  for  a  majority,  the  SNP  formed  the  main  opposition  party,  and  the  Liberal 
Democrats  held  the  balance  of  power  and  entered  into  a  second  power  sharing 
executive  with  Labour.  In  addition,  the  minority  Greens  and  SSP  won  seats  but  this 
time  in  excess  of  1999  (where  they  won  only  one  each)  and  for  the  first  time  achieved 
the  threshold  for  recognition  of  party  status  in  the  Parliament. 
Looking  at  the  ideological  composition  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  the  party 
political  dividing  lines  are  no  longer  drawn  between  Labour  and  the  Conservatives,  as 
they  have  been  for  the  best  part  of  a  century  at  Westminster.  The  Scottish 
Conservatives  were  placed  third  overall  in  both  devolved  elections,  but  are 
ideologically  isolated  as  the  only  right-wing  party  in  the  Parliament.  The  two  parties 
of  power  and  the  main  party  of  opposition  are  all  centre-left  in  their  ideological 
leanings.  What  appear  to  divide  the  two  main  parties  of  Scotland  are  not  the  left  and 
right  philosophies  of  economic  and  social  ordering  but  the  differences  of  separatism 
and  unionism. 
In  outlining  an  analytical  approach  for  this  study,  chapter  one  put  forward  a 
CDA  methodology.  Critical  discourse  analysis  affords  the  analyst  an  opportunity  to 
relate  changes  in  the  social  order  and  its  practices  to  changes  in  discourse  practices 
(and  vice  versa)  through  their  textual  manifestations.  According  to  the  critical 
discourse  tradition,  relations  of  power  and  ideology  can  be  studied  through  discourse 
produced  by  those  propagating  their  ideology  in  the  pursuit  or  maintenance  of  power. 
Of  the  varying  forms  of  CDA  approaches  available,  this  study  decided  to  draw 
primarily  from  the  frameworks  developed  by  Fairclough  (1992;  1995a;  1995b;  2001), 
van  Dijk  (1998;  2002;  2006a;  2006b)  and  Chilton  (1996;  2004;  2005).  This  was  in  an 
attempt  to  combine  the  strengths  of  Fairclough's  orientation  towards  the  analysis  of 
the  social  dimension  of  discourse  with  the  insights  of  van  Dijk  and  Chilton's  work  on 
the  cognitive  aspects  of  discourse.  In  this  way,  the  author  hoped  to  be  able  to  provide 
productive  insights  to  relations  between  changes  in  social  and  cultural  practices  (i.  e. 
changes  to  the  electoral  system  and  resulting  parliamentary  composition),  and 
cognitive  aspects  of  discourse  production  (i.  e.  the  rhetorical  and  ideologically 
motivated  strategies  used  to  negotiate  the  political  field). 
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particular  focus  on  the  ideological  centre,  where  most  elections  are  fought  and  won. 
This  was  an  attempt  to  look  at  the  content  of  parties'  ideologies  and  place  them  within 
their  social  and  political  context.  Drawing  on  previous  research  and  the  competing 
parties'  manifestos,  this  discussion  concluded  that  Scottish  political  culture  was 
definably  different  from  the,  predominantly  English,  Westminster  culture.  Scotland 
was  and  is  more  ideologically  left  of  centre  than  England  in  terms  of  popular  opinion 
and  party  political  representation.  Labour,  the  SNP  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  occupy 
the  popular  centre  ground,  and  under  the  devolved  arrangements  these  parties  are  the 
most  likely  to  form  a  power-sharing  executive.  It  was  also  suggested,  with  reference 
to  previous  research,  that  the  three  parties  of  the  Scottish  centre,  over  the  last  40 
years,  have  been  able  to  successfully  link  left-wing  ideology  with  Scottish  national 
identity.  These  points  have  meant  that  the  Scottish  Conservative  party  is ideologically 
isolated  in  devolved  Scotland.  They  are  currently  ideologically  incompatible  with  any 
of  the  other  centrist  parties,  and  only  able  to  obtain  levels  of  representation  because  of 
the  proportional  electoral  system  they  opposed. 
Analysis  of  previous  research  and  the  content  of  manifestos  also  confirmed 
that  the  main  ideological  battle  in  Scotland  is  not  between  left  and  right  but  separatist 
and  unionist  ideologies.  This  was  referred  to  as  the  nationalist  agenda  in  Scottish 
politics,  pointing  to  how  Scottish  national  identity  is  politicised  in  ways  Englishness 
is  not  in  England.  It  was  shown  that  the  three  centre-left  parties  have  a  great  deal  in 
common  in  terms  of  the  detail  of  their  ideological  goals  and  policy  preferences. 
However,  the  battle  lines  are  drawn  over  how  best  to  achieve  their  goals,  with  Labour 
contextualising  their  argument  within  a  `successful'  unionist  partnership  and  the  SNP 
advocating  constitutional  independence.  The  federal-unionist  Liberal  Democrats  then 
hold  the  balance  of  power,  ideologically  compatible  with  both  Labour  and  the  SNP  on 
the  left-right  dichotomy,  and  with  a  constitutional  preference  different  to  both.  With  a 
crowded  ideological  centre  ground  and  power  sharing  the  likely  outcome  of  the 
election,  the  end  of  chapter  2  raised  issues  in  relation  to  how  this  ideological 
landscape  is  negotiated  by  its  participant  parties  and  whether  there  are  tangible  effects 
on  their  campaign  discourse.  This  then  laid  the  way  for  the  forthcoming  investigation. 
Chapter  3  continued  the  analysis  of  manifestos,  focusing  instead  on  how  the 
rhetorical  construction  of  parties'  ideological  positions  was  achieved.  It  was  argued, 
that  this  approach  is  necessary  because  the  content  of  ideologies  is  not  the  same  as  the 
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framework  for  discourse  analysis.  Van  Dijk's  (1998)  ideological  square,  as  an 
explanation  for  the  ordering  of  ideological  discourse,  was  combined  with  Chilton's 
(2004)  deictic  analysis,  mapping  in  and  out-group  positions  in  discourse.  It  was 
demonstrated  that  the  nationalist  agenda  played  a  prominent  role  in  the  labelling  of 
political  in  and  out-groups.  Unionist  Labour  and  Conservative  parties  tended  to  have 
their  out-groups  with  Scottish  locations  and  both  utilised  ambiguities  of  reference  to 
negotiate  UK  political  agents.  Labour  drew  positively  on  the  UK  `partnership'  with 
ambiguities  of  positive  reference  in  relation  to  policies,  making  it  possible  for  them  to 
claim  Westminster  economic  achievements.  The  unionist  Conservatives  were 
ambiguous  in  the  criticism  of  Labour  to  avoid  criticising  the  Union.  However,  the 
separatist  SNP,  SSP  and  federal  unionist  Liberal  Democrats  all  used  locational  tokens 
(Higgins,  2004a)  or  labels  in  constructing  party  political  out-groups.  For  the  two 
separatist  parties  they  identified  agents  outwith  Scotland  as  political  opponents.  In 
contrast,  the  Liberal  Democrats  used  the  UK  context  to  rhetorically  contrast 
government  without  them  as  negative,  e.  g.  `people  can't  trust  Labour  on  their  own'.  It 
was  also  shown  that  the  two  minority  parties,  the  Greens  and  SSP,  also  defined  non- 
party  political  out-groups,  such  as  `the  car  lobby'  or  `Godfathers  of  global  capitalism'. 
Therefore,  chapter  3  began  to  illustrate  how  parties  rhetorically  construct  their 
opponents.  These  rhetorical  constructions  were  shown  to  be  affected  by  the  ordering 
processes  of  the  ideological  square.  Opponents  are  then  constructed  in  discourse  on  an 
antithetical  basis  to  the  in-group,  where  the  in-group  is  proximally  and  the  out-group 
distally  located  in  discourse.  Proximal  positions  relate  to  positive  sides  of  the 
ideological  square,  where  distal  positions  encode  the  negative  sides.  However,  when 
applied  to  a  devolved  Scotland,  van  Dijk's  (1998)  ideological  square  was  found  to 
have  insufficient  descriptive  power.  It  was  asserted  that  the  effects  of  the  electoral 
system  could  be  seen  at  play  and  the  ideological  square  required  amendment.  Labour 
did  not  define  the  Liberal  Democrats  as  an  out-group  (as  they  do  at  Westminster),  and 
the  SNP  only  label  the  Liberal  Democrats  as  an  out-group  in  conjunction  with  their 
coalition  partners,  as  in  `the  Labour-Liberal  Democrat  coalition'.  The  Liberal 
Democrats  make  no  direct  criticism  of  Scottish  Labour  and  only  criticise  Labour  as  a 
UK  party,  governing  alone  at  Westminster.  Also,  the  Liberal  Democrats  register  only 
one  instance  of  the  SNP  as  negative  out-group,  which  occurs  as  part  of  the  UK  party 
leader's  comments  and  not  as  part  of  the  Scottish  leader's  critique.  The  constitutional 
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negotiation  of  the  political  field.  Whereas  Labour  and  the  SNP  remain  antagonistic 
towards  each  other,  those  two  parties  exhibit  less  adversarial,  if  not  cooperative, 
discourse  towards  the  Liberal  Democrats,  and  the  Liberal  Democrats  to  them.  Labour 
and  the  SNP  are  divided  by  their  attitudes  to  the  Union  and  by  their  electoral  status  as 
the  two  dominant  parties  of  Scottish  politics.  However,  because  the  Liberal 
Democrats  hold  the  balance  of  power  under  the  proportional  electoral  system  they  are 
constructed  in  less  adversarial  terms  by  their  potential  coalition  partners.  The 
ideological  square  in  van  Dijk's  initial  formulation  is  unable  to  account  for  non- 
adversarial  discourse  in  competitive  scenarios.  The  square  needs  augmentation  to 
account  for  instances  of  cooperative  discourse  in  competitive  contexts  which  require 
compromise.  As  such,  a  quasi  in-group  category  was  suggested  to  bridge  the 
methodological  gap.  Under  particular  circumstances  groups  may  choose  discursive 
compromise  for  mutual  gain.  In  this  case,  an  allied  out-group  may  be  constructed  in 
similar  terms  to  the  in-group. 
Developing  on  the  previous  investigation,  chapter  4  explored  another  facet  of 
ideological  negotiation.  While  chapter  3  looked  at  how  parties  construct  discursive 
positions  for  themselves  and  their  opponents,  chapter  4  investigated  how  the  parties  of 
the  Scottish  centre  formulated  their  arguments,  that  is,  how  the  parties  rhetorically 
construct  positive  in-group  and  negative  out-group's  actions,  attributes  and 
achievements.  This  study  moved  on  to  examine  rhetorical  construction  in  party 
election  broadcasts  (PEBs),  employing  a  systemic  functional  grammatical  analysis. 
This  enabled  a  study  of  transitivity  and  modality  in  rhetorical  constructions,  to 
explore  responsibility  for  and  commitment  to  policy  achievements  and  programmes. 
Conclusions  from  the  previous  chapters  were  reaffirmed  by  this  analysis.  As  before, 
the  nationalist  agenda  was  seen  to  play  an  important  role  in  Scottish  electoral 
discourse.  Adversarial  discourse  strategies  continued  between  Labour  and  the  SNP, 
who  remain  divided  by  this  issue.  Again  less  adversarial  strategies  were  employed  in 
relation  to  the  Liberal  Democrats.  Labour  and  the  SNP  failed  to  criticise  their 
potential  coalition  partners  and  likewise  the  Liberal  Democrats  did  return  their 
criticism.  This  chapter  also  focussed  on  how  the  Liberal  Democrats  negotiate 
responsibility  for  the  same  policy  programme,  while  campaigning  on  separate  tickets. 
When  representing  policy  achievements  the  two  parties  represent  achievements  as 
their  own  and  omit  mentioning  the  other's  role.  Labour,  however,  do  not  discuss  the 
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refer  to  law  and  order.  As  these  were  significant  policy  areas  for  both  parties,  it  was 
mooted  that  omission  could  well  be  another  instance  of  leaving  a  rhetorical  space  for 
each  other  or  tacitly  cooperating.  It  was  observed  that  the  Liberal  Democrats  tended 
not  to  encode  strong  degrees  of  obligation  or commitment  to  future  policy  goals  (i.  e. 
through  the  use  deontic  or epistemic  modality).  Instead,  their  broadcasts  exhibited  the 
boulomaic  system  of  modality,  encoding  the  leader's  desire  to  achieve  policy  goals.  It 
was  suggested  this  rhetorical  strategy  reflected  the  Liberal  Democrats  as  a  minority 
coalition  partner,  where  they  would  have  to  selectively  negotiate  which  policies  were 
included  in  a  partnership  agreement.  Such  examples  of  rhetorical  strategies,  therefore, 
supported  the  previous  chapter's  call  for  a  redrawing  of  the  ideological  square. 
The  subsequent  chapter  departed  from  looking  at  the  texts  of  campaigning 
parties,  turning  its  attention  to  mediated  forms  of  political  discourse.  As  such,  chapter 
5  investigated  press  reception  of  PEBs,  critically  examining  the  language  used  and  the 
trajectories  of  party  messages.  Examining  a  corpus  of  newspaper  articles,  analysis 
suggested  that  a  pervasive  cognitive  schema  manifested  in  the  discourse  of  politicians 
and  journalists  alike.  Based  on  the  characteristics  of  three  intersecting  political 
metaphors  (politics  is  war,  politics  is  pugilism,  and  politics  is  argument)  the  schema 
was  described  as  `the  conflict  schema'.  The  schema  demonstrated  a  pervading 
common  sense  effect  on  the  representation  of  political  campaigns,  reproducing  them 
in  terms  of  a  competition  between  two  sides.  The  metaphors  and  language  of  the 
conflict  schema  perform  a  regulative  function  of  the  discursive  representation  of  the 
political  field:  privileging  certain  meanings  to  the  exclusion  of  others.  The  cognitive 
ordering  of  the  political  field  in  this  way  explains  why  only  the  SNP  and  Labour 
broadcasts  featured  in  newspaper  comment  on  the  PEBs.  This  representation  of  the 
political  field  benefits  the  two  main  parties,  Labour  and  the  SNP,  as  they  are  cast  as 
the  two  competing  protagonists  of  the  campaign  to  the  exclusion  of  others.  Other 
political  agents  of  differing  hues  had  discursive  contributions  included  in  campaign 
reportage;  however,  these  were  ordered  in  terms  of  comments  on  the  two  main  parties 
and  not  in  representing  their  own  policies.  Smaller  parties  struggled  against  the 
hegemony  of  two  party  politics.  This  study  critically  questioned  the  appropriateness 
of  representing  devolved  Scottish  elections  is  this  way.  This  is  particularly  so  as  a 
multi-party  system  was  clearly  in  operation  and  neither  of  the  two  biggest  parties 
were  likely  to  achieve  an  outright  majority.  The  representation  of  a  two  party  conflict 
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with  adversarial  discourses.  The  reportage  of  Labour  and  the  SNP  was,  therefore, 
asymmetrical  in  their  favour  and  an  inaccurate  characterisation  of  the  political  system. 
Latterly,  the  chapter  compared  the  recycling  of  SNP  and  Labour  Party  messages 
through  reportage  of  the  PEBs.  Labour  appeared  to  be  the  more  successful  of  the  two 
parties,  who  both  had  to  communicate  their  messages  through  ostensibly  hostile 
coverage.  Labour's  message  was  reproduced  more  often  and  accurately;  and  their 
success  was  put  down  to  their  ability  to  stay  `on  message'  in  subsequent  media 
interactions  and  because  of  their  use  of  another  culturally  salient  metaphor 
(independence  is  divorce). 
The  final  chapter  of  analysis  addressed  a  key  political  issue  which  featured 
prominently  in  each  of  the  previous  chapters:  that  of  the  nationalist  agenda. 
Specifically,  the  chapter  sought  to  explore  the  discursive  representations  of  Scotland 
and  Scottish  national  identity  in  campaign  discourse  of  politicians.  As  such,  an 
overview  of  both  the  manifestos  and  PEBs  was  taken.  The  investigation  also 
attempted  to  tackle  some  of  the  methodological  problems  of  previous  research  on 
nationalism  in  general  and  Scottish  nationalism  in  particular.  In  the  current  political 
science  and  sociological  literature  on  Scottish  national  identity  the  pervading 
paradigm  is  one  which  asserts  that  Scottish  national  identity  is  essentially  civic  in 
nature.  The  social  science  research  focuses  mainly  on  explicitly  political  referents  (i.  e. 
elections  and  referenda).  This  conception  of  national  identity  equates  to  the 
institutional  or  Staatsnation  concept  referred  to  in  the  critical  discourse  work  of 
Wodak  et  al  (1999)  and  de  Cillia,  Reisigl  and  Wodak  (1999).  Chapter  6  suggested  that 
voters  and  politicians  perhaps  evoke  differing  versions  of  national  identity  dependent 
on  the  context.  In  an  election  they  are  asked  to  make  a  democratic  and  civic  choice,  so 
those  conceptions  of  national  identity  are  the  most  prominent,  but  not  at  the  exclusion 
of  other  conceptions.  The  analysis  demonstrated  that  civic  and  non-civic,  and 
inclusive  and  exclusive  forms  of  national  identity  intertwine  in  the  discourse  of  all 
Scotland's  politicians.  It  was  also  suggested  that  this  mixing  was  entirely  appropriate, 
as  the  context  of  a  democratic  election  requires  participants  to  discursively  define  the 
bounded  national  in-group  but  also  advocate  an  open,  tolerant  and  inclusive 
democracy. 
Chapter  6  then  built  on  the  work  of  Billig  (1995),  Higgins  (2004a;  2004b)  and 
Law  (2001),  and  their  accounts  of  banal  nationalism.  This  analysis  supported  the  call 
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the  case  of  a  sub-state  nation:  Scotland.  There  was  evidence  presented  here  to  support 
the  claim  that  Scots  make  a  clear  distinction  between  their  state  (UK/British)  and 
national  (Scottish)  identities.  It  has  been  evident  that  this  distinction  is  at  the  crux of 
ideological  competition  in  devolved  Scottish  politics;  however,  whether  separatist  or 
unionist  the  distinction  between  state  and  national  identities  is  still  made  clear.  Where 
differences  arise  they  are  over  the  positive  or  negative  characterisation  of  the  union 
and  its  associated  state  identity.  This  analysis  has  demonstrated  that  Scottish 
politicians  utilise  either  identity  depending  on  their  discursive  requirements. 
In  further  summary,  this  investigation  has  demonstrated  evidence  that  the 
composition  of  devolved  Scottish  politics  defers  from  the  English  centred 
Westminster  political  context.  These  differences  are  due  to  regionally  (or  rather 
nationally)  specific  socio-political  characteristics  and  because  of  the  new  devolved 
constitutional  arrangements.  Correspondingly,  there  is  a  material  affect  on  the 
construction  and  negotiation  of  political  discourse  in  devolved  Scottish  elections. 
While  aspects  of  the  British  tradition  of  adversarial  politics  continue,  new  cooperative 
discourses  are  evident.  These  less  adversarial  rhetorical  strategies  involve  the  Liberal 
Democrats  in  relation  to  the  two  largest  parties:  rivals  SNP  and  Labour.  These 
cooperative  rhetorical  strategies  are  due  to  potential  patterns  of  coalition,  which  are 
determined,  in  large  part,  by  separatist-nationalist  ideological  leanings.  The  mediation 
of  state  and  national  identities  was,  therefore,  demonstrated  to  play  an  important  role 
in  the  discursive  production  of  party  political  ideologies  in  Scotland.  In  addition,  the 
role  of  the  media  was  explored  in  relation  to  the  press  reception  of  party  broadcasts. 
In  this  instance,  media  discourse  was  shown  to  order  and  reproduce  the  political  field 
in  terms  of  adversarial  discourse.  This  casting  of  Scottish  electoral  politics  as  a  two 
sided  competition  runs  counter  to  both  the  multi  party  character  of  devolved  Scottish 
politics  and  the  illustrated  examples  of  cooperative  party  political  discourse. 
Methodologically,  this  thesis  has  productively  integrated  social  and  cognitive 
approaches  to  CDA,  in  line  with  recent  calls  from  critical  discourse  analysts  to  do  so 
(Hart,  2005;  Koller,  2005;  van  Dijk,  2006a  and  2006b;  Wodak,  2006).  Chapter  1  laid 
an  initial  foundation  for  the  forthcoming  analysis  through  employing  quantitative 
social  science  approaches,  which  explored  the  socio-political  background  of  political 
ideology  in  Scotland.  Subsequent  chapters  then  expanded  on  initial  observation  by 
employing  cognitive  approaches.  Ideology  was  then  investigated  from  the  perspective 
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particularly  metaphor  and  schemata  (Lakoff,  1987  and  2002;  Lakoff  and  Johnson, 
1980),  the  ideological  square  (van  Dijk:  1998)  and  proximal  deixis  (Chilton,  2005)  as 
cognitive  structures  affecting  the  ordering  and  representations  of  discourse. 
7.3  Difficulties  and  Limitations  of  the  Study 
External  observation  has  its  advantages.  In  terms  of  reception  of  contemporary 
political  messages  from  politicians  and  the  media,  the  researcher's  stance  mirrors  that 
of  voters;  however,  the  researcher  is  undoubtedly  more  immersed  in  the  campaign, 
than  the  average  voter.  There  is,  therefore,  a  risk  of  over-reading  the  meaning  of  texts, 
making  stronger  inferences  than  actually  might  have  been  intended.  Also,  the 
researcher  lives  with  the  texts  of  the  election  campaign  for  long  after  it  is  over. 
Subsequent  events  occur,  and  there  is  the  risk  that  hindsight  informs  and  colours  one's 
interpretation.  However,  not  to  use  hindsight  when  it  is  clearly  available  would  also 
be  remiss,  especially  when  trying  to  determine  both  the  motivation  and  meaning  of 
discourse.  For  example,  this  study  observed  that  more  than  two  years  after  the  2003 
election  the  Scottish  Green  Party  discussed  the  possibility  of  coalition  with  the  SNP, 
as  a  third  party  of  coalition,  should  the  post  electoral  conditions  arise.  This  adds 
further  weight  to  the  assertion  that  the  political  conditions  in  Scotland  lend  themselves 
to  coalition. 
I  am  neither  a  journalist  nor  a  politician  and,  therefore,  infer  from  second  hand 
sources  and  deductions  what  potential  motivations  and  particular  social  and  discourse 
practices  they  use.  But  other  researchers,  embedded  and  familiar  with  the  practices  of 
these  professions  have  published  their  insights  (Bell,  1991,1994;  Bell  and  Garrett, 
1998;  Bruce,  1992;  Ingham,  2003;  Pritcher,  2002a,  200b;  Venables,  2005). 
In  using  linguistic  tools  of  analysis,  such  as  systemic  functional  analysis,  cases 
were  not  always  clear  cut  as  to  the  correct  way  of  interpreting  syntax  and  lexis.  And 
in,  for  example,  the  rhetorical  analysis  in  chapters  3  and  4  one  was  often  interpreting 
what  was  implied  or  even  left  unsaid.  Again  in  the  study  of  rhetorical  strategies  there 
was  an  awareness  of  the  weight  of  the  rhetorical  tradition  which  was  not  being  drawn 
on  in  any  great  detail.  In  another  study,  one  might  wish  to  explore  the  contributions  of 
Cicero,  Quintilian  and  the  great  sophist  Gorgias  in  relation  to  modem  political 
rhetoric.  This  study  reconciled  its  neglect  of  these  past  intellects  by  attempting  to  link 
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motivations  of  social  agents  (that  is  the  application  of  the  ideological  square  and 
Social  Identity  Theory  and  Self  Categorisation  Theory).  Also,  whereas  classical 
rhetoric  stops  at  the  text,  CDA  looks  beyond  it  to  the  social  context  of  its  production 
and  reception.  This  study  did  not  consider  political  text  in  isolation  but  intertextually 
related  (Fairclough,  1992)  as  part  of  a  wider  discourse  that  both  constitutes  and  is 
constituted  by  the  social  environment  in  which  it  arises. 
Due  to  time  restraints  and  limitations  of  space,  much  more  data  was  collected 
during  the  election  campaign  than  could  be  analysed.  For  example,  to  support  this 
investigation's  claim  of  a  new  dynamic  for  negotiating  potential  and  actual  coalition 
partnership  between  Labour,  SNP  and  Liberal  Democrats  a  study  of  televised  election 
hustings  would  have  been  useful.  Both  Scottish  BBC  and  Scottish  ITV  ran  a  number 
hustings  involving  individual  party  leaders  and  panel  discussions,  which  were 
recorded  as  part  of  this  study's  data  collection.  Conversational  analysis  would  have 
been  a  particularly  useful  tool  in  studying  how  the  party  leaders  negotiated  questions 
about  the  coalition.  I  began  making  transcriptions  of  the  panel  discussions  with  party 
leaders  but  time  constraints  prevented  a  complete  analysis.  Anecdotally,  I  would 
assert  that  the  strategies  analysed  above  were  at  play  in  these  discussions,  but  their 
further  analysis  will  have  to  wait  for  a  later  date.  Similarly,  there  was  a  great  deal  of 
ephemera  available  through  the  ASPECT  project  at  Strathclyde  University,  which 
collected  constituency  party  leaflets  during  the  campaign.  Again,  a  systematic 
analysis  was  not  possible  for  the  above  reasons.  Comparing  local  and  national 
campaign  in  terms  of  content  and  approach  could  be  a  fruitful  area  of  study. 
A  more  direct  comparison  could  have  been  made  between  devolved  and 
Westminster  elections.  However,  several  reasons  pointed  to  why  this  was  not 
practical.  First,  the  problems  of  one  researcher  dealing  with  the  amounts  of  data 
involved  in  one  Scottish  election  were  difficult  enough,  let  alone  including  an  even 
bigger  UK  general  election.  Secondly,  it  was  possible  to  draw  on  secondary  sources  to 
support  claims  for  the  adversarial  strategies  involved  in  Westminster  elections. 
However,  these  possible  flaws  are  to  confuse  breadth  of  study  with  focus.  This 
investigation  sought  to  identify  the  salient  themes  and  issues  which  related  to  the  new 
governing  arrangements  in  devolved  Scotland  and  in  particular  how  these  are 
negotiated  in  the  discourse  of  an  election  campaign.  Occasionally,  the  study  would 
widen  out  to  include  all  the  main  campaigning  parties  (e.  g.  chapters  4  and  6)  but  in 
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this  was  partly  to  do  with  managing  data  but  also  because,  as  chapter  2  indicated,  the 
centre-left  parties  were  where  the  new  (distinctively  Scottish)  fulcrum  of  power  lay  in 
the  devolved  Parliament. 
CDA  has  not  been  without  its  critics  and  detractors  of  its  methodological 
approach  (Pennycook,  1994;  Stubbs,  1997;  Tyrwhitt-Drake,  1999;  and  Widdowson, 
1995,1996).  The  main  criticisms  are  that  CDA  is  circular  in  approach,  that  it  is  not  so 
much  linguistic  as  sociological  and  political  in  character,  and  that  it  is  fundamentally 
politically  biased  in  approach.  In  large  part  responses  to  these  accusations  have 
already  been  discussed  in  the  introductory  chapter  but  more  in  the  guise  of 
explanation  than  justification.  These  indictments  will  be  dealt  with  in  a  direct  fashion. 
Stubbs  (1997)  takes  issue  with  CDA's  assertion  that  ideologies  cannot  be  read  directly 
off  texts,  and,  therefore,  if  this  is  not  possible  then  it  is  the  analyst  who  is  `reading 
meanings  into  texts  on  the  basis  of  their  own  unexplicated  knowledge'  (1997:  298). 
Similar  criticisms  are  levelled  by  Widdowson  (1995).  Fairclough  (1996)  responds  to 
these  criticisms  by  suggesting  they  conflate  interpretation  and  explanation.  All 
readers,  analyst  or  otherwise,  are  involved  in  an  active  interpretation  of  texts,  bringing 
to  bear  their  different  personal  resources  in  making  meanings.  Interpretation  is, 
therefore,  a  necessary  element  of  explanation  of  text.  The  critical  discourse  analyst 
not  only  visits  features  of  the  text  in  the  explication  of  meanings,  but  also  the  social 
context  from  which  readers  draw  their  resources  for  interpretation.  Text  is  in  a 
dialectal  relationship  with  discourse  production  and  action  and  analysis  of  the  latter 
two  is  an  essential  part  of  CDA  but  not  of  everyday  interpretations  of  text.  It  is 
accepted  practice  in  the  fields  of  pragmatic  and  semantic  studies  to  look  beyond  the 
surface  structure  of  text  in  the  explication  of  meaning.  In  exploring  ideology  and 
power,  which  are  necessarily  manifest  in  discourse  (in  its  CDA  triadic  definitions), 
CDA  is  hardly  behaving  extraordinarily,  in  terms  of  linguistic  analysis,  when  looking 
beyond  texts  to  social  structures  and  practices.  From  the  perspective  of  this  study, 
some  ideological  meanings  can  be  directly  read  off  texts;  but  when  dealing  with 
political  texts  this  is  hardly  surprising.  However,  when  trying  to  explain  certain 
aspects  of  discourse,  particularly  the  absence  of  certain  adversarial  strategies  and 
national  identity,  looking  beyond  texts  was  a  necessary  and  imperative  part  of 
analysis  and  explanation. 
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analysts'  interpretation  is  still  based,  in  part,  on  their  own  unexplicated  knowledge. 
Mitigation  of  this  is  found  in  the  triadic  approaches  to  analysis  and  CDA's  stance  on 
truth.  First,  discourse  is  visited  from  three  perspectives,  each  informing  the  other,  and 
like  other  approaches,  analysis  is  based  within  a  wider  tradition.  In  addition,  CDA 
tends  to  draw  on  empirical  traditions,  in  political  science,  sociology  and  psychology. 
Secondly,  CDA  is  not  an  analysis  of  truth  but  of  ideology,  where  meanings  are  not  a 
matter  of  empirically  verifiable  truth  but  of  interpreting  vacillating  positions  in  the 
production  of  meanings. 
Is  CDA  not  really  linguistic  analysis,  but  social  and  political  analysis,  and  is  it 
fundamentally  ideological  in  itself?  Firstly,  it  should  be  clear  by  now  that  CDA  is 
socio-political  and  linguistic  in  nature,  and  again  this  comes  back  to  the  dialogic 
account  of  discourse  and  the  triadic  approach  to  analysis.  Nevertheless,  as  indicated  in 
chapter  1,  the  vast  majority  of  people  working  in  the  tradition  have  backgrounds  in 
linguistic  analysis.  In  this  investigation,  I  certainly  found  it  extremely  beneficial  to 
draw  on  previous  work  done  in  political  and  social  sciences.  Equally,  the  linguistic 
tools  provided  ways  to  view  data  which  those  other  empirical  traditions  could  not.  For 
example,  previous  empirical  analysis  on  manifestos  has  elucidated  a  great  deal  about 
the  trends  in  policy  preferences  over  time,  but  the  approach  is  unable  to  tell  one  about 
how  these  issues  are  framed  and  used  for  political  advantage  by  political  parties. 
Previous  manifesto  analysis  might  tell  one  that  `devolution'  appeared  X  number  of 
times  in  manifestos,  but  not  how  that  policy  was  projected.  It  was  noted  in  this 
investigation  that  the  SNP  maintain  their  policy  of  independence  but  in  certain 
election  material  decided  to  marginalise  the  issue.  Similarly,  empirical  data  analysis 
has  been  very good  at  divining  people's  attitudes  to  nationalism,  but  poor  at 
illustrating  how  national  identity  is  mediated  in  day  to  day  life,  in  differing  contexts. 
On  the  second  point,  as  a  study  of  ideology  and  power,  critical  discourse  analysts  feel 
it  is  impossible  to  escape  one's  position  of  analysis,  and  therefore  commit  to 
explaining  as  fully  as  one  can  their  methodological  background.  Analysis  is  certainly 
political  in  its  challenging  of  common  sense  belief;  in  fact  maintaining  a  perceived 
position  of  objectivity  is  to  perpetuate  inequalities  of  power  and  the  supposed 
`naturalness'  of  certain  pervasive  beliefs.  Also,  CDA  is  not  myopic  in  its  explication 
of  meaning  because  of  this  oppositional  stance.  In  any  analysis  there  are  at  least  two 
alternative  readings  suggested,  the  analyst's,  and  the  conventional  reading  which  is 
206 being  questioned.  Readers  are  not  forced  to  accept  the  analyst's  account.  That  CDA 
has  greatest  sway  with  practitioners  with  more  left-wing  leanings  does  not  preclude 
the  use  of  the  approach  in  exploring  left-wing  discourses.  Fairclough  has  commented 
`these  political  positionings  and  priorities  are  not  inevitable:  a  CDA  of  the  left  is  quite 
conceivable,  directed  for  instance  at  left-wing  or  feminist  texts'  (1996:  52). 
Admittedly,  if  employing  CDA,  right-wing  theorists  might  find  it  difficult  to  reconcile 
the  aims  of  their  analysis  with  the  theoretical  premises  which  the  analysis  is  based  on. 
With  respect  to  this  analysis,  much  of  the  discourse  analysed  was  that  of  the  centre- 
left.  In  addition,  not  all  relationships  of  power  and  ideology  exist  between  left-right; 
as  this  thesis  demonstrated,  nationalist  and  unionist  ideologies  are  equally  amenable 
to  critical  analysis. 
7.4  Suggested  Future  Research 
From  the  observations  of  this  investigation  more  work  needs  to  be  done  in  two  areas: 
firstly,  on  how  institutional  and  cultural  forms  of  nationalism  coexist  and  occur  in 
differing  contexts;  and  secondly  how  state  and  national  identities  interrelate  when  a 
state  is  made  up  of  several  sub-state  nations.  On  this  note,  one  might  see  a  productive 
line  of  enquiry  taken  in  exploring  the  reaction  of  Englishness  (conflated  with 
Britishness)  to  the  peripheral  Celtic  countries'  different  relationship  with  Britishness. 
At  the  time  of  writing  there  was  particularly  vocal  reaction  in  the  English  press  to 
various  ('rebellious')  Scots  in  the  public  eye  such  as  Jack  McConnell  who  said  they 
would  not  be  supporting  England  in  the  world  cup.  The  West  Lothian  Question  has 
taken  on  a  new  post-devolutionary  form,  with  the  Conservative  Party  and  sections  of 
the  popular  English  press  calling  for  a  ban  on  Scottish  MPs  voting  on  allegedly 
English  issues.  This  call  is  not  matched  by  a  similar  determination  to  ban  London 
MPs  voting  on  issues  devolved  to  the  London  Assembly  and  Mayor. 
Chapter  six  might  cause  one  to  reflect  that  if  nation  and  state  identities  can  be 
differentiated,  constructed  and  negotiated  in  different  ways,  then  does  this  apply  to 
any  other  `big  identities?  Benjamin  Disraeli  once  proclaimed  `London:  a  nation,  not  a 
city'  (1870:  chapter  27),  which  illustrates  the  point  that  some  `world'  cities  like  New 
York  and  London  have  strong  senses  of  identity.  Equally  some  Yorkshire  and 
Cornishmen  might  sometimes  give  primacy  to  their  regional  identity  over  state  and 
national  identities.  In  other  instances  individuals  might  make  no  distinction  between 
207 state  and  national  identities  and  their  national-state  identity  may  be  always 
hierarchically  superior  to  their  regional  or city  identity.  Questions  which  may  be 
asked  then  are  what  contexts  and  circumstances  make  certain  identities  more 
important  than  others?  And  how  are  these  `big  identities'  constructed  and  negotiated 
in  relation  to  each  other?  The  work  from  Scottish  empiricists  covered  in  chapters  one 
and  six  makes  a  distinction  between  state  and  national  identities,  not  least  because  in 
Scotland  they  are  distinct.  Scottish  empiricists  also  make  a  distinction  between  civic 
and  non-civic  forms  of  nationalism.  De  Cillia,  Reisigl  and  Wodak  (1999)  and  Wodak 
et  al  (1999)  make  a  similar  distinction  between  institutional  (civic)  and  cultural  (non- 
civic)  forms  of  nationalism,  which  this  thesis'  evidence  also  supported,  but  they 
conflate  state  and  nation. 
This  thesis  mainly  focussed  on  the  centre  ground  and  in  doing  so  is  probably 
also  reproducing  existing  hegemonies  concerning  the  constitution  of  the  political 
field.  Future  analysis  might  begin  to  look  further  into  the  discourse  of  minority  parties 
in  Scottish  politics  and  how  as  peripheral  agents  they  struggle  with  existing  structures 
of  power. 
Having  developed  a  framework  to  account  more  fully  for  the  discursive 
negotiation  of  ideological  conflict,  it  would  be  pertinent  to  apply  this  framework  to 
other  instances  of  discursive  competition  and  conflict.  These  may  be  other  political 
but  equally  social  or  industrial  contexts.  As  such,  it  would  be  interesting  not  just  to 
look  at  antithetical  positions  of  domination  and  resistance,  as  CDA  has  tended  to  do, 
but  also  of  compromise  and  accommodation  in  the  mediation  of  ideology  and  power. 
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209 APPENDIX  I 
(Party  Election  Broadcast  Transcriptions) 
TEXT  A:  LABOUR  PARTY  ELECTION  BROADCAST 
[Jack  McConnell] 
I'm  sure  like  me  your  thoughts  at  this  time  are  with  our  troops  in  the  Gulf  and  with 
their  families back  home,  here  in  Scotland.  But  on  the  1St  May  Scotland  faces  a 
choice,  a  choice  between  two  futures.  And  I  believe  we  need  to  build  on  what  we've 
started,  build  on  the  achievements  of  our  young  Parliament,  build  on  the  lower  class 
sizes  in  primary  schools,  to  have  lower  class  sizes  in  secondary  too,  build  on  the 
lower  waiting  times  for  cancer  and  for  heart  disease,  with  lower  times  for  all 
operations  and  the  local  GP's  surgery  and  build  on  the  tough  action  we've  taken 
against  sex  offenders,  with  tougher  action  against  drug  dealers  now.  So  I  believe  that 
on  the  1St  May  you  should  vote  Labour  to  help  us  build  a  better  Scotland. 
You  might  think  the  Scottish  Parliament  has  been  a  disappointment.  You  might  think 
it's  achieved  nothing.  Setting  up  the  Scottish  Parliament  hasn't  been  without  its 
challenges  but  in  just  four  short  years  Labour  has  laid  strong  foundations.  Whether 
it's  a  nursery  place  for  every  three  and  four  year  old  or  free  nursing  and  personal  care 
for  Scotland's  older  people,  whether  it's  free  local  bus  travel  for  all  Scotland's 
pensioners  or  guaranteeing  jobs  for  all  new  nurses  and  midwifes,  Scottish  Labour  has 
worked  everyday  to  build  a  better  Scotland. 
Labour  is  also  committed  to  helping  Scotland's  hard-working  families  to  build  safer 
communities,  that's  why  tackling  crime  and  drugs  is  one  of  our  top  priorities. 
Whether  it's  toughening  the  Sex  Offender's  Register  or  new  powers  to  seize  the  assets 
of  drug  dealers,  Scottish  Labour  has  worked  every  day  to  make  every  Scottish 
community  safer  for  our  children  and  families. 
In  four  short  years,  forty  real  achievements  making  a  real  difference  to  people  across 
Scotland. 
210 TEXT  B:  LABOUR  PARTY  ELECTION  BROADCAST 
[Tony  Blair] 
Thursday's  elections  are  a  massive  choice  for  Scotland.  On  May  2nd  people  will  wake 
up  either  to  divorce  and  separation  under  the  Nationalists  or  to  partnership  and 
stability  under  the  Labour  Government.  It's  a  choice  for  the  economy,  between  the 
low  inflation,  low  mortgage  rates,  low  unemployment  we've  had  in  the  last  few  years 
or  all  the  economic  risks  of  separation.  It's  a  choice  of  public  services,  between  the 
investment  and  reform  under  the  Labour  Government  or  cuts  under  the  Scottish 
nationalists.  And  it's  a  choice  about  leadership.  It's  a  choice  between  a  leadership  that 
wants  Scotland  ripped  out  of  the  United  Kingdom  or  Labour's  leadership  under  Jack 
McConnell  and  his  team,  who  will  work  in  partnership  with  the  Westminster 
Parliament  to  get  the  best  out  of  the  UK  for  Scotland.  Thursday's  elections  matter. 
Come  out  and  vote  and  vote  for  partnership  and  not  divorce. 
[Jack  McConnell] 
Winning  the  election  is important  not  because  of  some  sense  of  achievement  for 
ourselves  but  because  of  what  I  believe  we  can  achieve  for  Scotland  over  these  next 
four  years.  And  I  know  that  sometimes  it  seems  that  in  Scotland  nothing  has  changed 
but  there  have  been  real  achievements  in  the  first  four  years  of  our  young  Parliament. 
We  have  delivered  a  nursery  place  for  every  three  and  four  year  old  in  Scotland  and 
over  a  thousand  extra  teachers  in  our  schools  and  we've  also  delivered  free  personal 
care  for  our  senior  citizens  and  free  local  bus  travel  for  Scotland's  pensioners  too. 
And  in  the  first  four  years  of  our  young  Parliament,  tougher  sentences  for  sex 
offenders,  a  drug  enforcement  agency  that  is  catching  the  dealers  and  action  on  youth 
crime  too.  So  in  the  second  term  of  our  young  Parliament  we  will  build  on  what 
we've  started  and  in  the  next  four  years  reduce  class  sizes  in  our  secondary  schools, 
bring  down  those  waiting  times  in  the  health  service  and  take  action  to  do  with  youth 
crime  and  disorder,  that  takes  place  in  far  to  many  Scottish  communities  every  Friday 
and  Saturday  night.  That's  government  that's  on  your  side,  a  government  in  Scotland 
acting  for  the  people  of  Scotland,  a  government  that  puts  schools  and  hospitals  first 
and  takes  action  to  tackle  crime. 
[Text] 
211 Vote  Scottish  Labour  on  the  15`  May. 
212 TEXT  C:  LABOUR  PARTY  ELECTION  BROADCAST 
[Unseen  narrator] 
If  Scotland  votes  SNP  on  May  IS`,  on  May  2"d  the  Nationalists  will  begin  the  process 
of  breaking  up  Britain.  Last  month  the  nationalist  leader  John  Swinney  said  that 
`independence  is  very,  very  close'.  And  if  he  gets  his  way  then  what?  What  would  be 
the  real  cost?  The  Nationalists  won't  admit  that  breaking  up  Britain  will  threaten  jobs, 
cause  economic  instability,  cut  investment  to  our  schools  and  hospitals  and  increase 
our  taxes.  In  Scotland  today  there  are  more  people  in  work  and  unemployment  is  at  a 
record  low,  but  Nationalist  plans  for  a  separate  Scotland  will  put  apprentices  and  jobs, 
in  places  like  Govan,  Scotstoun  and  Rosyth  under  serious  threat. 
Britain  has  a  strong  and  stable  economy;  Scotland  has  the  lowest  mortgage  rates  ever. 
Hardworking  families  and  businesses  can  plan  with  confidence.  But  the  Nationalists 
would  cause  instability  and  uncertainty;  they  would  put  all  that  at  risk.  In  Scotland  we 
are  building  new  schools,  cutting  class  sizes,  investing  in  education.  But  schools  and 
education  would  be  neglected  while  the  Nationalists  gave  priority  to  their  obsession 
with  an  expensive  divorce.  Our  children  only  have  one  chance  at  school;  the 
nationalists  will  put  this  at  risk. 
Pensions  are  now  rising.  Pensioners  in  Britain  have  a  £200  winter  fuel  allowance,  we 
have  introduced  free  personal  care  for  all  older  people  but  the  Nationalists  plan  to 
create  a  separate  Scottish  pensions  system  would  put  all  that  at  risk.  All  that  we  have 
worked  so  hard  for  would  be  at  risk.  And  most  worrying  of  all,  the  nationalists' 
divorce  would  leave  Scotland  isolated  in  an  uncertain  world. 
On  May  Is`  there  is  a  choice.  Don't  let  the  Nationalists  put  Scotland's  future  at  risk. 
213 TEXT  D:  SNP  PARTY  ELECTION  BROADCAST 
[On  screen  text] 
Labour  said  they'd  reduce  waiting  lists. 
They  haven't. 
Labour  said  they'd  deal  with  bed  shortages. 
They  haven't. 
Labour  said  they'd  tackle  staff  shortages. 
They  haven't. 
How  long  can  you  wait? 
[John  Swinney] 
On  May  lst  you  have  a  simple  choice.  Vote  Labour  and  you'll  wait  and  you'll  wait. 
Despite  what  they  tell  you,  nothing  has  changed  and  nothing  will  because  Labour's 
interests  are  not  in  the  people  of  Scotland.  Labour's  interests  are  in  Labour  in  London. 
At  a  time  when  the  wealth  gap  between  Scotland  and  the  UK  is increasing  and  we're 
languishing  at  the  bottom  of  the  European  growth  league,  Scotland  is  not  Labour's 
priority.  Vote  for  the  SNP  on  the  1st  May  and  you'll  see  a  difference.  Increasing 
nurses'  pay  means  more  nurses  and  more  nurses'  means  we  can  drive  down  waiting 
times.  One  thousand  more  police  officers  on  our  streets  mean  safer  communities.  And 
reducing  class  sizes  means  that  Scotland's  children  will  have  the  best  start  to  their 
education. 
And  as  for  independence,  I  think  it  will  be  good  for  Scotland.  I  want  it  but  it's  not  for 
me  to  decide,  that  decision  lies  with  you.  Our  priority  as  a  party  is  to  prove  ourselves 
to  you  that  we  can  make  a  difference  to  your  lives,  here  in  Scotland. 
So  on  the  first  of  May,  you  have  a  simple  choice.  Vote  Labour  and  you'll  wait. 
214 TEXT  E:  CONSERVATIVE  PARTY  ELECTION  BROADCAST 
[Male  1] 
So  law  and  order,  ah? 
[Male  2] 
Or  the  lack  of  it. 
[Male  1] 
Where's  the  bobby  on  the  beat  these  days? 
[Male  2] 
Aeh,  exactly. 
[Male  1] 
One  minute  they've  caught  the  criminals,  put  them  in  gaol,  the  next  minute  they're 
out,  walking  about  the  street. 
[Male  2] 
Aeh,  you're  right  there. 
And  what  about  these  drug  dealers,  ah? 
[Male  1] 
That's  another  one. 
[Male  2] 
Something  needs  to  be  done  about  that. 
[Male  1] 
What? 
[David  McLetchie] 
Scottish  Conservatives  know  that  crime  and  drugs  ruin  far  too  many  communities  in 
Scotland.  We  need  more  police  officers  on  the  streets.  We  need  fast  track  prosecution 
and  stiffer  sentences  for  drug  dealers.  We  need  to  take  persistent  young  offenders  off 
the  streets  and  make  sure  that  the  sentences  handed  out  in  courts  are  the  sentences 
actually  served. 
We  can  do  something  about  it. 
[Male  1] 
So,  I  went  to  the  hospital  a  few  days  ago. 
215 [Male  2] 
Oh  aeh,  have  you  still  got  that  problem  that  you  had? 
[Male  1] 
Aeh.  It  took  me  ages  to  get  an  appointment  as  well.  I  was  actually  getting  quite 
worried. 
[Male  2] 
Well,  so  you  should. 
[Male  1] 
It's  been  nine  months  since  I'd  first  seen  the  doctor. 
[Male  2] 
Nine  months? 
[Male  1] 
Yep,  ridiculous! 
[Male  2] 
Mind  you,  it's  not  the  fault  of  the  doctors  and  the  nurses,  you  know? 
[Male  1] 
Well,  I'm  not  saying  that,  as  far  as  I'm  concerned  they  do  a  good  job.  It's  just  that 
there's  something  wrong  there. 
[Male  2] 
Yeh,  I  know  but  what  can  we  do  about  it? 
[David  McLetchie] 
Scottish  Conservatives  believe  in  the  National  Health  Service  but  we  need  a  health 
service  that  puts  patients  first,  gives  them  real  choice  and  trusts  doctors  and  nurses  to 
do  the  job  at  local  level,  without  constant  interference  from  politicians. 
We  can  do  something  about  it. 
[Male  2] 
And  what  about  that  new  Scottish  Parliament  building,  Holyrood? 
[Male  1] 
Follyrood  more  like.  How  much  has  it  cost  them  now? 
[Male  2] 
About  three  hundred  million  at  the  last  count. 
216 [Male  1] 
Three  hundred  million? 
[Male  2] 
Three  hundred  million  and  rising. 
[Male  I]  And  who's  paying  for  that  then? 
[Male  I&  2] 
We  are. 
[Male  2] 
It's  our  taxes. 
[Male  1] 
That's  a  right  waste  of  money  that  is. 
[Male  2] 
I  know  but  what  can  we  do  about  it? 
[David  McLectchie] 
The  money  wasted  on  the  new  Scottish  Parliament  building  at  Holyrood  could  have 
built  one  hundred  new  primary  schools  or  twenty  five  new  secondary  schools  or  three 
brand  new  state-of-the-art  hospitals.  We  don't  need  a  palace  for  politicians.  We  do 
need  to  cut  government  in  Scotland  down  to  size,  that  means  fewer  ministers,  fewer 
spin  doctors,  fewer  bureaucrats,  better  value  for  money. 
We  can  do  something  about  it. 
[Male  1] 
So  you  watching  the  game  tonight? 
[Male  2] 
No. 
[Male  1] 
No? 
[Male  2] 
I've  got  to  do  my  paperwork  tonight.  You  know,  I  sometimes  wonder  why  I  even 
bothered  setting  up  on  my  own.  It's  just  rules  and  regulations  over  and  over  again. 
[Male  1] 
217 I  know,  it's  frustrating.  I  mean,  I  would  love  to  take  on  someone  else  but  I  just  can't 
afford  to  do  it  with  all  this  tax  and  red  tape. 
[Male  2] 
What  can  we  do  about  it? 
[David  McLetchie] 
Scottish  Conservatives  know  that  it's  the  people  and  not  the  politicians  who  create 
jobs  and  wealth  and  pay  the  taxes  that  finance  our  public  services.  That's  why  we  are 
determined  to  reduce  rates  and  taxes,  cut  red  tape  and  get  Scotland  moving  again  by 
investing  more  in  roads  and  transport.  We  can  do  something  about  it.  Four  years  on 
and  there's  not  much  to  show  for  the  Scottish  Parliament.  We  need  a  change  of 
approach.  We  need  a  government  that  trusts  the  people.  We  need  a  government  that 
backs  up  our  doctors  and  nurses,  teachers  and  police  officers.  We  need  a  government 
that  stops  wasting  money  and  instead  spends  it  wisely  on  the  public  services,  for  the 
benefit  of  us  all.  That's  what  I  stand  for,  that's  what  the  Scottish  Conservatives  stand 
for. 
Together  we  can  do  something  about  it. 
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[Unseen  narrator] 
Jim  Wallace  has  been  Scotland's  Deputy  First  Minister  for  four  years.  Living  in  the 
beautiful  Orkney  Islands  he  knows  the  values  of  a  strong  local  community.  And  he 
knows  too  the  importance  of  clean  air  and  water.  People  here  are  very  conscious  of 
the  need  to  protect  the  environment. 
[Jim  Wallace] 
Are  we  prepared  to  invest  in  jobs  and  our  environment  by  backing  the  development  of 
renewable  energy  technology?  My  answer  and  that  of  the  Liberal  Democrats  is  yes. 
[Unseen  narrator] 
Jim  Wallace  takes  particular  pride  in  what  the  Scottish  Liberal  Democrats  have  done 
for  older  people.  If  they  are  no  longer  able  to  wash  feed  or  dress  themselves  they  no 
longer  have  to  pay  for  care.  It's  a  big  worry  lifted. 
[Jim  Wallace] 
It  seems  very  odd  that  if  you  were,  say,  suffering  from  cancer  there  are  certain  care 
packages  that  you  got  free  but  if  you  were  suffering  from  Alzheimer's  you  didn't. 
And  that  seemed  to  be  totally  arbitrary  and  that's  what  we've  addressed  in  what  we 
did  by  making  personal  care  free  for  the  elderly. 
[Unseen  narrator] 
With  teenage  daughters  Jim  Wallace  knows  the  importance  of  education,  he  was 
determined  to  get  university  tuition  fees  abolished  and  he  succeeded. 
[Female  1] 
As  a  first  time  voter  I'm  going  to  vote  Lib  Dem  because  I  feel  that  they  have  done  a 
lot  for  the  students  by  abolishing  tuition  fees. 
[Female  2] 
They've  increased  coverage  by  GPs.  They've  sent  a  huge  number  of  pre-school 
children  into  nursery  education. 
219 [Male  1] 
Jim  Wallace,  of  course,  has  been  the  guiding  force  behind  all  these  changes. 
[Male  2] 
He  does  nae  turn  his  head  when  somebody  asks  him  a  question,  he'll  listen  and  take 
note  and  he'll  act  on  what  ye  ask  him. 
[Male  1] 
Well,  overall  I  think  the  achievement  of  the  Lib  Dems  in  Scotland  has  been  so 
significant  it  has  changed  our  country. 
[Female  2] 
The  Liberal  Democrats  in  Scotland  have  made  a  big  difference. 
[Unseen  narrator] 
In  the  next  Scottish  Parliament  there's  much  more  Jim Wallace  wants  to  achieve,  free 
eye  and  dental  checks  for  a  start. 
[Jim  Wallace] 
It  is  the  Liberal  Democrats  who  have  the  ideas,  the  energy,  the  credibility  and  the 
track-record  and  a  great  opportunity  lies  before  us  and  there  should  be  no  limit  to  our 
ambition. 
[Unseen  narrator] 
On  May  1S`  people  all  over  Scotland  will  have  the  chance  to  support  the  Scottish 
Liberal  Democrats.  You  have  three  votes,  for  your  constituent  MSP,  for  your  regional 
MSP  and  for  your  local  councillor.  The  more  support  you  give  us  the  more  we  really 
can  make  a  difference. 
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